Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The City of San Diego (City) sought to compel the San Diego City Employees Retirement System (SDCERS) to increase City employees' contributions to their retirement fund to share in covering an $800 million investment loss suffered by the fund. Four public employee labor unions ultimately intervened in the action on the employees' behalf, asserting the same or similar arguments as SDCERS to rebut the City's claims. After the case settled, the Unions moved to recover $1,785,147 in attorney fees. The court denied the motion, finding the Unions were not entitled to fees as their involvement in the lawsuit was unnecessary to the result that was achieved. The Unions appealed the court's ruling, contending: (1) they were entitled to recover their fees even if their attorneys' services were unnecessary to the result; and (2) the court abused its discretion in concluding those services were not necessary. The Court of Appeal rejected these contentions and affirmed the court's order. View "San Diego Municipal Employees Assoc. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Tinoco, employed by Express, injured Escobar by negligently operating a vehicle. Escobar received treatment at Santa Clara Valley Medical Center, owned and operated by the county, at a cost of $1,249,545.38. Escobar sued Tinoco and Express and recovered a judgment for $5,689.624.87. County asserted a lien against the judgment pursuant to Government Code 23004.1. Escobar’s attorney contended that the county was not entitled to the full amount of its bill but only to some lesser amount under schedules promulgated by the Workers Compensation Appeals Board. Express delivered a $1,249,545.38 check to Escobar’s attorney payable to the county and Carcione’s firm. The county sued Express, for statutory liability; Express and Escobar for money had and received; Escobar for value of services rendered; and Escobar, for imposition of a constructive trust. The trial court dismissed, ruling that the county could no longer pursue its own action against Express, but must seek enforcement of the lien in Monterey courts. The court of appeal reversed. An adjudicated tortfeasor holding disputed funds known to be encumbered by a public hospital lien cannot avoid liability by turning control of the funds over to the injured person in a check payable to both contestants, which satisfies neither the judgment nor the lien. View "Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Escobar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Corsair for the outstanding amount owed related to a real estate project. Corsair never filed a responsive pleading and the trial court entered default against Corsair. Then Corsair moved to set aside the default and default judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 473, subdivision (b). The trial court set aside the default and default judgment, finding that the default and default judgment were caused by counsel for Corsair. The court concluded that an attorney affidavit of fault under the mandatory relief provisions of section 473, subdivision (b) need not include an explanation of the reasons for the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. In this case, counsel's acknowledgment that he received plaintiff’s lawsuit filings from Corsair and did nothing with them qualifies as not giving them proper attention, and thus as neglect. The court further stated that it does not matter whether counsel’s neglect was excusable or inexcusable. Moreover, affidavits constitute substantial evidence that counsel’s neglect was the sole cause of the default and the court has no basis to disturb the trial court's factual finding regarding causation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order granting relief from default and default judgment. View "Martin Potts & Assoc. v. Corsair LLC" on Justia Law

Kathy Seacrist and her son, John McDonald sued Southern California Edison (Edison); the City of Palm Desert; J.R. Roberts; and Does 5 through 100. Seacrist owned a home near an Edison substation. Plaintiffs Seacrist and McDonald alleged stray electrical currents from the substation were causing them to suffer various medical issues. The Fourth Amended Complaint included seven causes of action against Edison: (a) negligence; (b) nuisance; (c) trespass; (d) strict liability/products liability; (e) strict liability/implied warranty of fitness; (f) strict liability/ultra hazardous activity; and (g) intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court sustained Edison’s demurrer without leave to amend, concluding “Plaintiffs claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the California Public Utilities Commission,” and thus, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the dispute with Edison. The Court of Appeal held previously that the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) did not have exclusive jurisdiction over a case involving injuries resulting from stray electrical currents from a substation. On appeal, plaintiffs contended the trial court erred by sustaining Edison’s demurrer because the PUC did not have exclusive jurisdiction over claims related to injuries from stray electrical currents. Edison asserts, among other things, that controlling case law was wrongly decided. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment. View "Seacrist v. So. Cal. Edison" on Justia Law

On March 28, 2014, real party in interest PCH Enterprises, Inc. sued defendants Sallie Cribley-Cole and Anna Gonzalez for breach of contract, specific performance, and declaratory relief. It alleged defendants failed to perform on a written agreement to sell a certain parcel of real property to PCH. PCH recorded a lis pendens on the same day it filed the complaint. No proof of service accompanied the lis pendens. Petitioner Rey Sanchez Investments sought to intervene, claiming it was the true owner of the property pursuant to a grant deed recorded April 2, 2014. Petitioner moved to expunge the lis pendens on grounds that there were technical defects in the service. PCH offered a proof of service that the lis pendens was personally served on Cribley-Cole in November 2014. The trial court denied the motion to expunge. On appeal, petitioner argued the lis pendens was completely void and subject to expungement because service was improper. The Court of Appeal agreed service was improper and reversed the trial court's judgment by way of a writ of mandate. View "Rey Sanchez Investments v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

