Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Allstate filed a qui tam action on behalf of itself and the State against defendants under the California Insurance Frauds Prevention Act, Insurance Code 1871.7. Following entry of the qui tam judgment, Allstate began efforts to collect it. During its investigation, Allstate learned of a series of real estate transactions conducted by defendants designed to transfer away their assets. Allstate, on behalf of the State, filed an action to set aside the fraudulent transfers of real and personal property. Allstate subsequently obtained a stay of the fraudulent conveyance action and returned to the qui tam court where it filed a motion for an order allocating the qui tam judgment proceeds. The motion was based on a stipulation entered into between the People and Allstate allocating to Allstate 50 percent of the civil penalties and assessments, plus reasonable attorney fees and costs. The trial court granted Allstate's allocation motion and entered the stipulation as judgment. Defendants appealed. The court held that judgment-debtor defendants in qui tam insurance fraud actions are not aggrieved by such allocation orders under section 1871.7, subdivision (g)(2)(A), with the result that they do not have standing to appeal. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dahan" on Justia Law

Marcos J., biological father of two-year-old Reed H., appealed orders dispensing with his consent to adoption and terminating his parental rights. Adoptive parents K.M. and E.M., filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely. To resolve the issue, the Court of Appeal first examined the statutory authorization to appeal the order dispensing with father's consent, to determine the proper rule to apply in assessing the timeliness of the notice of appeal and then resolved the question of whether the notice of appeal was timely filed. The Court determined that where the trial court takes the matter under submission and issues a written order which is both filed and served on the parties, the time for filing a notice of appeal runs from the date of service of the written order or other notice to the parties of the ruling. Here, the trial court took the case under submission awaiting written closing arguments. The parties were fully aware that the court would issue a written ruling. The court issued its written ruling, which was filed and served on December 24, 2015. Time for filing a notice of appeal expired on February 22, 2016, 60 days later. Marcos J. did not file his notice of appeal until February 26, 2016. The notice of appeal was untimely. "Appellate jurisdiction depends upon a timely notice of appeal." (In re Elizabeth G. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1327, 1331.) The motion to dismiss was granted. All other pending motions were deemed moot. View "Adoption of Reed H." on Justia Law

Riding in a non-competitive charity bicycling event, Minick fell while descending a hill in Petaluma. Erwin, riding behind Minick, saw him lose control of his bicycle after hitting a large pothole. Minick exhausted his administrative remedies, and then, represented by Watson, brought suit under Government Code section 835. The city moved for summary judgment, arguing that Minick, who had no recollection of the accident, had no proof of any dangerous condition on public property. Watson opposed the motion, attaching grainy, low-resolution black-and-white photographs of the alleged site, a copy of a police report containing Erwin's statement that he saw a pothole where Minick fell; and an engineer's expert declaration that a defect in the street caused the fall. The court issued a tentative ruling denying the motion. At the hearing, Watson appeared, but showed signs of physical distress and was taken to a hospital by ambulance. The day before a continued hearing, the court again tentatively denied the motion. After hearing arguments, the court granted the motion, referring to Watson’s arguments as “ludicrous.” The court later granted relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b), accepting Watson’s explanation that he had been suffering from a serious illness for which he was under heavy medication. The court of appeal affirmed., When a court finds a wholesale disintegration of the attorney’s professional capacity because of a medical crisis, the availability of relief for excusable neglect is within the court’s sound discretion. View "Minick v. City of Petaluma" on Justia Law

Aguirre sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) for failing to comply with the Public Records Act (PRA), Government Code sections 6250-6276.48 The complaint alleged that the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station was closed after it leaked radiation in 2012; that costs of the shutdown and loss due to the shutdown exceeded $4 billion; and that CPUC approved the owner assigning $3.3 billion of these costs to utility ratepayers during an ex parte meeting in Warsaw, Poland. Aguirre made PRA requests seeking the production of emails and other documents related to the CPUC’s investigation of the shutdown and the settlement and meetings. The superior court rejected CPUC’s motion to dismiss. The court of appeal agreed with CPUC. Public Utilities Code section 1759 bars the superior court from exercising jurisdiction over the suit. The duty to comply with the PRA is an “official duty” of the CPUC. A “writ of mandate in any court of competent jurisdiction” is one of the statutory means available to enforce the PRA (Gov. Code 6258), and a “writ of mandamus” may be brought against the CPUC in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal in appropriate cases under section 1759(b). View "Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In late August 2015, the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) filed a dependency petition regarding minor, who was about one month shy of his third birthday. While at the emergency room for a cut on his finger, child was observed to have red sores and pustules around his genitals and buttocks. Also, mother reported that she had not taken minor for any well checks since he was one month old, and that minor had not received any vaccinations. The petition alleged that mother had unresolved anger management issues. In 2013 mother was convicted for domestic violence arising from an incident in which she had struck her ex-husband in the head five times and struck his vehicle repeatedly with a metal stick. The petition also alleged that mother had an unresolved substance abuse problem; a history of methamphetamine use. She reportedly had last used methamphetamine approximately two weeks prior to the incident in which minor cut his finger. Mother’s probation officer reported that mother was not enrolled in a drug treatment program, had multiple positive drug tests, and was not attending Narcotics Anonymous meetings. Being sent to jail marked a significant turning point for mother. The child was placed with his maternal aunt and uncle. The aunt and uncle indicated a desire to adopt minor if reunification with mother were to fail. Mother contested the recommendation, and an evidentiary hearing was held. Ultimately, the court sided with SSA, terminated reunification services, and set a hearing. The court described mother’s progress while out of custody as “minimal” and “hollow.” The court described mother’s visitation as “strikingly sporadic.” The court noted, however, that while in custody, “mother has taken advantage of every service . . . available to her, and that certainly is to be commended.” The court also “emphathize[d] with mother for a variety of reasons, her youth, the loss that she has suffered in her life.” Nonetheless, the court felt “constrained by an evaluation of the . . . statutory and case law . . . .” Mother’s petition for writ of mandate arose from the trial court’s order terminating reunification services and the “.26 hearing.” After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court’s finding regarding mother’s actions towards reunification was not supported by substantial evidence. As such, the Court issued the requested writ of mandate. View "J.F. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Wendy Randall appeals a judgment for defendant after a court trial. There was no court reporter during the trial, and the trial court denied Randall's motion for a settled statement after trial. The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Randall's motion, and as a result, of her right to her appeal, but Randall failed to seek timely review of that denial. The court affirmed the judgment because the issue has been forfeited and because the record is insufficient to permit review of the judgment. View "Randall v. Mousseau" on Justia Law

