Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2013, a golf ball struck Miguel Leyva in the eye while he and his wife, Socorro Leyva, walked along a public path adjacent to the Bonita Golf Club. The Leyvas appealed summary judgment entered in favor of Crockett and Company, Inc., the owner and operator of the Club. The Leyvas contended Crockett was not entitled to summary judgment because the immunities designated in Government Code section 831.41 and Civil Code section 846 did not apply to their tort claims. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded section 831.4 barred their action, therefore affirming the trial court’s judgment. View "Leyva v. Crockett & Co." on Justia Law

On September 24, 2010, plaintiffs filed a civil complaint. Plaintiffs were the "heirs" to the Alta Dena Dairy fortune built by the Stueve family. Defendants were several attorneys and law firms. The causes of action generally included allegations of fraud, as well as claims of negligent hiring and supervision. With just three days remaining before the fifth anniversary of the filing of a civil complaint, a panel of 75 prospective jurors assembled in a courtroom for jury selection. The court clerk administered an oath and the panel swore to give truthful answers. Seven days later, while voir dire was still in progress, defendants moved to dismiss under the five-year dismissal statute. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the jury had not yet been “impaneled and sworn.” The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the jury was “impaneled” when the panel of prospective jurors assembled in the courtroom for voir dire. The panel was “sworn” when the prospective jurors took an oath to respond truthfully. Accordingly, the action was, in fact, “brought to trial” within five years of the filing of the civil complaint. Thus, the trial court should not have granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. View "Stueve v. Buchalter Nemer" on Justia Law

A "squabble" erupted between family members over the property of the deceased patriarch. The patriarch-settlor appointed defendant Melissa Reynoso (a granddaughter of the settlor) as trustee. In this proceeding, the trial court determined Reynoso was the most reliable and credible of the family members. The trial court found that other family members were not credible. Reynoso sold real property of the trust to Karen Bartholomew (a daughter of the settlor). Plaintiff Anthony Pizarro (a grandson of the settlor) filed a petition for relief against Reynoso concerning the sale of the real property. The court denied the petition and ordered Pizarro and others to pay the trust’s attorney fees and costs. On appeal, Pizarro contended the trial court erred in finding that Reynoso acted properly as trustee. However, the Court of Appeal concluded he failed to make a focused, organized, and coherent argument for why the Court had to reverse the order. Therefore, the Court concluded he forfeited the argument. Pizarro and Bartholomew contend that the award of attorney fees and costs against them was improper. The Court reversed the award of attorney fees and costs to the extent it imposed personal liability, rather than liable solely from their shares of trust assets. In all other respects, the Court affirmed. View "Pizarro v. Reynoso" on Justia Law

After a bus rollover accident in Arizona caused injuries and deaths, plaintiffs filed suit seeking to recover in strict liability. Plaintiffs, Chinese nationals, are the passengers who were injured, and the survivors of the passengers who were killed. Plaintiffs' theory of the case is that passenger seatbelts would have prevented the deaths and greatly lessened the injuries suffered. The court concluded that the trial court erred in applying Indiana products liability law, which is substantially less favorable to plaintiffs, as opposed to California products liability law. In this case, the tour bus had been manufactured in Indiana, by an Indiana manufacturer, but the manufacturer had previously settled out of the case. The court explained that the trial court should have fully reconsidered the choice of law issue after the manufacturer's settlement with plaintiffs. On de novo review, the court concluded that, considering the governmental interests at stake, California law has an interest in applying its laws, while Indiana does not. The court stated that California’s interest in imposing its rules of strict products liability, in which a California dealership ordered an allegedly defective product, imported it into the state, and sold it to a California tour company, for use on California roads, is strong. Because the trial court erred in applying Indiana law and the error was prejudicial, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Chen v. L.A. Truck Centers" on Justia Law

N.S. was placed in foster care when she was 11 years old. After she turned 18 in 2014, she remained under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a nonminor dependent. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 11400(v).) N.S. had been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and depressive disorder. She was participating in therapy and taking medication and would be enrolled in an educational program. In 2015, the Agency took the position that N.S. qualified for extended foster care because her mental health diagnoses prevented her from attending an educational or employment program or working at least half time. In 2016, the Agency recommended that N.S.’s dependency be dismissed because her exact whereabouts were unknown. N.S. was abusing methamphetamines and declined offers of housing, substance abuse treatment support, and options to get back on track with services. The Agency sought to have N.S.’s psychotherapist testify as to confidential communications. The court overruled N.S.’s objection. The court of appeal granted a writ prohibiting any inquiry concerning the psychotherapist’s confidential communications with N.S. N.S. did not put her mental condition at issue by responding to questions posed by the Agency in its case-in-chief with respect to her eligibility or by submitting documentation. View "N.S. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Leticia Bareno appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendants San Diego Miramar College (the College), San Diego Community College District, and San Diego Community College District Administrative Facilities Corporation. In early 2013, Bareno was disciplined by her employer, the College, in relation to her employment as an administrative assistant. Thereafter, Bareno required medical treatment and accompanying leave from work, and she requested medical leave from her supervisor. Bareno provided medical certification for this request for leave. After the time frame specified in Bareno's initial request for leave had ended, Bareno continued to be absent from work. Bareno had attempted to e-mail her supervisor a recertification of her need for additional medical leave, but the College claimed that Bareno's supervisor did not receive any such request from Bareno for additional leave. As a result, after Bareno continued to be absent from work for an additional five consecutive days, the College took the position that she had "voluntarily resigned." After Bareno learned that the College considered her to have voluntarily resigned, she attempted to provide the College with information regarding the medical necessity of the leave that she had taken. The College refused to reconsider its position. Bareno filed suit against all three defendants, alleging that in effectively terminating her employment, defendants retaliated against her for taking medical leave, in violation of the California Family Rights Act (CFRA). Defendants moved for summary judgment on Bareno's sole claim for retaliation under CFRA, and the trial court granted the motion. On appeal, Bareno argued that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there remain triable issues of material fact in dispute. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed, reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Bareno v. San Diego Community College Dist." on Justia Law

