Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Delaware Supreme Court addressed whether approval of a corporation’s Class B stockholders was required to transfer pledged assets to secured creditors in connection with what was, in essence, a privately structured foreclosure transaction. Stream TV Network, Inc. (“Stream” or the “Company”), along with Mathu and Raja Rajan, argued that the agreement authorizing the secured creditors to transfer Stream’s pledged assets (the “Omnibus Agreement”) was invalid because Stream’s unambiguous certificate of incorporation (“Charter”) required the approval of Stream’s Class B stockholders. Stream’s Charter required a majority vote of Class B stockholders for any “sale, lease or other disposition of all or substantially all of the assets or intellectual property of the company.” Stream argued the trial court erred by applying a common law insolvency exception to Section 271 in interpreting the Charter, and that the enactment of 8 Del. C. 271 and its predecessor superseded any common law exceptions. It contended that, in any event, such a “board only” common law exception never existed in Delaware. SeeCubic, Inc. argued the court correctly found that neither the Charter, nor Section 271, required approval of the Class B shares to effectuate the Omnibus Agreement. Because the Supreme Court agreed that a majority vote of Class B stockholders was required under Stream’s charter, it vacated the injunction, reversed the declaratory judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Steam TV Networks, Inc. v. SeeCubic, Inc." on Justia Law

Competing trade associations offered memberships to home inspectors, who typically inspect homes prior to home sales. Benefits of membership in the International Association of Certified Home Inspectors (InterNACHI) and the American Society of Home Inspectors (ASHI) included online advertising to home buyers, educational resources, online training, and free services such as logo design. From 2015 to 2020, ASHI featured the slogan “American Society of Home Inspectors. Educated. Tested. Verified. Certified” on its website. Contending that tagline mislead consumers, InterNACHI sued ASHI under the federal Lanham Act, claiming the line constituted false advertising because it inaccurately portrayed ASHI’s entire membership as being educated, tested, verified, and certified, even though its membership includes so-called “novice” inspectors who had yet to complete training or become certified. InterNACHI argued this misleading advertising and ASHI’s willingness to promote novice inspectors to the public caused InterNACHI to lose potential members and dues revenues. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of ASHI, concluding no reasonable jury could find that InterNACHI was injured by ASHI’s allegedly false commercial advertising. To this, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concurred: because InterNACHI did not present any evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that InterNACHI was injured by ASHI’s slogan, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for ASHI. View "Examination Board, et al. v. International Association, et al." on Justia Law

