Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In this class action lawsuit stemming from the 2011 nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP) in Japan, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissing Plaintiffs' suit under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that an adequate alternative forum was available in Japan.Plaintiffs were individuals and business entities who suffered property damage and/or economic harm as a result of the FNPP disaster. Plaintiffs filed suit against General Electric Company (GE) alleging that GE negligently designed the FNPP's nuclear reactors and safety mechanisms, both of which were implicated in the explosions. Plaintiffs alleged that venue was proper in the District of Massachusetts because GE maintained its corporate headquarters and principal place of business in Boston, Massachusetts. The district court dismissed the suit under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, determining that an adequate alternative forum was available to Plaintiffs in Japan and that dismissal was in the private and public interest. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Japan satisfied the forum availability requirement despite the jurisdictional idiosyncrasies presented in this case. View "Imamura v. General Electric Co." on Justia Law

Jostens, Inc. ("Jostens"), John Wiggins, and Chris Urnis (collectively, "defendants") appealed a circuit court's denial of their renewed motions for a judgment as a matter of law following the entry of a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of Herff Jones, LLC ("Herff Jones"), and Brent Gilbert (collectively, "plaintiffs"). Herff Jones and Jostens were nationwide competitors that manufactured scholastic-recognition products (e.g., class rings, diplomas, caps, gowns, tassels, and graduation announcements) for high school students. The companies sold their products through independent-contractor small businesses located in the schools' territories. Gilbert's business was GradPro Recognition Products, Inc. ("GradPro"), and he worked with Herff Jones for over 30 years, both as a sales representative for his father and as the current owner of GradPro. Wiggins worked for an independent distributor of Jostens from 2000 to late 2003; Urnis worked for an independent distributor of Jostens from 2001 to 2005. In 2004 and 2006, respectively, Gilbert hired Wiggins and Urnis away from Jostens to be sales representatives for GradPro and, ostensibly, for Herff Jones. Before joining Gilbert in working on behalf of Herff Jones, Wiggins and Urnis each spent one year away from the industry to honor their noncompetition agreements. After working with GradPro for a time, Wiggins and Urnis went to another independent distributor for Jostens. Herff Jones suffered a substantial loss in business, allegedly stemming from the move. An issue at trial arose over whether plaintiffs were required to present direct, customer-by-customer evidence of the reasons each of the 47 blue-list schools that switched from Herff Jones to Jostens in order for the issue of causation to be submitted to the jury. The Alabama Supreme Court determined plaintiffs presented ample circumstantial evidence that would allow the jury to infer that defendants' wrongful conduct led to plaintiffs' loss of the school accounts at issue. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order denying the defendants' renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law. View "Jostens, Inc. v. Herff Jones, LLC" on Justia Law

Tamikia Everheart; Cardell Coachman, by and through his mother and next friend Johnitia Coachman; Michael Coleman, as administrator of the estate of Diane McGlown; Mary Weatherspoon; and Elizabeth McElroy, as administratrix of the estate of Jakobie Johnson (collectively, "plaintiffs"), filed four separate of summary judgments entered in their separate cases by the Jefferson Circuit Court in favor of Rucker Place, LLC, and Savoie Catering, LLC. While attending a Christmas party in December 2015 at the residence of Bruce McKee and Dale McKee, Jason Bewley consumed alcohol. Later, he was driving while allegedly intoxicated and was involved in an accident with a vehicle occupied by five individuals. As a result of the accident, two of those individuals were injured and the other three were killed. The plaintiffs filed four separate actions against Bewley, alleging negligence and wantonness in the operation of his vehicle. The plaintiffs also asserted dram-shop claims against Dale McKee; the estate of Bruce McKee, who died shortly after the Christmas party; Savoie Catering, LLC, which had catered the McKees' party and had served guests alcohol that had been provided by the McKees; and Rucker Place, LLC, which operates a catering business with connections to Savoie, but which claims it had no involvement with the McKees' party. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgments based on the conclusion that plaintiffs did not demonstrate that Reg. 20-X-6- .02(4) applied to the circumstances involved in their cases. The Court expressed no opinion as to whether plaintiffs presented evidence sufficient to establish a joint venture between Savoie and Rucker Place. View "Everheart et al. v. Rucker Place, LLC et al." on Justia Law

