Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Cynthia C. and Gerardo L. appealed the termination of their parental rights to their daughter, R. L. Gerardo contended the jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders, and all subsequent orders, had to be reversed because the juvenile court did not have home state jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. He also contended he did not receive notice of the proceedings pursuant to the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters. Cynthia joined in Gerardo's arguments to the extent they inured to her benefit, but raised no other issues. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeals found Cynthia and Gerardo's arguments unavailing, and affirmed termination of their parental rights. View "In re R.L." on Justia Law

In 2002 the Enterprise Rancheria of Maidu Indians of California (Enterprise Tribe) submitted a request to the United States Department of the Interior (Department) to acquire a site in Yuba County for the purpose of establishing a casino/hotel resort complex. Pursuant to statute, the Secretary was authorized to acquire land, within or without an existing reservation, for the purpose of providing land for Indians. Land so acquired after October 17, 1988, could not, with some exceptions, be used for gaming. The exception at issue here was where the Secretary “after consultation with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and local officials, including officials of other nearby Indian tribes, determines that a gaming establishment on newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community, but only if the Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is to be conducted concurs in the Secretary’s determination.” The Governor indicated his official concurrence with the Assistant Secretary’s determination. Plaintiff Auburn Tribe owned and operated the Thunder Valley Resort and Casino, approximately 20 miles from the Yuba County site. The Auburn Tribe filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief, alleging: (1) the Governor was required to comply with California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) before concurring in the Secretary’s decision to take lands into trust for the Enterprise Tribe; and (2) the Governor performed a legislative act when he concurred with the Secretary and when he negotiated and executed the compact with the Enterprise Tribe, in violation of the constitutional mandate of separation of powers. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded the CEQA did not apply here, and that the Governor’s concurrence did not violate the separation of powers clause. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn Rancheria v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendants Eric Schrier, Frank Frederick, and Angela Martinez had been employed in various capacities by plaintiff SG Homecare, Inc. before abruptly leaving to start a competing firm, defendant Verio Healthcare, Inc. SG Homecare filed the underlying complaint, alleging the individual defendants breached their contractual and fiduciary duties, and misappropriated trade secrets. Schrier and his wife cross-complained against SG Homecare and its owner, Thomas Randall Rowley (together, the “SG parties”), alleging wrongful termination and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant Verio Healthcare and the individual defendants were represented by Donald Wagner of the firm Buchalter Nemer, PLC. Shortly after the cross-complaint was filed, the SG Parties moved to disqualify Buchalter Nemer. The motion was based on an assertion that shortly before the individual defendants’ departure from SG Homecare, Buchalter Nemer executed a retainer agreement with SG Homecare and was either currently representing SG Homecare, or, alternatively, the present litigation was substantially related to Buchalter Nemer’s prior representation of SG Homecare (requiring disqualification in either event). Adding to mix: Wagner, as a member of the California State Assembly, relied on statutory entitlement to a continuance and extension of time of the entire litigation. The trial court denied the motion for a stay without explanation. Defendants petitioned the Court of Appeals court for a writ of mandate to order the trial court to grant the stay. The Appeals court summarily denied the petition, but the California Supreme Court granted review and remanded back to the Appeals court with instructions to issue an order to show cause. The Court of Appeals issued that order and denied the writ, namely because it found that the trial court acted within its discretion in its finding that the stay would "defeat or abridge the other party's" right to relief. View "Verio Healthcare v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A person who pays for a trip to the emergency room out-of-pocket can be charged significantly more for care than a person who has insurance. This case centered on whether a person could maintain an action challenging this variable pricing practice under the Unfair Competition Law, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act or and action for declaratory relief. The Court of Appeals concluded after review of this case that most of the claims asserted by plaintiff Gene Moran lacked merit. However, he sufficiently alleged facts supporting a conclusion that he had standing to claim the amount of the charges defendants' hospital bills self-pay patients was unconscionable. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's dismissal of Moran's case, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Moran v. Prime Healthcare" on Justia Law

A very high wage-earner making $1.9 million during the marriage agreed to a stipulated divorce judgment providing for above-guideline child and spousal support. In this appeal of the denial of the high earner's post-judgment request for a reduction of his child support obligations to guideline and his request to terminate spousal support in the wake of the wife's remarriage, he raised two issues: (1) with respect to a clause in the stipulated judgment that any future modification proceeding would be reviewed de novo, did that clause eliminate the usual change-of-circumstances rule that applied to post-judgment modifications?; and (2) with respect to a clause that said if the high earner's ex-wife remarried to a person making less than $400,000 a year, the high earner would still keep paying her spousal support (but at a reduced rate). did the ex-wife's remarriage terminate spousal support anyway, given that the clause did not expressly mention Family Code section 4337? The Court of Appeals answered both questions in the negative, thus concluding there was no error in the orders challenged here. View "In re Marriage of Cohen" on Justia Law

