Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Brian Welken appealed a district court judgment piercing Lakeview Excavating, Inc.’s corporate veil and holding him personally responsible for money damages awarded to Eugene Taszarek, Marlys Taszarek, Trina Schilling, Steven Taszarek, and Michael Taszarek. In the spring of 2012, German Township in Dickey County, North Dakota selected Lakeview Excavating as a contractor for FEMA-funded road projects. Welken was Lakeview Excavating’s president and sole shareholder. A farmer who owned land adjacent to land owned by the Taszareks permitted Lakeview Excavating to enter his property to harvest field rock used for the road projects. However, Lakeview Excavating also took rock from the Taszareks’ property that was used in the road projects. The Taszareks sued Lakeview Excavating and Welken for intentional trespass, conversion of property, and unjust enrichment. The trespass and conversion claims were tried to a jury. The jury returned a verdict in the Taszareks’ favor, finding Lakeview Excavating was the alter ego of Welken and holding both parties liable for damages. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that while Welken had consented to the jury deciding the alter ego issue, the district court did not adequately instruct the jury on the alter ego doctrine. On remand the district court ordered a March 2018 bench trial on the issue of whether Lakeview Excavating was the alter ego of Welken, concluding Lakeview Excavating was the alter ego of Welken and ruled the Taszareks could recover damages from either Welken or Lakeview Excavating. Welken argued on appeal the district court erred in piercing Lakeview Excavating’s corporate veil and holding him personally liable for the Taszareks’ damages. The Supreme Court again reversed, concluding the district court did not make adequate findings of fact under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a), and its findings relating to piercing Lakeview Excavating’s corporate veil were inadequate to permit appellate review. View "Taszarek, et al. v. Lakeview Excavating, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Interiors by France (“IBF) appealed a district court judgment limiting IBF to a recovery of damages from Mitzel Contractors, Inc. (“MCI”) without an award of attorney fees. IBF initiated a small claims court proceeding in 2016 naming Mitzel Builders, Inc. (“MBI”) and Leeroy Mitzel as the defendants. IBF alleged it had not been paid for flooring materials and installation of the materials. MBI and Mitzel filed an answer, and Mitzel elected to remove the action from small claims court to district court. IBF argued it was entitled to a recovery of attorney fees under N.D.C.C. 27-08.1-04, which provided for the mandatory recovery of attorney fees to a prevailing plaintiff following the defendant’s removal of a small claims court case to the district court. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Interiors by France v. Mitzel Contractors, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty against defendants as barred by the applicable Arkansas statute of limitations. In this case, plaintiffs possessed enough information in 2004 to put them on notice of any allegedly fraudulent conduct had they exercised any due diligence. Therefore, plaintiffs' tolling argument was without merit and their claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations. View "Schmidt v. Newland & Associates PLLC" on Justia Law

In this case’s previous appearance before the Georgia Supreme Court, the primary issue involved taxation of alcoholic beverages at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. Clayton County appealed the trial court’s partial grant of summary judgment to the City of College Park on claims the City was not receiving its statutorily mandated share of taxes collected on alcoholic beverages. When the parties could not resolve their dispute, the City filed a complaint naming as defendants the County and two businesses that operated within the Airport, Mack II, Inc. and General Wholesale Company (the “taxpayer defendants”). The complaint sought an interlocutory and permanent injunction against the County (as well as the taxpayer defendants), and a declaratory judgment as to the City’s and County’s division and collection of alcoholic beverage taxes, as well as the taxpayer defendants’ payment of those taxes. The complaint also asserted claims against the County for an accounting, unjust enrichment, attorney fees, and damages. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that sovereign immunity does not apply to the City’s claims or the taxpayer defendants’ cross-claims for indemnity and contribution. The court granted the City’s motion for partial summary judgment on the declaratory judgment counts, finding that the Alcoholic Beverage Code, OCGA 3-3-1 et seq., permitted the City to impose alcoholic beverage tax only within its municipal limits and the County to impose such a tax only in the unincorporated areas of the County, that neither could impose and collect alcoholic beverage taxes within the other’s taxing jurisdiction, and that the taxpayer defendants had to submit tax monies only to the entity authorized to collect the funds. Ultimately, the Supreme Court vacated this judgment and remanded the case for consideration of the “threshold question of whether sovereign immunity applies at all in suits between political subdivisions of the same sovereign (like the City and the County).” The Supreme Court disagreed sovereign immunity did not apply to multiple issues raised by this case. The case was remanded for reconsideration. View "City of College Park v. Clayton County et al." on Justia Law