A Special Touch (Salon) was a sole proprietorship owned by Colleen Dorsey (Owner) offering nail, skin, massage, and permanent cosmetic services. After a 2014 audit, the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry (Department), Office of Unemployment Compensation Tax Services (OUCTS) issued a Notice of Assessment to the Salon indicating that it owed unemployment compensation (UC) contributions and interest in the amount of $10,647.93 for the period of 2010 through the second quarter of 2014. This assessment was based on OUCTS’s determination that ten individuals providing work for the Salon had been misclassified as independent contractors rather than employees of the Salon, thus subjecting it to the UC taxes. This discretionary appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court required a determination of what “customarily engaged” meant, as that term was used in Subsection 4(l)(2)(B) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law), 43 P.S. section 753(l)(2)(B). In particular, the Supreme Court had to determine whether the phrase required an individual to be involved in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business in actuality, as opposed to having the mere ability to be so involved. The Court concluded the phrase “customarily engaged” as used in Subsection 4(l)(2)(B) mandated that an individual actually be involved in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business. Because the Commonwealth Court reached a contrary conclusion, the Court reversed. View "A Special Touch v. UC Tax Services" on Justia Law

The issue raised on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court centered on the validity of a provision in several Delaware corporations’ charters requiring actions arising under the federal Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act” or “1933 Act”) to be filed in a federal court. Blue Apron Holdings, Inc., Roku, Inc., and Stitch Fix, Inc. were all Delaware corporations that launched initial public offerings in 2017. Before filing their registration statements with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), each company adopted a federal-forum provision. Appellee Matthew Sciabacucchi bought shares of each company in its initial public offering or a short time later. He then sought a declaratory judgment in the Court of Chancery that the FFPs were invalid under Delaware law. The Court of Chancery held that the FFPs were indeed invalid because the “constitutive documents of a Delaware corporation cannot bind a plaintiff to a particular forum when the claim does not involve rights or relationships that were established by or under Delaware’s corporate law.” The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed, finding that such a provision could survive a facial challenge under Delaware law. View "Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Alexander Walker, Jr. appealed a superior court order dismissing his claim of conspiracy to defame on res judicata grounds after finding privity between defendant Aaron Day, and other defendants in a separate defamation action. While plaintiff’s defamation action was pending, he filed a lawsuit against defendant, alleging a claim of conspiracy to commit defamation and seeking enhanced compensatory damages. The complaint described the defamation, which provided the basis for the conspiracy claim, in much the same terms as the complaint in the separate defamation action, but also alleged facts to support the conspiracy claim. Defendant moved to dismiss the conspiracy action on the grounds of, inter alia, res judicata, arguing, in part, that he was in privity with the defamation defendants for res judicata purposes. On appeal, plaintiff argued the trial court erred by: (1) deciding the privity issue at the motion to dismiss stage; and (2) applying the First Circuit Court of Appeals’ privity standard, rather than New Hampshire precedent, to determine privity. The New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred by applying the privity standard used by the First Circuit, and, therefore, vacated the trial court’s ruling and remanded. View "Walker v. Day" on Justia Law

