Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

This case concerned the relative priority of competing charging orders filed by 15 multiple judgment creditors against a foreign judgment debtor’s membership interests 16 in several Colorado limited liability companies. In July 2013, Chase Bank obtained an Arizona judgment of over $20 million against several defendants, including Reginald Fowler, an Arizona resident. As part of its postjudgment collection efforts, Chase obtained Arizona orders charging Fowler’s membership interests in three Colorado limited liability companies. In March 2014, respondents Douglas McClure, Nancy McClure, and Spiral Broadcasting, L.L.C. (collectively, “the McClures”), obtained a stipulated judgment for $1.5 million against Fowler, among others, in the Arizona Superior Court. In April 2014, the McClures domesticated their Arizona judgment in Colorado, and between May and July 2014, they obtained and served Colorado orders charging Fowler’s membership interests in the LLCs. Now confronted with facially competing charging orders, the LLCs paid Fowler’s then-due distributions into the Colorado District Court registry. That same day, the McClures moved for release of the distribution funds to them, and several days later, Chase sought and obtained leave to intervene and opposed the McClures’ motion. The district court ultimately ordered the distribution funds released to the McClures. Chase then domesticated its Arizona charging orders with a different Colorado District Court, and moved for reconsideration of the release order, arguing that its newly-domesticated charging orders should be deemed effective as of the date they were issued in Arizona and entitled to priority over the McClures’ charging orders. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded first that for purposes of determining the enforceability of a charging order, a membership interest of a non-Colorado citizen in a Colorado limited liability company is located in Colorado. We further conclude that when, as here, a judgment creditor obtains a foreign charging order that compels certain action by a Colorado limited liability company, the charging order is ineffective as against the limited liability company until the creditor has taken sufficient steps to obligate the company to comply with that order. Although the authorities are not uniform as to the steps to be taken, under any of the applicable scenarios, the charging orders obtained by Chase did not become effective until after the respondents had obtained and served competing charging orders. The Court thus concluded that the McClures’ charging orders were entitled to priority over Chase’s competing charging orders. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. v. McClure" on Justia Law

In 2014, seventeen-year-old plaintiff Seth Griffith was seriously injured when he attempted a triple front flip into a pit filled with foam blocks at an indoor trampoline park owned and operated by JumpTime Meridian, LLC (“JumpTime”). Plaintiff’s girlfriend and her sister were near the large foam pit. Plaintiff jumped into the large foam pit a few times. He spent about 45 minutes “kind of horsing around on both the runway trampoline and the foam pit and the twin trampolines.” After he did a double front flip into the small foam pit, the monitor came up to him and asked if he had ever done a double before. He answered that he had. As he continued performing double front flips into the small foam pit, he decided to try a triple front flip. When he attempted it, he did not rotate far enough and landed on his head and neck, suffering a cervical dislocation and fracture, which required a fusion of his C6 and C7 vertebrae. Plaintiff filed this action alleging that JumpTime negligently caused his injury. He contended that because he was under the age of eighteen, JumpTime had a duty to supervise him. He had been intentionally landing the double front flips on his back in the pit. He testified that he did so “because you don’t want to land on your feet because you can bash your head against your knees.” JumpTime’s written policy manual instructed its employees with respect to the foam pit to “[f]ollow the rules outlined on the wall and continuously enforce it.” There were signs on the walls near the two pits that instructed customers to land on their feet. JumpTime moved for summary judgment alleging that there was no negligence, based upon the opinion of an expert that industry standards permitted landing a front flip into a foam pit on one’s feet, buttocks, or back, and that there was no evidence of causation. In response, Plaintiff contended that the signs on the wall stating how to land in the foam pit established the standard of care and that because of the attendant’s failure to admonish him for landing incorrectly, he was not discouraged from attempting a more difficult maneuver like a triple front flip. The district court granted JumpTime’s motion for summary judgment, holding that Plaintiff had failed to produce evidence of negligence and causation. Plaintiff then timely appealed. Finding that Plaintiff’s testimony did not support an inference that JumpTime was in any way responsible for his decision to try the triple front flip, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to JumpTime based upon the lack of evidence regarding causation. View "Griffith v. JumpTime Meridian, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2007 a fire spread from defendant Lambirth Trucking Company’s storage site to plaintiff Vincent Scholes’ property. Scholes’ sued alleging negligent trespass, intentional trespass, and strict liability against Lambirth. Lambirth demurred to the third amended complaint, arguing it was barred by the statute of limitations and failed to state a viable claim for intentional trespass or strict liability. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Proceeding in pro per, Scholes appealed, arguing the trial court erred in finding his claims barred by the statute of limitations and by failing to grant Scholes leave to amend. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "Scholes v. Lambirth Trucking Co." on Justia Law

Defendant Nicholas Cassani appealed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to plaintiff H&E Equipment Services, Inc. on its complaint to collect on a 2001 Arizona judgment. Defendant argued that the action was time-barred under 12 V.S.A. 506. Alternatively, he contended that there was a material dispute of fact as to whether the Arizona court had personal jurisdiction over him at the time it entered its judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "H&E Equipment Services, Inc. v. Cassani Electric, Inc." on Justia Law

