Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves the removal of a newborn child, N., from her mother, C.J., due to the mother's substance abuse and mental health issues. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) placed N. with a foster caregiver, who was a trial attorney for the County Counsel’s office. Maternal aunt (aunt) requested placement of N. shortly after her birth, but DCFS failed to assess her for over a year despite repeated requests from mother’s counsel, N.’s counsel, and aunt herself. During this period, visitation between N. and her family was severely limited, with the caregiver dictating the visitation schedule.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County repeatedly ordered DCFS to assess aunt for placement, but DCFS did not comply. Eventually, aunt’s home was approved for placement, but DCFS still did not move N. to aunt’s care, deferring to the caregiver’s objections. By the time the court considered aunt for placement, over a year had passed, and the court found it was too late to apply the relative placement preference. The court also found that it was not in N.’s best interest to move her due to her bond with the caregiver.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that DCFS’s delays in evaluating aunt for placement and the court’s lackluster response to the family’s pleas for supportive services were prejudicial. The court concluded that the juvenile court erred by failing to apply the relative placement preference under section 361.3 and that the error was prejudicial. The appellate court reversed the order terminating mother’s reunification services, the order denying mother’s section 361.3 motion, and the order terminating her parental rights, and remanded for further proceedings. The court also directed DCFS and the juvenile court to ensure compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) requirements. View "In re N.J." on Justia Law

The City of Ontario filed an eminent domain action to acquire properties owned by We Buy Houses Any Condition, LLC, located near the Ontario International Airport. The City argued that the properties did not conform to land use requirements and suffered from airport-related impacts and blight. The City held a public hearing and adopted a resolution of necessity to commence eminent domain proceedings, citing the mitigation of airport impacts and elimination of blight as public uses. However, the resolution did not describe any specific proposed project.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted summary judgment in favor of We Buy Houses, finding that the City had not articulated a proposed project as required to exercise its power of eminent domain. The court concluded that the City’s resolution of necessity was insufficient because it did not describe a specific project, which is necessary to determine public interest, necessity, and compatibility with the greatest public good and least private injury. The court also granted We Buy Houses’s request for attorney fees, making certain reductions to the requested amounts.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that the City failed to identify a proposed project with sufficient specificity in its resolution of necessity, as required by the Eminent Domain Law. The court found the City’s arguments unpersuasive and concluded that the trial court properly rejected the City’s effort to exercise eminent domain. Additionally, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of attorney fees to We Buy Houses, affirming the fee award. View "City of Ontario v. We Buy Houses Any Condition" on Justia Law