Robinson purchased grain bin monitoring equipment for his Spink County farm, financed through an Equipment Lease Agreement with Northland. Northland’s place of business is in Minnesota. The Lease included a forum selection clause requiring any suit filed by either party to be filed in Stearns County, Minnesota. After Robinson stopped making payments, Northland filed suit in Spink County, South Dakota, where Robinson resided. Robinson objected, claiming that he intended to pursue claims against Northland and others in Minnesota for the defective equipment. In granting Northland summary judgment., the circuit court treated Robinson’s objection as a question of venue and determined that Robinson failed to make a timely objection in Spink County.The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, ordering the dismissal of the Spink County action. The court applied Minnesota law consistent with the Lease's choice of law provision and stated that the statutory venue provisions have no application to the question of the enforceability of the contractual forum selection clause. Robinson’s actions in responding to the suit do not support a waiver determination under the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Lease does not indicate that the forum selection clause was intended to solely benefit Northland, or that the mandatory language requiring “any suit by either of the parties” could be unilaterally waived. View "Northland Captial v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Frankie Ware died in 2011, survived by his wife, Carolyn Ware, and their three children, Dana Ware, Angela Ware Mohr, and Richard Ware. Richard was married to Melisa Ware. Carolyn was appointed executor of Frankie’s estate. At the time of his death, Frankie owned 25 percent of four different family corporations. Carolyn owned another 25 percent of each, and Richard owned 50 percent of each. Frankie’s will placed the majority of Frankie’s assets, including his shares in the four family corporations, into two testamentary trusts for which Carolyn, Richard, Angela, and Dana were appointed trustees. The primary beneficiary of both trusts was Carolyn, but one trust allowed potential, limited distributions to Richard, Angela, and Dana. Prolonged litigation between Carolyn and Richard ensued over disagreements regarding how to dispose of Frankie’s shares in the four corporations and how to manage the four corporations. Richard eventually filed for dissolution of the four corporations. The trial court ultimately consolidated the estate case with the corporate dissolution case, and denied Angela and Dana’s motions to join/intervene in both cases. It also appointed a corporate receiver (Derek Henderson) in the dissolution case by agreed order that also authorized dissolution. The chancery court ultimately ordered that the shares be offered for sale to the corporations, and it approved the dissolution and sale of the corporations. Angela and Dana appealed the trial court’s denial of their attempts to join or intervene in the two cases. Carolyn appeals a multitude of issues surrounding the trial court’s decisions regarding the corporations and shares. Richard cross-appealed the trial court’s net asset value determination date and methodology. The Receiver argued the trial court’s judgment should have been affirmed on all issues. In the estate case, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the chancery court’s determination that the estate had to offer the shares to the corporation prior to transferring them to the trusts; the corporations filed their breach of contract claim after the expiration of the statute of limitations. The Court affirmed the chancery court’s denial of Angela and Dana’s motions to intervene, and it affirmed the chancery court’s decision in the dissolution case. The Court reversed the judgment to the extent that it allowed the corporations to purchase shares from the estate. The cases were remanded to the chancery court for a determination of how to distribute the money from the corporate sales, in which the estate held 25 percent of the corporate shares. View "In The Matter of The Estate of Frankie Don Ware" on Justia Law

In 2014, Elizabeth Elting, a co-founder of TransPerfect Global, Inc. (“TPG”), asked the Delaware Court of Chancery to appoint a custodian to sell the Company because of a hopeless deadlock between Elting and fellow co-founder, Philip Shawe. More than eight years later, Elting sold her shares to Shawe, who won a court-ordered auction supervised by Robert Pincus, a custodian duly appointed by the Court of Chancery. The parties executed the sale agreement (the “SPA”) in November 2017. A contentious relationship emerged between Shawe and Pincus, resulting in "seemingly endless" litigation in Delaware, New York and Nevada, millions in contested legal fees, and an inability to agree on any material aspect of Pincus' tenure as Custodian, up to and including his discharge. This case consolidated three challenges brought by Shawe and TPG to orders of the Court of Chancery, each implicating Pincus’ right to petition the trial court for reimbursement of fees and expenses under the SPA and various court orders. In sum, the Delaware Supreme Court: (1) reversed and vacated the Court of Chancery’s October 17, 2019 Contempt Order and Sanction only as they applied to Shawe; affirmed the Contempt Order and Sanction as they applied to TPG; (3) affirmed the court’s April 14, 2021 Discharge Order terminating the custodianship of Pincus; and (4) affirmed the April 30, 2021 Fee Order awarding Pincus $3,242,251 in fees, subject to the qualification that TransPerfect Global, Inc. was the only party liable for the $1,148,291 Contempt Sanction. View "Transperfect Global, Inc., et al. v. Pincus, et al." on Justia Law

Lee Kathrein appealed a judgment piercing the veil of Kathrein Trucking, LLC. In May 2020, West Dakota Oil, Inc. sued Kathrein Trucking, LLC and its owner, Kathrein, for failing to pay for fuel West Dakota provided. West Dakota amended its complaint in January 2021 and alleged breach of contract, unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. A bench trial was held in June 2021. In September 2021, the district court issued a memorandum opinion finding in favor of West Dakota. The court issued its findings of fact and judgment, ordering Kathrein Trucking and Kathrein to pay $63,412.35, jointly and severally. In deciding to pierce the veil of Kathrein Trucking, the district court found Kathrein disregarded the formalities required of limited liability companies, provided West Dakota title to a trailer Kathrein personally owned as security for the company’s debt, charged items at West Dakota that Kathrein personally used, and utilized company assets for personal use. The court found Kathrein operated his company as an alter ego based on a totality of the circumstances and the rubric for factors used to pierce a veil. After reviewing the record, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the evidence did not support findings under the applicable factors or a conclusion the company’s veil should have been pierced. The decision to pierce the veil and hold Kathrein personally liable was reversed. View "West Dakota Oil v. Kathrein Trucking, et al." on Justia Law

