Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Iqbal bought a gasoline service station and contracted with S-Mart Petroleum for gasoline. Iqbal then hired Patel to conduct the business, ceding operational control to him. He chose Patel on the recommendation of Johnson, S-Mart’s president. Patel ran the business but did not pay for the gasoline, leading S-Mart to sue. The Indiana state court entered a judgment of more than $65,000 against Iqbal as guarantor. Under a settlement, Iqbal gave S-Mart a note, secured by a mortgage on the business premises. When he still did not pay, a state court entered a second judgment against him, and the property was sold in a foreclosure auction. Iqbal filed a federal suit, alleging that Patel and Johnson acted in cahoots to defraud him out of his business and seeking treble damages under 18 U.S.C. 1964, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The district court dismissed the complaint as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it challenged the state court’s judgments. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that Iqbal seeks damages for activity that (he alleges) predated the state litigation and caused injury independently of it. View "Iqbal v. Patel" on Justia Law

This dispute concerned an underlying breach of fiduciary duty case that was coordinated with an appraisal proceeding, both arising out of a take-private transaction involving Dole Food Company, Inc. (Dole). During the proceedings, Defendants identified a corporation as their expert witness on the subject of Dole’s value at the time of the transaction. Plaintiffs objected, arguing that an expert witness must be a biological person. The Court of Chancery agreed with Plaintiffs, holding that an expert witness must be a biological person, and therefore, Defendants could not rely on the corporation that they designated to serve as their expert witness. View "In re Dole Food Co., Inc. Stockholder Litig." on Justia Law

Walter Energy, Inc., appealed a circuit court order that dismissed claims it had asserted against investor Julian Treger, his firm Audley Capital Advisors LLP, and other associated investment entities (collectively, "the Audley defendants") stemming from their alleged involvement in a scheme to improperly manipulate the share price of Walter Energy stock. Walter Energy sued the Audley defendants alleging various claims stemming from their alleged involvement in a "pump and dump" scheme to manipulate the share price of Walter Energy stock. After affording Walter Energy three opportunities to amend its complaint, the trial court dismissed all the claims on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds. Walter Energy thereafter appealed the dismissal of two of its claims to the Alabama Supreme Court; however, upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the dismissal of those claims was proper, and the judgment of the trial court was accordingly affirmed. View "Walter Energy, Inc. v. Audley Capital Advisors, LLP" on Justia Law

Maurice Salem was admitted pro hac vice in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin in connection with some commercial litigation. Salem represented Trade Well International, a Pakistani company, which was suing United Central Bank for damages and the return of property that was left behind in a hotel that the Bank owned. Problems arose when Salem filed a Notice of Lien on behalf of his client; the Notice stated that there was a lien on the hotel and purported to provide notice of the litigation. The district court, concluding that the Notice was defective in several ways, held Salem in contempt of court, revoked his pro hac vice status, barred him from practicing in the Western District of Wisconsin for three years, and imposed a $500 fine. Salem appealed. On the merits, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the district court’s orders should have been set aside: nothing Salem did warranted a finding of contempt, nor these sanctions. View "Salem v. United Central Bank" on Justia Law

Appellants Holly and Polly Stubblefield, and appellees Loxley and William Stubblefield, are sisters and brothers. The sisters were residents of Florida; the brothers lived in Mississippi. Together, the siblings were officers, directors and shareholders of three closely held corporations, Scarlett & Associates, Inc., Parnell & Associates, Inc., and PJ & Associates, Inc. Scarlett was a Georgia corporation with its registered agent in Forsyth County. Parnell and PJ were Mississippi corporations with registered agents in Fulton County. In 2013, the brothers withdrew large sums of money from one of the corporations without board approval. The brothers notified the sisters of these withdrawals, asserting the sisters were entitled to receive equal amounts. However, the sisters took the position that the withdrawals were unlawful. The sisters notified the brothers that the three corporations would hold board meetings in Biloxi, Mississippi, and that the brothers were required to attend the meetings in person. The brothers did not appear at the meetings and the sisters voted to remove them from their positions as officers and directors of the three corporations. The brothers brought suit against the sisters and the corporations in Forsyth County. The primary question presented by this case was whether appellants were subject to personal jurisdiction in this state under the Georgia Long-Arm Statute. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that appellants were indeed subject to the Georgia statute, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "Stubblefield v. Stubblefield" on Justia Law

An Iowa plaintiff sued a nonresident corporation (Defendant) for unfair competition and civil conspiracy. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion, concluding that general jurisdiction was established because Defendant’s passive website held Defendant out as having a manufacturing facility in Sioux Center, Iowa. In fact, the Sioux Center facility was owned and operated by a separate Iowa defendant that supplied the product to Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed the order denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss but on an alternative ground, holding (1) the district court erred by exercising general jurisdiction over Defendant based solely on the inaccurate statement on Defendant’s website, as there was no proof that Defendant was “essentially at home” in Iowa to establish general jurisdiction; but (2) the totality of Defendant’s contacts with Iowa were sufficient to subject it to specific jurisdiction on claims related to those contacts. View "Sioux Pharm, Inc. v. Summit Nutritionals Int’l, Inc." on Justia Law

