Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment on the pleadings entered in favor of SunTrust on her complaint for wrongful foreclosure. The trial court ruled that the action was barred by a South Carolina judicial foreclosure judgment. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in taking judicial notice of the South Carolina judgment and the service of process finding. The doctrine of res judicata/collateral estoppel bars relitigation of a factual dispute even when the factual dispute was erroneously decided in favor of a party who did not testify. The court concluded that allowing plaintiff to proceed in this action would frustrate the purpose of the full faith and credit provisions, res judicata, and collateral estoppel rules. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hawkins v. SunTrust Bank" on Justia Law

USC found that John Doe violated USC's student conduct code as a result of his participation in a group sexual encounter at a fraternity party. Another student (Jane) alleged that she had been sexually assaulted by a group of men at the party. She reported that her sexual contact with John was consensual, but certain contact with the other men was not. USC's office of Student Judicial Affairs and Community Standards (SJACS) found that John violated nine sections of the student conduct code, including the section prohibiting sexual assault. The Appeals Panel found that there was insufficient evidence of any sexual assault, but held that John violated two sections of the student conduct code. John petitioned for a writ of mandate. The trial court rejected John's fair hearing challenge and held that there was substantial evidence to support the Appeals Panel's finding that John violated Student Conduct Code section 11.44C by encouraging and permitting the other students' behavior, but that there was not sufficient evidence to support the finding that John violated section 11.32 by endangering Jane. Both parties appealed. The court concluded that John was denied a fair hearing because USC failed to provide John fair notice of the allegations that resulted in suspension, or an adequate hearing on those allegations. The court also concluded that the evidence does not support the Appeals Panel's findings as to either Student Conduct Code violation. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Doe v. Univ. of Southern California" on Justia Law

Kimberly Kirchmeyer, as Executive Director of the Medical Board of California (the Medical Board), launched an investigation of Geoffrey Phillips, M.D., a licensed psychiatrist, based on a complaint that Phillips had carried on a sexual relationship with a patient. As part of the investigation, an investigatory subpoena duces tecum for the production of specified medical records of the patient was served on Phillips. After both he and the patient objected to the subpoena duces tecum, and he failed to produce the medical records, the Kirchmeyer filed a petition to compel their production. The trial court denied the petition and dismissed it. The Kirchmeyer appealed that dismissal. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err and affirmed: "The medical records sought by the investigatory subpoena duces tecum were protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege of Evidence Code section 1014. Because the psychotherapist-patient privilege is grounded in the patient’s constitutional right of privacy, the Director had to show a compelling interest justifying production of the medical records sought. The Director failed to show a compelling interest and has not established that an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege applied to the medial records sought by the investigatory subpoena duces tecum." View "Kirchmeyer v. Phillips" on Justia Law

In 1993, Latrice Rubenstein was a high school student. That year, her cross-country and track coach (coach) began sexually molesting her. Coach was an employee of Doe 1, a public entity (defendant). In early 2012, when Rubenstein was about 34 years old, the latent memories of the sexual abuse resurfaced. She filed a claim under the Government Claims Act with defendant, but defendant denied the claim as late filed. Later that year, she filed a complaint against defendant in Imperial County without the required certificates of merit. She ultimately dismissed the action. She then filed a complaint in San Diego County against Doe 1 and Does 2 through 20. The complaint included certificates of merit as to Doe 1 and an individual not named in the complaint. She also filed a petition for relief under Government Code section 946.6 (the petition). The trial court granted Rubenstein's petition, and later granted defendant's motion to change venue to Imperial County. After the case returned to Imperial County, defendant demurred to the complaint. In lieu of opposing the demurrer, Rubenstein filed a first amended complaint. Attached to the complaint were the previously filed certificates of merit from her attorney and a psychiatrist. Defendant again demurred. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, finding: (1) Rubenstein did not seek a finding of merit after an in camera review before serving the original or amended complaint; (2) the certificate of merit submitted by Rubenstein's counsel failed to articulate facts supporting his conclusion that Rubenstein's claim is meritorious; (3) the psychiatrist's letter was not executed under penalty of perjury and otherwise failed to articulate any facts supporting the conclusion that Rubenstein's claim is meritorious; and (4) no certificates of merit were filed for parties sued as Does 2 through 20. The trial court also found Rubenstein's failure to comply with the procedural hurdles of section 340.1 within 30 days of the order granting her Government Code section 946.6 petition rendered her claim against defendant fatally time barred and dismissed the action. Rubenstein appealed. The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant a Government Code section 946.6 petition finding that the statutory delayed discovery rule of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 applied to delay the accrual date of plaintiff's action for childhood sexual abuse. The Court found that the trial court erred in sustaining defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's complaint. Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Rubenstein v. Doe" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc. (Hospital) appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendants Blue Cross of California, doing business as Anthem Blue Cross (Blue Cross), Anthem Blue Cross Life and Health Insurance Company (BC Life), and Anthem UM Services, Inc. (Anthem UM). Hospital sued Anthem, as well as Eisenhower Medical Center (Eisenhower) and Keenan & Associates (Keenan), when the defendants refused to pay approximately $1.9 million the cost of medical services that Hospital provided to an insured patient following extensive communications with Anthem over a period of approximately 50 days regarding "authorization" for the services. The defendants ultimately denied coverage for the medical services based on an exclusion in the patient's policy for injuries sustained as a result of having a blood alcohol level over the legal limit. Hospital alleged that Anthem's continuing to "authorize" medical services during the patient's stay at Hospital, even after Anthem was made aware that the patient was admitted with a blood alcohol level far exceeding the legal limit, constituted a misrepresentation as to coverage, on which Hospital relied in providing care to the patient. The trial court determined that the Hospital's third amended complaint (TAC) lacked the necessary specificity to survive a demurrer, and entered judgment for Anthem. The Court of Appeal, however, reversed, concluding the TAC alleged facts with sufficient particularity to overcome a demurrer. The Court therefore reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Tenet Healthsystem Desert v. Blue Cross of Cal." on Justia Law

