Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed a judgment after the trial court's grant of defendants' motion for terminating sanctions. Chase moved for terminating sanctions based on its unsuccessful attempts to depose plaintiff's brother and plaintiff's threats of physical violence. The court held that courts have the inherent authority to dismiss a case as a sanction and the authority should be exercised only in extreme situations, such as where the conduct was clear and deliberate and no lesser sanction would remedy the situation. The court concluded that, based on plaintiff's conduct, this case required a terminating sanction. The court cited plaintiff's failure to pay sanctions, harassing behavior, highly contemptuous statements made to the court, brandishing pepper spray and use of a stun gun. The court rejected plaintiff's arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "Crawford v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Barry Schneer (father) appealed a family court order finding California lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to make an initial child custody determination regarding his daughter. Father filed his child custody petition on June 24, 2013. In support of the petition, father declared the child was born in June 2011 in Miami, Florida, and that the child and mother resided with father in Twentynine Palms, California, from April 2012 onward. In an attachment to a request for an emergency decree, father alleged mother took the child to Florida to visit the child's grandparents “under [the] presumption of her return following a short visit,” but mother and the child had been in Florida for more than three months “with no date of return.” In her response and in a motion to quash and dismiss the petition, defendant-respondent Alice Llaurado (mother) alleged the child lived in Miami since her birth and never resided in California. Mother declared she and the child visited California several times between August 2012 and March 2013, but she never stayed more than a few weeks at a time. Mother denied having any intent to relocate to California, and denied residing in any state other than Florida. Father argued the California family court erred by ruling California was not the child's home state for purposes of the UCCJEA because the child did not reside in California during the six-month period immediately before father filed his child custody petition. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with father's interpretation of the UCCJEA and reversed the family court's order. View "Schneer v. Llaurado" on Justia Law

Petitioner Catalina Island Yacht Club hosted social events for its members and also arranged for its members to dock their boats in Avalon Harbor. Real party in interest Timothy Beatty and petitioners Charles Boppell, V. Kelley York, Lowell Dreyfus, Tom Nix, and Dave Horst were members of the Yacht Club and its board of directors. In 2013, Beatty sued Petitioners, alleging they conspired to remove him from the board and suspend his membership in the Yacht Club. He alleged Petitioners defamed him by telling others that the Yacht Club removed him because he committed various acts that prejudiced “the best interests of the Club.” The complaint alleged claims for libel, slander, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Beatty served inspection demands on Petitioners seeking written communications and other documents relating to his removal from the Yacht Club’s board of directors and suspension of his membership. In early February 2014, Petitioners served written responses that included boilerplate objections based on the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. Nearly two months later, Petitioners served a privilege log identifying 17 “communications” they withheld from production based on the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. For each communication, the log simply provided the date of the communication and explained it was between “counsel for Defendants and Defendants.” The ultimate issue the Court of Appeal was asked to decide centered on the privilege log: the trial court found a waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine when petitioners submitted a log that failed to provide sufficient information to evaluate the claims of privilege. The trial court ordered petitioners to produce 167 e-mails identified on their privilege log because the log failed to describe the subject matter or content of the e-mails, and therefore failed to show the e-mails were protected by either the attorney-client privilege or attorney work product doctrine. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred because it exceeded its authority. "[W]hen a privilege log fails to provide a trial court with sufficient information to rule on the merits of a privilege objection, the only relief the court may grant – other than sanctions – is an order requiring a further privilege log that provides the necessary information." View "Catalina Island Yacht Club v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Surety appealed from a summary judgment entered against it on a forfeited bail bond of $25,000. Surety claimed that summary judgment was premature and therefore improper because it was entered while Surety’s motion for an extension of time under Penal Code section 1305.4 was pending. The court concluded that the trial court not only erred by entering summary judgment against Surety while the timely extension motion was pending, but it further erred by failing to set aside the summary judgment once Surety pointed out the trial court’s mistake in a timely motion for relief. The court rejected the County’s argument that the summary judgment was not premature because no further extension of time could have been granted by the trial court under section 1305.4. The court also concluded that, because a proper summary judgment was not entered within 90 days after the date upon which it first could be entered, the bond must be ordered exonerated. View "People v. United States Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Developer Defendants seek a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order approving good faith settlements between codefendants Shell and Equilon and plaintiffs, as well as the City. The settlements involved mass tort litigation arising out of an environmental investigation showing that soil beneath a housing tract was contaminated with residual petroleum hydrocarbons. The court concluded that Shell's compliance with the Remedial Action Plan (RAP), which was mandated by the Water Board pursuant to the state’s police powers, was not part of the settlement consideration, and therefore should not be included in the valuation of the good faith settlement. The court concluded that, although the trial court gave some weight to the value of the RAP remediation in approving the good faith settlements, the error was harmless. On the record presented, the $90 million monetary payment, standing alone, was well within the range of Shell’s proportionate liability. The court finally concluded that the determination of good faith settlement did not require an allocation of the $90 million settlement consideration among the 1,491 individual plaintiffs and between their economic and noneconomic damages. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for writ of mandate. View "Dole Food Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Pro se defendant Gerald Brooks appealed a restraining order entered against him, after a hearing, pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA). Defendant argued to the Court of Appeal that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because, at the time of the commencement of this proceeding and at the time of the hearing, he lived out of state. Furthermore, defendant argued that the trial court erred in failing or declining to consider his opposition papers he sent to the court by fax on the morning of the hearing. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that, because defendant failed to properly move to quash service, he waived his challenge to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over him. In addition, the Court concluded that, assuming the trial judge ever saw defendant’s untimely opposition papers, it would have been proper to disregard them because defendant attempted to file them by fax in violation of the local rules of court. View "Sabato v. Brooks" on Justia Law