Currency loaned money at high interest rates to elderly artists who owned rights to receive royalty payments from music rights management companies. Wertheim persuaded artists to assign their royalty rights and any causes of action they might have against Currency. After Wertheim’s judgment against Currency had been vacated, the superior court in the interpleader proceedings released all deposited funds to Currency. Currency then moved to recoup from Wertheim the $238,615.45 in attorney fees that had been paid to the royalty payors, contending all or most of those entities’ fees were incurred as a result of Wertheim’s litigation tactics. In opposition to the motion, Wertheim contended the fees were incurred as a result of Currency’s litigation tactics. The superior court found no merit to either side's argument. Currency appeals the order denying its motion for attorney fees. The court concluded that equity does not require that Wertheim pay at least some of the fees where Wertheim had a colorable claim on the interpleaded funds in the form of a judgment, and Currency could have avoided the interpleader action by paying the judgment. Therefore, the trial court acted within its discretion in finding it “proper” for Currency to pay the attorney fees and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wertheim LLC v. Omidvar" on Justia Law

In the underlying action, petitioner filed a complaint against real party in interest Poulet Nikolay, alleging that Nikolay violated Civil Code section 1708.85 by distributing, and threatening to distribute to petitioner's employer, electronic and/or physical copies of photographs, film, videotape, recordings, depicting petitioner's exposed intimate body parts or showing petitioner engaging in an act of intercourse, oral copulation, sodomy, or other act of sexual penetration. Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate vacating the superior court's order directing that all future proceedings in the underlying action be filed with his true name. In this case, the superior court, after receiving Confidential Information Form MC-125 from petitioner, stated that because the form was posted online to the court’s publicly accessible Website, it obviated the need to refer to petitioner by the pseudonym, and ordered the parties to thereafter refer to petitioner by his real name. The court concluded that this is not a circumstance in which a party waived a right to keep information confidential or sealed by inadvertently disclosing it. Accordingly, the court granted the petition and ordered respondent court to vacate its April 8, 2016 minute order. Respondent court is ordered to treat information filed on Confidential Information Form MC-125 as confidential. View "Doe v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The trial court found respondent Hugo H. committed an act of domestic violence against appellant Celia S., and therefore awarded her sole legal and physical custody of the couple’s two children because Hugo presented no evidence showing an award of custody to him was in the children’s best interest. Nonetheless, the court also awarded Hugo “visitation” consistent with the “50/50 timeshare” arrangement to which Celia and Hugo agreed nearly a year earlier. Under that arrangement, the children alternated living with Celia for one week and then Hugo for a week. Family Code section 3044 established a rebuttable presumption that prevents a trial court from awarding sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to a parent who commits an act of domestic violence against the other parent, unless the offending parent establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that an award of custody to that parent is in the child’s best interest. Celia appealed the visitation order, arguing that the trial court could not circumvent section 3044 by characterizing its order granting physical custody as visitation. The Court of Appeals agreed: "The nature of any order must be determined based on the order’s legal effect, not the label the trial court attaches." The trial court therefore abused its discretion awarding Hugo equal time with the children without requiring him to establish that arrangement was in the children's best interest. That portion of the trial court's order was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Celia S. v. Hugo H." on Justia Law

In Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist., the court held that a plaintiff may allege compliance with the claims presentation requirement in the Government Claims Act, Gov. Code 910 et seq., by including a general allegation that he or she timely complied with the claims statute. Applying the rule adopted in Perez, the court concluded that the plaintiff in this case adequately alleged compliance with the Government Claims Act and the demurrer should have been overruled. The court published this decision to confirm the holding of Perez and set forth the court's interpretation of the California Supreme Court’s decision in DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara. The court does not read DiCampli, a summary judgment case that did not address the adequacy of the pleadings, as impliedly disapproving Perez or the rule allowing plaintiffs to plead compliance with the claims statutes using a general allegation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Esparza v. Kaweah Delta Dist. Hosp." on Justia Law

Peymaneh Rothstein and Mark Rothstein instituted proceedings in January 2014 to dissolve their marriage. Judge Byrd made findings and orders in the Family Law Case and entered a judgment upon stipulation of the parties that terminated Peymaneh and Mark’s married status. Additional proceedings ensued, and about a month after Judge Byrd granted a motion to impose sanctions against Peymaneh, Real Party in Interest Precious Time, a Virginia limited liability company, filed a civil suit against Mark, alleging causes of action for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Mark filed a notice with the superior court that identified the Family Law Case and the Civil Case as related. Both cases were ordered related - not consolidated - and the Civil Case was transferred to Judge Byrd, the judge before whom the Family Law Case was then pending. At issue is whether Precious Time's Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 challenge in the related civil action requires transfer of both cases to a new judge. The court held that a section 170.6 challenge filed in a case that is related to (not consolidated with) an earlier-filed case in which the assigned judge has resolved a disputed factual issue relating to the merits requires transfer of only the later-filed case to another judge. In this case, the peremptory challenge Precious Time filed in the Civil Case does not disqualify Judge Byrd in the Family Law Case for the most fundamental of reasons: the cases are merely related, not consolidated, and there has been no challenge filed against Judge Byrd in the Family Law Case. Therefore, the court issued a writ of mandate ordering respondent superior court to vacate its June 1, 2016, order transferring the Family Law Case and the Civil Case to a new judge and to enter a new order transferring only the Civil Case to a new judge. View "Rothstein v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law