Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2003, Richard Howell invented a binding that has a “special, patented heel release designed to mitigate knee injuries . . . that are common in downhill skiing.” Howell formed a business relationship with John Springer-Miller, and the two signed transaction documents, which included an employment agreement, a stock-purchase agreement, an investor-rights agreement, and an amended certificate of incorporation. Howell and Springer-Miller’s working relationship “began to deteriorate almost immediately,” and the KneeBinding board voted to terminate Howell as president in September 2008. In prior proceedings, the Vermont Supreme Court in large part affirmed an August 2016 trial court decision, but reversed a decision to dissolve a March 2009 permanent injunction, and remanded the court’s award of attorney’s fees to KneeBinding, Inc. with directions to consider additional evidence of legal fees. On remand in August 2019, the trial court: (1) awarded additional attorney’s fees to KneeBinding; (2) issued a sanction for a May 23, 2018 finding that Richard Howell violated an August 10, 2017 injunction that was in place while "KneeBinding II" was pending; and (3) found Howell in contempt for violating the March 2009 permanent injunction that the Supreme Court restored in KneeBinding II. On appeal, Howell challenged the May 23, 2018, finding that he violated the August 2017 injunction and the August 2019 finding that he violated the March 2009 permanent injunction. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kneebinding, Inc. v. Howell" on Justia Law

The trial court found defendants Peng Xufeng and Jia Siyu filed a frivolous anti-SLAPP motion against Changsha Metro Group Co., Ltd. (Changsha). Changsha sued defendants for: (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) constructive fraud; (3) aiding and abetting; (4) unjust enrichment; and (5) a constructive trust. Defendants responded with an anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court ordered defendants to pay Changsha $61,915 for Changsha’s attorney’s fees in opposing the anti-SLAPP motion. Defendants contended the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to Changsha because: (1) defendants were not given a 21-day safe harbor period; and (2)Changsha requested attorney’s fees in its opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion, rather than in a separate motion. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Changsha Metro Group Co. v. Xufeng" on Justia Law

Defendants Garrett Reed, Reilly Reed, Element Services, LLC, Jhenna Reed, Reedesign Concepts, and Robert Kubistek appealed a district court order remanding this case from federal district court to Colorado state court due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff Elite Oil Field Enterprises, Inc. (Elite) moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Plaintiff Elite was a Colorado corporation formed in March 2012 to provide roustabout services for the oil field industry. Immediately after its formation, Elite formed two subsidiaries: Elite Oil Field Services, Inc. and Elite Oil Field Equipment, Inc. At some point after the formation, Reilly Reed (Reilly) became upset that he only had a 25% ownership interest in Elite and believed that he was entitled to a 50% share. Reilly and his brother Garrett Reed (Garrett), allegedly devised a scheme for Reilly to form, surreptitiously, a competing company known as Element Services, LLC (Element), and for Element to improperly lure away Elite’s customers and employees with the intent of economically harming Elite and rendering Elite unable to continue its operations. As part of the scheme, Reilly filed a civil lawsuit in Colorado federal district court against Elite, its two subsidiaries, his former business partner Dustin Tixier, and business manager Jason Whisenand, alleging in pertinent part, Elite's corporate documents were altered such that Reilly owned only 25% of the total outstanding corporate stock rather than the originally agreed upon 50%. Plaintiffs moved to transfer and consolidate the multiple civil suits and counterclaims to Colorado state court. The Tenth Circuit determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal, thereby granting Elite's motion to dismiss this appeal. View "Elite Oil Field Enterprises v. Reed" on Justia Law

Two powerful friends decided to take out significant loans in order to invest in a purported business opportunity overseas. The business opportunity was in reality, a scam. The friends offered as collateral assets which were not theirs to encumber. The third party to whom the assets belonged had no idea the assets were being so encumbered. And the "lender" was another investor in the scam intent on recouping its investment. The opportunity was "a complete bust," and the friends were unable to pay the loans back. The lender sued to collect what was owed and foreclose on its secured interest in the offered collateral. The friends failed to answer the lawsuit, and a default judgment was obtained. The lender then began to execute on its judgment. The issues presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on two main issues: (1) whether the default judgment was void; and (2) assuming it was valid, whether the trial court should have vacated the default and default judgment under its statutory and equitable powers. The Court determined the order denying the motion to vacate default judgment should have been reversed, and the matter remanded for the trial court to vacate the default, default judgment and an assignment order (entered April 30, 2018). View "Luxury Asset Lending v. Philadelphia Television Network" on Justia Law

