Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Appellant, Stilwyn, Inc., brought suit against the Respondents stating nine claims for relief arising out of a failed transaction to purchase an interest in a loan. The district court dismissed those claims, holding that they were barred by prior federal litigation involving Stilwyn, two of the Respondents, and the same failed transaction. It held the claims were barred by claim preclusion and because the claims were compulsory counterclaims in the federal litigation that were not asserted there. Stilwyn argued on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court that the district court erred in both respects. Respondents cross-appealed to argue that the district court erred in failing to grant their requests for attorney fees. Respondents also requested attorney fees on appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the district court erred in its conclusion that Stilwyn's claims were barred by claim preclusion; (2) the district court erred in concluding that Stilwyn's claims were compulsory in the federal litigation; and (3) the district court did not err in refusing to grant attorney fees. View "Stilwyn, Inc. v. Rokan Corporation" on Justia Law

In "Vinings Bank v. Brasfield & Gorrie, LLC," (759 SE2d 886 (2014)), the Court of Appeals affirmed, among other rulings, the trial court’s determination that Vinings Bank was not entitled to summary judgment with regard to a counterclaim for conversion brought against the Bank by Brasfield & Gorrie, LLC ("B&G"). This case stemmed from a defaulted $1.4 million business loan. The bank made the loan to Wagner Enterprises, Inc., which used as collateral, a security interest in all of its accounts and accounts receivable, including Wagner's contract to provide drywall services for general contractor B&G. Wagner defaulted on the loan, and the Bank filed suit against B&G seeking to collect on Wagner's accounts receivable. B&G counterclaimed for conversion, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The bank appealed the denial of its motion. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. In affirming the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeals did not consider whether B&G had any right to assert a counterclaim against the bank for conversion of funds due to Wagner's subcontractors. The Supreme Court found that B&G had no direct relationship with the Bank, B&G was not, itself, a subcontractor of Wagner entitled to any of Wagner's funds, B&G did not have direct contractual relationships with any of Wagner's subcontractors, and B&G had no fiduciary relationship with any of Wagner's subcontractors. Furthermore, there was no evidence that Wagner or Wagner's affected subcontractors assigned B&G any of their rights. "Therefore, even if we assume without deciding that funds in [Wagner's] account were held in a constructive trust for the benefit of [Wagner's] subcontractors, B&G is not the party to assert those rights and had no standing to do so." View "Vinings Bank v. Brasfield & Gorrie, LLC" on Justia Law

Eighteen years after Nissan and Wayzata entered into an agreement which established Wayzata as an authorized Nissan dealer, Nissan informed Wayzata that it intended to establish a new dealership in Eden Prairie, eight miles from Wayzata. Nissan sought a declaratory judgment that the Eden Prairie dealership neither violated their dealer agreement nor infringed Wayzata's "relevant market area" under Minn. Stat. 80E.14. One month later, Wayzata sued Nissan in Minnesota state court, alleging the new dealership violated its dealer agreement and the statute, and moved to dismiss the federal action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion to dismiss after concluding that the parties were not diverse under 28 U.S.C. 1332. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. A district court may dismiss or stay a declaratory judgment action when it determines that the question in controversy would be better handled in state court. It would be duplicative and uneconomical for a federal court to decide a case substantially similar to one which has been pending for over a year in state court. View "Nissan N. Am., Inc. v. Wayzata Nissan, LLC" on Justia Law

Southeast Construction, L.L.C. ("SEC"), appealed a circuit court order that found WAR Construction, Inc., had provided SEC with certain releases as previously ordered by the circuit court and that SEC was accordingly now required to pay the outstanding $263,939 remaining on a $373,939 judgment previously entered on a February 16, 2011, arbitration award obtained by WAR against SEC, along with interest accruing from February 16, 2011. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed that judgment to the extent it held that WAR provided all required releases and that SEC was obligated to fulfill the judgment entered on the arbitration award. However, the Court reversed the judgment inasmuch as it held that SEC is required to pay interest on the award as calculated from February 16, 2011. On remand, the circuit court was instructed to calculate interest on the principal at the rate set forth in the arbitration award accruing from September 8, 2014. View "Southeast Construction L.L.C. v. WAR Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jourdan Rivers Estates, LLC (JRE) and Jourdan River Resort and Yacht Club (Yacht Club), filed suit for damages in December 2011 against Defendants Scott Favre, Cindy Favre, Jefferson Parker, and CB Partners, LLC d/b/a Cinque Bambini. CB Partners, LLC d/b/a Cinque Bambini was later dismissed from the action without prejudice. The complaint alleged multiple claims against Defendants, including slander of title; slander and/or defamation; trespass; nuisance; tortious interference with use of property; tortious interference with contractual relationships; harassment and intimidation of plaintiffs' agents and intentional infliction of emotional distress upon plaintiffs' agents; assault upon plaintiffs' agents; willful destruction of plaintiffs' property; negligence; gross, willful, and wanton negligence; malicious prosecution; unjust enrichment; false imprisonment; and any other applicable theory of law giving rise to a cause of action. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The circuit court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The circuit court dismissed all of Yacht Club's claims in relation to the claim(s) that Defendants made false representations to the Hancock County Board of Supervisors and/or Hancock County employees, finding that such allegations fell under the "Noerr-Pennington" doctrine, expressly adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court. The circuit court dismissed JRE's claims of slander of title, slander and/or defamation; harassment; assault; and false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress because each claim constituted an intentional tort and was barred under the statute of limitations. The circuit court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss as to JRE's claims for trespass; nuisance; tortious interference with use of property; tortious interference with contractual relationships; willful destruction of property; negligence; gross, willful, and wanton negligence; malicious prosecution; and unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs thereafter petitioned for an interlocutory appeal. Because the Supreme Court found that Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion should have been converted into a motion for summary judgment, as provided in Rule 56 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, it reversed the circuit court's order granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jourdan River Estates, LLC v. Favre" on Justia Law

