Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

This case involves a dispute between siblings Elizabeth and Jason Carter, who are both licensed dentists and co-owners of Carter Dental. In 2020, Jason accused Elizabeth of misusing the practice’s funds for her personal benefit. The parties agreed to mediation, which resulted in a settlement agreement that included a noncompete clause. Elizabeth later refused to sign a written mutual release, leading Jason to move to enforce the settlement agreement. The district court found the settlement agreement and noncompete clause enforceable and dismissed the case with prejudice. Elizabeth appealed, arguing that the noncompete clause and the settlement agreement were unenforceable.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court's judgments. The court found that Elizabeth was estopped from arguing that the settlement agreement was unenforceable because she had not appealed the district court’s dismissal of the case with prejudice. The court also held that the district court did not err in awarding attorney fees and costs to Jason and Carter Dental. The court concluded that Jason and Carter Dental were entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal. View "Carter Dental v. Carter" on Justia Law

A mortgage company, Approved Mortgage Corporation, initiated two wire transfers, but the instructions for the transactions were altered by a third party. The funds were transferred to Truist Bank, which deposited the funds into an account it had previously flagged as suspicious. The funds were then withdrawn in the form of cashier’s checks. Approved Mortgage sued Truist, seeking damages in the amount of the transfers. The company asserted two claims under the Indiana Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which governs the rights, duties, and liabilities of banks and their customers with respect to electronic funds transfers, and a common law negligence claim.The district court dismissed the UCC claims due to lack of privity between Approved Mortgage and Truist, and dismissed the negligence claim as preempted by the UCC. The court held that the UCC does not establish an independent remedy and must be read with another section of the UCC, which entitles a sender to a refund only from the bank which received its payment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the UCC claims, agreeing with the lower court that the UCC does not establish an independent remedy and must be read with another section of the UCC. However, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of the negligence claim, holding that to the extent the negligence claim arises from Truist’s issuance of the cashier’s checks after Truist credited the funds to the suspicious account, the claim is not preempted by the UCC. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Approved Mortgage Corporation v. Truist Bank" on Justia Law

In 2020 and 2021, two plaintiffs, identified as Jane Doe WHBE 3 and Jane Doe LSA 35, filed separate lawsuits against Uber Technologies, Inc. and its subsidiary, Raiser, LLC, alleging they were sexually assaulted by their Uber drivers in Hawaii and Texas, respectively. These cases, along with hundreds of others, were coordinated before a single judge of the San Francisco Superior Court. Uber moved to stay the cases on the ground of forum non conveniens, arguing that the cases should be heard in the jurisdictions where the alleged incidents occurred. The trial court granted Uber's motions, staying the cases and providing for tolling of the statute of limitations.The trial court's decision was based on a comprehensive 21-page order that considered whether the alternate forums (Hawaii and Texas) were suitable for trial, the private interests of the litigants, and the public interest in retaining the action for trial in California. The court concluded that the alternate forums were suitable, and that the public interest factors weighed heavily in favor of transfer. The court also found that the cases should be viewed as individual sexual assault/misconduct cases in which the plaintiffs claimed Uber was vicariously liable due to its deficient safety practices, rather than as corporate misconduct cases.The plaintiffs appealed both the trial court’s forum non conveniens order and the agreed-upon order applying it to the non-California cases. They argued that the trial court erred in failing to ensure that a suitable alternative forum existed for all the affected cases, failing to require Uber to demonstrate that California was a “seriously inconvenient” forum, and failing to “accord the coordination order proper deference.” The Court of Appeal rejected all of these arguments and affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Doe v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around Brad Packer, a shareholder of 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc. (FLWS), who alleged that Raging Capital Management, LLC, Raging Capital Master Fund, Ltd., and William C. Martin (collectively, the Appellees) violated Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This section requires owners of more than 10% of a company's stock to disgorge profits made from buying and selling the company's stock within a six-month window. Packer claimed that the Appellees, as 10% beneficial owners of FLWS, engaged in such "short-swing" trading and failed to disgorge their profits. After FLWS declined to sue the Appellees, Packer filed a shareholder derivative suit on behalf of FLWS.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed Packer's suit, reasoning that he lacked constitutional standing because he did not allege a concrete injury. The District Court concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, which elaborated on the "concrete injury" requirement of constitutional standing, abrogated the Second Circuit's previous decision in Donoghue v. Bulldog Investors General Partnership. In Donoghue, the Second Circuit held that a violation of Section 16(b) inflicts an injury that confers constitutional standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with the District Court's interpretation. The Appeals Court held that TransUnion did not abrogate Donoghue, and the District Court erred in holding that it did. The Appeals Court emphasized that a District Court must follow controlling precedent, even if it believes that the precedent may eventually be overturned. The Appeals Court found that nothing in TransUnion undermines Donoghue, and thus, the District Court erred in dismissing Packer's Section 16(b) suit. The Appeals Court reversed the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Packer v. Raging Capital Management, LLC" on Justia Law