LA Hillcreste filed a complaint in an unlawful detainer seeking to evict petitioner for the alleged non-payment of rent. The court subsequently ordered the case transferred from the Appellate Division under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1008. At issue is whether petitioner may bring a motion to quash service of the summons on the ground that the landlord did not properly serve the three-day notice to pay rent or quit required under the Unlawful Detainer Act, Code Civ. Proc., 1159-1179a. The court concluded that petitioner may not challenge the allegedly defective service of the three-day notice via a motion to quash service of summons because the three-day notice is an element of an unlawful detainer action. In so holding, the court disagreed with the broad language of Delta Imports, Inc. v. Municipal Court, which held that a motion to quash service is the only method to challenge whether a complaint states a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The court denied the petition for writ of mandate. View "Borsuk v. Appellate Division" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a trial court's order that appellant Kierstin Smith pay $124,352 to claimant-respondent Cindy Smith, and $151,967, subject to a specified offset, to respondent Mark Smith. Kierstin argued that the trial court erred by combining cost shifting pursuant to Family Code section 2030 with sanctions pursuant to Family Code section 271, making no explicit differentiation between sums awarded pursuant to each statute. She further argued that the trial court abused its discretion in making an award under either statute. Mark and Kierstin divorced in 2002, but they have remained engaged in litigation regarding child custody and support, which has expanded to involve Cindy, Mark's current wife. The most recent proceedings began in December 2008, when Mark applied for a post-judgment modification of child support, attorney fees, and sanctions, and also included consideration of Mark's January 2010 application seeking a change in child custody, and Kierstin's August 2012 application for a modification of child support. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's order, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Marriage of Smith" on Justia Law

In October 2014, the California State Lands Commission (SLC) approved the San Francisco Bay and Delta Sand Mining Project, which authorized real parties in interest Hanson Marine Operations, Inc., Morris Tug & Barge, Inc. and Suisun Associates (collectively, Hanson) to continue dredge mining sand from sovereign lands under the San Francisco Bay pursuant to 10-year mineral extraction leases. San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. filed a petition for a writ of mandate to challenge the SLC’s decision to approve the project, which the trial court denied. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, Baykeeper argued: (1) the SLC failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA); and (2) the mineral leases authorized by the SLC’s approval of the project violated the common law public trust doctrine. The Court of Appeal granted the petition, finding that the SLC’s environmental review of the mining project complied with CEQA, but it failed to consider whether the sand mining leases were a proper use of public trust property. The trial court was directed to mandate that the SLC to address this issue. View "S.F. Baykeeper v. Cal. State Lands Com." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from an order renewing a civil harassment restraining order against him under section 527.6, subdivision (j), of Code of Civil Procedure. The court held that renewal under section 527.6, subdivision (j)(1) is not automatic; instead the trial court has discretion whether to renew the restraining order and the duration of the restraining order. The court reversed because the trial court incorrectly assumed it had no discretion to decide whether or not to renew the restraining order in the first place. The court declined to award attorney fees to defendant because it would be premature at this stage. View "Cooper v. Bettinger" on Justia Law