The Bank of Louisiana (“BOL”) and two of its directors appeal the district court’s dismissal of their complaints against the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The district court ruled that the complaints rehashed allegations that it had repeatedly held it lacked jurisdiction to consider.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal holding that preclusion principles bar relitigation of the same jurisdictional issue decided in a prior case. The court reasoned that BOL’s new complaints aim to relitigate the same jurisdictional issue decided previously. Once again, the BOL contendsed there is district court jurisdiction over its constitutional claims against the FDIC. That is the same issue the court decided against the BOL in the prior suits. The new complaints thus repeat rather than remedy the jurisdictional problem that warranted the earlier dismissals View "Bank of Louisiana v. FDIC" on Justia Law

Movant, IJK Palm LLC filed a motion in the district court seeking discovery under 28 U.S.C. Section 1782 from several companies and individuals for use in a suit it intended to file in the Cayman Islands. After IJK filed its request under Section 1782, the company on behalf of which IJK intended to sue, entered liquidation proceedings.   In the Cayman Islands, only a company’s official liquidator may ordinarily sue on the company’s behalf. IJK proposes three avenues through which it might nevertheless use the material it requests. The district court granted IJK’s discovery request. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling granting Movant’s discovery request. The court held that Movant has not established that it is an “interested person” with respect to its first proposed suit and that it has not established that the material it requests is “for use” in any of its proposed suits within the meaning of Section 1782. View "IJK Palm LLC v. Anholt Services USA, Inc. et al." on Justia Law

EBO filed suit after unsuccessfully seeking to lease a space in a building owned by the Taylor LLC, including derivative claims brought by EBO on behalf of Taylor, alleging that the denial of the lease caused Taylor to suffer economic injury. The defendants argued that EBO lacked standing under Corporations Code section 17709.02 to pursue them because during the litigation it relinquished its interest in and was no longer a member of the Taylor LLC. The court determined that it nonetheless had statutory discretion to allow EBO to maintain the derivative claims.The court of appeal vacated. Section 17709.02 requires a party to maintain continuous membership in a limited liability company to represent it derivatively, just as section 800 requires a party to maintain continuous ownership in a corporation to represent it derivatively. The statutory discretion conferred on trial courts under section 17709.02(a)(1), to permit “[a]ny member [of an LLC] who does not meet these requirements” to maintain a derivative suit does not permit courts to excuse a former member from the continuous membership requirement. While equitable considerations may warrant exceptions to the continuous membership requirement, no such considerations were presented here. View "Sirott v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma certified two questions of law to the Oklahoma Supreme Court relating to the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act, and whether it applied to conduct outside of Oklahoma. The matter concenred a dispute between Continental Resources, Inc. (Continental), an oil and gas producer headquartered in Oklahoma, and Wolla Oilfield Services, LLC (Wolla), a North Dakota limited liability company that operated as a hot oil service provider in North Dakota. Continental alleged the parties entered into an agreement for Wolla to provide hot oil services at an hourly rate to Continental's wells in North Dakota. As part of the contract, Wolla agreed to submit its invoices through an "online billing system" and to bill accurately and comprehensively for work it performed. A whistleblower in Wolla's accounting department notified Continental about systematic overbilling in connection with this arrangement. Continental conducted an audit and concluded Wolla's employees were overbilling it for time worked. Wolla denies these allegations. The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded: (1) the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act does not apply to a consumer transaction when the offending conduct that triggers the Act occurs solely within the physical boundaries of another state; and (2) the Act also does not apply to conduct where, even if the physical location is difficult to pinpoint, such actions or transactions have a material impact on, or material nexus to, a consumer in the state of Oklahoma. View "Continental Resources v. Wolla Oilfield Services" on Justia Law