This case involves TRC Operating Co., Inc. and TRC Cypress Group, LLC (collectively TRC) and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (Chevron), oil producers operating adjacent well fields in Kern County, California. Both companies pump from a shared underground oil reservoir and engage in a process known as “cyclic steaming” to make oil extraction more efficient. In 1999, a “surface expression” formed near a Chevron well, which occurs when the steaming process causes a lateral fracture from the wellbore, allowing oil and other effluent to escape to the surface. Despite Chevron’s attempts at remediation, in 2011, an eruption occurred in the area of the well, causing a sinkhole to form, which killed a Chevron employee. The state oil and gas regulator issued various orders preventing steaming in the area, which lasted four years. TRC sued Chevron, claiming Chevron’s negligent maintenance and operation of its property led to dangerous conditions which made it unsafe to perform cyclic steaming operations. These conditions led to the regulator's shut-down orders, and to TRC’s harm and damages. Chevron countersued, claiming TRC’s failure to adequately maintain its own wells was the cause of the surface expression, the eruptions, and damages suffered by Chevron. The jury found in favor of TRC, awarding approximately $120 million in damages against Chevron. Nothing was awarded to Chevron. Chevron filed motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The trial court denied the JNOV, but granted a new trial based on misconduct by a juror. TRC appealed the granting of this motion. The Court of Appeal reversed the grant of a new trial, finding that the juror was not ineligible and no prejudice resulted from the juror’s failure to disclose his prior criminal conviction or the previous civil lawsuit. Chevron also filed a protective cross-appeal, in the event the Court of Appeal found against it on TRC’s appeal. Chevron appealed the denial of its JNOV, arguing that the regulator's orders to stop steaming were the superseding cause of any harm suffered by TRC and precludes it from bearing any liability. The Court of Appeal concluded sufficient evidence was introduced to sustain the verdict, demonstrating TRC did not stop any of its steaming operations solely because of the regulator's orders, which were therefore not a superseding cause. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order granting a new trial, and remanded with instructions to reinstate the judgment against Chevron. View "TRC Operating Co. v. Chevron USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves PB Legacy, Inc., a Texas-based shrimp breeding company, and American Mariculture, Inc., a Florida-based company that operated a shrimp breeding facility. PB Legacy had a contract with American Mariculture to breed shrimp. However, PB Legacy failed to fulfill its contractual obligations, including removing its shrimp from the facility on time. When American Mariculture threatened to harvest the abandoned shrimp, PB Legacy sued in state court. After a failed attempt to resolve the dispute, American Mariculture used the shrimp to launch a competing company, American Penaeid, Inc. PB Legacy then sued American Mariculture, Penaeid, and their CEO, Robin Pearl, in federal court, alleging conversion, defamation, trade secret misappropriation, breach of contract, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment.The case proceeded to a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. During the trial, the district judge had to leave before the jury returned its verdict. The parties agreed to have a magistrate judge receive the verdict. However, the magistrate judge also responded to several jury questions and rejected a request for clarification about the verdict. The jury awarded $4.95 million in damages to PB Legacy on each of their federal and state trade secret claims. Post-trial motions were filed and denied.The case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The defendants argued that the magistrate judge lacked authority to preside over the last three days of trial because the parties did not consent to the magistrate judge’s exercise of Article III authority. The court agreed, stating that while the parties had consented to the magistrate judge receiving the verdict, they had not consented to the magistrate judge performing non-ministerial duties such as responding to jury questions and rejecting a request for clarification about the verdict. The court vacated the judgment, remanded for a new trial, and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. View "TB Foods USA, LLC v. American Mariculture, Inc." on Justia Law

