Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In a juvenile wardship proceeding, the minor's counsel declared a doubt about the minor's competency to stand trial. Consequently, the juvenile court suspended the proceedings and referred the minor for a competency evaluation. The court's protocol mandated the disclosure of the minor's mental health records to the court-appointed expert for evaluation. The minor objected, citing the psychotherapist-patient privilege under California Evidence Code section 1014. The court overruled the objection and ordered the disclosure, prompting the minor to file a writ petition challenging this decision.The Contra Costa County Superior Court overruled the minor's objection, stating that Welfare and Institutions Code section 709 permits the compelled disclosure of all available records, including mental health records, for competency evaluations. The court also referenced Evidence Code section 1025, which it interpreted as allowing such disclosures in competency proceedings. The minor's request for a stay to seek appellate review was denied, leading to the filing of the writ petition.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Evidence Code section 1016 renders the psychotherapist-patient privilege inapplicable in juvenile competency proceedings once the minor's counsel declares a doubt about the minor's competency. The court reasoned that the issue of the minor's mental or emotional condition is tendered by the minor through their counsel, thus falling under the patient-litigant exception to the privilege. The court denied the minor's writ petition and dissolved the partial stay of the juvenile court's order. View "T.M. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2017, Riverside Mining Limited (Riverside Mining) leased 73 acres of its property to Quality Aggregates (Quality) for mining. By 2020, disputes arose, leading Quality to sue Riverside Mining in 2021 for breach of contract, trespass, and quiet title. In 2022, Riverside Mining filed an unlawful detainer action to evict Quality for alleged lease breaches. The parties agreed that Quality would deposit monthly rent payments with the court during the litigation. Quality later made a settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, which Riverside Mining did not accept. Riverside Mining then dismissed the unlawful detainer action without prejudice.The Superior Court of Riverside County dismissed the unlawful detainer action and later addressed two motions: Quality's motion for attorney fees under section 998 and Riverside Mining's motion to disburse the deposited rent payments. The court denied Quality's motion for attorney fees and granted Riverside Mining's motion for disbursement.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decisions. It held that Quality was not entitled to attorney fees under section 998 because Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b)(2), precludes awarding attorney fees when an action is voluntarily dismissed. The court also affirmed the disbursement of the deposited funds to Riverside Mining, as Quality had no right to a setoff for attorney fees. The court's main holding was that section 998 does not independently authorize attorney fees without an underlying statutory or contractual right, and Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b)(2), prevents such an award in cases of voluntary dismissal. View "Riverside Mining Limited v. Quality Aggregates" on Justia Law

The case involves the Old Creek Ranch Winery, owned by Holguin Family Ventures, LLC, and leased by OCRW, Inc. The Ventura County Board of Supervisors found that the appellants violated the Ventura County Non-Coastal Zoning Ordinance by expanding the winery and wine-tasting area without a conditional use permit (CUP) and changing the principal use of the ranch from crop production to a wine tasting/event venue. The Board also denied their request for zoning clearance for a paved parking lot and electric vehicle charging stations.The trial court upheld the Board's decision, applying the substantial evidence standard of review. The court found that the appellants had converted the property’s principal use from crop and wine production to a commercial wine bar and event space. The court also denied appellants' motion to amend their complaint to add a new cause of action for declaratory relief and dismissed their remaining cause of action for inverse condemnation.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the substantial evidence standard was appropriate and found that substantial evidence supported the Board's decision. The court also upheld the trial court's denial of the motion to amend the complaint, concluding that the proposed new cause of action was unnecessary and that the delay in filing the motion was unjustified. Additionally, the court ruled that the Outdoor Events Ordinance did not apply to the winery, as it was separately regulated under the Non-Coastal Zoning Ordinance.The main holding is that the substantial evidence standard of review was correctly applied, and substantial evidence supports the Board's findings of zoning violations and the denial of the zoning clearance for the parking lot and charging stations. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend the complaint. The judgment was affirmed. View "Holguin Family Ventures v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law

