Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

M-I and NOV compete, providing solid-control equipment to the oil-and-gas industry, including mesh screens that filter solid matter from drilling fluid. In 2012, Russo became business development manager of M-I’s screen division and obtained in-depth knowledge of M-I’s bidding strategies, pricing, customer preferences, solid-control systems, and deployment strategies. In 2014, Russo left M-I to become NOV’s screen division global product line manager. M-I sent Russo a letter, asserting breach of a non-compete agreement he executed when he joined M-I . Russo sought a declaration that the agreement was unenforceable. M-I counterclaimed for breach of the agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, misappropriation of trade secrets, and tortious interference, and asserted third-party claims against NOV. At a hearing on M-I’s application for a temporary injunction, M-I sought to establish its trade secrets by Moore’s oral testimony, and requested that everyone, except counsel, experts, and Russo be excluded from the courtroom. The trial court denied M-I’s request. Concerned about disclosing Moore’s testimony, M-I obtained a recess to petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. M-I submitted, in camera to the court of appeals, Moore's affidavit detailing her proposed testimony . Russo and NOV objected to the affidavit as an ex parte communication. The court of appeals denied their motion for access, along with M-I’s mandamus petition. The Texas Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief. The trial court erred in concluding that the exclusion of NOV’s designated representative from portions of the hearing involving trade secrets would violate due process without balancing the competing interests and must, on remand, conduct that balancing. The court also abused its discretion when it ordered the Moore affidavit disclosed without reviewing it in camera. View "In re M-I, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The Circuit Court dismissed claims asserted by St. Union Baptist Church, Inc. ("the corporation"), against Reverend James M. Howard, Sr., and the counterclaims asserted by Howard against the corporation and its directors after concluding that their dispute was ecclesiastical in nature and outside the jurisdiction of the court. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the corporation's claims because they were indeed ecclesiastical in nature and outside the Circuit Court's jurisdiction. But the Court reversed dismissal of Howard's claims because the issues underlying that appeal involved only the financial affairs and property rights of the church. Howard's case was remanded for further proceedings. View "St. Union Baptist Church, Inc. v. Howard" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit against defendants, alleging that they charged plaintiffs more than the statutory maximum fees allowed by N.Y. Pub. Health Law 18(2)(d) and (e) for providing copies of plaintiffs' medical records. The district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss the action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) on the ground that the complaint alleged that the requested records had been paid for by plaintiffs' attorneys, ruling that the complaint therefore did not plead injury-in-fact to plaintiffs themselves and that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court concluded that, in light of the ordinary principles of agency, the complaint's allegations that each named plaintiff "through [her or his] counsel" "paid" the charges demanded by defendants for providing the records and that "Plaintiffs" bore "the ultimate expense" for those records, plausibly alleged that plaintiffs themselves were injured by the claimed violations of New York law. Because the district court erred in dismissing the suit under Rule 12(b)(1), the court vacated and remanded. View "Carter v. HealthPort Technologies, LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal grew out of a conflict between the business models of Sprint Nextel Corporation and The Middle Man, Inc. Middle Man bought mobile telephones, including Sprint’s, and tries to resell them at a profit. Sprint brought a breach of contract lawsuit against Middle Man, and Middle Man counterclaimed seeking a declaration that its business model did not violate the contract that accompanied the purchase of Sprint telephones. The district court held as a matter of law that the contract unambiguously prohibited Middle Man from selling new mobile telephones purchased from Sprint regardless of whether they were active on Sprint’s network. In light of this holding, the district court: (1) granted judgment on the pleadings to Sprint on Middle Man’s counterclaim for a declaratory judgment; and (2) granted summary judgment to Sprint on its breach of contract claim, awarding Sprint nominal damages of $1. Middle Man appealed, contending that the entry of judgment on Sprint’s claim and Middle Man’s counterclaim was made in error and that the district court should have awarded judgment to Middle Man on both claims. The Tenth Circuit, after review of the contract at issue here, determined parts were ambiguous, and that the district court erred in ruling as a matter of law that it was not. As such, Sprint was not entitled to judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. The district court's judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Sprint Nextel Corp. v. Middle Man" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a stockholder of The ADT Corporation (ADT), challenged a series of decisions by ADT’s board of directors (the Board) for the alleged purpose of appeasing an activist investor and avoiding a proxy contest. Prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s complaint, another ADT stockholder, in Ryan v. Gursahaney, filed a complaint challenging the Board’s decisions. The Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1. Plaintiff’s complaint in this case largely mirrored the operative complaint in Ryan. The Court of Chancery dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint under Rule 23.1, holding that Plaintiff failed to distinguish his complaint from the Court’s decision in Ryan sufficiently to avoid dismissal. View "Binning v. Gursahaney" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants alleging breach of fiduciary duty resulting from oppressive conduct, breach of fiduciary duty resulting from self-dealing, fraud in the inducement, and negligent misrepresentation. During trial, Plaintiff produced 155 pages of documents that had not been produced to Defendants during discovery. Defendants argued that they were denied a fair trial because the information contained in the documents would have permitted them to properly cross-examine Plaintiff. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 37(b) as a sanction for the mid-trial production of documents. The court subsequently denied Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the order of dismissal under Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice pursuant to Rule 37; and (2) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying Rule 60(b) relief. View "Joachim v. Straight Line Prods., LLC" on Justia Law

