Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Defendants Eric Schrier, Frank Frederick, and Angela Martinez had been employed in various capacities by plaintiff SG Homecare, Inc. before abruptly leaving to start a competing firm, defendant Verio Healthcare, Inc. SG Homecare filed the underlying complaint, alleging the individual defendants breached their contractual and fiduciary duties, and misappropriated trade secrets. Schrier and his wife cross-complained against SG Homecare and its owner, Thomas Randall Rowley (together, the “SG parties”), alleging wrongful termination and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant Verio Healthcare and the individual defendants were represented by Donald Wagner of the firm Buchalter Nemer, PLC. Shortly after the cross-complaint was filed, the SG Parties moved to disqualify Buchalter Nemer. The motion was based on an assertion that shortly before the individual defendants’ departure from SG Homecare, Buchalter Nemer executed a retainer agreement with SG Homecare and was either currently representing SG Homecare, or, alternatively, the present litigation was substantially related to Buchalter Nemer’s prior representation of SG Homecare (requiring disqualification in either event). Adding to mix: Wagner, as a member of the California State Assembly, relied on statutory entitlement to a continuance and extension of time of the entire litigation. The trial court denied the motion for a stay without explanation. Defendants petitioned the Court of Appeals court for a writ of mandate to order the trial court to grant the stay. The Appeals court summarily denied the petition, but the California Supreme Court granted review and remanded back to the Appeals court with instructions to issue an order to show cause. The Court of Appeals issued that order and denied the writ, namely because it found that the trial court acted within its discretion in its finding that the stay would "defeat or abridge the other party's" right to relief. View "Verio Healthcare v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Appellant Pandora Franchising, LLC was a foreign limited liability company. In its application for certificate of authority to transact business in Georgia, Pandora identified its principal place of business in Maryland. Appellee Kingdom Retail Group (“Kingdom”) filed suit against Pandora in Thomas County Superior Court, alleging Pandora wrongfully withheld its consent to Kingdom’s bid to acquire a number of Pandora franchises. Kingdom alleged venue was proper in Thomas County pursuant to OCGA 14-2-510 (b) (4) because the cause of action originated in Thomas County. Over Kingdom’s objection, the trial court granted Pandora’s request to remove the complaint to Gwinnett County where, Pandora claimed in its notice of removal, “it maintains its registered office as its principal place of business in Georgia.” The Court of Appeals granted Kingdom’s application for interlocutory review and reversed the grant of removal. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly construed OCGA 14-2-510 (b) (4) to mean that, in a claim in which the basis for venue was the allegation that the cause of action originated in the county where the claim was filed, only a corporation with its worldwide principal place of business, or “nerve center” in Georgia had the right to remove the claim to the county in Georgia where that principal place of business was located. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision and adopted the reasoning set forth in that court’s opinion. View "Pandora Franchising, LLC v. Kingdom Retail Group, LLLP" on Justia Law

This letter opinion addressed Third-Party Defendants’ motions to dismiss Third-Party Plaintiffs’ amended third-party complaint. The Third-Party Defendants advanced four bases on which the amended complaint should be dismissed, including lack of personal jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, failure to comply with Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, and an unreasonable delay in bringing the amended complaint. The Court of Chancery granted the Third-Party Defendants’ motions to dismiss, holding that the Third-Party Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred because the Third-Party Plaintiffs failed to identify a tolling doctrine or extraordinary circumstances sufficient to avoid application of laches. View "CMS Inv. Holdings, LLC v. Castle" on Justia Law

In 2002, Deere became the exclusive North American wholesale supplier of Hitachi products. In 2014, Deere notified Rudd, a long-time authorized dealer of Hitachi equipment, of its intent to terminate its dealer agreements and initiated arbitration proceedings, as required by the agreement. Although Rudd agreed that arbitration was the proper forum, it sought injunctive relief to maintain the status quo during arbitration and moved to seal the case, stating that “the very fact of this lawsuit” could cause loss of customers, layoffs (or preemptive departure) of employees, and diminution of the value of Rudd’s financial investment. Two weeks later, the district court entered Rudd's proposed order, before Deere submitted a response. During an on-the-record telephonic status conference, the court asked the parties whether the case should remain under seal; Rudd’s counsel replied that it should, while Deere’s counsel was silent. The matter proceeded to an Agreed Order. The arbitration panel requested a copy of that Order, believing that it would obviate the need for an expedited hearing. Deere’s counsel forwarded the Order without consulting Rudd. Rudd moved for contempt . Deere moved to vacate the sealing order. The Sixth Circuit affirmed an order unsealing the case. Rudd cannot show any countervailing privacy interest sufficient to outweigh the strong presumption in favor of public access to federal court records View "Rudd Equip. Co., Inc. v. John Deere Constr. & Forestry Co." on Justia Law

