Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Business Law
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Plaintiffs Cheryl Thurston and Luis Licea (collectively Thurston) were California residents who purchased items from defendant Fairfield Collectibles of Georgia, LLC (Fairfield), a Georgia limited liability company, through the company's website. Thurston alleged Fairfield’s website was not fully accessible by the blind and the visually impaired, in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. The trial court granted Fairfield’s motion to quash service of summons, ruling that California could not obtain personal jurisdiction over Fairfield, because Fairfield did not have sufficient minimum contacts with California. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the evidence showed that Fairfield made some eight to ten percent of its sales to Californians. "Hence, its website is the equivalent of a physical store in California. Moreover, this case arises out of the operation of that website." The trial court therefore could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over Fairfield. View "Thurston v. Fairfield Collectibles of Georgia, LLC" on Justia Law

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After Buyers purchased two care facilities from Sellers, Buyers filed suit alleging that Sellers made fraudulent or, at best, negligent misrepresentations in the parties' sale agreements. Buyers also brought claims against Sellers' representatives in their individual capacities.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Buyers' claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court held that the district court properly dismissed Buyers' non-fraud claims for negligent misrepresentation and breach of contractual representations and warranties because these claims were subject to arbitration. In regard to the remaining claims, the court held that Buyers have not adequately pleaded a misrepresentation with respect to both facilities and thus they failed to meet the particularity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Therefore, because there was no misrepresentation, there was no fraud. View "Colonial Oaks Assisted Living Lafayette, LLC v. Hannie Development, Inc." on Justia Law

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In this complaint brought by Black Diamond Energy and Black Diamond Energy of Delaware (together, the BDE Companies) and seventeen limited partnerships (the Limited Partnerships) the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing with prejudice the complaint, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice.The complaint alleged that S&T Bank's lending policies in the wake of the 2008 economic recession caused severe financial loss to the seventeen limited partnerships (the Limited Partnerships) managed by Black Diamond Energy and Black Diamond Energy of Delaware (together, the BDE Companies). Daniel Groskop, the trustee of a trust formed by the Limited Partnership, was later substituted for the Limited Partnerships as the true party in interest on the condition that the BDE Companies' claims against the Bank be dismissed with prejudice. Due to Groskop's noncompliance with discovery orders and the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Groskop's violation of two court orders compelling discovery, two orders awarding attorneys' fees, and the failure to fulfill the representative duties associated with Wyo. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) required dismissal with prejudice. View "S&T Bank v. Groskop" on Justia Law

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Without permission from Epic, TCS downloaded thousands of documents containing Epic’s confidential information and trade secrets. TCS used some of the information to create a “comparative analysis”—a spreadsheet comparing TCS’s health-record software (Med Mantra) to Epic’s software. TCS’s internal communications show that TCS used this spreadsheet in an attempt to enter the U.S. health-record-software market, steal Epic’s client, and address key gaps in TCS’s own Med Mantra software.Epic sued. A jury ruled in Epic’s favor on all claims, including multiple Wisconsin tort claims. The jury then awarded Epic $140 million in compensatory damages, for the benefit TCS received from using the comparative-analysis spreadsheet; $100 million for the benefit TCS received from using Epic’s other confidential information; and $700 million in punitive damages for TCS’s conduct. The district court upheld the $140 million compensatory award and vacated the $100 million award. It reduced the punitive damages award to $280 million, reflecting Wisconsin’s statutory punitive-damages cap. The Seventh Circuit remanded. There is sufficient evidence for the jury’s $140 million verdict based on TCS’s use of the comparative analysis, but not for the $100 million verdict for uses of “other information.” The jury could punish TCS by imposing punitive damages, but the $280 million punitive damages award is constitutionally excessive. View "Epic Systems Corp. v. Tata Consultancy Services Ltd." on Justia Law

