Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Rita Patel appealed the trial court’s dismissal of her case after granting terminating sanctions striking her complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. The court concluded Patel filed the complaint for an improper purpose without evidentiary or legal support because her claims were barred by res judicata based on her previous adversary action in federal court opposing Victor Ali’s bankruptcy petition. After Ali obtained his bankruptcy discharge, however, Patel did not sue him in this action for fraud and related claims, but rather his business partners, including Ana Alonso, and their company Crown Diamonds, Inc. (Crown). The Court of Appeal reversed, however, finding that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply to insulate defendants from answering for what Patel claims were their fraudulent activities. View "Patel v. Crown Diamonds, Inc." on Justia Law

The family court determined appellant Bruce Frencher, Sr., owed $11,083.84 in child support arrears. Frencher contends the family court erred in its calculation because the excess Social Security derivative benefits paid for his child should have been applied to the arrears owed by Frencher. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed there was a miscalculation and reversed the judgment. View "In re Marriage of Hall & Frencher" on Justia Law

Cummins installed asbestos containing products in California and had received hundreds of asbestos bodily injury claims, including many lawsuits, based on exposure to its asbestos containing materials. Cummins purchased 19 U.S. Fidelity insurance policies 1969-1987, and purchased four U.S. Fire policies, 1988-1992, for “primary, umbrella, and or excess insurance policies,” some of which “may be missing or only partially documented.” Cummins and its parent company (Holding, formed in 2014) sought a “declaratory judgment that defendants are obligated to defend and/or indemnify Cummins [Corp.], in full, including, without limitation, payment of the cost of investigation, defense, settlement and judgment . . . , for past, present and future Asbestos Suits under each of the Policies triggered by the Asbestos Suits.” The trial court dismissed without leave to amend, finding that Holding lacked standing. The court of appeal affirmed. Holding, the controlling shareholder of Cummins, does not have a contractual relationship with the insurers and is not otherwise interested in the insurance contracts. View "D. Cummins Corp. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a board certified obstetrician and gynecologist who was appointed to Sierra Vista’s medical staff, was denied reappointment to her position due to alleged concerns about her fitness for practice. In this appeal, plaintiff contends that her filing of three motions attempting to relitigate the trial court's final judgment denying her petition for writ of administrative mandate challenging Sierra Vista's decision to terminate her, does not make her a vexatious litigant. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding where the trial court, after denying the second motion, admonished plaintiff that she could be declared a vexatious litigant “if similar unsubstantiated motions continue to be filed without any reasonable likelihood of success.” Because plaintiff failed to heed this admonition, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Goodrich v. Sierra Vista Reg'l Med. Center" on Justia Law

After Diagnostics obtained a judgment against plaintiff, plaintiff filed a Claim of Exemption seeking a judicial declaration that seven of his Fidelity Investments accounts were exempt from levy. The court held that the money that a person sets aside for the “qualified higher education expenses” of his children under Internal Revenue Code section 529 (so-called “section 529 savings accounts”) are not exempt from the collection efforts under the California Enforcement of Judgments Law, Code of Civil Procedure section 680.010 et seq., of a creditor who has a valid judgment against that person. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's ruling to the contrary and reversed the trial court's finding that plaintiff's retirement accounts are fully exempt from collection because the trial court did not apply the proper legal standard in evaluating the exemption for private retirement accounts. View "O'Brien v. AMBS Diagnostics" on Justia Law

The Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Association sought to impose fines and related fees of $19,979.97 on the Carsons for alleged rule violations related to the Carsons’ use of their properties as short-term vacation rentals. The Carsons cross-complained for breach of contract, private nuisance, and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The Carsons had engaged in short-term rental for many years and believed that they were exempt from new regulations and enforcement efforts. The court ruled against the Carsons on their cross-complaint but also rejected many of the fines as unreasonable. The court upheld fines pertaining to the use of Almanor’s boat slips and ordered the Carsons to pay $6,620.00 in damages. The court determined Almanor to be the prevailing party and awarded $101,803.15 in attorney’s fees and costs. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that the award of attorney’s fees, compared to the “overall relief obtained” by Almanor, was not so disproportionate as to constitute an abuse of discretion. View "Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Ass'n. v. Carson" on Justia Law

The child's ("Isabella G.") father and paternal grandparents appealed the denial of the grandparents' petition for placement of the child. The father also appealed the termination of his parental rights. This case involved repeated requests by the child's grandparents for placement of the child, starting when the child was first detained in protective custody. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) did not conduct an assessment of the grandparents' home as required under Welf. & Inst. Code section 361.3, governing relative placement. Instead, the Agency placed the child in the home of a nonrelative extended family member and secured the cooperation of the grandparents and other relatives by representing that the Agency could not change the child's placement for a year. After a year, the grandparents again requested placement. The Agency did not conduct an assessment of their home as required. After reunification services were terminated, the Agency disregarded the grandparents' new request for placement. The grandparents retained counsel and filed a section 388 petition. Only then did the Agency complete a relative home assessment, approving the placement in less than three weeks. At the hearing on the petition, the juvenile court denied the grandparents' request to proceed under section 361.3, instead applying the caregiver adoption preference under section 366.26, subdivision (k). The Agency conceded the juvenile court erred in applying the adoption preference prior to terminating parental rights. The Agency maintained, however, that section 361.3 did not apply because the grandparents' request for placement was made after the reunification period ended and no new placement was necessary. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that when a relative requested placement of the child prior to the dispositional hearing, and the Agency does not timely complete a relative home assessment as required by law, the relative requesting placement was entitled to a hearing under section 361.3 without having to file a section 388 petition. Consequently, the Court reversed the juvenile court's orders denying the grandparent's request for placement under section 366.26, subdivision (k), necessarily reversed the orders terminating parental rights, and remanded for a relative placement hearing under section 361.3. View "In re Isabella G." on Justia Law

