Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Haniff was employed as a delivery truck driver when he was injured in a motor vehicle accident while unloading packages from his parked truck on the Stanford campus. According to Haniff, an automobile owned by Kim and parked by Hohman, a Stanford University employee, rolled down a hill and struck Haniff. As a result of the accident, Haniff sustained multiple fractures of his right femur and pelvis and underwent surgery. He has not returned to work and filed a personal injury complaint naming Hohman, Kim, and Stanford University as defendants. During the course of discovery, defendants successfully sought an order compelling Haniff to undergo a vocational rehabilitation examination by their vocational expert. Haniff challenged the order by filing a petition for writ of mandate in the court of appeal, arguing that a defense vocational rehabilitation examination is not one of the six methods of civil discovery expressly authorized by Code Civ. Proc., 2016.010. The court of appeal agreed and vacated the order. Whether a defense vocational rehabilitation examination should be an available discovery method as a matter of fundamental fairness where the plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for wage loss and loss of earning capacity is better addressed to the Legislature. View "Haniff v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Gonzalez challenged an administrative order declaring that she should be reported to the statewide child abuse index for what was deemed excessive discipline of her 12-year old daughter. She had spanked the girl with a wooden spoon. After she successfully appealed the trial court’s denial of relief, she sought an award of approximately $60,000 in attorney fees incurred to four separate law practices. The trial court awarded $7,500, denying her claim as to all but her current counsel and finding the evidence in support of two other claims technically deficient, although no evidentiary objection had been asserted against them. It denied the third claim on the basis of objections that were only raised when the court permitted the opposing party to file a third opposition memorandum. The court of appeals remanded, stating that the rulings “may have grown out of an understandable frustration with counsel for plaintiff, whose several failings included the belated assertion of arguments and the devotion of considerably more attention to unsound technicalities than to making a bulletproof showing on the merits.” The court stated that complete denial of relief as to three of plaintiff’s four attorneys exceeded the bounds of sound discretion. View "Gonzalez v. Santa Clara County Department of Social Services" on Justia Law

In the seventh appeal arising from a 20-year multi-phase litigation, the issue presented for the Court of Appeal’s review centered on whether the trial court had authority to award approximately $281,000 in receivership fees to one of the prevailing parties under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (c). The trial court denied the cost request on the grounds the matter was previously decided when the court terminated the receivership and approved the receiver’s final accounting. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court retained authority to exercise its discretion and consider whether the receivership fee should be paid by one party or shared between the parties. Therefore, the Court reversed the order granting the motion to tax costs and remanded the matter to permit the court to exercise its discretion on this limited issue. In all other respects, the trial court’s postjudgment order was affirmed. View "Southern Cal. Sunbelt v. Banyan, Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff contended the trial court erred by not accepting the parties‘ stipulation to continue a hearing on defendant‘s summary judgment motion and the trial for 60 days. The parties had agreed to these continuances to allow plaintiff to take depositions of the witnesses whose declarations had been submitted in support of defendant‘s pending summary judgment motion. Plaintiff had timely noticed these depositions but they could not go forward because defendant‘s counsel was engaged in trial. The court had earlier granted defendant‘s ex parte motion to continue the trial so that defendant‘s summary judgment motion could be heard. Under these circumstances, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court abused its discretion by failing to accommodate counsel‘s joint request for a further 60-day continuance. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment. View "Hamilton v. Orange County Sheriff's Dept." on Justia Law

Presley, certified as a mentally disordered offender (MDO), was placed into an outpatient conditional release program (CONREP) in 2013. He was initially housed at a board and care facility, with weekly drug screening, group therapy, and individual counseling. After he moved to his family’s home CONREP visited him and stayed in contact with family members. Presley went to the CONREP facility for group therapy and twice-monthly drug screening. In 2014, CONREP recommended that Presley’s commitment be terminated. The state conceded that Presley should be discharged based on a psychologist’s opinion that he no longer met the MDO qualifications and that, although the issue was moot, under Penal Code 2972.1, Presley would have been entitled to a jury trial on his MDO status. Before the court ruled, Presley’s psychologist requested revocation of Presley’s outpatient status because he had “gone AWOL,” leaving his medications behind. The court revoked Presley’s outpatient status, issued a bench warrant, and set a hearing. Presley did not appear, although his counsel was present. The court ordered that Presley be confined in a state hospital. The court of appeal affirmed. While Presley was improperly deprived of a jury trial, his absconding from outpatient treatment before the court ruled on his commitment status forfeited the claim of error. View "People v. Presley" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on the notice and time requirements of the Right to Repair Act (the act), Civil Code section 895 et seq. The Court granted petitioner William Blanchette's petition for a writ of mandate and directed that the trial court vacate its order staying proceedings pending Blanchette's compliance with the act. Blanchette's compliance with the act was relieved by virtue of real party GHA Enterprises, Inc.'s (GHA) failure to timely acknowledge receipt of Blanchette's notice of a claim. "Contrary to GHA's argument, the act's goal of promptly resolving claims without resort to litigation cannot be achieved by permitting homebuilders to serve tardy responses to claims or to ignore them entirely." View "Blanchette v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

