Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Arnold, a former officer of two corporate defendants, held significant stock in each. In 1999, Arnold sued both in Illinois state court, claiming shareholder oppression. In 2006, the parties allegedly agreed to settle, but never executed settlement documents. The defendants have not paid any of the $207,500 purportedly required. The court dismissed without deciding whether the case had been settled. A month later, Arnold agreed to sell his stock to KJD for $290,000. KJD advanced $100,000; Arnold represented that he had good title. KJD notified the defendants that it had purchased the stock and wished to inspect the corporate books. They did not respond, but moved to vacate the dismissal, alleging that, under the alleged settlement, Arnold had transferred his stock to the corporations. They also filed suit before a different judge, resulting in a default judgment ordering Arnold to execute settlement papers and comply with the agreement. The Appellate Court affirmed. KJD was never joined as a party. The court stayed proceedings in the original action. Arnold filed a FRCP Rule 22 interpleader action, naming the corporations and KJD, stating that he made no claim to continued ownership and was willing to transfer the stock to whichever defendant the court determined to have superior right. Invoking the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the district court dismissed, but ordered Arnold to return the $100,000 advance payment. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, reasoning that the interpleader action does not attack the state court judgment itself, so further proceedings are necessary.View "Arnold v. KJD Real Estate, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2009, Trans Healthcare, Inc. (THI) filed a petition requesting that an individual and his firm be appointed as receiver over THI and forty-three related entities. THI’s petition was granted. Approximately eighteen months after the appointment, the receiver requested that a substitute receiver be appointed. The motion was granted. Almost six months later, Francina Spivery-Jones, a creditor, filed a motion to vacate the receivership, challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court. The circuit court denied the motion. Spivery-Jones appealed. The court of special appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that the order denying the motion to vacate the receivership was not a final judgment, nor was it appealable under Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 12-303 or under the collateral order doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Spivery-Jones had no right of appeal pursuant to section 12-303(3)(iv) or the collateral order doctrine. View "Spivery-Jones v. Trans Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

Mark Fisher and Reece Boudreaux were limited partners of Nighthawk Oilfield Services, Ltd. (“Nighthawk”), which acquired Richey Oilfield Construction, Inc. (“Richey Oil”) from Mike Richey. The business did not go well, and Nighthawk and Richey Oil filed for bankruptcy. Richey sued Fisher and Boudreaux in Wise County where Richey resided, alleging claims for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, common law fraud, statutory fraud and violations of the Texas Security Act. Fisher and Boudreaux responded by moving to transfer venue to Tarrant County or dismiss the suit pursuant to the mandatory venue selection clauses in the acquisition documents. The trial court denied the motions. Fisher and Boudreaux sought mandamus relief from the court of appeals, which denied relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to enforce the venue selection clauses in the acquisition documents. View "In re Fisher" on Justia Law

Respondent-claimant, Ben Snell was employed by petitioner-employer Kentucky Fried Chicken of McAlester. He alleged that while at work he slipped and fell while carrying a tray of chicken weighing approximately 40 to 50 pounds. The trial court awarded claimant temporary total disability (TTD) and reasonable and necessary medical treatment for injuries to his neck, the second finger of his right hand, and aggravation of pre-existing conditions to his left knee and low back. All other issues were reserved. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) sustained the award. In its opinion, COCA ruled the standard of review in this case was the "any competent evidence" standard because of a holding in a previous opinion by the same division, "Westoak Industries, Inc. v. DeLeon," which held 85 O.S. 2011 sec. 340(D)(4), setting out "against the clear weight of the evidence" as the appellate standard of review in workers' compensation cases, constituted a violation of the separation of powers provision of the Oklahoma Constitution. Westoak was completely at odds with another COCA opinion, "Harvey v. Auto Plus of Woodward." "Harvey" held section 340(D)(4) was not unconstitutional as a separation of powers violation. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the issue as one of first impression since certiorari was not sought in either of the previous cases. The Court concluded that there was no constitutional separation of powers prohibition in in the Okla.Const., art IV, section 1 against the Legislature's adoption of the "against the clear weight of the evidence" standard of review in 85 O.S. 2011 sec. 340(D)(4). COCA's opinion was therefore vacated. Because "Westoak" and "Harvey" were totally inconsistent with the views expressed in this opinion, they were both specifically overruled. View "Kentucky Fried Chicken of McAlester v. Snell" on Justia Law

J. Hoyt Stephenson incorporated National Financial Systems Management, Inc. (NFSM) in Utah. The same day, the NFSM Employee Stock Ownership Plan was created. The Plan has always owned 100% of NFSM’s stock. Stephenson was one of the Plan’s trustees. In June 2006, Stephenson, along with his wife and children, moved from Utah to Wyoming, and as a result, Stephenson became a Wyoming citizen. About a year later, Stephenson sold one of his companies, National Financial Systems, Inc. (NFS) to NFSM. Then he sold another one, Metronomics Inc. to NFSM. In June 2009, Stephenson and his family went back to Utah. The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on whether Stephenson became a Utah citizen when he moved back. Brent Middleton, the Stock Plan's trustee, and several others (all Utah citizens), brought several federal-law claims Stephenson in the federal district court. Stephenson fought back with state-law counterclaims and a third-party complaint asserting state-law claims against multiple third-party defendants. The district court dismissed those counterclaims and third-party claims, concluding that it lacked diversity jurisdiction to hear them because Stephenson also was from Utah. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Stephenson was a Utah citizen. View "Middleton, et al v. Stephenson, et al" on Justia Law