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The parties to this appeal were a Bolivian company, Compania de Inversiones Mercantiles S.A. (“CIMSA”), and Mexican companies known as Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua, S.A.B. de C.V. and GCC Latinoamerica, S.A. de C.V. (collectively “GCC”). Plaintiff-appellant CIMSA brought a district court action pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act to confirm a foreign arbitral award issued in Bolivia against Defendant-appellee GCC. The underlying dispute stemmed from an agreement under which CIMSA and GCC arranged to give each other a right of first refusal if either party decided to sell its shares in a Bolivian cement company known as Sociedad Boliviana de Cemento, S.A. (“SOBOCE”). GCC sold its SOBOCE shares to a third party after taking the position that CIMSA failed to properly exercise its right of first refusal. In 2011, CIMSA initiated an arbitration proceeding in Bolivia. The arbitration tribunal determined that GCC violated the contract and the parties’ expectations. GCC then initiated Bolivian and Mexican court actions to challenge the arbitration tribunal’s decisions. A Bolivian trial judge rejected GCC’s challenge to the arbitration tribunal’s decision on the merits. A Bolivian appellate court reversed and remanded. During the pendency of the remand proceedings, Bolivia’s highest court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the original trial judge. But as a result of the simultaneous remand proceedings, the high court also issued arguably contradictory orders suggesting the second trial judge’s ruling on the merits remained in effect. GCC filed a separate Bolivian court action challenging the arbitration tribunal’s damages award. That case made its way to Bolivia’s highest court too, which reversed an intermediate appellate court’s nullification of the award and remanded for further proceedings. Invoking the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, CIMSA filed a confirmation action in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. After encountering difficulties with conventional service of process in Mexico under the Hague Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, CIMSA sought and received permission from the district court to serve GCC through its American counsel pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3). The district court then rejected GCC’s challenges to personal jurisdiction, holding (among other things) that: (1) it was appropriate to aggregate GCC’s contacts with the United States; (2) CIMSA’s injury arose out of GCC’s contacts; (3) exercising jurisdiction was consistent with fair play and substantial justice; and (4) alternative service was proper. The district court rejected GCC's defenses to CIMSA's claim under the New York Convention. Before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court affirmed the district court: the district court properly determined that CIMSA’s injury arose out of or related to GCC’s nationwide contacts. "The district court correctly decided that exercising personal jurisdiction over GCC comported with fair play and substantial justice because CIMSA established minimum contacts and GCC did not make a compelling case to the contrary." The Court also affirmed the district court's confirmation of the arbitration tribunal's decisions. View "Compania De Inversiones v. Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Business Court in this action brought by Global Textile Alliance, Inc. (GTA) alleging that Defendants engaged in several improper acts during the formation and operation of Dolven Enterprises, Inc., holding that the Business Court did not abuse its discretion either by ordering production of the relevant communications or by conducting a limited review of those communications.When it was discovered that GTA had withheld confidential correspondence between GTA and its outside counsel and Haspeslagh conveying legal advice regarding the matters giving rise to the instant litigation Defendant filed a motion to compel GTA to produce the communications. Defendant argued that GTA waived the attorney-client privilege by including Stefaan Haspeslagh on communications with GTA's counsel. The Business Court granted the motion to compel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Business Court (1) did not abuse its discretion by determining that communications involving Haspeslagh were not privileged under the attorney-client privilege; (2) did not err in determining that communications involving Haspeslagh were not protected under the work-product doctrine; and (3) did not err by not conducting an exhaustive in camera review of all communications involving Haspeslagh. View "Global Textile Alliance, Inc. v. TDI Worldwide, LLC" on Justia Law

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Defendants-tenants John and Rosa Castro (the tenants) leased a residential property from plaintiff-landlord Fred Graylee. The landlord brought an unlawful detainer action against the tenants, alleging they owed him $27,100 in unpaid rent. The day of trial, the parties entered into a stipulated judgment in which the tenants agreed to vacate the property by a certain date and time. If they failed to do so, the landlord would be entitled to enter a $28,970 judgment against them. The tenants missed their move-out deadline by a few hours and the landlord filed a motion seeking entry of judgment. The trial court granted the motion and entered a $28,970 judgment against the tenants under the terms of the stipulation. The tenants appealed, arguing the judgment constituted an unenforceable penalty because it bore no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages the parties could have anticipated would flow from a breach of the stipulation. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed and remanded this matter for further proceedings. View "Graylee v. Castro" on Justia Law