Laura Saterbak appealed the dismissal of her first amended complaint (FAC) after the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend. Saterbak claimed the assignment of the deed of trust (DOT) to her home by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) to Structured Asset Mortgage Investment II Trust 2007-AR7 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates 2007-AR7 was invalid. Arguing the assignment occurred after the closing date for the 2007-AR7 trust, and that the signature on the instrument was forged or robo-signed, she sought to cancel the assignment and obtain declaratory relief. At the time of the foreclosure, Saterbak owed approximately $1.6 million. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Saterbak lacked standing and affirm the judgment. View "Saterbak v. JPMorgan Chase" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the minority shareholder of Omega, filed suit against majority shareholder Kent Constable, his wife Karen, and Omega, alleging direct and derivative claims arising from a dispute over management of Omega and its assets. Counsel represented all defendants in the litigation. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion to disqualify Counsel from representing any of the defendants. The court concluded that the trial court did not err by disqualifying Counsel as to Omega because Counsel concurrently represented defendants in the same action where an actual conflict existed between them, and Kent alone did not have authority to consent to the conflicting representation on Omega's behalf. The court concluded that the trial court erred by disqualifying Counsel as to the Constables where Counsel's continued representation of the Constables poses no threat to Counsel's continuing duty of confidentiality to Omega. Finally, the trial court did not err by concluding defendants did not meet their burden of showing plaintiff waived his right to seek to disqualify Counsel where plaintiff's 16-month delay was not unreasonable because prejudice to defendants was not extreme. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Ontiveros v. Constable" on Justia Law

Class representatives filed suit alleging that RHI committed numerous violations of Civil Code section 1747.08, also known as the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act. The trial court found RHI was liable for as many as 1,213,745 violations of that statute and set a penalty recovery in the amount of $30 per violation, subject to RHI's right to dispute any specific claim. Francesca Muller, a class member and the person prosecuting the appeal, requested the court order notice of the attorney fee motion be sent to all class members. The trial court denied the request, granted the attorney fee motion, and entered judgment in the action. Muller appealed. Michael Hernandez, class representative, contests each of Muller's claims of error. The court concluded that, under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, the court must adhere to Eggert v. Pac. States S. & L. Co. and dismiss the appeal. Even if the court were free to disregard Eggert, adhering to Eggert's approach would not leave nonparty class members without protection or appellate recourse. Under California law, where class members are given the option of opting out, they are not bound by the judgment in the class action but instead may pursue their own action. Intervention would have the effect of giving Muller a clear avenue from which to challenge the attorney fee award. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc." on Justia Law

This suit was brought on behalf of twin minors. They alleged Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation knew or should have known physicians prescribed its asthma medication to pregnant women for the off-label purpose of preventing or inhibiting preterm labor. They alleged studies available to Novartis before it sold the rights to its brand-name product in 2001 showed the drug was not effective for tocolysis (inhibiting preterm labor), it could cross the placenta, and it could interfere with fetal development. The twins allegedly sustained neurological injuries in utero as a result of their mother having been prescribed the medication. The minors contended on appeal to the Court of Appeal that despite Novartis having sold its interested in the medication six years after the medication was prescribed, Novartis had a duty to revise the label warnings while it still owned the drug to indicate a risk to fetal development and its failure to do so contributed to their injuries years later. The Court of Appeal concluded the minors demonstrated the could amend their complaint to state a claim under California law for negligent failure to warn and negligent misrepresentation based on acts or omissions by Novartis prior to 2001, which allegedly caused the twins' injuries in 2007. The Court reversed the trial court which held to the contrary and remanded for further proceedings. View "T.H v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals" on Justia Law

In their one-day dissolution trial, Paul was represented by his attorney. Susan was not represented by counsel. The court denied Susan’s continuance request and admitted Paul’s 22 exhibits into evidence.The court entered a judgment dissolving the marriage, declining to award spousal support to either party, dividing the couple’s property, stating that Susan waived future spousal support and that the court would not have awarded spousal support in any event because “each party was self-supporting,” and finding that Paul was entitled to a credit of $2,500 for support payments he had made to Susan in 2012 and 2013. Susan timely filed notice of appeal. Because there had been no court reporter, Susan requested a settled statement under California Rules of Court, 8.137. The court of appeal vacated; the order cannot stand because it was entered without a motion, without the required findings, and based on the false premise that Susan was responsible for the protracted nature of the proceedings on her motion. View "Mooney v. Superior Court" on Justia Law