In June 2012, the United States District Court for the District of Utah dismissed the claims of J. Hoyt Stephenson (a man the district found to be a Utah citizen), for lack of diversity jurisdiction. Less than three months later, Stephenson assigned his interests in various stock and real property to a new company of his creation, National Fitness Holdings, Inc., a Wyoming corporation of which Stephenson was the sole director, officer and shareholder. Four days later, National Fitness sued Grand View Corporate Centre, LLC in federal district court. The district court once again dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, this time finding that Stephenson had impermissibly made the assignments to manufacture diversity jurisdiction. Upon review of the appeal of that decision, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err in finding it lacked jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "National Fitness Holdings v. Grandview Corporate Center, et al" on Justia Law

Judy Knight appealed the dismissal of her lawsuit against Mooring Capital Fund. “Most of [the Tenth Circuit’s] reasons for affirmance are routine.” But the Court took the opportunity of this case to comment on Knight’s federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims based on alleged misconduct in a prior litigation. With regard to her RICO claim, Knight argued that defendants made misrepresentations to the district court through pleadings and testimony that increased the cost of litigating her prior case, and caused the district court to rule against her. She alleged that that activity violated wire-fraud and mail-fraud statutes, thereby constituting a pattern of racketeering in violation of RICO. Because Knight did not identify any arguments she would have made regarding few and costs had it not been for defendants’ fraud, because she did not offer any specific explanation if how defendants’ litigation misconduct affected her ability to litigate he issues in the prior litigation, and because Knight did not allege there was evidence of misconduct that was unavailable while that prior litigation was pending, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal on this RICO claim too. View "Knight, et al v. Mooring Capital Fund LLC, et al" on Justia Law

Appellant T.A.H. First, Inc. had a default judgment entered against it because it failed to answer appellee Clifton Leasing Company, Inc., t/a Delmarva Kenworth's complaint in a timely manner. T.A.H. First moved the Superior Court to vacate the default judgment. The Superior Court denied that motion, and specifically held that not only was T.A.H. First not entitled to defend the claims brought by Clifton against it, but T.A.H. First also was prohibited from pressing counterclaims against Clifton because those counterclaims were not filed in a timely manner. The Superior Court agreed to hold an inquisition hearing to quantify the amount of the default judgment against T.A.H. First. But Clifton eventually concluded that T.A.H. First was likely judgment proof and that it did not want to waste further resources or those of the Superior Court by holding an inquisition hearing. Clifton sought to dismiss the case with prejudice as to all claims that any party to the case was required to have raised in a timely pleading in the case. The Superior Court granted Clifton’s request and dismissed the case. T.A.H. First appealed, arguing that the Superior Court abused its discretion by denying the motion to vacate the default judgment. Because Clifton had dismissed the case without seeking to quantify the default judgment and impose a duty upon T.A.H. First to pay a sum certain, the Supreme Court was concerned that it was addressing a moot point and that there might not be proper grounds for appeal. After receiving supplemental submissions, the Court entered an order that, "in candor, was confusing and can be read as contradictory. In essence, the Order contains language that can be read as both affirming the Superior Court’s denial of T.A.H. First’s motion to vacate the default judgment, while simultaneously reviving T.A.H. First’s ability to file counterclaims that it had not timely filed." After the Superior Court granted summary judgment on T.A.H. First’s claims on remand, T.A.H. First again appealed, arguing that the Supreme Court's prior mandate required the Superior Court to allow T.A.H. First to press its claims, despite the default judgment T.A.H. First had earlier suffered. Upon re-review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion or commit an error of law in its rulings in this case. View "T.A.H. First, Inc. v. Clifton Leasing Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against MAM, a Delaware corporation. Plaintiff was a MAM secured creditor and he held two Convertible Promissory Notes. Plaintiff's complaint alleged claims related to the Security Agreement that each note was secured by. MAM failed to respond to plaintiff's complaint and two weeks after plaintiff moved for entry of default judgment, Michael Gleicher moved to intervene in the case. Gleicher sought leave to intervene in two capacities: (1) as a MAM general creditor holding two Convertible Promissory Notes; and (2) as a MAM shareholder. The court concluded that Gleicher cited no source giving a general creditor a right to defend his debtor from another general creditor for the sole purpose of defeating the latter's claim. Further, Gleicher cited no source giving a corporation's shareholder the right to intervene in a suit brought against the corporation by one of its creditors for the sole purpose of defeating the creditor's claim. Gleicher has not established, nor could he, that he suffered an injury-in-fact as a result of plaintiff's filing of this lawsuit. Therefore, Gleicher lacked standing to intervene and he lacked standing to appeal the district court's final judgment. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Hawes v. Gleicher" on Justia Law

St. Jude sued its competitor, Medtronic, for tortiously interfering with its business relationship with an employee. After the parties arbitrated their claims, St. Jude then sued the employee's wife (defendant) for related claims. On appeal, St. Jude challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant. Defendant had left her at-will employment with St. Judge to work for Medtronic and her husband's sales at St. Jude dropped significantly. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that Florida law applied because Florida was the forum that rendered the arbitration judgment. Applying Florida's requirements for res judicata, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of Counts 1, 3, 5, and 6 arising from defendant's acts as a St. Jude employee because they were not barred by res judicata; the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Counts 2 and 4; and the court remanded for further proceedings. View "St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc. v. Cormier" on Justia Law