Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs in this putative class action case, Stacey and Tyler Walker, appealed the trial court's order disqualifying their counsel, Hogue & Belong (the Firm), in this putative class action suit against their former employer, Apple, Inc. The trial court found automatic disqualification was required on the basis the Firm had a conflict of interest arising from its concurrent representation of the putative class in this case and the certified class in another wage-and-hour class action pending against Apple. Specifically, based on the parties' litigation strategies and evidence Apple submitted in support of its disqualification motion, the trial court concluded that to advance the interests of its clients in this case, the Firm would need to cross-examine a client in the Felczer class (the Walkers' store manager) in a manner adverse to that client. After review of plaintiffs' arguments on appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not err in finding the Firm represented the store manager and that a disqualifying conflict existed between her interests and the Walkers' interests. View "Walker v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant S.P. (mother) and respondent F.G. (father) were parents to E.P. (child). Mother appealed the trial court's child support order requiring father to pay her $14,840 per month, as well as pay expenses relating to E.P.'s extracurricular activities, health and education directly to those providers. Mother argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion as to the appropriate amount of child support considering E.P.'s historical and then-current expenses; (2) there was insufficient evidence that it was in E.P.'s best interests to aware support in an amount below that contemplated by statute; and (3) the trial court erred by not making findings explaining its reasons as to (1) and (2). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's support order. View "S.P. v. F.G." on Justia Law

In 2001, Millview County Water District began diverting substantial flows from the Russian River under a century-old water rights claim leased from Hill and Gomes. In 2009, Millview purchased the claim for $2.1 million, four months after the State Water Resources Control Board proposed a cease and desist order (CDO) to drastically restrict diversion under the claim. After the Board entered the CDO, Millview, Hill, and Gomes jointly prevailed in a mandate action challenging the CDO. After the court of appeal affirmed, they sought an award of attorney fees from the Board under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, arguing they had conferred a substantial public benefit by obtaining a published appellate opinion addressing the issue of water rights forfeiture and that the action had constituted a “financial burden” to them because they stood to gain no money judgment. The trial court awarded plaintiffs attorney fees with respect to the appeal but declined to award fees incurred during the remainder of the legal proceedings. The court of appeal vacated the award and affirmed the trial court’s decision not to award additional fees, concluding plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that the cost of the litigation outweighed its potential financial benefits to them. View "Millview County Water District v. State Water Resources Control Board" on Justia Law

For some period of time before March 2015, the Agricultural Labor Relations Board had delegated plenary authority to seek injunctive relief under Labor Code section 1160.4 to general counsel. In March 2015, the board decided to change that delegation by requiring general counsel to obtain case-specific approval from the board for every request for injunctive relief. In May 2015, general counsel asked the board to approve a proceeding for injunctive relief against Gerawan Farming, Inc. (Gerawan). The board gave its conditional approval to that proceeding. When Gerawan asked the board to disclose the communications between the board and general counsel regarding the matter under the California Public Records Act, the board refused, claiming privilege. Gerawan brought a writ proceeding in Sacramento County Superior Court seeking to force the board to disclose the requested communications, and the court ordered disclosure. The board brought the present writ proceeding to the Court of Appeals to challenge the superior court’s ruling. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded the superior court erred in ordering disclosure of the communications between the board and general counsel relating to the decision to seek injunctive relief against Gerawan because those communications were indeed protected by the attorney-client privilege. "[E]ven if due process concerns with respect to the pending administrative proceeding against Gerawan are raised by the communications at issue, those concerns do not preclude the attorney-client privilege from attaching to those communications, and because the communications are privileged, they are exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act." Accordingly, the Court directed that a writ of mandate issue ordering the superior court to vacate its order requiring disclosure of those communications and enter a new order denying Gerawan’s request for disclosure. View "Agricultural Labor etc. Bd. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The "Agreement Regarding Real Property (TOT)" (TOT Agreement) was an agreement between the City of Oceanside and S.D. Malkin Properties, Inc. For its part, Malkin agreed to develop, in two phases, a 360 room luxury hotel on land owned by the successor to the city's former redevelopment agency; the city agreed to pay Malkin a total subsidy of $11,335,250,5 from transient occupancy taxes (TOT) generated by the hotel. Under the TOT Agreement, the hotel would be developed in two phases, and, for the first four years after each phase was complete, 100 percent of TOT's generated by each phase would be paid to Malkin. Thereafter smaller percentages of TOT's generated by the hotel would be paid to Malkin. The city council put the TOT Agreement, and items closely related to the hotel development, on its agenda for its September 10, 2014 meeting. According to plaintiff and appellant San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG), there was no serious opposition to the hotel project at the city council meeting. At the meeting, the city council adopted a resolution approving the TOT Agreement and the subsidy report. SDOG filed an amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and a petition for writ of mandate against the city in 2015, alleging violations of the Brown Act, the subsidy reporting provisions of Gov. Code section 53803, and the California Constitution. The trial court heard the matter on the merits on October 23, 2015 and found in the city's favor. Thereafter, it entered judgment in favor of the city, and SDOG filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, SDOG again asserted the city violated the Brown Act and section 53803. Finding no violation, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. View "San Diegans for Open Government v. City of Oceanside" on Justia Law

