Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in California Court of Appeal
by
Defendant-appellant Ramon Soto appealed an order denying his motions to: (1) vacate entry of default and default judgment; and (2) quash service of summons and dismiss. Defendant filed the motions in connection with an action brought by plaintiff-respondent Diana Buchanan to set aside a fraudulent transfer. Plaintiff claimed that defendant Maria Soto transferred certain real property to her husband Ramon as a fraudulent conveyance to prevent Buchanan from executing an anticipated judgment on the property. Plaintiff eventually obtained the underlying judgment when she sued Maria for failing to pay money owed by Maria to plaintiff in connection with Maria's purchase of plaintiff's bridal business. Defendant argued the court erred in denying his motions because, at the time of entry of default and judgment thereon, the court allegedly did not have personal jurisdiction over him and he was not properly served with process. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Buchanan v. Soto" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff, the landlord, filed an unlawful detainer action against Coolwaters, the commercial lessee. On appeal, Coolwaters challenged the trial court's order denying its special motion to strike the complaint and awarding plaintiff attorney fees as sanctions for the expenses of responding to the special motion to strike. The court concluded that a nonpaying tenant should not be permitted to frustrate an unlawful detainer proceeding by initiating litigation against the landlord in order to bring a special motion to strike the landlord’s subsequently filed unlawful detainer complaint, on the asserted ground that the unlawful detainer action arose out of the tenant’s protected activity in filing the initial lawsuit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order denying the special motion to strike and imposing monetary sanctions against Coolwaters. View "Olive Properties v. Coolwater Enter." on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff filed suit against defendant alleging 13 contract and fraud-based causes of action. On appeal, defendant challenged an order granting a motion to vacate and set aside a default judgment filed by defendant. The court concluded that, because plaintiff’s complaint did not specify the amount of damages sought, the default judgment was void and subject to collateral attack at any time. The court rejected plaintiff’s contention that he met the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure, section 5801 by serving defendant with a statement of damages under section 425.11 or 425.115, when the underlying claims did not involve personal injury or wrongful death, and the default judgment was for compensatory damages only. Further, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the default judgment is merely voidable, rather than void. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order setting aside default judgment. View "Dhawan v. Biring" on Justia Law

by
The small claims court dispute at issue here stems from a condominium lease, which contained a prevailing party attorney fee provision. After the superior court heard the small claims appeal, it entered judgment in favor of the tenants, Jeffrey and Rebekah Crosier, against the landlord, Michael Dorsey as trustee of the Dorsey Trust, in the principal amount of $1,560. After judgment, Crosier sought $11,497.50 in attorney fees as the prevailing parties under the attorney fee provision in the lease. Dorsey opposed the motion, asserting section 116.780(c) trumped the contractual attorney fees provision, limiting any award to $150. The superior court awarded Crosier $10,373. The issue in this case of first impression was whether Code Civ. Proc. section 116.780(c) expressly, or the policy of the statute implicitly, overrode the freedom to contract for a different amount of attorney fees. The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate to command the superior court to vacate its order. “Crosier sought out the small claims court procedure which is quick, inexpensive, and efficient. Having elected to utilize the advantages of the small claims procedure, Crosier must accept its disadvantages. . . . Small claims court exists so people with meritorious claims for small amounts may have those claims adjudicated without spending more on attorney fees than the claims are worth. Section 116.780(c) reflects a legislative determination that a small claims appeal should require no more than minimal attorney time. The small claims appeal procedure was intended to be integral to the legislative scheme for expeditious and cost-effective resolution of small claims. Therefore, … section 116.780(c) must be construed to override contractual attorney fee provisions and limit the attorney fee award here to $150.” View "Dorsey v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

by
Defendant-appellant S.H. (mother) was the biological mother of C.G. (born in 2013), the child at issue here, and B.H. (born in 2011), who was C.G.’s half sibling. Both children were removed from mother’s custody, and her parental rights were eventually terminated. On appeal, mother argued that the order terminating her parental rights as to C.G. should have been reversed for failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian and Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). After review of the specific facts entered into the trial court record, the Court of Appeal agreed, reversed and remanded. View "In re B.H." on Justia Law

by
Behm claimed that she was persuaded by the false representations of CVT's officers and directors to invest $200,000 in the company. CVT claimed to be developing a product that would measure pours of alcohol with such precision that it would save large sums of money for purveyors of adult beverages. CVT had financial difficulties. Behm discovered the product did not have the viability she had been assured. She filed suit against CVT and its officers and directors seeking compensatory damages exceeding $200,000. During the litigation, CVT failed to produce discovery and to comply with court orders. Behm obtained terminating sanctions. A default was entered against CVT. Behm procured a default judgment for $1,264,668.83, including $924,000 in punitive damages. CVT moved to vacate the default and the judgment, arguing that it did not have sufficient notice of the amount of punitive damages under Code of Civil Procedure 425.115, 2(f) and that it was entitled to mandatory relief from default under section 473(b) because the default was incurred due to the mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect of its prior attorney. The appeal court affirmed the trial court order, vacating the default judgment after finding the notice of damages was insufficient, and denying CVT’s request to be relieved from the underlying default. View "Behm v. Clear View Techs." on Justia Law