The case involves the removal of a newborn child, N., from her mother, C.J., due to the mother's substance abuse and mental health issues. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) placed N. with a foster caregiver, who was a trial attorney for the County Counsel’s office. Maternal aunt (aunt) requested placement of N. shortly after her birth, but DCFS failed to assess her for over a year despite repeated requests from mother’s counsel, N.’s counsel, and aunt herself. During this period, visitation between N. and her family was severely limited, with the caregiver dictating the visitation schedule.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County repeatedly ordered DCFS to assess aunt for placement, but DCFS did not comply. Eventually, aunt’s home was approved for placement, but DCFS still did not move N. to aunt’s care, deferring to the caregiver’s objections. By the time the court considered aunt for placement, over a year had passed, and the court found it was too late to apply the relative placement preference. The court also found that it was not in N.’s best interest to move her due to her bond with the caregiver.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that DCFS’s delays in evaluating aunt for placement and the court’s lackluster response to the family’s pleas for supportive services were prejudicial. The court concluded that the juvenile court erred by failing to apply the relative placement preference under section 361.3 and that the error was prejudicial. The appellate court reversed the order terminating mother’s reunification services, the order denying mother’s section 361.3 motion, and the order terminating her parental rights, and remanded for further proceedings. The court also directed DCFS and the juvenile court to ensure compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) requirements. View "In re N.J." on Justia Law

The City of Ontario filed an eminent domain action to acquire properties owned by We Buy Houses Any Condition, LLC, located near the Ontario International Airport. The City argued that the properties did not conform to land use requirements and suffered from airport-related impacts and blight. The City held a public hearing and adopted a resolution of necessity to commence eminent domain proceedings, citing the mitigation of airport impacts and elimination of blight as public uses. However, the resolution did not describe any specific proposed project.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted summary judgment in favor of We Buy Houses, finding that the City had not articulated a proposed project as required to exercise its power of eminent domain. The court concluded that the City’s resolution of necessity was insufficient because it did not describe a specific project, which is necessary to determine public interest, necessity, and compatibility with the greatest public good and least private injury. The court also granted We Buy Houses’s request for attorney fees, making certain reductions to the requested amounts.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that the City failed to identify a proposed project with sufficient specificity in its resolution of necessity, as required by the Eminent Domain Law. The court found the City’s arguments unpersuasive and concluded that the trial court properly rejected the City’s effort to exercise eminent domain. Additionally, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of attorney fees to We Buy Houses, affirming the fee award. View "City of Ontario v. We Buy Houses Any Condition" on Justia Law

In 2019, the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 218 (AB 218), which allowed plaintiffs to bring childhood sexual assault claims against public entities within a three-year window, even if those claims were previously barred by statutes of limitations or claim presentation requirements. A.M.M. filed a complaint against the West Contra Costa Unified School District, alleging sexual assaults by a District employee from 1979 to 1983. The District argued that reviving such claims constituted an unconstitutional gift of public funds under the California Constitution. The trial court overruled the District’s demurrer, leading the District to seek writ review.The trial court sustained the demurrer for the first three causes of action but overruled it regarding the gift clause argument. The District then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, for a writ of mandate to sustain the demurrer in its entirety. The appellate court issued an order to show cause, and both parties filed responses, including amicus curiae briefs from various entities.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, held that AB 218’s retroactive waiver of the claim presentation requirement did not constitute an unconstitutional gift of public funds. The court reasoned that the waiver did not create new substantive liability but merely removed a procedural barrier to existing claims. The court also found that AB 218 served a valid public purpose by providing relief to victims of childhood sexual assault, aligning with the state’s interest in public welfare. Additionally, the court ruled that the District lacked standing to assert due process claims under both the federal and California Constitutions. The petition for writ of mandate was denied. View "West Contra Costa Unified School District v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Jose Medina purchased a used car from St. George Auto Sales in December 2014, with financing from Alaska Federal Credit Union. Medina later discovered that the car had extensive engine repairs that were not disclosed to him at the time of purchase. He experienced multiple issues with the car, including the check engine light activating several times shortly after the purchase. Despite repeated repairs, the problems persisted. In December 2015, Medina learned from a different dealership that the car had significant pre-existing engine issues, which led him to believe that St. George had concealed this information.Medina filed a lawsuit in August 2018 against St. George and Alaska Federal, claiming a violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA). The defendants argued that the claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations. They contended that Medina should have been aware of the issues by March 2015 due to the repeated activation of the check engine light. The Superior Court of San Bernardino County overruled the defendants' demurrer and denied their motion for summary judgment, finding that there were factual questions about when Medina should have suspected the harm. The jury ultimately found in favor of Medina, concluding that he did not have sufficient notice of the claim until later.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the discovery rule applies to the CLRA’s statute of limitations, meaning the limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the basis for the claim. The court found no error in the trial court’s rulings on the demurrer, summary judgment, or nonsuit motions, as there were factual questions about when Medina should have known about the engine issues and the defendants' potential wrongdoing. The judgment in favor of Medina was affirmed. View "Medina v. St. George Auto Sales, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a U.S. citizen residing in Beirut, Lebanon, filed a defamation lawsuit against three media companies based in Dubai. The companies broadcast a news story on their Arabic language channels, which was rebroadcast in the U.S. via DISH Network and republished on their website and YouTube channel. The plaintiff alleged that the story falsely accused him of helping a Hezbollah leader launder money. The defendants moved to quash the lawsuit, arguing that California courts lacked personal jurisdiction over them due to insufficient contacts with the state.The Los Angeles County Superior Court granted the defendants' motion to quash, finding that the defendants did not have sufficient minimum contacts with California to justify jurisdiction. The court noted that the defendants' primary audience was in the Middle East and North Africa, and their U.S. viewership, including California, was minimal. The court also found that the plaintiff's connections to California were not strong enough to establish jurisdiction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the defendants did not purposefully avail themselves of the California forum. The court emphasized that the defendants' broadcast was not specifically targeted at California but was part of a broader international distribution. The court also noted that the plaintiff's primary professional and personal connections were in Lebanon, not California, and thus the brunt of any harm from the alleged defamation would be felt in Lebanon. The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendants' conduct was expressly aimed at California, as required under the "effects test" from Calder v. Jones. The court also upheld the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's request for jurisdictional discovery, finding that further discovery was unlikely to produce evidence establishing jurisdiction. View "Safieddine v. MBC FZ" on Justia Law