In 2019, the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 218 (AB 218), which allowed plaintiffs to bring childhood sexual assault claims against public entities within a three-year window, even if those claims were previously barred by statutes of limitations or claim presentation requirements. A.M.M. filed a complaint against the West Contra Costa Unified School District, alleging sexual assaults by a District employee from 1979 to 1983. The District argued that reviving such claims constituted an unconstitutional gift of public funds under the California Constitution. The trial court overruled the District’s demurrer, leading the District to seek writ review.The trial court sustained the demurrer for the first three causes of action but overruled it regarding the gift clause argument. The District then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, for a writ of mandate to sustain the demurrer in its entirety. The appellate court issued an order to show cause, and both parties filed responses, including amicus curiae briefs from various entities.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, held that AB 218’s retroactive waiver of the claim presentation requirement did not constitute an unconstitutional gift of public funds. The court reasoned that the waiver did not create new substantive liability but merely removed a procedural barrier to existing claims. The court also found that AB 218 served a valid public purpose by providing relief to victims of childhood sexual assault, aligning with the state’s interest in public welfare. Additionally, the court ruled that the District lacked standing to assert due process claims under both the federal and California Constitutions. The petition for writ of mandate was denied. View "West Contra Costa Unified School District v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Jose Medina purchased a used car from St. George Auto Sales in December 2014, with financing from Alaska Federal Credit Union. Medina later discovered that the car had extensive engine repairs that were not disclosed to him at the time of purchase. He experienced multiple issues with the car, including the check engine light activating several times shortly after the purchase. Despite repeated repairs, the problems persisted. In December 2015, Medina learned from a different dealership that the car had significant pre-existing engine issues, which led him to believe that St. George had concealed this information.Medina filed a lawsuit in August 2018 against St. George and Alaska Federal, claiming a violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA). The defendants argued that the claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations. They contended that Medina should have been aware of the issues by March 2015 due to the repeated activation of the check engine light. The Superior Court of San Bernardino County overruled the defendants' demurrer and denied their motion for summary judgment, finding that there were factual questions about when Medina should have suspected the harm. The jury ultimately found in favor of Medina, concluding that he did not have sufficient notice of the claim until later.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the discovery rule applies to the CLRA’s statute of limitations, meaning the limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the basis for the claim. The court found no error in the trial court’s rulings on the demurrer, summary judgment, or nonsuit motions, as there were factual questions about when Medina should have known about the engine issues and the defendants' potential wrongdoing. The judgment in favor of Medina was affirmed. View "Medina v. St. George Auto Sales, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a U.S. citizen residing in Beirut, Lebanon, filed a defamation lawsuit against three media companies based in Dubai. The companies broadcast a news story on their Arabic language channels, which was rebroadcast in the U.S. via DISH Network and republished on their website and YouTube channel. The plaintiff alleged that the story falsely accused him of helping a Hezbollah leader launder money. The defendants moved to quash the lawsuit, arguing that California courts lacked personal jurisdiction over them due to insufficient contacts with the state.The Los Angeles County Superior Court granted the defendants' motion to quash, finding that the defendants did not have sufficient minimum contacts with California to justify jurisdiction. The court noted that the defendants' primary audience was in the Middle East and North Africa, and their U.S. viewership, including California, was minimal. The court also found that the plaintiff's connections to California were not strong enough to establish jurisdiction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the defendants did not purposefully avail themselves of the California forum. The court emphasized that the defendants' broadcast was not specifically targeted at California but was part of a broader international distribution. The court also noted that the plaintiff's primary professional and personal connections were in Lebanon, not California, and thus the brunt of any harm from the alleged defamation would be felt in Lebanon. The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendants' conduct was expressly aimed at California, as required under the "effects test" from Calder v. Jones. The court also upheld the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's request for jurisdictional discovery, finding that further discovery was unlikely to produce evidence establishing jurisdiction. View "Safieddine v. MBC FZ" on Justia Law

Jill and Grant Wiese were married for nearly 30 years before their marriage was dissolved in 2016. They had a premarital agreement (PMA) that kept their assets and earnings separate, with Grant responsible for reasonable support. Jill worked as an independent agent for Grant’s real estate brokerage, receiving 100% of her commissions after deductions for business expenses and estimated taxes. Grant deducted amounts for taxes and personal expenses he believed exceeded his support obligations, but the tax deductions did not match the actual taxes paid, and he did not refund the excess to Jill.The Superior Court of Orange County found the PMA valid and enforceable. Jill then brought claims against Grant for breach of fiduciary duty, arguing that his deductions from her commissions were excessive and impaired her separate property. Grant countered that Jill’s claims were time-barred and meritless. The trial court ruled in Jill’s favor on the tax-withholding claims, awarding her over $1.3 million, but rejected her other claims. Both parties appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that Jill’s fiduciary duty claims were subject to a four-year statute of limitations and that most were time-barred. For the surviving claims, the court found Grant breached his fiduciary duty by withholding excessive amounts for taxes but erred in awarding Jill the entire amount withheld rather than the excess. The court also found that Grant’s deductions for personal expenses required reconsideration. It affirmed that Grant was solely liable for the mortgage debt on their jointly owned property but reversed the order requiring Jill to reimburse Grant for housing during their separation. The court remanded for further proceedings, including recalculating damages and reconsidering attorney fees. View "Marriage of Wiese" on Justia Law

WasteXperts, Inc. (WasteXperts) filed a complaint against Arakelian Enterprises, Inc. dba Athens Services (Athens) and the City of Los Angeles (City) in June 2022. WasteXperts alleged that Athens, which holds a waste collection franchise from the City, sent a cease and desist letter to WasteXperts, arguing that WasteXperts was not legally permitted to handle Athens’s bins. WasteXperts sought judicial declarations regarding the City’s authority and Athens’s franchise rights, and also asserted tort claims against Athens for interference with contract, interference with prospective economic advantage, unfair competition, and trade libel.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Athens’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike the entire complaint, finding that the claims were based on Athens’s communications, which anticipated litigation and were therefore protected activity. The court also held that the commercial speech exemption did not apply and that WasteXperts had no probability of prevailing on the merits of its claims. WasteXperts’s request for limited discovery was denied.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court concluded that the declaratory relief claim did not arise from protected activity, as it was based on an existing dispute over the right to move waste collection bins, not on the prelitigation communications. The court also found that the commercial speech exemption applied to Athens’s communications with WasteXperts’s clients, removing those communications from the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute. Consequently, the tort claims did not arise from protected activity. The appellate court did not address the probability of WasteXperts prevailing on the merits or the request for limited discovery. View "Wastexperts, Inc. v. Arakelian Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