Plaintiff XMission, L.C. appealed a district court's dismissal of its claims against Fluent, LLC for lack of personal jurisdiction over Fluent in Utah. Fluent was a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in New York. It described its service as digital marketing; its business model was apparently based on supplying consumer data to businesses. XMission was a Utah limited liability company with its principal place of business in Salt Lake City. As an internet service provider (ISP), it used servers and other hardware that it owned and operated in Utah to provide internet access for its commercial and residential customers. It also provided email hosting and other internet-related services. Any email sent to a domain hosted by XMission would arrive on XMission’s email servers in Utah. XMission’s complaint against Fluent was based on more than 10,000 emails sent from 2015 to early 2018 to more than 1,100 XMission customers in Utah through its servers, allegedly in violation of the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 (CAN-SPAM Act). The emails at issue instructed recipients to follow links that offered to rewards. By clicking the link, the recipient is taken to a Fluent-controlled data-gathering domain that prompts the recipient to enter personal information such as name, age and date of birth, gender, email address, social media activity, zip code, and street address. Fluent apparently collects and aggregates the consumer information and sells this personal data to others to assist them in developing targeted marketing campaigns. The record does not disclose whether the email recipients actually obtain any rewards from the named companies or whether Fluent is compensated in any way by those companies for these emails. After review, the Tenth Circuit remained unpersuaded the offending emails created personal jurisdiction over Fluent in Utah, and thus affirmed the district court's dismissal. View "XMission, L.C. v. Fluent, LLC" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Sherman Act, RICO Act, and common-law claims against defendants for lack of Article III standing. Plaintiffs are a group of investment funds and defendants are a collection of financial institutions. Plaintiffs' claims stemmed from a scheme to fix the benchmark interest rates used to price financial derivatives in the Yen currency market.The court held that plaintiffs alleged an injury in fact sufficient for Article III standing, because plaintiffs plausibly alleged that defendants' conduct caused them to suffer economic injury. In this case, plaintiffs alleged that they entered into financial agreements on unfavorable terms because defendants manipulated benchmark rates in their own favor. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Sonterra Capital Master Fund Ltd. v. UBS AG" on Justia Law

Lawler Manufacturing Co., Inc., appealed an order requiring Chris Lawler, president of Lawler Manufacturing, among other things, to authorize and give his consent to a pending shipment of goods from China, and to refrain from engaging in conduct that is contrary to the best interest of Lawler Manufacturing. In 2019, Lawler Manufacturing sued Delmas Lawler, a shareholder, vice president, and alleged former employee of Lawler Manufacturing, and Sandra Lawler, an alleged former employee, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, theft, and conspiracy. Delmas moved the court to order Lawler Manufacturing and Chris, as president of Lawler Manufacturing, to continue the business operations of Lawler Manufacturing in the usual and customary manner in which business affairs had been conducted before the litigation was commenced, which would include authorizing the shipment of an order from China that had been placed earlier. The trial court granted the motion and ordered Chris to act in the best interest of the company. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter the order. The presiding judge disqualified himself from this case, and no longer had authority to appoint his successor or to enter the order appointing the judge who entered the order requiring Chris Lawler to act in Lawler Manufacturing's best interest. " Therefore, Presiding Judge Woodruff's appointment of Judge Fannin was not a valid judicial appointment, and that order is vacated." View "Lawler Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Lawler" on Justia Law

Rembrandt contracted to supply Rexing with 3,240,000 cage-free eggs every week for a year. Eight months later, Rexing claimed that Rembrandt failed to provide eggs that met the specified quality standards. Rexing sought a declaration that it was excused from accepting any more eggs, and incidental and consequential damages. Rembrandt counterclaimed, seeking damages. The trial court determined that Rexing had unilaterally terminated the contract and that the breach was not excused. Rembrandt was awarded $1,522,302.61 in damages.Rexing voluntarily dismissed its subsequent appeal and filed suit in state court, alleging conversion and deception. Rexing claimed that Rembrandt had refused to return reusable shipping materials, the “EggsCargoSystem,” Rexing had provided. In the first suit, Rexing had sought the value of the EggsCargoSystem as part of the start-up costs that it allegedly incurred in reliance on the agreement. Rembrandt removed the second suit to federal court and argued that the claims were barred by claim-preclusion in light of the district court’s grant of summary judgment in the first suit and that Rexing had improperly split its claims between the two cases.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the second suit. Rexing impermissibly split its claims. Both suits centered around the same controversy. Under Indiana’s doctrine prohibiting claim splitting, a plaintiff cannot bring a new lawsuit based upon the same transaction or occurrence that underlies claims brought in another lawsuit. View "Rexing Quality Eggs v. Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law