Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Susan Diamond appealed an order denying her request to set aside a judgment in her marital dissolution proceeding. Susan argued that the judgment should be vacated due to duress and mental incapacity during the dissolution process. The Family Code does not define mental incapacity or duress, but the court found guidance in the Probate Code and Code of Civil Procedure, which address an individual's ability to make decisions regarding assets, medical options, and ongoing legal actions.In the lower court, Susan and Troy Diamond were married in 1992 and separated in 2008. Susan filed for dissolution in 2013. Susan's attorney withdrew due to her lack of communication, and she represented herself thereafter. Susan did not appear at the trial in May 2015, leading to an uncontested trial where the court awarded Troy custody of their daughter, child support, and a significant monetary judgment. Susan later sought to set aside the judgment, claiming she was unaware of the trial and was incapacitated due to health issues. Her initial request was denied based on the disentitlement doctrine and lack of evidence of mistake.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Susan did not meet her burden to show she was mentally incapacitated or under duress during the dissolution proceedings. The court found that Susan's actions during the relevant period, such as selling her home and handling financial transactions, indicated she understood the nature and consequences of her actions. The court also found no evidence that Troy used threats or pressure to induce Susan not to participate in the proceedings. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Susan did not establish grounds for relief under Family Code section 2122. View "Marriage of Diamond" on Justia Law

In March 2020, Eva Osborne sued Pleasanton Automotive Company, LOP Automotive Company LP, HAG Automotive Investments LP, and Bob Slap, alleging workplace misconduct including discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and wage violations. Osborne, who worked as Slap’s executive assistant, claimed Slap required her to perform personal tasks without proper compensation. In response, Slap filed a cross-complaint against Osborne in August 2022, alleging libel, slander, and other claims based on statements Osborne made in a letter to HAG’s HR director.The Alameda Superior Court granted Osborne’s special motion to strike Slap’s cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that Osborne’s statements were protected activity made in anticipation of litigation and were privileged under Civil Code section 47. The court found that Slap could not show his claims had minimal merit because the statements were privileged and he failed to demonstrate malice.The California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that Osborne’s statements were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute and that the litigation privilege barred Slap’s claims. The court found that Osborne’s HR letter was sent in good faith contemplation of litigation, supported by her retention of counsel and subsequent legal actions. The court did not need to address Osborne’s alternative arguments regarding conditional privilege and malice, as the litigation privilege alone was sufficient to affirm the trial court’s ruling. View "Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co., LP" on Justia Law

Lois and David divorced in 1992, with David ordered to pay child and spousal support. The child support obligation ended in 2001 when their daughter turned 18 and graduated high school, but wage garnishments continued until 2008. In 2021, David sought reimbursement for overpaid child support, claiming he overpaid $46,061.55. Lois opposed, arguing the delay was unreasonable and would cause her financial hardship.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied David's request, finding he did not act timely and his reasons for the delay were insufficient to overcome the prejudice to Lois. The court noted David had previously acted to terminate spousal support but did not do so for child support. The court also found Lois had unclean hands, as she likely knew she was receiving overpayments. However, the court granted David $3,000 in attorney fees as sanctions against Lois for failing to comply with court orders.On appeal, David argued that reimbursement of overpaid child support is mandatory under Family Code section 4007 and that laches should not apply. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the defense of laches did not apply due to Lois's unclean hands but disagreed with David's interpretation of Family Code section 4007. The court noted that the original support order did not require Lois to notify David of the termination of the child support obligation, and it was David's responsibility to terminate the wage garnishment order. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying David's request for reimbursement due to the significant delay and resulting prejudice to Lois. View "In re Marriage of Saraye" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between longtime friends over a failed business venture, resulting in a $20 million judgment against Stanley N. Cohen for negligent misrepresentation. Cohen, a professor at Stanford University, and his colleague discovered a genetic mutation linked to Huntington’s disease and formed a company, Nuredis, with Moshe and Chris Alafi, who invested $20 million. The FDA rejected Nuredis’s request for human clinical trials for the drug HD106 due to its toxicity, leading to the abandonment of the drug. The Alafis sued Cohen and his colleague for failing to disclose the drug’s history of toxicity.The Santa Clara County Superior Court held a bench trial and found in favor of the plaintiffs on the negligent misrepresentation claim against Cohen, awarding $20 million in damages. The court did not address the other causes of action. Cohen appealed, arguing that the claim required an affirmative misrepresentation, that the plaintiffs did not rely on the alleged omission, and that they were aware of the drug’s history. He also contended that the trial court erred by not issuing a statement of decision upon his request.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, found that the trial court’s failure to issue the requested statement of decision was prejudicial error, as it prevented effective appellate review of the trial court’s factual and legal findings. Consequently, the appellate court did not address Cohen’s arguments on the merits and reversed and remanded the case for the trial court to issue the statement of decision. View "Alafi v. Cohen" on Justia Law