Scott Buras and Carlos Rodriguez founded Lagniappe Logistics in 2004. Since then, Buras and Rodriguez’s business relationship deteriorated to the point that Buras left the company in June 2013. In early 2014, Buras filed suit claiming that Rodriguez had been unjustly enriched through Lagniappe’s operation. Buras’s complaint requested that the chancellor declare Buras a fifty-percent owner of Lagniappe, order an accounting, judicially dissolve the company, and appoint a receiver or custodian to wind up its affairs. Rodriguez and Lagniappe moved to dismiss Buras’s complaint based on Mississippi’s catch-all, three-year statute of limitations. According to the defendants, Buras’s claims (which depended on Buras’s status as an owner) were time-barred because Buras failed to file a legal action to rescind or cancel a 2006 agreement transferring his ownership interest to Rodriguez within three years of the agreement’s execution. "Occasionally, the question of whether the statute of limitations has run turns on the resolution of a fact question. In such cases, a statute-of-limitations defense cannot be resolved on a defendant’s motion to dismiss based on Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." The chancellor found it inappropriate to dismiss the case at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage due to an existing fact question and denied the motion. Finding no reversible error with that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lagniappe Logistics, Inc. v. Buras" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a conflict among the three members of IE Test, LLC (IE Test). After a dispute between defendant Kenneth Carroll and the other members, Patrick Cupo and Byron James, IE Test filed an action to expel Carroll, pursuant to the Limited Liability Company Act (LLCA). In 2004,Carroll and Cupo formed Instrumentation Engineering, LLC. Carroll owned a fifty-one percent interest in Instrumentation Engineering, and Cupo owned the remaining forty-nine percent. James was employed by Instrumentation Engineering, initially as Business Development Manager and later as Vice President. Carroll, Cupo, and James entered into a preliminary agreement stating intention to enter into an operating agreement for IE Test. Carroll claimed that Instrumentation Engineering owed substantial sums to him and his companies, and that became a point of contention among Cupo, James, and Carroll soon after they agreed to share ownership of IE Test. Carroll acknowledged that IE Test had no legal obligation to repay him for losses sustained because of Instrumentation Engineering's bankruptcy, but pressed for compensation that would allow him to recover some of his lost investment. By early 2010, Cupo and James were actively pursing a strategy to use the LLCA to expel Carroll as a member of the LLC. The trial court found in IE Test's favor on its claim based on subsection 3(c), reasoning that the "not reasonably practicable" language imposed a less stringent standard than did subsection 3(a). The trial court granted IE Test's motion for partial summary judgment and expelled Carroll as an LLC member. Carroll appealed. In an unpublished opinion, an Appellate Division panel affirmed, construing N.J.S.A.42:2B-24(b)(3), and its counterpart provision in the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA), N.J.S.A.42:2C-46(e), to mandate that a trial judge engage in predictive reasoning in order to evaluate the future impact of an LLC member's current conduct. The panel found that Carroll's relationship with Cupo and James never recovered from Carroll's demand that he be compensated in a manner that permitted him to recoup his lost investment. The Supreme Court reversed. Applied to the record of this case, the standard of subsection 3(c) did not warrant a grant of partial summary judgment expelling Carroll from IE Test. View "IE Test, LLC v. Carroll" on Justia Law

In 2015, Plaintiff, a stockholder of Tradeworx, Inc., requested a declaratory judgment that shares issued in 2000 to WisdomTree Investments, Inc. were void because they were issued in exchange for future services, a practice that, at the time, was prohibited under certain provisions of the Delaware General Corporation Law and the Delaware Constitution. WisdomTree moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court of Chancery granted WisdomTree’s motion, holding that Plaintiff’s claim was barred under the doctrine of laches because the claim exceeded the analogous statutory limitations period by almost twelve years. View "Kraft v. Wisdomtree Invs., Inc." on Justia Law

Attorney Donald Gilbert represented the Utah Down Syndrome Association and several of its founders in litigation between the Association and the Utah Down Syndrome Foundation, Inc. Gilbert filed this petition for extraordinary relief challenging (1) a 2008 district court judgment ordering Gilbert to disgorge $30,000 taken from Foundation bank accounts to pay his attorney fees, (2) an injunction that originally barred Gilbert’s clients from paying him with Foundation funds, (3) an order denying Gilbert’s motion to vacate the 2008 judgment, and (4) an order denying Gilbert’s motion for relief from the 2008 judgment. The Supreme Court denied Gilbert’s petition for extraordinary relief, holding (1) Gilbert unreasonably delayed seeking extraordinary relief from the injunction, the disgorgement order, and the denial of his motion to vacate; and (2) Gilbert failed to pursue the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy of direct appeal from the denial of his motion for relief from judgment. View "Gilbert v. Third Dist. Court Judges" on Justia Law

The State of Washington sued more than 20 foreign electronics manufacturing companies (including petitioners) for price fixing. The State claimed the foreign companies conspired to fix prices by selling CRTs (cathode ray tubes) into international streams of commerce intending they be incorporated into products sold at inflated prices in large numbers in Washington State. The trial court dismissed on the pleadings, finding it did not have jurisdiction over the foreign companies. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the State alleged sufficient minimum contacts with Washington to satisfy both the long arm statute and the due process clause. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. LG Elecs., Inc." on Justia Law

CEEG (Shanghai) Solar Science & Technology Co., Ltd. (“CEEG”), a Chinese company, agreed to sell solar energy products to LUMOS, LLC, a U.S. company. After receiving certain shipments, LUMOS filed a warranty claim alleging workmanship defects, and refused to remit the balance due. After two years of "fitful" negotiations, CEEG filed an arbitration proceeding pursuant to the parties’ agreements. Although the parties had communicated exclusively in English to that point, CEEG served LUMOS with a Chinese-language notice of the proceedings, and LUMOS did not immediately realize what the notice was. After the arbitration panel ruled in its favor, CEEG moved for the district court to confirm the award. LUMOS filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Chinese-language notice caused it to miss the deadline to participate in appointing the arbitration panel. The district court granted the motion, finding that the notice was not reasonably calculated to apprise LUMOS of the arbitration proceedings. The Tenth Circuit agreed and affirmed. View "CEEG (Shanghai) Solar Science v. Lumos" on Justia Law