Kathleen and Bruce Smith filed a petition to confirm the validity of a 2016 amendment to a trust established by Ernest Myers. The amendment would grant the Smiths Ernest’s 54.2 percent interest in a property, adding to their existing 45.8 percent interest. Without the amendment, the trust would give Ernest’s interest to Emma Myers, his widow. Emma argued that the Smiths’ petition was barred by the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 366.3, which requires claims arising from a promise or agreement with a decedent to be filed within one year of the decedent’s death.The Superior Court of Glenn County denied Emma’s motion for summary adjudication, concluding that section 366.3 did not apply to the Smiths’ petition, as it concerned the internal affairs of a trust rather than a promise relating to a distribution. After a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the Smiths, validating the amendment and ordering Emma to transfer the property interest to them. Emma’s cross-petition to invalidate the amendment was denied.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, agreeing that section 366.3 did not apply to the Smiths’ petition. The court held that the statute of limitations in section 366.3 pertains to claims based on promises or agreements to create testamentary documents, not to claims based on the documents themselves. Consequently, the trial court’s judgment in favor of the Smiths was upheld, and Emma’s appeal was dismissed. View "Smith v. Myers" on Justia Law

Carlton Loeber, the trustor of an irrevocable trust owning two undeveloped properties within the Lakeside Joint School District, sought to place an initiative on the ballot to exempt taxpayers over 65 from any district parcel tax on undeveloped parcels. The district declined to call the election, citing cost concerns and legal objections. Loeber filed a petition for a writ of mandate to compel the district to place the initiative on the ballot. The trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that Loeber lacked standing.The trial court found that Loeber did not have a direct and substantial interest in the initiative because he did not personally own property in the district and failed to show that the trust could qualify for the exemption. The court also rejected Loeber’s public interest standing argument, noting the lack of public engagement and the significant cost to the district. The court concluded that the public need was not weighty enough to warrant the application of the public interest exception.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and determined that Loeber had standing under the public interest exception, given the significant public right at issue concerning the initiative power. However, the court concluded that the proposed initiative did not fall within the scope of Article XIII C, Section 3 of the California Constitution, which allows initiatives to reduce or repeal local taxes. The court held that the initiative, which sought to create a new exemption for certain taxpayers, did not constitute "reducing" a tax within the meaning of the constitutional provision. Consequently, the district was not obligated to call an election on the initiative. The judgment was modified to deny the writ petition and affirmed as modified. View "Loeber v. Lakeside Joint School District" on Justia Law

The case involves Susan George, a teacher who had worked for the Susanville Elementary School District for several years before resigning to teach at another school district. She later returned to the District. Upon her return, the District did not credit her for the years of experience she gained at the other school district following her resignation. George filed a petition for writ of mandate arguing the District violated the uniformity requirement of Education Code section 45028 and the restoration requirement of section 44931 when placing her on the salary schedule without accounting for the years of experience she gained while outside the District after her resignation.The trial court found that the District complied with the Education Code. It ruled that the collective bargaining agreement prevented George from acquiring credit for the two years she worked for another school district. The trial court further found the uniformity requirement did not afford George relief and the District complied with the restoration requirement by restoring George to her prior position. Consequently, the trial court denied George’s petition for writ of mandate.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the District violated the uniformity requirement by failing to place George at step 15 of the District’s salary schedule. The court disagreed with the District's argument that the uniformity requirement is inapplicable to George’s placement on the salary schedule because the restoration requirement controls the placement of teachers rehired within 39 months. The court found that the District must credit George with up to 12 years of out-of-district experience. The court remanded the case with directions to issue a writ compelling the District to place George on its salary schedule in compliance with Education Code section 45028 as construed herein, with appropriate back pay and benefits. The District was ordered to pay costs on appeal. View "George v. Susanville Elementary School District" on Justia Law