Shahriyar Shayan appealed an order denying his motion to quash a writ of execution for attorney fees filed by Zohreh McIntyre Shayan. The couple married in 2002, had two children, and Zohreh petitioned for dissolution in 2007. In 2010, the family court awarded Zohreh $125,000 in attorney fees. In April 2022, Zohreh sought a writ of execution on the judgment, which Shahriyar contested, arguing it had expired under the 10-year limitation of Code of Civil Procedure section 683.020 and was not renewed as required by section 683.130.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Shahriyar's request to set aside the writ, leading to his appeal. Shahriyar contended that the attorney fees judgment should be subject to the 10-year limitation and renewal requirements, and that Family Code section 291’s exemptions did not apply to such judgments.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Family Code section 291, which exempts money judgments entered under the Family Code from the 10-year limitation and renewal requirements, includes judgments for attorney fees. The court found the language of Family Code section 291 unambiguous and supported by legislative history, which aimed to simplify enforcement rules for family law judgments and protect litigants' rights. The court affirmed the lower court's order, concluding that the judgment for attorney fees was enforceable until paid in full and did not require renewal. View "In re Marriage of Shayan" on Justia Law

Govind Vaghashia and other plaintiffs appealed a trial court order denying their motion to vacate a settlement agreement with Prashant and Mita Vaghashia. The settlement involved a $35 million payment from the Govind Parties to Prashant and Mita, with specific terms about collateral and property interests. Disputes arose over the interpretation and execution of the agreement, leading to motions to enforce the settlement by both parties. The trial court enforced the agreement largely in favor of Prashant and Mita, rejecting the Govind Parties' interpretations.The trial court found that the Govind Parties were judicially estopped from challenging the settlement agreement after previously moving to enforce it. The court concluded that the Govind Parties' current position that the agreement was unenforceable was inconsistent with their earlier position that it was enforceable. The court also found that the Govind Parties had not taken their initial position due to ignorance, fraud, or mistake.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the elements of judicial estoppel were met: the Govind Parties had taken two totally inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings, and the trial court had accepted their initial position that the settlement was enforceable. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's application of judicial estoppel and upheld the denial of the motion to vacate the settlement agreement. The court also denied Prashant and Mita's motion to dismiss the appeal based on the disentitlement doctrine, finding insufficient evidence of non-compliance with trial court orders by the Govind Parties. View "Vaghashia v. Vaghashia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, residents of Wisconsin, filed two class action complaints against Experian Information Solutions, Inc. under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). They alleged that Experian failed to include a required statement in the "Summary of Rights" portion of their consumer reports, violating 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(c)(2)(D). Plaintiffs sought actual, statutory, and punitive damages. Experian removed the cases to federal court, where Plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing they lacked standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution because they did not suffer a concrete harm. The federal court agreed and remanded the cases to state court.In state court, Experian moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing Plaintiffs lacked standing under Wisconsin law and that their FCRA claim did not fall within the statute's "zone of interests." Plaintiffs contended California law should apply and that they had standing under it. The trial court, referencing the recent Limon v. Circle K Stores Inc. decision, which required a concrete injury for standing in California state courts, granted Experian's motion. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing Limon was wrongly decided.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found Limon persuasive, holding that Plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not allege a concrete or particularized injury. The court noted that under both California and federal law, an informational injury without adverse effects is insufficient to confer standing. Consequently, the judgment in favor of Experian was affirmed. View "Muha v. Experian Information Solutions" on Justia Law

