Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

An elderly woman, Janice Geerdes, and her long-time friend, Albert Gomez Cruz, had a partnership raising hogs on a piece of land. Initially, Janice deeded half of her interest in the land to Albert. Over a decade later, she deeded the rest of her interest in the land to Albert, receiving nothing in return. About six months later, Janice’s adult daughters were appointed her conservator and guardian. The conservator challenged the validity of the quitclaim deed based on undue influence and lack of capacity.The district court set aside the deed, finding that there was undue influence through a confidential relationship and that Janice lacked the necessary capacity to deed her interest in the land. The court of appeals affirmed the decision on the basis of lack of capacity.The Supreme Court of Iowa, however, disagreed with the lower courts. The Supreme Court found that the conservator did not establish by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence that there was undue influence or that Janice lacked capacity at the time of the gift. The court found that the lower courts gave too much weight to the perceived improvidence of the transaction and too little weight to the testimony of the third-party accountant who witnessed the transaction. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the district court judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Conservatorship of Janice Geerdes v. Cruz" on Justia Law

The case involves Leah Lorch, who filed a peremptory challenge against Judge Timothy B. Taylor, who was newly assigned to preside over her trial. Lorch's challenge was denied by Judge Taylor, who ruled that the challenge was untimely under the master calendar rule. This rule requires a party to file a challenge to the judge supervising the master calendar not later than the time the cause is assigned for trial. After the denial of the challenge, Judge Taylor proceeded with a two-day jury trial, which resulted in a defense verdict and judgment in favor of the defendant, Kia Motors America, Inc. Lorch then filed a petition within the statutory 10-day period, arguing that her challenge was timely because it was filed before the trial started.The trial court denied Lorch's peremptory challenge, ruling that it was untimely under the master calendar rule. The court also refused to stay the trial, and Judge Taylor immediately began a two-day jury trial, which resulted in a defense verdict and judgment in favor of Kia Motors America, Inc. Lorch then filed a petition within the statutory 10-day period, arguing that her challenge was timely because it was filed before the trial started.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, held that Lorch's section 170.6 challenge was timely filed before the commencement of the trial and rejected Kia's laches argument. The court also concluded that the Superior Court of San Diego County's local rule, which purports to provide any superior court judge with the power to act as a master calendar department for purposes of assigning cases for trial, is inconsistent with section 170.6 and case law interpreting the statute. The court granted the petition with directions to vacate the void orders and judgment entered by Judge Taylor after denying the peremptory challenge. View "Lorch v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves Creative Games Studio LLC and Ricardo Bach Cater, who sued Daniel Alves for alleged breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, constructive fraud, and deceit. The plaintiffs, who are co-founders of Creative Games Studio, a company that develops board games for online sale, accused Alves of collaborating with a competitor and using the company's funds and intellectual property for the competitor's benefit. Alves, a Brazilian citizen, was also a co-founder of the company. The plaintiffs filed the lawsuit in Montana, where the company is based.The District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, dismissed the case due to lack of personal jurisdiction over Alves. The court determined that exercising jurisdiction over Alves would not comply with constitutional requirements. Alves had moved to dismiss the complaint under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction or under the doctrine of forum non-conveniens.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Alves did not consent to jurisdiction and that subjecting him to the jurisdiction of Montana courts would not comply with due process. The court noted that Alves' only connection to Montana was the fact that one of the plaintiffs resided there and established the company in the state. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to show that Alves either availed himself of the privileges of Montana law or that their claims arose out of Alves's actions in Montana. View "Creative Games v Alves" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the antitrust implications of a settlement agreement between Forest Laboratories, a brand manufacturer of the high-blood pressure drug Bystolic, and seven manufacturers of generic versions of Bystolic. The settlement agreement was reached after Forest Laboratories initiated patent-infringement litigation against the generic manufacturers. As part of the settlement, Forest Laboratories entered into separate business transactions with each generic manufacturer, paying them for goods and services.The plaintiffs, purchasers of Bystolic and its generic equivalents, filed a lawsuit against Forest Laboratories and the generic manufacturers, alleging that the payments constituted unlawful “reverse” settlement payments intended to delay the market entry of generic Bystolic. The plaintiffs' claims were dismissed twice by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that any of Forest’s payments were unjustified or unexplained, instead of constituting fair value for goods and services obtained as a result of arms-length dealings. The court also held that the district court’s application of the pleading law was appropriate. The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that Forest’s payments were a pretext for nefarious anticompetitive motives rather than payments that constituted fair value for goods and services obtained as a result of arms-length dealings. View "In re Bystolic Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