Subcontractor Ehmcke Sheet Metal Company (Ehmcke) recorded a mechanic’s lien to recoup payment due for sheet metal fabrication and installation work done on a luxury hotel project in downtown San Diego. Project owner RGC Gaslamp, LLC (RGC) secured a bond to release the lien. Thereafter Ehmcke filed three successive mechanic’s liens, each identical to the first, prompting RGC to sue it for quiet title, slander of title, and declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court granted Ehmke’s special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court found that Ehmcke met its moving burden because the filing of even an invalid lien was protected petitioning activity. Thereafter, the court found that RGC failed to make a prima facie showing that its sole remaining cause of action for slander of title could withstand application of the litigation privilege. RGC appeals both findings, arguing that the duplicative filing of mechanic’s liens after the posting of a bond was not protected activity. The Court of Appeal concluded after review that RGC erroneously imported substantive requirements of the litigation privilege into the first step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry. Ehmcke met that moving burden once its erroneously excluded reply declarations were considered. With the burden shifted on prong two, RGC failed to make a prima facie showing that the litigation privilege did not bar its slander-of-title cause of action. The anti-SLAPP motion was thus properly granted, and Court likewise affirmed the subsequent attorney’s fees and costs award. View "RGC Gaslamp v. Ehmcke Sheet Metal Co." on Justia Law

Shawn Kluver and Little Knife Disposal, LLC, appeal from a district court judgment ordering them to pay $140,042.83 to Titan Machinery, Inc., and $100,731.62 to Renewable Resources, LLC. In 2016, Kluver was the general manager of Renewable Resources, which was in the business of oilfield waste disposal. “At Kluver’s request and direction,” Renewable Resources leased a Case excavator and other equipment from Titan. The rental agreement for the Case excavator showed an estimated return date of June 28, 2016. Kluver also executed a credit application and personal guaranty with Titan to ensure Renewable Resources’ payment obligations under the rental agreement. Renewable Resources made all payments under the rental agreement from June 21, 2016, to December 6, 2016. No additional rental payments were made. In February 2017, while still employed by Renewable Resources, Kluver executed the operating agreement of Little Knife Disposal, LLC, as its sole member. Little Knife was also in the business of oilfield waste disposal. After Renewable Resources failed to make rental payments, Titan retrieved the Case excavator in October 2017. The excavator was damaged during the lease, and the excavator’s bucket was missing. In November 2017, Titan sued Renewable Resources for damaging the equipment and failing to pay the balance due under the rental agreement. In January 2018, Renewable Resources filed a third-party complaint against Kluver and Little Knife, claiming they wrongfully used the equipment leased from Titan and did not reimburse Renewable Resources. Renewable Resources requested that Kluver and Little Knife indemnify Renewable Resources for their use of the equipment. In October 2018, Titan obtained a $140,042.83 money judgment against Renewable Resources. In January 2019, Titan sued Kluver, claiming that under the personal guaranty he was liable for Renewable Resources’ debt to Titan. Kluver denied Titan’s allegations and brought a third-party complaint against Renewable Resources, asserting Renewable Resources should indemnify him for any amounts he was required to pay to Titan. Kluver and Little Knife argued the district court erred in finding they benefited from the equipment leased by Renewable Resources. They claimed there was no evidence they received a benefit from the Case excavator leased by Renewable Resources and the court erred in ordering them to indemnify Renewable Resources. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the order in favor of Titan Machinery and Renewable Resources. View "Titan Machinery v. Kluver" on Justia Law

Bismarck Financial Group, LLC, and its individual members (together “BFG”) appeal from an order granting James Caldwell’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss their complaint. According to BFG’s complaint, Bismarck Financial Group, LLC, was formed in 2009 as a limited liability company. After Caldwell became a member, the parties executed various governing documents, including an operating agreement. While Caldwell was a member, the company entered into a 10-year office lease. The company also had one salaried employee. In 2019, Caldwell informed the other members he was dissociating from the company. BFG subsequently brought this lawsuit requesting a declaration that Caldwell’s dissociation was wrongful and damages in excess of $137,879.55 based on Caldwell’s pro rata share of the company’s debt obligations, employee salary, office overhead, and other expenses. Caldwell moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Caldwell argued that he could not be held personally liable for company expenses and obligations under principles of corporate law. Caldwell also asserted BFG had not incurred any damages caused by his dissociation because, according to the terms of the operating agreement, the members have no obligation to contribute capital to cover company expenditures. The district court granted Caldwell’s motion. The court assumed Caldwell wrongfully dissociated from the company, but concluded BFG had not pleaded a cognizable claim for damages because Caldwell could not be held liable for future company expenses and obligations. Finding only that the district court erred in dismissing BFG's complaint as a matter of law in its entirety, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed in part, "BFG’s allegation that Caldwell’s withdrawal caused additional, currently-unidentifiable damages, if proven, is sufficient to support recovery against Caldwell." The Court affirmed in all other respects, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bismarck Financial Group, et al. v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