Steven Watts, an automotive repair shop owner, was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2019, a disease linked to asbestos exposure. He and his wife, Cindy Watts, filed a lawsuit against 28 defendants, later adding eight more. By the time of trial, only one defendant, Pneumo Abex, LLC (Abex), remained. The jury awarded the plaintiffs $2,943,653 in economic damages, $6.75 million in noneconomic damages, and $1 million for loss of consortium, attributing 60% fault to Abex, 25% to other brake manufacturers, and 15% to Watts.The trial court had granted a directed verdict against Abex on its sophisticated user defense, which argued that Watts, as a trained mechanic and business owner, should have known about the dangers of asbestos. The court also made several rulings affecting the allocation of fault, including refusing to include joint compound manufacturers on the verdict form and precluding Abex from using Watts’s interrogatory responses.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in directing the verdict against Abex on the sophisticated user defense, as there was substantial evidence that Watts should have known about the asbestos risks. The court also found errors in the trial court’s rulings on the allocation of fault, including the exclusion of joint compound manufacturers from the verdict form and the preclusion of Watts’s interrogatory responses.The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, allowing Abex to present its sophisticated user defense and addressing the allocation of fault issues. The court also upheld the trial court’s discretion in allocating pretrial settlements but found that the overall handling of the case warranted a new trial. View "Watts v. Pneumo Abex" on Justia Law

Terrence Richard, a brakeman for Union Pacific Railroad Company, fell from a train and broke his leg while working. He sued Union Pacific for negligence under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA). Richard claimed that the locomotive engineer’s mishandling of the train caused a surge that led to his fall. The trial court excluded the testimony of Richard’s expert, Richard Hess, a retired Union Pacific engineer, who would have testified that the engineer’s actions caused the surge. The jury found in favor of Union Pacific, concluding the company was not negligent.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Union Pacific’s motion in limine to exclude Hess’s testimony, reasoning that Hess lacked the necessary qualifications and expertise. Hess had intended to testify that the delay between releasing the train brakes and engaging the throttle caused excessive slack action, leading to a surge at the rear of the train where Richard was working. The trial court’s exclusion of this testimony left Richard without an expert to support his claim of negligent train handling.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in excluding Hess’s testimony. The appellate court found that Hess’s extensive experience as a locomotive engineer qualified him to testify about the train handling practices and the potential dangers of the engineer’s actions. The exclusion of Hess’s testimony was deemed prejudicial because it deprived Richard of critical expert evidence to support his negligence claim. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the judgment for Union Pacific and remanded the matter for a new trial. View "Richard v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Blake Wentworth, a former professor at the University of California, Berkeley, sued the Regents of the University of California, alleging violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Information Practices Act (IPA). Wentworth claimed that the Regents failed to engage in the interactive process, provide reasonable accommodations, and invaded his privacy by leaking information about student complaints and his disability accommodations to the media.The Alameda County Superior Court granted summary adjudication in favor of the Regents on three of Wentworth’s causes of action under FEHA and IPA, denied his motion to compel discovery responses, and denied his request for a retrial on a cause of action for which the jury left the verdict form blank. The court also denied Wentworth’s post-judgment request for attorney’s fees and costs.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the summary adjudication on the claims for failure to engage in the interactive process and provide reasonable accommodations, finding that the Regents had offered reasonable accommodations and engaged in the interactive process in good faith. However, the court reversed the summary adjudication of the invasion of privacy cause of action, finding that there were triable issues of fact regarding whether the Regents violated the IPA by leaking a letter about student complaints and disclosing information about Wentworth’s disability accommodation.The court also reversed the trial court’s denial of Wentworth’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs, remanding for further proceedings to determine whether Wentworth was the prevailing party under the IPA and whether he was entitled to fees under the catalyst theory. The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Wentworth’s motion for a retrial on the personnel file cause of action, finding that Wentworth had forfeited his right to object to the verdict form by failing to raise the issue before the jury was discharged. View "Wentworth v. UC Regents" on Justia Law