Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Medical Marijuana, Inc. (MMI) and HempMeds PX, LLC (HempMeds) (jointly "the plaintiffs") sued defendants ProjectCBD.com (Project CBD), Martin Lee, and Aaron Cantu. Project CBD appealed a trial court's order denying their special motion to strike1 counts 1 and 3 of the complaint against them, which asserted causes of action for libel and false light. Plaintiff MMI held investments in numerous industrial hemp businesses, including plaintiff HempMeds. HempMeds manufactures and sells RSHO, a product containing cannabidiol (CBD) derived from the industrial hemp plant. MMI also holds interests in KannaLife Sciences, Inc. Per the first amended complaint, Jason Cranford, another defendant, resigned from KannaLife's Board of Directors and then began competing with MMI and HempMeds by selling CBD products through his Colorado medical marijuana dispensary, Rifle Mountain, LLC (Rifle Mountain - also named as a defendant in the case). Project CBD was a California nonprofit organization that identifies itself as an organization dedicated to promoting and publicizing research regarding CBD and other components of the cannabis plant. Project CBD had samples of plaintiffs’ cannabis product tested, and released results on their Facebook page. Plaintiffs contended that those results and other statements made about their products were false. On appeal, the Project CBD defendants contended that the trial court incorrectly determined that plaintiffs demonstrated a probability of prevailing on counts 1 and 3 against defendants. The Project CBD defendants also claimed that the trial court erred in concluding that plaintiffs were not limited public figures, meaning that the plaintiffs would not have to demonstrate that the Project CBD defendants acted with actual malice in publishing an article about the plaintiffs, and/or that the court erred in concluding in the alternative that the plaintiffs demonstrated that the Project CBD defendants acted with actual malice in publishing the article. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's ruling with respect to the Project CBD defendants' anti-SLAPP motion directed at counts 1 and 3 was correct, albeit on grounds different from those relied on by the trial court. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court's order and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com" on Justia Law

Defendant Greyhound Lines, Inc. (Greyhound) appealed a trial court’s order granting plaintiff Linda Gee’s motion to set aside dismissal pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). Gee had been injured while a passenger on a Greyhound bus. She alleged the driver was going too fast, which caused the bus to hit two other vehicles and then crash into a tree. Gee also sued the bus driver’s estate and several others relating to the accident. On appeal, Greyhound argued that the trial court erred in granting relief under section 473, subdivision (b), contending that: (1) the court lacked jurisdiction to set aside the dismissal under section 473, subdivision (b), because Gee failed to comply with the requirements of section 1008; and (2) Gee failed to provide a sufficient showing to justify relief under section 473, subdivision (b). The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial court’s judgment, and affirmed. View "Gee v. Greyhound Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

All parties to this matter appealed a district court’s judgment. Orange County Social Services Department (SSA) sought to remove Z.G. and I.L. from their parents’ custody, C.G. (Mother) and H.L. (Father), after Children’s sibling, H.L., Jr. (Junior), died. The juvenile court found Parents’ “neglect” was a cause of Junior’s death. Despite the Parents essentially doing nothing to move the family towards reunification, the court found reunification was in the “best interest” of Children. The Parents appealed the jurisdiction and disposition orders and argued there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding their neglect was a cause of Junior’s death. Thus, they contend the court erred by concluding Children were subject to jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (f), and that Parents were subject to the reunification services bypass provisions of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(4). The Children appealed the disposition order and contended there was insufficient evidence to support the finding reunification with Parents is in the best interest of Children. Hence, they argued, the court abused its discretion by ordering reunification services for Parents under section 361.5, subdivision (c). SSA joined the Children’s argument. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding Parents’ neglect was a cause of Junior’s death, but there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding reunification with Parents was in Children’s best interest. Therefore the court abused its discretion by ordering reunification services for Parents. Consequently, the Court reversed that portion of the disposition order, but affirmed the jurisdiction and disposition orders in all other respects. View "In re Z.G." on Justia Law

Tanguilig, a Bloomingdale’s employee, filed a representative action on behalf of herself and fellow employees pursuant to the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) (Lab. Code 2698), alleging several Labor Code violations by the company. The trial court denied a motion by Bloomingdale’s to compel arbitration of Tanguilig’s “individual PAGA claim” and stay or dismiss the remainder of the complaint. The court of appeal affirmed. Under California Supreme Court precedent and consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C. 1), a PAGA representative claim is nonwaivable by a plaintiff-employee by means a predispute arbitration agreement with an employer. A PAGA claim (whether individual or representative) acts as a proxy for the state, with the state’s acquiescence, and seeks civil penalties largely payable to the state; such a plaintiff cannot be ordered to arbitration without the state’s consent. View "Tanguilig v. Bloomingdale's, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-respondent interest Kevyn Thaxton was employed as a corrections officer by appellant, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). After being dismissed from his position, Thaxton filed an appeal with the State Personnel Board (the SPB), along with three other colleagues who were also dismissed in relation to the same incident that led to Thaxton's dismissal. The SPB consolidated all four employees' appeals and scheduled a joint evidentiary hearing. Thaxton did not appear on the first day of the evidentiary hearing, and failed to appear on the second day, although his attorney was present to represent him on both days. On the second day of the hearing, CDCR proffered the testimony of a process server to the effect that Thaxton had informed the process server that Thaxton was purposely avoiding service of CDCR's subpoena. Thaxton's attorney indicated that he would not accept service of the subpoena on Thaxton's behalf. After Thaxton's attorney refused to accept service of the subpoena, the administrative law judge (ALJ) overseeing the hearing ordered that Thaxton appear that afternoon. When the hearing resumed, Thaxton's attorney indicated that he had informed Thaxton of the ALJ's order, but Thaxton neither appeared nor provided any justification or explanation for his continued absence from the proceeding. The ALJ then dismissed Thaxton's appeal. Thaxton petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandate. The trial court granted the petition, and effectively ordered that Thaxton be reinstated to his former position at CDCR and receive back pay and interest. CDCR appealed, arguing the trial court erred in granting Thaxton's petition for a writ of mandate, and contended the ALJ properly dismissed Thaxton's appeal because Thaxton failed to personally appear at the hearing, which CDCR contended was required by SPB regulation, and/or because the ALJ acted within the scope of her authority in determining that Thaxton's conduct in failing to appear despite the ALJ's order that he appear constituted a failure to proceed with the hearing. The Court of Appeals agreed with the CDCR’s reasoning and reversed the trial court’s judgment. View "Thaxton v. California Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