KOKO Development, LLC, a real estate developer, contracted with Phillips & Jordan, Inc., DW Excavating, Inc., and Thomas Dean & Hoskins, Inc. (TD&H) to develop a 180-acre tract of land in North Dakota. However, the project faced numerous issues, leading KOKO to sue the defendants for breach of contract and negligence. KOKO did not disclose any expert witnesses before the trial, leading the district court to rule that none of its witnesses could give expert testimony. Consequently, the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that without expert witnesses, KOKO could not establish its claims.The district court's decision was based on the complexity of the issues involved in the case, which required expert testimony. The court found that KOKO's negligence and breach of contract claims required complex infrastructure and engineering analysis, which was beyond the common knowledge or lay comprehension. KOKO appealed the decision, arguing that the district court erred in finding that it did not properly disclose witnesses providing expert testimony and that expert testimony was necessary for the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that KOKO did not identify the witnesses that would provide expert testimony and did not meet the requirements of Rule 26(a)(2). The court also agreed with the district court that the negligence and breach of contract claims required expert testimony due to the complexity of the issues in the case. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the three witnesses' expert testimony and requiring expert testimony for the negligence and breach of contract claims. View "KOKO Development, LLC v. Phillips & Jordan, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around W.P. Productions, Inc. (WPP), a company owned by Sydney Silverman, and Sam's West, Inc. WPP, which sold kitchen products under the Wolfgang Puck brand to Sam's Club, owed significant debt to Sam's West. Despite this, WPP initiated a tort lawsuit against Tramontina U.S.A., Inc. and Sam's West. After a final judgment was entered against WPP, Sam's West filed a supplemental lawsuit to pierce WPP's corporate veil and hold Silverman personally liable for WPP's unpaid judgments. Silverman, who used a shared bank account for his personal and WPP's corporate funds, allegedly spent over $3 million from the shared account on personal expenses and transfers to himself and his relatives.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of Sam's West, piercing the corporate veil and holding Silverman personally liable for the judgments against WPP. The court adopted a Report and Recommendation (R&R) that determined Silverman was the alter ego of WPP, but did not establish the remaining elements of improper conduct or causing an injury. Both parties then moved for summary judgment regarding these elements. The court adopted a second R&R stating that the undisputed facts showed Sam's West was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its veil piercing claim.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Silverman appealed the district court's decision, alleging that the court improperly pierced the corporate veil on summary judgment. After reviewing the case, the appellate court affirmed the district court's decision. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the three elements for piercing the corporate veil in Florida: Silverman was the alter ego of WPP; Silverman used WPP for the improper purpose of evading Florida's Rule of Priorities; and this improper use of WPP's corporate form caused injury to Sam's West. Therefore, the court held that the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Sam's West and pierced the corporate veil. View "Sam's West, Inc. v. Silverman" on Justia Law

The case involves a shareholder derivative action against Cognizant Technology Solutions Corporation and its board of directors. The plaintiffs, shareholders of Cognizant, alleged that the directors breached their fiduciary duties, engaged in corporate waste, and unjust enrichment. The allegations stemmed from a bribery scheme in India, where Cognizant employees allegedly paid bribes to secure construction-related permits and licenses. The plaintiffs claimed that the directors ignored red flags about the company's anti-corruption controls and concealed their concerns from shareholders.The case was initially dismissed by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, which held that the plaintiffs failed to state with particularity the reasons why making a demand on the board of directors would have been futile. The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, reconsidered the standard of review for dismissals of shareholder derivative actions for failure to plead demand futility. The court decided to abandon its previous standard of review, which was for an abuse of discretion, and adopted a de novo standard of review. Applying this new standard, the court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the case. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that a majority of the directors faced a substantial likelihood of liability or lacked independence, which would have excused the requirement to make a demand on the board. View "In re: COGNIZANT TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS CORPORATION DERIVATIVE LITIGATION" on Justia Law

