Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In seeking an attorney fee award in this wrongful foreclosure case, plaintiffs Calvin and Tracy Mountjoy sought a lodestar sum of $308,425 for over 760 hours of attorney and law student work billed at hourly rates ranging from $450 to $200. Concluding that “well over 70% of the billing entries” submitted in support of the attorney fee request were flawed in one or more respects, the trial court reduced the number of hours claimed by 70 percent, to 228. Thereafter, applying a “blended” billing rate of $260 per hour to the reduced number of hours, the court awarded the Mountjoys $59,334.60 in attorney fees. The Mountjoys appealed the fee award, but the Court of Appeal rejected most of their arguments. However, the Court concluded the trial court did abuse its discretion in basing the award on a 70 percent across-the-board reduction in the number of hours claimed. "Even assuming the trial court was correct in finding that well over 70 percent of the time entries underlying the fee request were flawed in one manner or another, there is no reasonable basis for concluding that the time entries the court found were flawed actually included 70 percent of the total time for which the Mountjoys sought compensation. Thus, the trial court's reduction in compensable hours was arbitrary and may have swept too broadly, denying the Mountjoys compensation for time claimed in billing entries that were not flawed." The Court reversed the order on the Mountjoys' fee motion and remanded the case back to the trial court for further consideration. View "Mountjoy v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

The Arbitration Certification Program (ACP) certifies the qualified dispute resolution process identified in the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Civil Code 1790, the “lemon law.” Not all automobile manufacturers must have an ACP certified program. Those manufacturers who choose to operate a certified arbitration process have limited lemon law liability. Plaintiffs bought new cars that were under the original manufacturers’ warranties when they sought declaratory relief claiming that public statements in ACP publications were illegal underground regulations not adopted in conformity with California’s Administrative Procedures Act, because the ACP states that car manufacturers may adjust the price of a defective vehicle to be repurchased from its owner as a lemon for excessive wear and tear and that it is not within an arbitrator’s purview to make such an adjustment. The court concluded plaintiffs were interested persons under Government Code 11350 and denied a motion to dismiss. The court of appeal vacated. Plaintiffs may not invoke the doctrine of public interest standing, and their individual interests in the controversy are too conjectural to confer standing to bring an action for declaratory relief. View "CA Dep't. Consumer Affairs v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Board issued an administrative investigative subpoena seeking complete, certified records of three of plaintiff's patients on the grounds that there was good cause to believe that plaintiff departed from the standard of care in connection with the treatment of those patients. Plaintiff's petitions to quash the subpoena were denied, and the Board’s petition to compel compliance was granted in part, with the limitation that the records to be provided should be limited by time period. The court concluded that the Board had pointed out specific instances of prescribing irregularities, which were sufficient for a finding of good cause; substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding of good cause; and there is no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that Dr. Pollak was qualified to render an expert opinion in this matter. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to convince the court that, if the evidence of medical records at issue was obtained in violation of Civil Code section 56.26, the Board was not permitted to use it in the investigation. While the trial court may not have specifically stated it was engaging in a balancing test, the long discussion of good cause shows careful consideration of the patients’ right to privacy versus the state’s interest in safeguarding its citizens from negligent medical care. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's claim that the subpoena was overbroad where the trial court did not err in failing to modify the subpoena in more ways than it already did in applying time restrictions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fett v Medical Bd. of CA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and a related corporation filed claims arising from a foreclosure sale against several defendants, including respondent T.D. Service (the underlying action). Respondent subsequently filed a motion for relief from the default and default judgment, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the trial court erred in setting aside the default and default judgment. Under the doctrine of extrinsic mistake, relief from a default and default judgment is potentially available when the clerk or trial court erred in entering them. The court found no error in the trial court’s decision to set aside the default and default judgment where the record supports relief on the basis of extrinsic mistake under the three-part test set forth in Rappleyea v. Campbell. In this case, respondent demonstrated a meritorious defense to the claims asserted in the complaints; respondent demonstrated a satisfactory excuse for not presenting its defense, namely, the mistaken entry of a default and default judgment; and respondent also established that it acted diligently to set aside the default and default judgment after discovering them. In sum, the trial court did not err in setting aside the default and default judgment and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bae v. T.D. Service Co." on Justia Law

When Mother was about one-month pregnant, she and N.S.’s father were arrested for illegally growing and possessing marijuana for sale in their Hayward home. About two weeks after N.S. was born, they were again arrested for possessing marijuana for sale in their home. The Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a dependency petition alleging that N.S. faced a substantial risk of harm (Welfare and Institutions Code 300(b)). N.S. was placed with a maternal relative who lived in a two-unit building in Union City. Mother moved into the other unit. Visits between Mother and N.S. went well. Mother regularly attended a support group, participated in therapy, repeatedly tested negative for drugs, had no contact with Father, and moved out of the Hayward home, listing it for sale. N.S. had no medical issues and was not alleged to have suffered any physical harm in her parents’ care. The Agency nonetheless recommended that the juvenile court take jurisdiction because Mother had been arrested twice for serious charges. The court sustained the dependency petition, concluding that there was a current risk of harm. While appeal was pending, the juvenile court dismissed dependency jurisdiction, awarding custody to Mother, with supervised visits for Father. The court of appeal dismissed an appeal, noting that Mother suffered no harm as a result of the jurisdictional findings below. View "In re N.S." on Justia Law