When the main Youngstown-area crushed-stone supplier discontinued production, RGI, a Sandusky quarry, approached Hardrives, Sabatine's asphalt paving company, to discuss jointly establishing a large RGI distribution center and Hardrives production plant. In 1998, RGI’s representatives and Sabatine produced a draft agreement, with contingencies, such as the minimum amount of stone Hardrives was to buy, low-cost railroad transportation, and government incentives; it stated that it was subject to RGI senior management approval. Sabatine was unable to convince Norfolk Railroad to establish access and enlisted Congressman Traficant’s help.Unbeknownst to RGI, Sabatine paid Traficant a $2,400 bribe and was later indicted. Ultimately, the parties arrived at an acceptable rail rate and selected a Youngstown site. Hardrives began bidding on larger projects and purchasing new equipment. All the agreed contingencies were fulfilled, except RGI had arguably not given explicit senior management approval. Sabatine called RGI about ordering a $1.5 million asphalt plant for the site. According to Sabatine, RGI gave him the go ahead. Sabatine purchased the plant. Two months later RGI told Hardrives that it would no longer participate in the joint venture. Hardrives began losing money, and by 2001, became Cranmark and sold to McCourt. In 2004, Cranpark sued, alleging breach of contract and promissory estoppel. In 2010, the court granted RGI summary judgment, based on the limitations period, and holding RGI’s representations were not unambiguous promises. On remand, RGI argued that Cranpark was not the “proper party” because it had sold everything, including the right to bring the cause of action, to McCourt. The court denied the motion. A jury awarded $15.6 million, but the court then held that Cranmark lacked standing. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that the court failed to timely call the proof-of-standing issue to counsel’s attention, once RGI finally squarely presented the issue. View "Cranpark, Inc. v. Rogers Group, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, a large Georgia corporation that properly registered to do business in Delaware was sued in Delaware over claims having nothing to do with its activities in Delaware. Adhering to the interpretation given to Delaware's registration statutes, the Superior Court held that, notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in "Daimler AG v. Bauman," the foreign corporation consented to Delaware's general jurisdiction merely by registering to do business in Delaware. After review, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that after "Daimler," it was "not tenable to read Delaware's registration statutes" in the same way as the Superior Court did in "Sternberg v. O'Neil … Delaware cannot exercise general jurisdiction over it consistent with principles of due process. Furthermore, the plaintiffs concede that they cannot establish specific jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant under the long-arm statute or principles of due process. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claim must be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the Superior Court‘s judgment." View "Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, et al." on Justia Law

Clatus Junkin, a resident of Fayette County, owned and operated Johnco Materials, Inc., a sand and gravel pit located in Lowndes County. At some point in time, Junkin purchased diesel fuel from Southeastern Energy and had it delivered to Johnco Materials. When Southeastern Energy did not receive payment for the fuel, Southeastern Energy sued Johnco Materials and Junkin, individually, in Lowndes County. With regard to Junkin, Southeastern Energy alleged that "Junkin was personally liable to Southeastern Energy for diesel fuel that was sold and delivered to Johnco Materials." At the request of the parties, the Lowndes Circuit Court entered a consent judgment against Johnco Materials and in favor of Southeastern Energy for an agreed-upon amount and dismissed Junkin from the action with prejudice. Junkin then sued Southeastern Energy in Fayette County alleging malicious prosecution by Southeastern Energy in the Lowndes County case. Southeastern Energy moved to dismiss the malicious prosecution action or, in the alternative, to transfer the action to "Montgomery County, Alabama, or any other proper venue, pursuant to Rule 82(d), Ala. R. Civ. P., and governing law." Southeastern Energy Corp. petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus ordering the Fayette Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Southeastern Energy's motion for a change of venue for the underlying action and directing the Fayette Circuit Court to grant the motion and transfer the action to the Montgomery Circuit Court (case no. 1150033). Southeastern Energy filed a second petition for a writ of mandamus asking the Supreme Court to direct the Fayette Circuit Court to vacate an order transferring the underlying action to the Lowndes Circuit Court, and to direct the Fayette Circuit Court to enter an order transferring the action to the Montgomery Circuit Court (case no. 1150294). Finding no errors in the transfer orders, the Supreme Court dismissed Southeastern Energy's petition in case no. 1150033, and denied its petition in case no. 1150294. View "Ex parte Southeastern Energy Corp." on Justia Law

William Burgess, a common stock shareholder of BancorpSouth, Inc., filed a shareholder derivative action after a Special Committee comprised of BancorpSouth directors and officers rejected his presuit demand. In that presuit demand and in his Shareholder Derivative Complaint, Burgess made various claims relating to alleged misrepresentations in company publications directed to shareholders following the 2008 economic downturn. Ultimately, the Circuit Court dismissed the action. Finding no reversible error in the Circuit Court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Burgess v. Patterson" on Justia Law