Pinky’s Aggregates, Inc., and its president, Dale Honsey, appealed the grant of summary judgment awarding Frontier Fiscal Services, LLC, $526,253.12 in its action for breach of contract and to collect on a personal guaranty. Because Pinky’s and Honsey failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment. View "Frontier Fiscal Services LLC v. Pinky's Aggregates, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Eight Ball Trucking, Inc., and David and Laurie Horrocks (collectively “defendants”) appealed from an order entered after the district court denied their motion under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) for relief from a summary judgment. The Horrocks are officers of Eight Ball, a Utah trucking company doing business in North Dakota during the relevant time period. A dispute arose over Eight Ball’s allocation of employees between North Dakota and Utah and Eight Ball’s obligation to procure North Dakota workers compensation insurance for its North Dakota employees. In late March and early April 2016, Workforce Safety & Insurance (“WSI”) commenced an action against the defendants by serving them with a summons and complaint to enjoin them from employing individuals in North Dakota and to collect $802,689.84 in unpaid workers compensation insurance premiums, penalties, and interest. The complaint alleged that WSI had issued an August 28, 2015 notice of an administrative decision finding the Horrocks personally liable for unpaid premiums and penalties owed by Eight Ball, that the Horrocks did not request reconsideration nor appeal from that decision, and that the administrative decision was res judicata. WSI filed the pending lawsuit in district court and moved for summary judgment. According to the Horrocks, they did not respond to the summary judgment motion because they thought they had submitted necessary documentation to WSI to resolve the issue. The district court ultimately granted WSI’s motion for summary judgment, awarding WSI $812,702.79 in premiums, penalties, and costs and disbursements and enjoining Eight Ball from engaging in employment in North Dakota. On December 19, 2016, WSI sent the Horrocks a letter, informing them the judgment had been entered against them on December 15, 2016, and requesting payment. The defendants did not appeal the summary judgment. Defendants moved to set aside the summary judgment on grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. The district court denied the motion, determining the defendants’ disregard and neglect of the legal process was not excusable neglect and failed to establish extraordinary circumstances necessary to set aside the judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b). After review of the district court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court concurred and affirmed judgment. View "WSI v. Eight Ball Trucking, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Becker, a Missouri citizen, wanted to buy the St. Louis Ashley Power Plant. Through a Missouri corporation, SL, he secured financing from Power Investments, a Nevada corporation with one member, Miller, who lives and practices law in Kentucky. Power loaned SL $300,000. Becker called, texted, and emailed Miller extensively, seeking funds and making allegedly false assurances. Becker (through another Missouri entity, Ashley) signed a purchase agreement. The sale fell apart. Power bought Becker’s interest in Ashley, assuming the obligation of the power-plant deal. Power now owns the plant. Miller sued in Kentucky, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment. Becker sued in Missouri, alleging breach of contract and fraudulent conveyance. Becker successfully moved to dismiss the Kentucky case for lack of personal jurisdiction.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Becker “transact[ed] . . . business” and made “a telephone solicitation” within the meaning of Kentucky's long-arm statute. Under the Due Process Clause, a state can exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant only if that defendant has “minimum contacts” with the state sufficient to accord with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” This case turns on specific jurisdiction, based on the “affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy.” Becker initiated the relationship. He communicated with Miller extensively; Becker’s alleged misrepresentations in these communications constitute the core of Miller’s fraud claims. Becker “purposefully avail[ed] himself of the privilege of acting in [Kentucky] or causing a consequence” there. View "Power Investments, LLC v. SL EC, LLC" on Justia Law