This case involves a judgment in an interpleader action initiated by Southern California Gas Company against various defendants. After remand, the Gas Co., Andrea L. Murray, and Scott Tepper each filed a motion seeking payment from the interpleader funds on different grounds, and the trial court ultimately granted some portion of the funds sought by each party. Patrick J. Flannery and the Law Offices of Joseph Daneshrad appealed. The court concluded that the interpleader case satisfies the "separate, independent action" requirement for enforcement of an attorney fee lien. The court also concluded that the trial court's factual findings that Tepper withdrew involuntarily and for good cause did not violate due process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant M. Strasner sued out-of-state defendants Brightpoint, Inc., Brightpoint North America, LP, Touchstone Wireless Repair and Logistics, LP, and Touchstone Acquisition, LLC (collectively, Defendants) for injuries she suffered when a Touchstone employee allegedly uploaded a private photograph of Strasner to her Facebook page from a mobile telephone she had returned to T-Mobile. The court granted Defendants' motion to quash service of the summons and amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Strasner appealed, contending she made a sufficient showing of Defendants' contacts with California, both directly and through their California parent corporation, to subject them to personal jurisdiction. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Court of Appeals affirmed. View "Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair & Logistics" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Stonebridge, challenging the insurer’s partial denial of his claim for hospitalization benefits. The trial court ruled that a policy provision was unenforceable, entitling plaintiff to $31,500 in additional benefits under the policy. A jury then found that Stonebridge acted with fraud and fixed the punitive damage award at $19 million. At issue is the trial court's remittitur of that award from $19 million to $350,000 based on a ratio of punitive to compensatory damages of 10:1. The Supreme Court held on review that the Brandt v. Superior Court fees should be included as compensatory damages in the ratio calculation irrespective of whether such fees were awarded by the trial court or the jury. On remand from the Supreme Court, the court held that the Brandt fees should be included in the compensatory damages, modified the judgment and, as modified, affirmed it. View "Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

ZF, a microchip company, sued NSC and obtained a $20 million settlement in 2004. Afterwards, venture capital firms that had invested in ZF, including TAT, successfully sued ZF for fraudulent transfer of the NSC settlement proceeds. ZF filed a cross-complaint, alleging breach of fiduciary duty by TAT, but later severed that claim and consolidated it into a third suit, in which ZF alleged that Putney, a TAT representative who was a ZF board member, breached fiduciary duties owed to ZF. TAT argued that ZF’s 2009 claim, which accrued in 2002, was barred by a four-year statute of limitations. ZF contended that the statute of limitations was tolled by the 2005 filing of TAT’s lawsuit. TAT replied that this tolling doctrine applied only to compulsory cross-complaints; because the ZF cross-complaint was permissive (unrelated to TAT’s complaint), its filing did not relate back to the date the complaint was filed. The trial court held the tolling doctrine applied only to compulsory cross-complaints. The jury found ZF’s cross-complaint time-barred. The court of appeal reversed, agreeing that ZF’s cross-complaint was permissive but concluding the tolling doctrine applies to both permissive and compulsory cross-complaints. The filing of ZF’s permissive cross-complaint related back to the date TAT filed its complaint. View "ZF Micro Devices, Inc. v. TAT Capital Partners, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Company purchased the assets of Johnson Oyster and assumed the operation of a 1,060-acre mariculture facility at Drakes Estero estuarial bays in Point Reyes National Seashore. The site is owned by the federal government and within the California Coastal Commission’s permitting jurisdiction. The 40-year lease with the federal government expired in 2012. The government did not renew the agreement. The Company unsuccessfully challenged that decision in court. The operation had issues with the Commission relating to unpermitted development that began before and continued after the Company took over. Eventually, the Commission issued a consent order in which the Company agreed to stop certain development. The parties continued to have unresolved issues concerning unpermitted development and restoration. In 2013, the Company filed suit, alleging the Commission had infringed on the jurisdiction of the State’s Department of Fish and Wildlife and violated the Coastal Act, the Company’s due process rights, and the California Environmental Quality Act. The Commission sought injunctive relief and civil penalties against the Company. The court denied the Commission’s motion for a preliminary injunction and to disqualify certain Commission staff members from participating in the litigation and from communicating confidentially with the Commission regarding the litigation. The court of appeal affirmed. The Company’s argument that the Commission might in the future take further enforcement actions is too speculative and involves circumstances too uncertain to deprive it now of its staff’s assistance in the litigation. View "Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. California Coastal Commission" on Justia Law