This matter arose from Whitney Engler's use of a medical device, the "Polar Care 500," manufactured by Breg, Inc. (Breg) and prescribed by David Chao, M.D. Engler suffered injuries as a result of her use of the Polar Care 500, and she brought various tort claims against Chao, his medical group Oasis MSO, Inc. (Oasis), and Breg, among others. At trial, the jury considered Engler's claims for medical malpractice, design defect (under theories of negligence and strict liability), failure to warn (also under theories of negligence and strict liability), breach of fiduciary duty, intentional misrepresentation, and intentional concealment. With a few exceptions, the jury generally found in favor of Engler, and against the defendants, on these claims. The jury awarded $68,270.38 in economic compensatory damages and $5,127,950 in noneconomic compensatory damages to Engler. It allocated responsibility for Engler's harm: 50 percent to Chao, 10 percent to Oasis, and 40 percent to Breg. The jury made findings of malice, oppression, or fraud as to each defendant on at least one claim. In the punitive damages phase of trial, the jury awarded $500,000 against Chao and $7 million against Breg. The jury declined to award any punitive damages against Oasis. Breg, Chao, Oasis, and Virginia Bigler-Engler, as administrator of Engler's estate, appealed, raising numerous challenges to the judgment. In the published portions of its opinion, the Court of Appeal considered: (1) whether Engler's counsel committed prejudicial misconduct during trial; (2) whether the jury's awards of noneconomic compensatory damages and punitive damages were excessive; (3) whether the evidence supported the jury's verdict against Breg for intentional concealment in the absence of a transactional relationship between Breg and Engler (or her parents); (4) whether Oasis fell within the medical provider exception to the doctrine of strict products liability; (5) whether Breg was entitled to an instruction on the learned intermediary doctrine; (6) whether the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA) and Proposition 51 applied to the jury's verdict; and (7) whether Engler's pretrial settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 complied with the statute. In the unpublished portions of the opinion, the Court considered additional challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court's jury instructions, and the trial court's evidentiary rulings. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in part, concluding the jury's verdict as to several claims was not supported by the evidence, including Engler's intentional concealment claim against Breg and her strict products liability claim against Oasis. In light of this reversal of Engler's intentional concealment claim against Breg, the jury's punitive damages award against Breg had to be reversed too. Furthermore, the Court concluded the jury's award of noneconomic compensatory damages and the jury's award of punitive damages as to Chao were indeed excessive. Those awards were reversed and remanded for a new trial unless Bigler-Engler accepted reductions in those awards to $1,300,000 and $150,000 respectively. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, Pamela Silva filed an action against her former employer, See's Candy Shops, Inc., alleging wage and hour violations. Silva brought the action in her individual capacity, on behalf of a class of See's Candy employees, and on behalf of aggrieved workers under the Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA). The trial court certified a class on Silva's claims challenging two of See's Candy's policies pertaining to the calculation of employee work time: (1) a rounding policy, which calculated timeclock punches to the nearest tenth of an hour; and (2) a grace-period policy, which permitted employees to clock in 10 minutes before and after a shift, but calculated work time from the employee's scheduled start/end times. In a prior appeal, the Court of appeal granted See's Candy's writ petition challenging the trial court's dismissal of See's Candy's affirmative defense that its rounding policy was lawful. After remand, See's Candy successfully moved for summary judgment on Silva's PAGA cause of action. In a later proceeding, the trial court granted summary judgment in See's Candy's favor on all of Silva's remaining claims. In this appeal, Silva challenged the summary judgment order on her PAGA claim and the summary judgment on all remaining causes of action. After review, the Court of Appeal determined the trial court erred in granting summary judgment with respect to certain of Silva's individual claims, but the court properly entered judgment in See's Candy's favor on all remaining claims, including the PAGA cause of action and the class-certified claims. View "Silva v. See's Candy Shops" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the NCAA for seven causes of action and the NCAA exercised a peremptory challenge to the trial judge assigned to the case at the time. The case was reassigned to a different jurist. The NCAA then moved to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. In this petition for writ of mandate, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law by ruling on a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute and requests the court to vacate its order accepting the postappeal peremptory challenge. The court held that Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2) allows a party to exercise a second peremptory challenge only after prevailing in an appeal from a final judgment, but not following reversal of an interim decision. The court granted the petition for writ of mandate and directed the trial court to vacate its order accepting the NCAA's peremptory challenge pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, and enter a new order rejecting the challenge. View "McNair v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In this case, the issue presented for the Court of Appeal’s review was whether an anti-SLAPP motion was timely when it was filed within 60 days of service of a third amended complaint and no previous anti-SLAPP motion had been filed. After review, the Court concluded the filing of an amended complaint did not automatically reopen the period for bringing an anti-SLAPP motion. Whether the filing of an amended complaint reopens the period for bringing an anti-SLAPP motion depends on the basis and nature of the claims in the amended complaint. View "Newport Harbor Ventures v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism" on Justia Law