Appellant C. Tucker Cheadle, as administrator of the estate of Robert F. Obarr, appealed an order denying his motion to disqualify counsel for respondent DP Pham LLC. Pham made three loans to Obarr totaling nearly $3 million, and Obarr secured each loan by granting Pham a lien on a mobilehome park he owned in Westminster (Property). This action arose when Obarr allegedly agreed to sell the Property to two different buyers. In March 2013, Obarr allegedly contracted to sell the Property to S.C.D. Enterprises (SCD). SCD promptly assigned the purchase agreement to Westminster MHP Associates, LP (Westminster), which allegedly opened escrow on the Property with Obarr. According to Westminster, it satisfied all contingencies for the sale within 10 days of opening escrow. In April 2013, Westminster filed suit alleging contract claims against Obarr. Obarr died unexpectedly in August. The trial court appointed Cheadle as a special administrator for Obarr’s estate and in that capacity substituted Cheadle for Obarr as a party to this action. Cheadle then filed a cross-complaint alleging an interpleader claim against both Westminster and Pham concerning the Property. Based on Pham’s loans to Obarr, Cheadle also alleged claims against Pham for usury, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, money had and received, unjust enrichment, reformation, and violation of the unfair competition law. Cheadle contended disqualification was required because Pham’s counsel improperly obtained copies of privileged communications between Obarr and his attorney, and used those communications to oppose another party’s summary judgment motion in this case. The trial court denied the disqualification motion because it concluded the communications were not privileged. The Court of Appeal reversed. After reviewing copies of the communications, the trial court concluded they were not privileged based on their content. "A court, however, may not review the contents of a communication to determine whether the attorney-client privilege protects that communication. The attorney-client privilege is an absolute privilege that prevents disclosure, no matter how necessary or relevant to the lawsuit. The privilege attaches to all confidential communications between an attorney and a client regardless of whether the information communicated is in fact privileged. Accordingly, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to review a communication to determine whether the attorney-client privilege protects it." View "DP Pham v. Cheadle" on Justia Law

Jose Lopez sued the national Jehovah's Witnesses organization, Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. (Watchtower), alleging his Bible instructor sexually abused him in 1986 when he was a child. Lopez asserted several legal theories, including failure to warn, negligent supervision, and negligent hiring/retention. After contentious discovery disputes, the court issued two discovery orders against Watchtower: (1) compelling the deposition of an individual (Gerrit Losch) whom the court found was a "managing agent" of Watchtower; and (2) ordering the production of documents in Watchtower's files pertaining to other perpetrators of child sexual abuse. When Watchtower failed to comply with these orders, the court granted Lopez's motion for monetary and terminating sanctions, struck Watchtower's answer, and entered Watchtower's default. Watchtower appealed, challenging the validity of the discovery orders and an abuse of discretion in failing to impose lesser sanctions. After review, the Court of Appeal rejecte Watchtower's challenges to the production order, but concluded the court erred in ordering Watchtower to produce Losch for deposition and the subsequent sanctions. The Court remanded for the trial court to consider the appropriate sanctions for Watchtower's violation of the document production order. "The initial measure should be a remedy that is less onerous than a terminating sanction." View "Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society" on Justia Law

In 2005, Crossroads Investors, L.P. borrowed $9 million subject to a promissory note. The note was secured by a deed of trust recorded against an apartment building Crossroads owned in Woodland. Defendant Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) was the beneficiary of the deed. The note imposed on Crossroads a prepayment premium should Crossroads pay the unpaid principal before the note’s maturity date or should Crossroads default and Fannie Mae accelerate the loan. Crossroads defaulted on the note in late 2010. Fannie Mae served Crossroads with a notice of default, and accelerated the loan. In February 2011, Fannie Mae initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. In April 2011, Crossroads entered into a contract to sell the property to Ezralow Company, LLC (Ezralow) for $10.95 million. A few weeks later, Crossroads and Ezralow proposed to Fannie Mae that Ezralow would assume Crossroads’ obligations and pay off the loan on Fannie Mae’s agreeing to waive the prepayment premium. Fannie Mae refused to waive the prepayment premium and rejected the proposal. By June, Fannie Mae recorded a notice of trustee’s sale against the property, stating the total unpaid amount of Crossroad’s obligations was estimated at more than $10.5 million. The day before the property was scheduled to be sold, Crossroads filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection to protect its interest in the property. In its petition, Crossroads asserted it owed Fannie Mae $8.7 million. Fannie Mae sold the property after it was granted relief from the bankruptcy stay. Crossroads then sued Fannie Mae for wrongful foreclosure, breach of contract, fraud, and other tort and contract actions. Fannie Mae filed an anti-SLAPP motion, contending the actions on which Crossroads based its complaint were Fannie Mae’s statements in its papers filed in the bankruptcy proceeding. The trial court disagreed and denied the motion. This appeal challenged the trial court’s denial of Fannie Mae's special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order. "The principal thrust of Crossroads’ action was to recover for violations of state nonjudicial foreclosure law, not for any exercise of speech or petition rights by Fannie Mae. Even if protected activity was not merely incidental to the unprotected activity, Crossroads established a prima facie case showing it was likely to succeed on its causes of action." View "Crossroads Investors v. Federal National Mortgage Assn." on Justia Law