Blue Bell Creameries USA, Inc. suffered a listeria outbreak in early 2015, causing the company to recall all of its products, shut down production at all of its plants, and lay off over a third of its workforce. Three people died as a result of the listeria outbreak. Pertinent here, stockholders also suffered losses because, after the operational shutdown, Blue Bell suffered a liquidity crisis that forced it to accept a dilutive private equity investment. Based on these unfortunate events, a stockholder brought a derivative suit against two key executives and against Blue Bell’s directors claiming breaches of the defendants’ fiduciary duties. The complaint alleges that the executives breached their duties of care and loyalty by knowingly disregarding contamination risks and failing to oversee the safety of Blue Bell’s food-making operations, and that the directors breached their duty of loyalty. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to plead demand futility. The Court of Chancery granted the motion as to both claims. The Delaware reversed: "the mundane reality that Blue Bell is in a highly regulated industry and complied with some of the applicable regulations does not foreclose any pleading-stage inference that the directors’ lack of attentiveness rose to the level of bad faith indifference required to state a 'Caremark' claim. ... The complaint pled facts supporting a fair inference that no board-level system of monitoring or reporting on food safety existed." View "Marchand v. Barnhill, et al." on Justia Law

At issue in this case before the Mississippi Supreme Court was a dispute between an automobile manufacturer and one of its dealerships. Specifically, the issue reduced to whether the dealer filed a timely complaint under Mississippi Code section 63-17-73(1)(d)(iii) after the dealer received the manufacturer’s notice it would terminate the applicable dealership agreement. The Court determined the statute was unambiguous, and its plain meaning provided a dealer may file its verified complaint within the sixty day notice period, i.e., the sixty days preceding the effective date of termination. Because the statute was unambiguous and conveyed a clear and definite meaning, the Court did not resort to the rules of statutory construction. The Court found the dealer’s complaint was timely filed within the sixty days immediately preceding the effective date of termination. View "Nissan North America, Inc. v. Great River Nissan, LLC d/b/a Great River Nissan" on Justia Law

The federal United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia certified questions of Georgia law to the Georgia Supreme Court regarding the scope of the “acceptance doctrine” in negligent construction tort cases. At issue was whether and how the acceptance doctrine applied as a defense against a claim brought by a subsequent purchaser of allegedly negligently constructed buildings. Thomaston Crossing, LLC (the “original owner”) entered into a construction contract with appellee Piedmont Construction Group, Inc. to build an apartment complex in Macon. Piedmont then retained two subcontractors – appellees Alan Frank Roofing Company and Triad Mechanical Company, Inc. – to construct the roof and the HVAC system, respectively. In 2014, the complex was completed, turned over to, and accepted by the original owner. In 2016, the original owner sold the apartment complex to appellant Thomaston Acquisition, LLC (“Thomaston”) pursuant to an “as is” agreement. Shortly after the sale, Thomaston allegedly discovered evidence that the roof and HVAC system had been negligently constructed. Thomaston filed suit against Piedmont, asserting a claim for negligent construction of the roof and HVAC system and a claim for breach of contract/implied warranty. Piedmont then filed a third-party complaint against Alan Frank Roofing and Triad Mechanical because both companies had allegedly agreed to indemnify Piedmont for loses arising out of their work. Each of the appellees later moved for summary judgment based in part on the defense that Thomaston’s negligent construction claim is barred by the acceptance doctrine. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded the acceptance doctrine applied to Thomaston’s claim, and that “readily observable upon reasonable inspection” referred to the original owner’s inspection. “Without any real claim of privity, Thomaston nevertheless contends that it should be treated like the original owner because it is the current owner-occupier of the property. But doing so would undermine the acceptance doctrine’s foundational purpose of shielding contractors from liability for injuries occurring after the owner has accepted the completed work, thereby assuming responsibility for future injuries. There is no ‘current owner-occupier’ or ‘subsequent purchaser’ exception to the acceptance doctrine, and the facts of this case do not compel us to recognize one here.” View "Thomaston Acquisition, LLC v. Piedmont Construction Group, Inc." on Justia Law