Scott R. appealed the termination of his parental rights to his biological daughter, A.B., under Family Code section 7822,1 which authorizes the termination of rights of a parent who "has left the child in the care and custody of the other parent for a period of one year without any provision for the child's support, or without communication . . . with the intent . . . to abandon the child." He argued that the one-year statutory period referred only to the year immediately preceding the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights, which precluded its application to him. Scott argued in the alternative that reversal was warranted in any event because: (1) he rebutted the presumption that he intended to abandon A.B.; (2) the termination of his rights was not in A.B.'s best interests; and (3) the juvenile court erred in determining that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply absent proof that a tribe he identified actually received notice as required under that statutory scheme. After review, the Court of Appeal rejected Scott's arguments and affirmed the order. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law

Defendant Clyde Greco, Jr. was the trustee of his parents’ trust and the administrator of their estates. He used money from the trust and estates to fund litigation against his sister and others, purportedly to recover money they owed to the trust and estates. After he allegedly spent considerably more money on litigation than he could have possibly recovered, his sister, plaintiff Cara Lyn Greco, brought two lawsuits against him, one at the trial court and one at the probate court, to recover the money he spent, plus penalties. She claimed the prior litigation was a personal vendetta. Clyde Jr. responded to each lawsuit by filing separate special motions to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. In each case, the special motion to strike was denied. On appeal, Clyde Jr. contended he met his burden on the first prong of section 425.16 by establishing that Cara Lyn’s claims arose from protected petitioning activity, funding litigation. He further argued that Cara Lyn could not meet her burden on the second prong of section 425.16 to submit evidence to establish a prima facie case of each claim because all her claims are barred by the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). The Court of Appeal found the gravamen of most of Cara Lyn’s claims was the alleged wrongful taking from the trust and estates and that was not a protected activity under section 425.16. The courts properly denied Clyde Jr.’s special motion to strike as to these claims. The one exception was Cara Lyn’s claim for constructive fraud based on Clyde Jr.’s alleged misrepresentations about the underlying litigation. While Clyde Jr.’s statements about the litigation are protected activity, Clyde Jr. did not show it was covered by the litigation privilege. The Court remanded this matter back to the probate court for a determination of whether Cara Lyn met her evidentiary burden under the second prong of section 425.16 analysis. View "Greco v. Greco" on Justia Law

Appellant Danilo Sese sought to challenge an order denying his motion for interim attorney fees under Civil Code section 2924.12 after he secured a preliminary injunction to enjoin the foreclosure sale of his residential real property. The trial court denied the motion on grounds section 2924.12, subdivision (i) did not provide for interim attorney fees. Sese argued on appeal that the order should have been reversed because section 2924.12 provided attorney fees to a borrower immediately after successfully obtaining a preliminary injunction. Respondent Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells Fargo) argued the appeal should have been dismissed because the trial court’s order was interlocutory in nature and nonappealable under the one final judgment rule. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court’s order was nonappealable because it was interlocutory in nature. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal. View "Sese v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

In September 2015, the Trinity County Department of Health and Human Services (Department) filed a juvenile dependency petition as to then eight-year-old S.N. The petition alleged that mother "failed to protect [S.N.] in that she drove under the influence of alcohol with [S.N.] in the vehicle, resulting in a single car collision into the embankment, causing [S.N.] to suffer serious physical and emotional harm." The petition further alleged that mother "failed to provide [S.N.] with adequate medical care in that [S.N.] had ligature marks and abrasions on her chest as a result of a vehicle accident which were not immediately treated due to the mother telling [S.N.] she was not 'hurt enough' to require medical care." C.N., mother of minor S.N., appealed the juvenile court’s orders taking jurisdiction and later terminating jurisdiction after awarding custody to father at disposition. She contended the court failed to obtain a valid waiver of her right to a contested jurisdictional hearing. Mother further contended that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at the jurisdictional hearing. In the published portion of the Court of Appeal's opinion, the Court concluded the trial court failed to obtain a valid waiver. Because this error was found as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s orders nevertheless. View "In re S.N." on Justia Law