Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2013, M’Guinness sued fellow shareholder, Johnson, for claims arising out of the operation of a small construction firm, TLC. M’Guinness also sought involuntary dissolution and appointment of a receiver. Johnson cross-complained against M’Guinness, TLC, and the third TLC shareholder. Johnson was represented by the Casas law firm. The other parties moved to disqualify the firm, claiming it had been retained by TLC as its counsel in 2006, TLC never discharged the firm; the firm never withdrew as counsel. The court denied the motion, finding the evidence insufficient to warrant automatic disqualification based upon a concurrent representation conflict and rejecting a claim of subsequent representation conflict of interest. The court of appeal reversed. The firm continued to represent TLC through the time the lawsuit was instituted. If a party moving to disqualify an attorney establishes concurrent representation, the court is required, “in all but a few instances,” to automatically disqualify the attorney without regard to whether the subject matter of the representation of one client relates to the representation of the second client. While disqualification is a drastic measure and motions to disqualify are sometimes brought for improper tactical reasons, disqualification is not “generally disfavored,” and, in this situation, was required. View "M'Guinness v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Nora Garibotti appealed an order granting Bruce Hinkle’s motion to vacate a default judgment and the revised judgment the trial court entered based on that order. Garibotti was comedian Joey Bishop’s girlfriend for over 20 years. Bishop died in October 2007, and Garibotti was one of his estate’s major beneficiaries. During his lifetime, Bishop had hired Hinkle to perform construction projects at the Lido Island residence Bishop and Garibotti shared, based on Hinkle’s claim he was a skilled and licensed contractor. Hinkle was neither. He often failed to appear at the job site during projects and the work he performed did not comply with the Uniform Building Code or other industry standards. After Bishop’s death, Hinkle convinced the Trust’s trustee that he was Bishop’s good friend and a licensed contractor who could help renovate the Lido Island residence and prepare it for sale. The trustee hired Hinkle to pack the residence’s furnishings and other contents, move those items to a storage facility, and perform construction work at the residence. Hinkle’s construction work again failed to comply with the Uniform Building Code and other industry standards. Hinkle also stole many of the items he was supposed to move to storage, vandalized other pieces of personal property, and damaged or lost many of the items during transport and storage. In October 2009, Garibotti sued Hinkle to recover the items he stole and also damages for his unlicensed and substandard construction work. After several unsuccessful attempts to prove up her claims and damages, Garibotti obtained a default judgment against Hinkle in January 2013. Hinkle challenged that default judgment, and the trial court granted his motion in part. In July 2013, the court entered a revised judgment against Hinkle, awarding Garibotti various amounts for the value of the missing personal property, prejudgment interest and costs. Garibotti timely appealed the trial court’s order granting Hinkle’s motion and the revised judgment. Hinkle cross-appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in granting Hinkle's motion, thereby voiding the revised judgment. The Court remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Garibotti v. Hinkle" on Justia Law

Goldstone and Lanz are Santa Rosa attorneys. Lanz represented Garcia-Bolio in a “Marvin” action and had a contingency fee agreement. The suit settled on the third day of trial. There was a dispute as to the value of the settlement and Lanz’s fee. Lanz sued Bolio, who failed to respond, and her default was taken. Goldstone became Bolio’s lawyer and, following relief from default, filed an answer and a cross-complaint, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, and several ethical violations by Lanz, including that he acted with “moral turpitude.” Lanz defeated Bolio’s cross-claims, leaving only Lanz’s claim against Bolio. Lanz obtained a complete victory at trial, in a decision highly critical of Bolio’s conduct. Lanz then sued Goldstone for malicious prosecution. Goldstone filed an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion to dismiss. The court of appeal affirmed denial, concluding that Lanz met his burden under prong two of the anti-SLAPP analysis, demonstrating a probability of success on all three elements of malicious prosecution. View "Lanz v. Goldstone" on Justia Law