In October 2022, Starship Enterprises of Atlanta, Inc. filed a lawsuit against Gwinnett County, challenging a 2015 county ordinance regulating "Adult Establishments." Starship, which owns two stores in Gwinnett County, had previously filed a similar lawsuit in 2017, which it voluntarily dismissed. The county, however, maintained its counterclaim, and the trial court granted the county a permanent injunction restraining Starship from "regularly making more than 100 sexual devices available for sale" at each of its locations. Starship appealed the decision, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of a permanent injunction against Starship.In the second lawsuit, Starship invoked a constitutional amendment that waives sovereign immunity for certain lawsuits, including lawsuits against a county for declaratory judgment and related injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed Starship’s lawsuit, holding that it was barred by sovereign immunity and by res judicata. Starship appealed to the Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia due to the novel constitutional question involved.The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that although the constitutional waiver of sovereign immunity applied to Starship’s lawsuit, the suit was barred by res judicata. The court found that Starship's lawsuit sought relief from the county's prospective acts of enforcement, which will occur after January 1, 2021, and therefore the county’s sovereign immunity was waived under the constitutional amendment. However, the court also found that the lawsuit was barred by res judicata because the constitutional matters Starship now sought to raise could have been raised in the previous lawsuit. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing the lawsuit. View "STARSHIP ENTERPRISES OF ATLANTA, INC. v. GWINNETT COUNTY" on Justia Law

The case involves David Moeller, who was convicted of securities fraud after deceiving an acquaintance into investing $9,500 in a non-existent business. Moeller appealed his conviction, but died during the appeal process. The Court of Appeals, applying the precedent set in State v. Hollister, ruled that Moeller's death did not render his appeal moot and affirmed his conviction and sentence. Moeller's defense counsel petitioned for review, arguing that the court should overrule Hollister and that the panel erred in concluding his conviction was supported by sufficient evidence.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and the district court. The court held that under the doctrine of stare decisis, it would continue to adhere to Hollister, which establishes that the death of a criminal defendant during the appeal of his or her conviction does not automatically abate the appeal but may render some issues moot. The court found that Hollister was not originally erroneous and that more good than harm would come from adhering to it. The court also held that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Moeller's conviction for securities fraud. The court concluded that Moeller's conduct constituted fraud or deceit and that the transaction between Moeller and the victim involved the sale of a security in the form of an investment contract. View "State v. Moeller" on Justia Law

The case revolves around an alleged business partnership between Elaine Clemens and the late Arthur Emme. Clemens and Emme were intimate partners who never married. Clemens began working at Emme's business, O'Neill Body and Frame, in 1990. They moved in together in 1992 and worked together on several ventures. After Emme's death in 2017, Clemens filed a lawsuit against Curtis Emme, the personal representative of Arthur Emme's estate, claiming that she and Arthur Emme had created a business partnership in 1992. She sought a declaration that a business partnership existed between her and Arthur Emme, with each owning equal interests in the partnership.The district court for Holt County, Nebraska, rejected Clemens' argument that Curtis Emme was judicially estopped from denying the existence of a business partnership between her and Arthur Emme. The court found that Arthur Emme never unequivocally stated in a prior action that Clemens was his business partner and that the courts in that action did not adopt the position that Clemens and Arthur Emme were business partners.The case then proceeded to a jury trial on the existence of a business partnership. The jury found that Clemens failed to meet her burden of proof establishing that a partnership existed. The district court entered judgment in favor of Curtis Emme and against Clemens. Clemens appealed, but the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding no error in its rulings. View "Clemens v. Emme" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Blackrock Enterprises, LLC and BB Land, LLC and JB Exploration 1, LLC over a Lease Acquisition Agreement (LAA). Both parties claimed the other had breached the agreement and sought declaratory relief regarding their respective rights and obligations. The trial was bifurcated into two phases. In the first phase, a jury found that both parties had materially breached the LAA, but that Blackrock had committed the first material breach. As a result, the business court concluded that Blackrock could not recover for any subsequent breach committed by Jay-Bee. In the second phase, the business court determined that the parties were engaged in a de facto mining partnership and ordered Blackrock dissociated from the partnership. The court also valued Blackrock’s partnership interest at zero and ordered it to quit-claim its interests in certain leases to Jay-Bee. Blackrock appealed, arguing that the business court committed multiple errors in both phases of the proceedings.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that the business court erred in its construction of the first material breach doctrine and by granting judgment for Jay-Bee on the basis of clearly erroneous findings “deemed” made by operation of West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a). The court reversed the final judgment and remanded for a new trial and further proceedings. The court also vacated that portion of the final judgment order finding the parties engaged in a mining partnership. View "Blackrock Enterprises, LLC v. BB Land, LLC" on Justia Law