According to plaintiff-appellant Randall Blackwell, as he was at the top of a ladder installing rain gutters at an investment property owned by defendant-respondent Ray Vasilas, Blackwell stepped on scaffolding that another contractor had erected at the job site, and the scaffolding collapsed. The collapse caused Blackwell to fall, and he suffered injuries when he landed on a pile of bricks approximately 10 feet below. Blackwell sued Vasilas for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Vasilas. After review of the arguments made on appeal, the Court of Appeal found that as the moving party, Vasilas did not meet his initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Vasilas's motion, and the resulting judgment was reversed. View "Blackwell v. Vasilas" on Justia Law

On May 8, 2014, petitioner City of San Diego (City) denied the application of Jeri Dines, the real party in interest, for leave to file a late claim filed pursuant to the California Government Claims Act. Dines did not file a petition with the trial court for an order relieving her from the claims presentation requirements until November 13, 2014 (i.e., more than six months after the City denied her application). Dines alleged former City Mayor Bob Filner inappropriately touched her. However, citing section 915.2, subdivision (b) of the Act that extends by five days the period for a recipient of a mailed notice to respond to the notice, the trial court granted her petition, concluding section 915.2, subdivision (b), gave her an additional five days to file her section 946.6 petition. The City filed a petition for writ of mandate to the Court of Appeal, challenging the trial court's order. The City argued section 915.2, subdivision (b), was inapplicable to, and did not extend, the Act's section 946.6's six-month limitations period for filing a petition with the court. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the City and granted the requested relief. View "City of San Diego v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, filed suit against defendants, alleging claims for failure to pay regular and overtime wages, failure to provide meal and rest periods, failure to furnish accurate wage statements, failure to pay wages upon termination or discharge, and unfair competition in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute within five years. The court rejected plaintiff's contention that the parties’ participation in private mediation during the final months of the five-year period triggered Code of Civil Procedure section 1775.7, subdivision (b), which contains an automatic tolling provision. The court concluded that section 1775.7 only applies to mediation conducted in a court-annexed alternative dispute resolution program. The court also concluded that plaintiff did not show it was impossible, impracticable or futile to bring his case to trial within five years. Finally, the court concluded that equitable estoppel does not apply in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Castillo v. DHL Express" on Justia Law

Western Albuquerque Land Holdings, LLC was the judgment creditor of a $47 million judgment against SCC Acquisitions, Inc. As part of its efforts to enforce the judgment, Western propounded requests for production of documents, and later brought a motion to compel SCC to respond further to those requests. The trial court granted Western’s motion to compel as to requests Nos. 14, 21, 22, 23, and 37. SCC appealed the order granting Western’s motion to compel. Western then moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground the order granting its motion to compel was not an appealable postjudgment order under section Code of Civil Procedure 904.1, subdivision (a)(2). The Court of Appeal treated the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate and denied it. The trial court did not err by granting Western’s motion to compel. The Court concluded the trial court had authority under section Code of Civil Procedure 708.030 to compel SCC to produce documents in its possession or control regarding third parties, and the Court rejected SCC’s contentions that requests Nos. 14, 21, 22, 23, and 37 violated the privacy rights of third parties and that requests Nos. 21, 22, 23, and 37 were overbroad. View "SCC Acquisitions v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Kirk King sustained a back injury while at work for CompPartners, Inc. In July 2011, King suffered anxiety and depression due to chronic back pain resulting from the back injury. In 2011, King was prescribed a psychotropic medication known as Klonopin. The Klonopin was provided to King through Workers’ Compensation. In July 2013, a Workers’ Compensation utilization review was conducted to determine if the Klonopin was medically necessary. Naresh Sharma, an anesthesiologist, conducted the utilization review. Sharma determined the drug was unnecessary and decertified it. As a result, King was required to immediately cease taking the Klonopin. Typically, a person withdraws from Klonopin gradually by slowly reducing the dosage. Due to the sudden cessation of Klonopin, King suffered four seizures, resulting in additional physical injuries. In September 2013, someone requested King again be permitted to take Klonopin. In October 2013, Mohammed Ashraf Ali, a psychiatrist, conducted a second utilization review. Ali also determined Klonopin was medically unnecessary. Neither Sharma nor Ali examined King in-person, and neither warned King of the dangers of an abrupt withdrawal from Klonopin. King sued CompPartners and Sharma for: (1) professional negligence; (2) negligence; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress. King's wife, Sara, sued CompPartners and Sharma for loss of consortium. The Kings sought general, special, exemplary, and punitive damages. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend. The Kings raised three issues on appeal to the Court of Appeal: (1) their claims were not preempted by the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA); (2) defendants owed them a duty of care; and (3) the trial court erred by denying them leave to amend. The Court affirmed the sustaining of the demurrer but reversed the denial of leave to amend. View "King v. CompPartners" on Justia Law