In the name of controlling litigation costs, a heating and air conditioning contractor, Blue Hen Mechanical, Inc. sued Christian Brothers Risk Pooling Trust as subrogee for the Little Sisters of the Poor for malicious prosecution. In January 2008, the Little Sisters of the Poor contracted with Blue Hen to maintain the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning equipment at its nonprofit residential nursing home facility. Two months later, the nursing home's air conditioner broke, requiring the unit to be replaced at a cost of $168,740. The Little Sisters of the Poor filed suit against Blue Hen, alleging that the unit's failure was due to Blue Hen's negligence in inspecting and maintaining the equipment. After briefing and oral argument, the Superior Court determined that the Little Sisters of the Poor had not produced sufficient evidence of Blue Hen's negligence, and granted Blue Hen's motion for summary judgment. Rather than seek costs in that lawsuit, Blue Hen initiated another suit against the Little Sisters of the Poor, alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Blue Hen conceded that the Little Sisters of the Poor initially had good cause to sue. But it contended that during the course of that litigation, the Little Sisters of the Poor should have realized that its suit lacked probable cause, and should have dismissed its claims against Blue Hen. The Superior Court refused to enlarge the tort of malicious prosecution, which has historically been disfavored by Delaware courts, and determined that under the tort (as Delaware court have defined it), Blue Hen failed to demonstrate that the Little Sisters of the Poor acted maliciously in bringing its action and granted summary judgment to the Little Sisters of the Poor. Blue Hen appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed: "[w]hatever the original wisdom for sanctioning the tort of malicious prosecution, we refuse to extend it to encompass claims properly brought before the court in the first instance. As important, there is no basis in the summary judgment record to support a rational jury finding that the Little Sisters of the Poor acted maliciously in the original suit, rather than in a good faith belief that Blue Hen was responsible for the serious losses that the Little Sisters of the Poor had suffered." View "Blue Hen Mechanical, Inc. v. Christian Brothers Risk Pooling Trust" on Justia Law

The Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC) Commissioner appealed a superior court judgment dismissing his claim against the Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Commission for lack of standing. The Appeals Commission overturned the ABC Commissioner's decision to deny an application for a change of license classification by Lex-Pak, Inc., d/a/b Hak's Sports Bar & Restaurant. Hak's filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that the ABC Commissioner lacked standing. The superior court agreed and dismissed the case. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Delaware Code did not vest the ABC Commissioner with standing to pursue an appeal of decisions by the Appeals Commission. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Office of the Commissioner Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Appeals Commission Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Control" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the dismissal of Cecily Considine’s lawsuit against the receivers appointed in her separate lawsuit against her former business partner, Michael Affatato, on the ground that the receivers had official immunity. She alleged conversion, unjust enrichment, fraud and other claims over a dispute over the right to control the assets of "Model Master," a company Considine and Affatato created. The trial court appointed a receiver to preserve the company's property during the pendency of the litigation. Considine and Affatato executed a letter agreement with certified public accountant George Murphy and his firm, Murphy & McInvale, PC (M&M) as the court-appointed receiver. While the lawsuit against Affatato was pending, Considine filed suit against Murphy and M&M, alleging gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duty based on their alleged mismanagement of the receivership. The receivers moved to dismiss, asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction based on their official immunity as Considine's failure to obtain leave of the court in the Affatato matter prior to filing a lawsuit against Murphy and M&M. The trial court held a hearing, but Considine voluntarily dismissed her suit against the receivers before the trial court issued an order. Again without seeking prior approval, Considine filed the underlying suit to this appeal against the receivers, raising several claims including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, gross negligence, and willful and wanton misconduct. The receivers again moved to dismiss. The trial court granted the receivers' motion and dismissed Considine's suit. The Court of Appeals reversed on grounds that the trial court ruled on the motion to dismiss less than 30 days after it was filed, depriving Considine proper notice or opportunity to be heard. Furthermore, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal based on official immunity. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that this lawsuit against the receivers should instead have been dismissed on the ground that Considine failed to obtain leave from the trial court in her lawsuit against Affatato before filing a separate lawsuit against the receivers appointed in that case. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment on this ground, and therefore vacate the court’s discussion of immunity. View "Considine v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Health Grades, Inc., operated a website providing information to healthcare consumers about hospitals and physicians around the country, filed suit against two of its former employees, Christopher Boyer and Patrick Singson. Its complaint alleged that Boyer and Singson created competing websites during their employment at Health Grades and solicited Health Grades’ clients to advertise on their competing websites, which utilized proprietary methodologies created by Health Grades to increase the probability that consumers would discover their websites. The complaint included claims of breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with prospective business advantage, and ultimately, breach of contract and conversion. Defendants Boyer and Singson denied Health Grades’ material allegations and asserted a counterclaim for abuse of process. In support of their counterclaim, they alleged that Health Grades’ claims lacked a reasonable factual basis or cognizable basis in law and were based on allegations Health Grades largely knew to be false. A jury rejected all of Health Grades’ claims and returned a verdict for defendants on their counterclaim. The court subsequently denied Health Grades’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On appeal, the intermediate appellate court found that the district court erred by allowing the jury to decide the question of whether Health Grades’ claims were devoid of reasonable factual support or lacked any cognizable basis in law such that they were not immune from liability under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment; and it remanded with instructions for the district court to make an independent judicial determination of that question. Shortly after the opinion was released, the Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in "General Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Bacheller," (291 P.3d 1), holding that the heightened standard set forth in earlier case law did not apply where the underlying alleged petitioning activity was the filing of an arbitration complaint concerning a purely private dispute. On rehearing, the court of appeals modified its initial opinion, concluding that nothing in "General Steel" required the modification of its remand order. Because the Supreme Court held that the underlying rationale for its judgment in General Steel concerning arbitration proceedings was equally applicable to actions filed in courts of law, and because it was uncontested by the parties that the action filed by Health Grades involved a purely private dispute, the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the matter remanded with directions to affirm the jury’s verdict. View "Boyer v. Health Grades, Inc." on Justia Law

Susan White appealed a judgment on the pleadings in favor of Glen and Loretta White in an action by Glen and Loretta White against T.P. Motel, L.L.C., and an order denying her motion to intervene. Susan White was married to Ross White, and the daughter-in-law of Glen and Loretta. Susan and Ross were the co-owners and members of T.P. Motel. T.P. Motel entered into a contract for deed to purchase real property and a motel in Mandan from Glen and Loretta. The contract for deed required T.P. Motel to make monthly payments of $2,500 to Glen and Loretta beginning on March 15, 2012. T.P. Motel did not make payments in March, April, and May of 2012, but began making the monthly payments in June. Susan and Ross separated in January 2013, and Susan moved to California and initiated a divorce action against Ross in California. T.P. Motel failed to make monthly payments on the contract for deed in January and February 2013, but began making payments again in March 2013. In February 2013, Glen and Loretta served notice of default on the contract for deed on T.P. Motel and on Susan individually. When T.P. Motel failed to cure the default within 30 days as allowed by the contract for deed, Glen and Loretta sued T.P. Motel to cancel the contract for deed. In her answer, Susan included a counterclaim against Glen and Loretta and a crossclaim against Ross, alleging fraud, collusion, malicious intent, and breach of fiduciary obligations. The counterclaim alleged Ross, Glen, and Loretta acted in concert to operate the motel and prevented Susan from entering and operating the motel. Susan alleged Ross, Glen, and Loretta White perpetrated a fraud on her by acting in concert to manipulate T.P. Motel's financial information, by accepting and not reporting cash rentals of property, and by paying non-business bills and expenses out of T.P. Motel's accounts. A hearing was held on T.P. Motel's motion to dismiss Susan's crossclaim against Ross, and her motion to join Ross as a party to the action. The district court did not rule on the motions. Both parties acknowledged the district court indicated it did not believe Susan was a proper party to the action, and she should have moved to intervene if she wanted to be made a party. Susan moved to intervene, arguing as a fifty-percent owner of T.P. Motel, she had an equal right to answer the complaint on behalf of T.P. Motel. She argued Ross was not acting in the best interest of T.P. Motel by admitting the default and requesting cancellation of the contract for deed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings and in denying the motion to intervene. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "White v. T.P. Motel, L.L.C." on Justia Law