Gray1 CPB, LLC (Gray1), obtained a judgment against defendants SCC Acquisitions and Bruce Elieff. Almost two years later, defendants paid the amount of the outstanding judgment and accrued interest with a cashier's check. In the interim, Gray1 allegedly incurred more than $3 million in attorney fees in an effort to enforce its judgment. The fees were largely incurred in litigating a separate action against Elieff in an effort to untangle what Gray1 asserted were a number of fraudulent transactions resulting in the placement of fraudulent liens on Elieff's real property as part of a scheme to insulate Elieff's properties from the judgment. According to Gray1, it was only when it appeared the separate action was imminently headed toward resolution in Gray1's favor that defendants gave Gray1 the cashier's check to pay the judgment. Gray1 did not immediately cash the check. It held onto the check long enough for its attorneys to file a motion for postjudgment costs, including attorney fees. Once deposited, the issuing bank honored the check. A motion for postjudgment costs (including attorney fees) must "be made before the judgment is satisfied in full." The trial court denied Gray1's motion for postjudgment costs, finding the motion was made after the judgment had been fully satisfied. Gray1 appealed. The issue for the Court of Appeal's review was whether the judgment paid with a cashier's check was deemed satisfied. Because Gray1's motion for attorney fees incurred in a separate action to enforce its judgment in the underlying matter was not filed before defendants paid Gray1 with a certified cashier's check accepted by Gray1 and in an amount in excess of the full judgment (including awarded attorney fees and accrued interest), Gray1's motion was untimely and properly denied by the superior court. View "Gray1 CPB, LLC v. SCC Acquisitions, Inc." on Justia Law

Multiple plaintiffs, including ConAgra Foods, Inc. and Swift-Eckrich, Inc., brought suit in Kansas state court against Americold Logistics, LLC and Americold Realty Trust (the "Americold entities"). The Americold entities removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. As grounds for removal, the Americold entities argued the parties were completely diverse. No party challenged the propriety of removal; the district court did not address the issue. The merits of the suit were submitted to the district court on cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to the Americold entities. ConAgra and Swift-Eckrich then appealed. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the Americold entities to file a supplemental brief addressing whether the citizenship of a trust was determined by exclusive reference to the citizenship of its trustees? According to "Carden v. Arkoma Associates," (494 U.S. 185 (1990)), the answer to this question was "no:" the citizenship of a trust, just like the citizenship of all other artificial entities except corporations, is determined by examining the citizenship "of all the entity's members." That being the case, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the suit underlying this appeal. The case was remanded back to the district court for vacation of its judgment on the merits and for remand of the matter to state court. View "Conagra Foods v. Americold Logistics" on Justia Law

Hutterites disavow individual property ownership for a communal lifestyle. The Hutterian Church has three conferences. South Dakota’s Hutterville Colony belonged to the Schmiedeleut Conference. Hutterville’s nonprofit corporation operates a communal farm, conducts business, and owns all property. In 1983, when the Colony formed, Kleinsasser led Schmiedeleut Conference. Several ministers repudiated Kleinsasser’s leadership in 1992 and followed Wipf. Colonies following Wipf ratified a new constitution. Kleinsasser’s colonies did not. Each group claimed that it was the true Schmiedeleut. Waldner, Hutterville’s ecclesiastical leader, its corporation’s president, and a director, was loyal to Kleinsasser. The complaint alleges that through “sham” corporate meetings in 2008-2009, Wipf faction members were elected to replace Waldner faction officers and directors. Each faction conducted business in the name of the company. In 2009 a state trial court determined that Wipf faction members were the duly elected directors and officers. Waldner and Kleinsasser excommunicated Wipf faction members. State courts rejected a challenge to the excommunication, reasoning that control of the corporation could not be determined without addressing religious questions. In a second state action, the supreme court reversed appointment of a receiver, concluding that even corporate dissolution is beyond secular jurisdiction. As the factions were contesting the receiver’s accounting, the Waldners filed suit under RICO, as individuals and in their “official” capacities as purported directors and officers, claiming that attorneys worked with the Wipf faction to “wrest control” of Hutterville, and that the receiver was part of the plan. The district court dismissed, reasoning that official capacity standing required knowing who truly controls Hutterville, which involves religious disputes; individual claims for property damages claims were dismissed based on the renunciation of individual property. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Hutterville Hutterian Brethren, Inc. v. Sveen" on Justia Law

Ricketti, a podiatrist, hired Plishchuk as an associate. In addition to his own practice, Ricketti treated patients at Restorix wound care center. Ricketti regularly sent Plishchuk to Restorix to treat patients. Ricketti terminated Plishchuk’s employment for allegedly failing to comply with regulatory requirements. Plishchuk continued treating Ricketti’s patients at Restorix. After Plishchuk stopped treating patients, Restorix allegedly prevented Ricketti from practicing there. Ricketti sued Plishchuk, claiming breaches of contract, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the duty of loyalty; tortious interference with economic advantage; and conversion, but did not join Restorix, nor inform the court that they should have been joined. The parties settled. Ricketti filed another suit naming Restorix and its manager, without Plishchuk, alleging the same causes of action and facts. The court dismissed, holding that the entire controversy doctrine barred Ricketti’s second suit. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded for evaluation of the party joinder issue under the summary judgment standard. The court should enter judgment for defendants on those grounds only if it finds that this is a successive action, that failure to disclose defendants as potentially liable parties in the Plishchuk action was inexcusable, and that this omission substantially prejudiced defendants. View "Ricketti v. Barry" on Justia Law