In 2016, plaintiff-appellee Isaac Sutton went shopping for a vehicle at the defendant-appellant David Stanley Chevrolet, Inc.'s (hereafter DSC) car dealership. He agreed to purchase a 2016 Chevy Silverado on credit and he agreed to trade-in his 2013 Challenger. He was informed by DSC that his credit was approved. In addition, he was given $22,800.00 for the Challenger for which he still owed $25,400.00. The documents for the purchase of the vehicle amounted to approximately eighty-six pages, which included a purchase agreement and a retail installment sale contract (RISC). He left the dealership that evening with the Silverado and left his Challenger. Several days later he was informed by DSC that his financing was not approved and he would need a co-signor to purchase the Silverado. Sutton visited DSC but was then told he did not need a co-signor and there was no need to return the vehicle. At the end of June his lender for his 2013 Challenger contacted him about late payments. Sutton contacted DSC who said it was not their responsibility to make those payments since they did not own the Challenger he traded-in. A few days later, he was notified by DSC that his Challenger had been stolen and the matter was not the responsibility of DSC. Sutton had to make an insurance claim on his Challenger and DSC took back the Silverado. In the meantime, Sutton continued to make payments on the Challenger. Plaintiff and his wife Celeste Sutton sued DSC over the whole transaction involving the Challenger. DSC moved to compel arbitration. Plaintiffs alleged they were fraudulently induced into entering the arbitration agreement. The trial court found there was fraudulent inducement and overruled the motion to compel arbitration. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded for further proceedings concerning the unconscionability of the arbitration agreement. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari, and found the trial court's order was fully supported by the evidence. The opinion of the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals was therefore vacated and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Sutton v. David Stanley Chevrolet" on Justia Law

In 2017, Sibanye Gold Ltd. (“Sibanye”) acquired Stillwater Mining Co. (“Stillwater”) through a reverse triangular merger. Under the terms of the merger agreement, each Stillwater share at closing was converted into the right to receive $18 of merger consideration. Between the signing and the closing of the merger, the commodity price for palladium (which Stillwater mined) increased by nine percent, improving Stillwater’s value. Certain former Stillwater stockholders dissented to the merger, perfected their statutory appraisal rights, and pursued this litigation. During the appraisal trial, petitioners argued the flawed deal process made the deal price an unreliable indicator of fair value and that increased commodity prices raised Stillwater’s fair value substantially between the signing and closing of the merger. In 2019, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued an opinion, holding that the $18 per share deal price was the most persuasive indicator of Stillwater’s fair value at the time of the merger. The court did not award an upward adjustment for the increased commodity prices. Petitioners appealed the Court of Chancery’s decision, arguing that the court abused its discretion when it ignored the flawed sale process and petitioners’ argument for an upward adjustment to the merger consideration. After review of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, and after oral argument, the Delaware Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the Court of Chancery. View "Brigade Leveraged Capital Structures Fund Ltd v. Stillwater Mining Co." on Justia Law

Two months before trial, appellant Reales Investment, LLC’s attorney moved to withdraw from the case. Reales did not retain counsel until a few days before trial began, and it did not participate in any of the pretrial proceedings mandated by Riverside County Superior Court Local Rule 3401. On the morning of the first day of trial, Reales’ new attorney orally requested a continuance. The trial court denied the request, and also excluded all documents and witnesses Reales did not disclose in pretrial exchanges between the parties as required by Rule 3401. Because Reales did not disclose anything under Rule 3401, it was precluded from offering any evidence or testimony at trial, so the trial court granted a nonsuit for respondent Thomas Johnson. On appeal, Reales argued the trial court’s pretrial rulings were an abuse of discretion. After review, the Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the judgment. View "Reales Investment, LLC v. Johnson" on Justia Law