Raul and Ingrid married in 1978 in Santa Cruz County. In 1993, the family moved to Chile, where Ingrid had been born. The couple separated in 1995. Since 2010, Raul has resided in New York. In 2012, Ingrid filed a dissolution petition in Santa Cruz, seeking attorney fees and spousal support. Raul signed a receipt for papers mailed to New York, but did not appear. The court ordered him to pay support plus attorney fees. Later, the court garnished Raul’s wages. In 2013, Ingrid sought an order determining Raul’s arrearages. Raul appeared on his own behalf. The court ruled that the support order was valid and awarded arrearages. Months later Raul moved to quash service for lack of jurisdiction and to set aside the 2013 orders and garnishment. Raul asserted that Ingrid “has lived and continues to live in Chile since . . . 2000 or 2001.” Ingrid introduced evidence showing her presence in the county for at least part of the six months prior to her filing. The court found that Raul had submitted to jurisdiction and later entered default. The court of appeal reversed. While Raul’s appearance constituted a general submission to jurisdiction and he forfeited his objection to an untimely hearing notice, the court erred by entering default while Raul’s court of appeal petition was pending. View "In re: Marriage of Obrecht" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a petition against their stepfather, to recover property belonging to their mother’s estate and sought damages of double the value of the property, based on Probate Code 859: “If a court finds that a person has in bad faith wrongfully taken, concealed, or disposed of property belonging to ... an elder, ... or the estate of a decedent, or has taken, concealed, or disposed of the property by the use of undue influence in bad faith or through the commission of elder or dependent adult financial abuse … the person shall be liable for twice the value of the property recovered [and] in the court’s discretion ... for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” Staggers died. His son was substituted in as the respondent in the probate proceeding. The court held that double damages and attorney fees under section 859 were punitive in nature and not available against the son, based on Code of Civil Procedure 377.42, which excepts from recovery against a successor “damages recoverable under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other punitive or exemplary damages.” The court of appeal vacated, reasoning that section 859 damages may be punitive in nature, but are not punitive damages. View "Hill v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendants Chaim Woolf and Steven Camhi were attorneys who represented plaintiffs in a prior civil action. They appealed an order granting plaintiffs' motion to set aside the dismissal of a legal malpractice action. The court dismissed the case after plaintiffs Michael Younessi and Alea Investments, LLC failed to timely file an amended complaint in response to an order sustaining demurrers to the original complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiffs filed motions to dismiss the appeal, for relief from default in failing to file a respondents' brief, and for judicial notice. The Court of Appeals denied plaintiffs' motions. But the Court "reluctantly" affirmed the trial court's order vacating the dismissal: while the evidence did not support granting relief for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, since the dismissal resulted from plaintiffs' newly retained attorney's failure to oppose the demurrers and timely file an amended complaint, plaintiffs were entitled to relief under Code Civ. Proc. section 473, subdivision (b)'s attorney-fault provision. View "Younessi v. Woolf" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Remax and Jose Garcia-Yanez, alleging 13 causes of action related to her employment. The trial court granted Remax's motion to compel arbitration and stayed the litigation in the judicial forum under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4. The arbitration provider subsequently dismissed the arbitral proceeding after no arbitration costs were paid. Plaintiff then moved that the trial court lift its prior order staying the litigation and defendants filed no contemporary motion or petition seeking an order compelling resumption of the arbitration proceeding. Therefore, the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion and lifted the litigation stay. Defendants then appealed the order lifting the litigation stay. The court dismissed the appeal, holding that defendants are appealing from a nonappealable order. View "Gastelum v. Remax Int'l" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the District and two of its employees, alleging wrongful discharge in violation of California's whistleblower statute, Lab. Code, 1102.5; discrimination based on race, gender and age in violation of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code,12900 et seq.; and unlawful harassment in violation of FEHA. Plaintiff was denied postjudgment relief after the trial court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court concluded that the trial court improperly denied plaintiff's request for relief from judgment on the ground that a Code of Civil Procedure Section 473(b) motion must be signed under penalty or perjury where the trial court had discretion to treat her motion as a request for relief under section 473(b), Section 473(b) imposes no penalty-of-perjury requirement, and plaintiff's motion substantially complied with the requirements for a Section 473(b) request for relief. Accordingly, the court reversed. View "Austin v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law