N.S. was placed in foster care at age 11. After she turned 18 in 2014, she remained under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a nonminor dependent. (Welf. & Inst. Code 11400(v)), having been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and depressive disorder. She was participating in therapy and taking medication. The report indicated that N.S. would be enrolled in an educational program. A 2015 report indicated that N.S. qualified for extended foster care because her mental health, prevented her from participating in education or an employment program. In 2016, the Agency recommended that N.S.’s dependency be dismissed because her exact whereabouts were unknown and she had not participated in any services. N.S. had admitted she was using methamphetamine. She was not interested in treatment referrals or placement. She was meeting with her therapist, Chan, sporadically. At the contested hearing, both N.S. and Chan testified. Counsel asked Chan about N.S.’s diagnosis; she and N.S. asserted the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The juvenile court concluded the privilege did not apply because N.S. had put her mental state at issue. The court of appeal disagreed, rejecting an argument that the Agency and the court will be unable to verify the eligibility requirement without information from Chan. It is the Agency’s position that it is N.S.’s substance abuse, and not her mental health condition, that prevents her from meeting the criteria. View "N.S. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Andrew and Kathi Kalnoki (the Kalnokis) appealed a judgment dismissing their second amended complaint for wrongful foreclosure-related causes of action after the trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend (case No. C073207, the foreclosure appeal). They separately appealed an order after judgment awarding attorney fees to defendants (case No. C075062, the attorney fees appeal), and an order disbursing funds the Kalnokis deposited with the court under Code of Civil Procedure section 1170.5 to delay the trial in an unlawful detainer action filed against them regarding the residential property at issue here (case No. C079144, the rental disbursement appeal). The Court of Appeal consolidated all three appellate cases for argument and decision. Finding that the Kalnokis failed to allege a cause of action on any theory, the Court affirmed the judgments dismissing the second amended complaint with prejudice. The Court also concluded the trial court properly awarded attorney fees. The Court found, however, that the court erred in disbursing to Wells Fargo the rental funds on deposit with the court. The Court therefore reversed the rental disbursement order and order that the funds be returned to the Kalnokis. View "Kalnoki v. First American" on Justia Law

Van sued her employer, Language Line, alleging discrimination because of her Vietnamese background, harassment based on her race, and various wage and labor law violations. Starting in May 2014, Language Line began trying to take Van’s deposition. Ultimately, the trial court entered an order sanctioning her ($7,713) and finding her in contempt. The court found that Van had disobeyed a prior court order by refusing to attend a deposition noticed by Language Line and had engaged in other discovery violations relating to her deposition. The court of appeal reversed. That prior court order, allegedly disregarded by Van, did not order her to attend a deposition and was not issued as a result of a motion to compel. It was only a denial of Van’s own ex parte application to have her deposition stayed based on her claim that the location was more than 80 miles from her home. Language Line did file a motion to compel Van’s attendance (and Van filed a motion to quash the deposition notice) but those were never ruled upon before the case was dismissed. . View "Van v. Language Line Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs borrowed $110 million in 2007 from Bear Stearns to finance the purchase of Rincon Towers, a San Francisco apartment complex. In 2010, after plaintiffs failed to repay the loan and after changes in the ownership of the loan, CP III purchased the property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Plaintiffs sued CP III and other entities who were involved in administering the loan, unsuccessful workout negotiations, and the eventual foreclosure sale. The trial court rejected all of their claims. The court of appeal remanded plaintiffs’ legal claims (breach of contract, fraud, slander of title, trade secret misappropriation), finding that the trial court erred in striking their demand for a jury trial, but affirmed as to the equitable claims (unfair competition, to set aside the foreclosure sale, and for an accounting). View "Rincon EV Realty, LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc." on Justia Law