Jill and Grant Wiese were married for nearly 30 years before their marriage was dissolved in 2016. They had a premarital agreement (PMA) that kept their assets and earnings separate, with Grant responsible for reasonable support. Jill worked as an independent agent for Grant’s real estate brokerage, receiving 100% of her commissions after deductions for business expenses and estimated taxes. Grant deducted amounts for taxes and personal expenses he believed exceeded his support obligations, but the tax deductions did not match the actual taxes paid, and he did not refund the excess to Jill.The Superior Court of Orange County found the PMA valid and enforceable. Jill then brought claims against Grant for breach of fiduciary duty, arguing that his deductions from her commissions were excessive and impaired her separate property. Grant countered that Jill’s claims were time-barred and meritless. The trial court ruled in Jill’s favor on the tax-withholding claims, awarding her over $1.3 million, but rejected her other claims. Both parties appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that Jill’s fiduciary duty claims were subject to a four-year statute of limitations and that most were time-barred. For the surviving claims, the court found Grant breached his fiduciary duty by withholding excessive amounts for taxes but erred in awarding Jill the entire amount withheld rather than the excess. The court also found that Grant’s deductions for personal expenses required reconsideration. It affirmed that Grant was solely liable for the mortgage debt on their jointly owned property but reversed the order requiring Jill to reimburse Grant for housing during their separation. The court remanded for further proceedings, including recalculating damages and reconsidering attorney fees. View "Marriage of Wiese" on Justia Law

WasteXperts, Inc. (WasteXperts) filed a complaint against Arakelian Enterprises, Inc. dba Athens Services (Athens) and the City of Los Angeles (City) in June 2022. WasteXperts alleged that Athens, which holds a waste collection franchise from the City, sent a cease and desist letter to WasteXperts, arguing that WasteXperts was not legally permitted to handle Athens’s bins. WasteXperts sought judicial declarations regarding the City’s authority and Athens’s franchise rights, and also asserted tort claims against Athens for interference with contract, interference with prospective economic advantage, unfair competition, and trade libel.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Athens’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike the entire complaint, finding that the claims were based on Athens’s communications, which anticipated litigation and were therefore protected activity. The court also held that the commercial speech exemption did not apply and that WasteXperts had no probability of prevailing on the merits of its claims. WasteXperts’s request for limited discovery was denied.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court concluded that the declaratory relief claim did not arise from protected activity, as it was based on an existing dispute over the right to move waste collection bins, not on the prelitigation communications. The court also found that the commercial speech exemption applied to Athens’s communications with WasteXperts’s clients, removing those communications from the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute. Consequently, the tort claims did not arise from protected activity. The appellate court did not address the probability of WasteXperts prevailing on the merits or the request for limited discovery. View "Wastexperts, Inc. v. Arakelian Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law