A group of retirement and pension funds filed a consolidated putative securities class action against PG&E Corporation and Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (collectively, PG&E) and some of its current and former officers, directors, and bond underwriters (collectively, Individual Defendants). The plaintiffs alleged that all the defendants made false or misleading statements related to PG&E’s wildfire-safety policies and regulatory compliance. Shortly after the plaintiffs filed the operative complaint, PG&E filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, automatically staying this action as against PG&E but not the Individual Defendants. The district court then sua sponte stayed these proceedings as against the Individual Defendants, pending completion of PG&E’s bankruptcy case.The district court for the Northern District of California issued a stay of the securities fraud action against the Individual Defendants, pending the completion of PG&E's Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. The court reasoned that the stay would promote judicial efficiency and economy, as well as avoid the potential for inconsistent judgments. The plaintiffs appealed this decision, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by entering the stay.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal under the Moses H. Cone doctrine because the stay was both indefinite and likely to be lengthy. The appellate court found that the district court abused its discretion in ordering the stay as to the Individual Defendants. The court held that when deciding to issue a docket management stay, the district court must weigh three non-exclusive factors: the possible damage that may result from the granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity that a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and judicial efficiency. The appellate court vacated the stay and remanded for the district court to weigh all the relevant interests in determining whether a stay was appropriate. View "PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASS'N OF NEW MEXICO V. EARLEY" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a lawsuit filed by Masimo Corporation against John Bauche, BoundlessRise, LLC (Boundless), and Skyward Investments, LLC (Skyward), represented by The Vanderpool Law Firm (Vanderpool). The lawsuit was based on Bauche's misappropriation of corporate funds while he was a Masimo employee. Bauche had fraudulently engaged Boundless, a company he solely owned, as an "outside vendor" for Masimo, and later transferred the money paid for fraudulent vendor services to Skyward, another company he solely owned. Masimo's attempts to obtain substantive discovery responses from the defendants were met with boilerplate objections, leading to a motion to compel responses and a request for discovery sanctions.The case was stayed twice, first due to Bauche's appeal from the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion, and then to allow a federal criminal case against him to be resolved. The referee supervising discovery recommended that the motion to compel be granted and Masimo be awarded $10,000 in discovery sanctions. The trial court agreed and entered an order to that effect, awarding sanctions against Vanderpool and the three defendants.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three, Vanderpool appealed the order, arguing that it had substituted out of the case as counsel before the motion to compel was filed and was therefore unsanctionable. The court rejected this argument, stating that it is not necessary to be counsel of record to be liable for monetary sanctions for discovery misuse. The court affirmed the order, concluding that Vanderpool and its clients were liable for discovery misuse. The court also criticized Vanderpool for its lack of civility in the proceedings. View "Masimo Corporation v. The Vanderpool Law Firm, Inc." on Justia Law

Bader Farms, Inc. sued Monsanto Company and BASF Corporation, alleging that its peach orchards were damaged by dicamba drift between 2015 and 2019 due to the defendants' negligent design and failure to warn. The jury awarded $250 million in punitive damages against both Monsanto and BASF based on Monsanto’s acts in 2015-16, which the district court later reduced to $60 million. The defendants appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision except for punitive damages, holding BASF and Monsanto liable as co-conspirators in a civil conspiracy. The court remanded the case to separately assess punitive damages against Monsanto and BASF. However, before the new trial, Monsanto settled with Bader Farms. The district court did not conduct a new trial and instead ruled that BASF could not be liable for any punitive damages, dismissing all claims against BASF.Bader Farms appealed, arguing that the district court ignored the appellate court’s mandate and its holding that BASF could be assessed punitive damages for its acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. The appellate court reviewed the district court’s interpretation of its mandate de novo and found that the district court did not comply with the appellate mandate. The appellate court held that BASF is vicariously liable for Monsanto’s actions and remanded the case for a trier of fact to apportion the punitive damages award. The court reversed the judgment and remanded with instructions to hold a new trial on the single issue of punitive damages. View "Bader Farms, Inc. v. BASF Corporation" on Justia Law