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Two counties sued Sherwin-Williams in state court, seeking abatement of the public nuisance caused by lead-based paint. Anticipating suits by other counties, Sherwin-Williams sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Sherwin-Williams claimed that “[i]t is likely that the fee agreement between [Delaware County] and the outside trial lawyers [is] or will be substantively similar to an agreement struck by the same attorneys and Lehigh County to pursue what appears to be identical litigation” and that “the Count[y] ha[s] effectively and impermissibly delegated [its] exercise of police power to the private trial attorneys” by vesting the prosecutorial function in someone who has a financial interest in using the government’s police power to hold a defendant liable. The complaint pleaded a First Amendment violation, citing the company’s membership in trade associations, Sherwin-Williams’ purported petitioning of federal, state, and local governments, and its commercial speech. The complaint also argued that the public nuisance theory would seek to impose liability “that is grossly disproportionate,” arbitrary, retroactive, vague, and “after an unexplainable, prejudicial, and extraordinarily long delay, in violation of the Due Process Clause.”The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Sherwin-Williams failed to plead an injury in fact or a ripe case or controversy because the alleged harms hinged on the County actually filing suit. View "Sherwin Williams Co. v. County of Delaware" on Justia Law

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Dr. Dominick Lembo employed Arlene Marchese in his dental practice as his office manager, and Karen Wright, a dental hygienist. Sometime before December 2011, Marchese and Wright unlawfully took possession of numerous checks totaling several hundred thousand dollars, forged Lembo’s indorsement on the checks, and deposited the proceeds from the forged checks into their personal accounts at TD Bank. In February 2015, Lembo filed a complaint against TD Bank, alleging that “TD Bank knew or should have known that Marchese and/or Wright were not permitted to negotiate checks made payable to [Lembo].” The complaint also alleged that by permitting them to negotiate checks with forged indorsements, TD Bank “aided and abetted Marchese and Wright in their fraudulent scheme and conduct.” The complaint did not assert that Lembo had a banking relationship with TD Bank. And Lembo did not file an action for conversion under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) within the three-year limitations period. Had Lembo done so, TD Bank would have been strictly liable for depositing or cashing those checks, subject to the defenses in N.J.S.A. 12A:3-405 or N.J.S.A. 12A:3-406. The trial court granted the Bank's motion to dismiss, finding that the UCC governed Lembo's remedies against the Bank, and “common law negligence is not such a remedy” in the absence of a “special relationship” between Lembo and the bank. The court also rejected Lembo’s argument that the Uniform Fiduciaries Law (UFL) provided an affirmative cause of action against the bank. The Appellate Division reversed, reading into the complaint the basis for an affirmative UFL claim, and remanded to allow Lembo to amend the complaint to assert such a claim. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded the Appellate Division misconstrued the purpose of the UFL, finding the Legislature enacted the UFL not to create an affirmative cause of action against a bank but to provide a defense when the bank is sued for failing to take notice of and action on the breach of a fiduciary’s obligation. "The UFL confers a limited immunity on a bank, unless the bank acts in bad faith or has actual knowledge of a fiduciary breach." The Supreme Court found no affirmative cause of action arose under the statute; whether a UFL claim was adequately pled was therefore moot. Recognizing the predominant role the UCC plays in assigning liability for the handling of checks, the Supreme Court also found Lembo had no “special relationship” with the bank to sustain the common law causes of action. View "Lembo v. Marchese" on Justia Law

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Since 2010, appellant Mark Spanakos has tried to gain control over and revive Hawk Systems, Inc., a void Delaware corporation, by filing a series of direct and derivative actions in Florida against former Hawk Systems insiders and taking several steps outside of court to establish himself as the Company’s majority stockholder and sole director. Spanakos was successful in his direct Florida litigation, having won a Partial Final Judgment in one action and favorable Summary Judgment rulings in another. Spanakos’s derivative claims in the third Florida action, however, were stayed to allow Spanakos to clarify his standing to pursue those claims. Accordingly, in 2018 Spanakos filed suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery seeking: (1) a declaration that he controlled a majority of the voting shares of Hawk Systems and that he was the validly elected, sole director and officer of Hawk Systems; or (2) in the alternative, an order compelling the company to hold an annual election of directors under 8 Del. C. sections 223(a) and 211(c). Following a trial, briefing, and post-trial argument, the Court of Chancery denied both of Spanakos’s requests for relief, ruling that he had not carried his burden of proof to obtain any of the relief that he sought. On appeal, Spanakos argues that the Court of Chancery abused its discretion when it declined to order a stockholders’ meeting for the election of directors despite the fact that Spanakos satisfied the elements of Section 211. Having reviewed the record on appeal and the court’s opinion below, the Delaware Supreme Court found the Court of Chancery did not abuse its discretion when it declined to compel a stockholders’ meeting given the unique facts of this case. View "Spanakos v. Page, et al." on Justia Law