Movants-appellants Ali Fadavi, Shadi Ghazi, Pamela Bacha, Mary Roll, Jenna Pearce, Joe Pearce, Michael Ehsani, Robert Glass, and Rocheda Reid appealed an order denying their motion to intervene in the underlying lawsuit on the grounds it was not timely. Brookfield Ziani LLC (Brookfield) constructed a condominium development in Newport Coast. In July 2012, Ziani Homeowners Association (HOA) sued Brookfield and others, alleging construction defects, including plumbing defects. Movants were owners of individual units within the Condominium Development and were HOA members. The plumbing defect claims were the largest item (by cost of repair) in the lawsuit. The HOA complaint was brought in the name of the HOA. From the outset, the HOA board of directors and its attorney, Mr. Kaneda, represented to the individual unit owners, including Movants, that the HOA was pursuing the plumbing defect claims and would not settle unless and until it obtained full recovery to pay for the necessary repairs to the common areas and to the individual units. The HOA board and Mr. Kaneda told the individual unit owners they could file their own lawsuits, but discouraged them from doing so, because, they promised, the HOA and its counsel were bearing the expenses of the litigation and were vigorously pursuing all of the plumbing defect claims. The HOA eventually agreed to settle the lawsuit with Brookfield. At the one HOA board meeting, the individual unit owners were informed of the existence of the settlement, but not its terms. The HOA and its counsel refused to answer questions about the settlement, including questions about the plumbing defect claims. One HOA board member resigned in protest over the settlement. At a subsequent board meeting, Mr. Kaneda disclosed more terms of the settlement, which allegedly showed the settlement would leave the individual unit owners with some combination of out-of-pocket expenses for the plumbing repairs, a special HOA assessment, and depleted HOA reserves. In May 2014, Movants filed a motion to intervene (Motion) in the suit. Among the things Movants argued was that the HOA board and its counsel were no longer adequately representing Movants' interests due to the trickle of information they received about the settlement. Movants contended the trial court erred as a matter of law by ruling their Motion was untimely, based on the finding that almost two years had elapsed from the date “[t]he individual homeowners knew or should have known about this litigation on or about the date the complaint was filed, 7/13/12.” Movants argued the court should have determined the timeliness issue, based on the date they knew or should have known their interests in the litigation were not being adequately represented. The Court of Appeal agreed with Movants, and reversed the trial court's decision denying their Motion to intervene. View "Ziani Homeowners Ass'n v. Brookfield Ziani LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants for personal injury and property damage allegedly suffered in an automobile accident. Plaintiff seeks to vacate the trial court's order granting defendant's motion in limine. The trial court's order excluded the testimony of three of plaintiff's proposed witnesses and was imposed as an evidence sanction for plaintiff's alleged failure to respond completely to an interrogatory. The court concluded that the Superior Court committed an abuse of discretion and that issuance of an alternative writ and oral argument would not measurably contribute to the court's consideration of the issue and would cause undue delay. In this case, even if interrogatory No. 12.1 could be construed as a request for the identity of witnesses who would testify to post-accident physical disabilities and difficulties, there was no evidence that plaintiff’s failure to identify the witnesses was willful or that plaintiff contravened a court order to provide discovery. Accordingly, it was error to impose an evidence sanction based on plaintiff’s failure to divulge the names of the three witnesses in response to interrogatory No. 12.1 or to defendant’s general request for supplemental responses to interrogatories. The court vacated the order. View "Mitchell v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A suit was filed on behalf of a minor, Jonnie, alleging that Jonnie, while a kindergartner at in the Hollister School District, was sexually molested at school by another male kindergartener on two occasions. The District sought an order compelling Jonnie to submit to an independent mental examination, which would include personal interviews of Jonnie and his parents by Dr. Kuo, a psychiatrist, and psychological testing of Jonnie by Dr. Hall, a psychologist. The superior court granted the motion. After imposing a stay, the court of appeal vacated the order insofar as it authorized collateral interviews of Jonnie’s parents. The court exceeded its authority under Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.020.1 View "Roe v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Six years after a San Jose police officer testified falsely against