Richard Sheley (decedent) formed and operated a corporation, George's Pest Control, Inc. Cross-complainant/respondent Nancy Sheley, the decedent's wife at the time of his death, owned a 25 percent share in the corporation. After the decedent's death in 2011, cross-defendants/appellants Linda Harrop and Valerie Richard, decedent's daughters from a prior marriage, owned a 75 percent share in the corporation. After appellants assumed control, the corporation commenced an action against respondent. An amended complaint added appellants as plaintiffs. Respondent filed a cross-complaint against appellants. Appellants filed an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike the cross-complaint. The trial court granted the motion as to respondent's fourth cause of action, sounding in intentional infliction of emotional distress, but otherwise denied the motion. On appeal, appellants argued that the trial court erred in denying their special motion to strike the first, second, and third causes of action in respondent's cross-complaint because the alleged conduct arose out of their constitutional right to petition, and respondent could not establish a probability of prevailing on the merits. Alternatively, appellants contended the trial court should have granted their motion as to the specific allegations involving protected activity in the first, second, and third causes of action. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that some of respondent's allegations in the remaining three causes of action arose out of protected activity. Furthermore, the Court concluded that, as to those particular allegations which were based on protected activity, respondent failed to establish that the claims were legally sufficient and factually substantiated. Therefore, the Court modified the trial court's order by granting appellants' motion to strike the specific claims founded on allegations of protected activity in each remaining cause of action in the cross-complaint. View "Sheley v. Harrop" on Justia Law

In December 2011, Purchasing Power filed suit against Bluestem in Georgia state court. Bluestem, a citizen of Minnesota and Delaware, sought to remove the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. Burr & Forman (B&F) was the law firm representing Purchasing Power. In 2014, the district court granted summary judgment for Bluestem. On appeal, this court noted that the pleadings did not allege Purchase Power's citizenship. B&F had failed to realize, and no one bothered to investigate, that Falcon, one of the LLCs, did not own an interest in Holdings directly. This missing piece of information was essential in destroying diversity jurisdiction because Falcon was incorporated in Delaware, of which Bluestem was a citizen. The district court subsequently found that B&F misrepresented to either the district court or Bluestem on five occasions that diversity of citizenship existed. In this appeal, B&F challenged the district court's sanctions order. The court reversed the district court's imposition of sanctions, concluding that, while the requirements of diversity jurisdiction were complicated, no party in this case acted with bad intentions. View "Purchasing Power, LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc." on Justia Law

Roger Garling, Sheryl Garling, and their business, R and D Enterprises, Inc. sued the United States for damages arising from an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) raid and investigation of their laboratory. The district court held the Garlings’ action was time-barred under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The Garlings appealed, arguing the EPA’s conduct was a continuing tort or, alternatively, that they were entitled to equitable tolling. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that sovereign immunity barred the Garlings’ claims and the district court thus lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Court therefore reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with directions to dismiss this action for lack of jurisdiction. View "Garling v. EPA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sustained injuries while working for Union Pacific Railroad Company “as a spiker machine operator near Minidoka, Idaho.” Union Pacific’s decision to reduce “the spiker machine’s customary three-[person] crew to a two-[person] crew” placed greater physical demands on plaintiff, causing or contributing to the injuries he suffered. As a result of Union Pacific’s alleged negligent maintenance of the spiker machine and its decision to reduce the number of persons operating that machine, plaintiff suffered economic and noneconomic damages totaling approximately $615,000. The question this case presented was whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permitted Oregon to exercise general jurisdiction over an interstate railroad for claims unrelated to the railroad’s activities in Oregon. The trial court ruled that it could exercise general jurisdiction over the railroad and denied the railroad’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence action for lack of personal jurisdiction. After the railroad petitioned for a writ of mandamus, the Supreme Court issued an alternative writ to the trial court, which adhered to its initial ruling. After review, the Supreme Court held that due process did not permit Oregon courts to exercise general jurisdiction over the railroad. View "Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was working for BNSF Railway Company in Pasco, Washington, where she was repairing a locomotive engine. While she was reaching up to remove an engine part, the “portable stair supplied by [BNSF] rolled or kicked out from under [p]laintiff,” causing her to sustain substantial injuries. The question that this case presented was whether, by appointing a registered agent in Oregon, defendant (a foreign corporation) impliedly consented to have Oregon courts adjudicate any and all claims against it regardless of whether those claims have any connection to defendant’s activities in the state. Defendant moved to dismiss this action because the trial court lacked general jurisdiction over it. When the court denied the motion, defendant petitioned for an alternative writ of mandamus. The Oregon Supreme Court issued the writ, and held as a matter of state law, that the legislature did not intend that appointing a registered agent pursuant to ORS 60.731(1) would constitute consent to the jurisdiction of the Oregon courts. View "Figueroa v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

In 1989, Marcus Moore slipped and fell in a grocery store owned by the defendant, Roberts Company, Inc. (“RCI”). Moore was three years old at the time, and he allegedly struck his head when he fell. After he reached the age of majority, Moore filed suit against RCI, claiming that RCI was negligent in allowing the floor to be slick. Moore also alleged that the fall had caused “marked and significant traumatic and permanent injuries to his brain,” leaving him with “permanent and profound deficits” in several areas. The jury returned a verdict in the defendant’s favor, and the trial court entered judgment in accordance with that verdict. Moore filed a post-trial motion arguing, among other things, that one of the jurors was a convicted felon and therefore, statutorily disqualified. The trial judge agreed and granted Moore a new trial. The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s petition for an interlocutory appeal, and reversed the trial court’s order granting a new trial. View "Roberts Company, Inc. v. Moore" on Justia Law