by
In 1998, the superior court established a conservatorship over G.H.’s person pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, 5000. G.H. has been under continuous conservatorship since that time. In 2012, the Santa Clara County Public Guardian sought to be reappointed G.H.’s conservator, alleging that G.H remained gravely disabled as a result of mental disorder. G.H.’s counsel requested t an evidentiary hearing. On the date of the hearing G.H. was not present in court. The Public Guardian explained that G.H. had refused to submit to a mental examination with the Public Guardian’s doctor, and that it did not intend to transport G.H to court unless G.H. submitted to the mental examination. At a second hearing, the Public Guardian explained that G.H. had again refused to submit to a mental examination with the Public Guardian’s doctor. G.H. was not present at a third hearing. The court granted the reappointment petition, reasoning that G.H.’s failure to submit to a mental examination with the Public Guardian’s doctor authorized the court to impose an evidence sanction or a terminating sanction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.410. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the court erred in imposing a terminating, as opposed to an evidence sanction. View "Conservatorship of G.H." on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff-appellant Ilan Brand appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendants Hyundai Motor America and Allen Used Cars, LLC (Hyundai) after granting Hyundai's nonsuit motion on plaintiff's breach of implied warranty of merchantability lawsuit. Plaintiff argued the trial court erred in granting the motion on grounds that no reasonable jury could have concluded a new vehicle sunroof that spontaneously opens and closes while driving constituted a safety hazard in violation of the implied warranty. The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiff and reversed the judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Brand v. Hyundai" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff Jason Carlsen was severely injured from a fall from a cliff above the Sacramento River. Although he could not recall how or why he fell, he sued his two travel companions, defendants Sarah Koivumaki and Zachary Gudelunas, asserting causes of action for assault and battery, negligence, willful misconduct, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He claimed defendants put him in peril by bringing him to the edge of a cliff when he was highly intoxicated, leading to his fall, and that they aggravated his injuries by waiting several hours to inform the authorities of the fall. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sarah, finding that it could not reasonably be inferred from the evidence submitted that she touched or threatened to touch plaintiff or that she breached a duty of care owed to him. Plaintiff contended the trial court erred because "[m]ultiple material issues of fact [existed] relating to [Sarah]'s role in placing [him] in peril at the bottom of the cliff," and "[Sarah] owed [him] an affirmative duty to summon aid so as to protect [him] in the face of the ongoing imminent harm, danger, and medical emergency" and "as a result of a special relationship." The Court of Appeal concluded plaintiff established triable issues of material fact as to the negligence and willful misconduct causes of action, and that on the facts tendered, a jury could have reasonably inferred Sarah had acted to put an inebriated plaintiff in peril at the edge of a cliff. The Court reversed summary judgment entered in favor of Sarah but affirmed the summary judgment as to the assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress causes of action. Zach failed to respond to plaintiff's complaint, and a clerk's default was entered against him. After the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Sarah, plaintiff filed a request for the entry of a default judgment against Zach. The trial court denied plaintiff's request and entered judgment in favor of Zach, finding that plaintiff "failed to prove his case against [Zach]." Plaintiff contended the trial court erred in doing so. The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiff, and reversed the judgment entered in Zach's favor and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to conduct a hearing to determine whether plaintiff could establish damages and, if so, to enter a default judgment for plaintiff and against Zach. View "Carlsen v. Koivumaki" on Justia Law

by
Defendant-respondent Stephen Lipworth won a judgment against Plaintiff-appellant Raj Singh, and successfully moved to amend the judgment to add certain aliases Singh used. The trial court then granted Lipworth's application for the sale of certain property that Singh transferred to his wife, who in turn transferred the property to Sunman Mehta. The trial court concluded that "Mehta" was another alias Singh adopted to avoid paying his creditors. The court set aside that series of transfers and ordered the property sold to satisfy the judgment. The order granting Lipworth's application for sale became final after various appeals were dismissed. In the case before the Court of Appeal, Singh, along with his wife Karen and "Mehta," sued Lipworth alleging he used "fraudulent representations" to persuade the trial court in the prior case that Singh was "hiding some properties from his creditors using different names such as Archana Singh and Suman Mehta." After several frivolous motions were decided against Singh, the trial court invited Lipworth to file a motion to require Singh to furnish security or have the case dismissed pursuant to the vexatious litigant statutes. Lipworth did so, and filed both a demurrer and a special motion to strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court found Singh to be a vexatious litigant with no reasonable probability of prevailing in the litigation because the lawsuit amounted to an impermissible collateral attack on a prior final judgment and post-judgment orders. The trial court ordered "Raj Singh aka Suman Mehta" to furnish security and dismissed the lawsuit as to plaintiff when no such security was furnished. The trial court then granted the anti-SLAPP motion as to Karen Singh, and awarded attorney fees and costs. Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeal, and Lipworth filed a motion for sanctions against plaintiffs and plaintiffs' counsel pursuant to section 907 and rule 8.276 for bringing a frivolous appeal. The Court of Appeals concluded sanctions were warranted in this case. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment and imposed sanctions against plaintiffs and their attorney. View "Singh v. Lipworth" on Justia Law