Wolf Metals filed suit against RPS for breach of contract. The trial court entered a default judgment for Wolf Metals, awarding $292,055.093 in damages, together with $70,400 in pre-judgment interest and $430.00 in costs. When RPS did not satisfy the judgment, Wolf Metals requested that the judgment be amended to name Donald Koh and South Gate Steel, Inc. (SGS) as additional judgment debtors. The trial court granted the request, concluding that Koh was RPS’s alter ego and that SGS was RPS’s successor corporation. The court concluded that pursuant to the California Supreme Court’s decision in Motores de Mexicali v. Superior Court, the default judgment could not be amended to add Koh as an alter ego to the judgment. The court also concluded that the judgment was properly amended to add SGS as a corporate successor. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Wolf Metals v. Rand Pacific Sales" on Justia Law

After allegedly losing millions of dollars in a hedge fund, investors sued the fund's administrator for breach of contract, alleging the administrator failed to: (1) value the hedge fund's assets, (2) advise investors of the hedge fund's net asset value, and (3) respond to investor inquiries about the fund. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the fund administrator, determining the undisputed material facts established no breach of contract. Later, the court awarded the fund administrator $3,027,237.96 in attorney fees based upon a contractual provision entitled "Standard of Care," which provides the administrator was to be indemnified for losses, including reasonable attorney fees pertaining to administration of the fund. The investors appealed, arguing that there were triable issues of material fact that should not have been dismissed through summary judgment. They also argued the court erroneously awarded attorney fees. After review, the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment, determining the undisputed material facts established the administrator did not breach the applicable contract. However, the Court reversed the award of attorney fees because the contractual language relied upon was a third party indemnity provision that did not create a right to prevailing party attorney fees in litigation between the parties to the contract. View "Alki Partners v. DB Fund Services" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Mercer admitted that he negligently collided with plaintiff Lillie Moore's car. The impact had major consequences for her health and lifestyle, and suffered chronic pain. At issue in this appeal was a question of the reasonable value of medical services provided to Moore, who at the time of her injury, was uninsured. Defendant insisted that plaintiff failed to sustain her burden to prove she actually incurred liability for the full amount of the doctor and hospital charges. "If there was a failure, it was defendant’s failure to challenge plaintiff’s evidence at trial." The Court of Appeals reversed a sanctions order made in this case against the defense, but affirmed in all other respects. View "Moore v. Mercer" on Justia Law

Manuel Nava was injured while a patient at Saddleback Memorial Medical Center (Saddleback). His injury occurred while he was being transported in the hospital on a gurney. Nava filed suit against Saddleback, and an ambulance service, Herren Enterprises, Inc. (Herren). The complaint was filed more than one year, but less than two years, after his injury. Both Saddleback and Herren filed motions for summary judgment, contending that the complaint was time-barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 340, which imposed a one-year statute of limitations when an injury was caused by the professional negligence of a health care provider. The trial court granted the motions. Subsequently, the California Supreme Court held that section 340.5 applied when negligence occurs in the use or maintenance of medical equipment or premises while medical care is being provided to the plaintiff. Applying the Supreme Court's holding to this case, the Court of Appeals concluded that Nava’s claims were barred by section 340.5’s statute of limitations. "The transfer of Nava in the hospital on a gurney was integrally related to Nava’s medical treatment or diagnosis, and, therefore, the injury occurred in the rendering of professional services." The Court, therefore, affirmed. View "Nava v. Saddleback Memorial Medical Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Da Loc Nguyen appealed a trial court's order granting the motion of his former employer, defendant Applied Medical Resources Corporation, to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause contained in his employment application. The court ordered plaintiff to submit his individual claims to arbitration and struck all class and representative claims except for the representative Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) cause of action. Plaintiff argued the order was immediately appealable based on the "death knell doctrine." As to the merits of the appeal, plaintiff argued the court erred in finding the arbitration clause was not unconscionable, severing the cost provision, and dismissing the class claims with prejudice. The Court of Appeals rejected all but the last argument, finding that the trial court erred in dismissing the class claims because whether the arbitration provision contemplated class arbitration was a question for the arbitrator to decide. The Court of Appeals issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the trial court to vacate that portion of its order dismissing the class claims to allow the arbitrator to decide whether the arbitration clause permitted arbitration on a class-wide basis. In all other respects, the peremptory writ challenging the order compelling arbitration was denied. View "Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp." on Justia Law