plaintiff during a preliminary hearing, the city agreed to pay plaintiff $150,000 and not to oppose any motion plaintiff might bring for a declaration of factual innocence of the criminal charges brought against him. The parties agreed that plaintiff’s counsel could seek an award of costs incurred and reasonable attorney’s fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act, 42 U.S.C. 1988. Plaintiff sought $1,448,397 in attorney fees and $75,255 in costs, based on “2,419.9 compensable attorney hours … utilizing reasonable hourly billing rates roughly 20% below established market rates[,] i.e[.,] ranging from $425 to $650 per hour,” plus $102,998.75, added for “fees-on-fees work.” Plaintiff also requested a 1.5 multiplier to the lodestar amount “to account for the significant risk counsel has taken in litigating this hotly[ ]contested matter on a wholly contingent basis, with little prospect of settlement until the eve of trial.” The court awarded compensation of $436,807.50, declined to apply the 1.5 multiplier, and awarded costs of $23,935.07. The court of appeals remanded, finding the lower court’s reasoning inadequate. View "Kerkeles v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment in favor of defendants after the trial court found plaintiff had not provided required documentation and failed to carry his burden of proof with regard to entry of a default judgment on his complaint for unpaid rent and damages to the rental property. The court concluded that, despite repeated attempts, plaintiff failed to submit the documents required for entry of a default judgment pursuant to the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 585. The court further concluded that the cause is properly returned to the trial court to permit plaintiff to file a request for entry of a default judgment based on an accurate statement of the required documentation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded to allow plaintiff to submit a new form CIV-100 with supporting declarations. View "Holloway v. Quetel" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Adam Prue appealed a judgment in favor of defendant Brady Company/San Diego, Inc. (Brady) after the trial court granted Brady's motion for summary judgment in Prue's action against it for wrongful termination of employment in violation of public policy. On appeal, Prue argued the court erred by: (1) granting the motion for summary judgment because his complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and that cause of action was not barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations; and (2) denying him leave to amend his complaint to more fully allege facts in support of that cause of action and/or by not continuing the hearing on the motion. Because the Court of Appeal concluded Prue's complaint adequately alleged facts apprising Brady of his cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and was timely filed, the trial court erred by granting Brady's motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, the Court concluded the court erred by denying Prue leave to amend his complaint. View "Prue v. Brady Co./San Diego, Inc." on Justia Law

In November 2014, 21-month-old A.A. (Child) was detained and removed from the home and care of her mother, As.A. (Mother). While in the family home, Child had been allowed to play with lit matches, exposed to heavy marijuana smoke, and surrounded by a variety of drug paraphernalia and drugs in plain sight. Mother was arrested and temporarily incarcerated. Child's father, S.S. (Father), who lived separately, had a history of substance abuse and declined to take custody of Child. Mother and Father did not contest the juvenile court's jurisdiction, and Child was placed with foster parents, the C.'s. At the C.'s, Child was reportedly healthy, happy, and enjoying visits with Mother, who wanted to regain custody of Child. At a disposition hearing approximately one month later, the Imperial County Department of Social Services reported that Child had passed away the previous day. The Department informed the court that multiple investigations were ongoing regarding the circumstances of Child's death. The Department was conducting a separate investigation for the welfare of other children who had been living in the C.'s home. The police department was conducting a criminal investigation, and other governmental agencies were investigating the C.'s for foster care and day care licensing purposes. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether a juvenile court could retain jurisdiction over a dependency case after the subject child has died, for the purpose of learning the child's cause of death and/or appointing a guardian ad litem to investigate potential tort claims for the child's estate. The juvenile court determined it must terminate its jurisdiction under the circumstances. The Court of Appeal agreed and affirmed. View "Imperial County Dept. etc. v. S.S." on Justia Law