Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

This action represents Metabyte’s fourth attempt to hold Technicolor liable for Technicolor’s allegedly improper auction of a patent portfolio in 2009. After the French courts ruled they lacked jurisdiction in the criminal action, Metabyte brought an action in district court alleging a federal RICO claim and several state law causes of action. After the district court ruled that equitable tolling did not apply to its RICO claim as a matter of federal law, Metabyte dismissed the federal action and brought its state law claims in Los Angeles County Superior Court. The trial court granted Technicolor’s demurrer without leave to amend. Metabyte contends the trial court erred in finding equitable estoppel applies only where a plaintiff invokes remedies designed to lessen the extent of a plaintiff’s injuries or damages, with the result that Article 145 proceeding in France could not support equitable tolling because it did not provide such a remedy. Technicolor defends the trial court’s ruling but devotes more of its energies to its contentions that even if equitable tolling did apply, the order should be affirmed by applying the doctrines of issue preclusion and judicial estoppel.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s ruling sustaining the demurrer on the alternate ground that Metabyte failed to adequately plead facts showing that its decision to proceed in France was objectively reasonable and subjectively in good faith. However, the court granted Metabyte leave to amend. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Metabyte v. Technicolor S.A." on Justia Law

Menasha licensed Nulogy’s software, Nulogy Solution. Years later, Deloitte reviewed Menasha’s systems in hopes of better integrating Nulogy Solution into Menasha’s other software. Deloitte and Menasha asked Nulogy to share proprietary information. Nulogy alleges that the two used this information to reverse engineer an alternative to Nulogy Solution. In 2020, Nulogy filed suit in Ontario’s Superior Court of Justice, alleging breach of contract by Menasha and violations of trade secrets by Menasha and Deloitte. Deloitte objected to jurisdiction in Canada.Nulogy voluntarily dismissed its trade secret claims against both companies and refiled those claims in the Northern District of Illinois under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. 1836(b). The breach of contract claims against Menasha remained pending in Canada. Menasha moved to dismiss the U.S. trade secrets litigation. Menasha’s contract with Nulogy contained a forum selection clause, identifying Ontario, Canada. Deloitte did not join that motion but filed its own motion to dismiss arguing failure to state a claim. The district court dismissed the claims against Menasha but reasoned that the forum non-conveniens doctrine required the dismissal of the entire complaint, including the claims against Deloitte.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Nulogy’s claims against Menasha but reversed the Deloitte dismissal. Deloitte has no contractual agreement with Nulogy identifying Canada as the proper forum and continues to insist that Canadian courts do not have jurisdiction. View "Nulogy Corp. v. Menasha Packaging Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an invitee, was allegedly injured by exposure to asbestos on the defendant landowner’s property. The landowner, petitioner ExxonMobil Oil Corporation (Mobil), requested a jury instruction to limit its potential liability for injuries caused by “known or obvious” dangers pursuant to § 343A of Restatement (Second) of Torts (Am. L. Inst. 1965). The trial court declined to give the § 343A instruction, and the jury issued a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Mobil argued that the jury should have been instructed on both §§ 343 and 343A of the Restatement as a matter of law. According to Mobil, an instruction on § 343A was necessary to make the jury instructions complete and to allow Mobil to argue its theory of the case. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed: “it is well established that the issuance of jury instructions is ‘within the trial court’s discretion’ and that instructions on ‘a party’s theory of the case’ are not ‘required’ unless they are supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” View "Wright v. 3M Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff HNHPC, Inc., appealed a judgment entered in favor of Defendants the Department of Cannabis Control (the Department) and Nicole Elliott. The complaint alleged the Department failed to perform its mandatory duties and/or failed to properly perform discretionary duties under the Medicinal and Adult-Use Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act (MAUCRSA). Plaintiff contended the court erred by taking judicial notice of certain documents and by sustaining defendants' demurrer. In sustaining defendants’ demurrer, the court took judicial notice of two government contracts with a contractor to design the track and trace system and the Department’s budget request for the 2021-2022 fiscal year. Relying on these documents, the court found the Department had complied with its ministerial duties under Bus. & Prof. Code section 26067. Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court properly took judicial notice of the documents, the Court of Appeal found the complaint still stated a claim for a writ of mandate and injunctive relief because the judicially noticed documents did not contradict the complaint's allegations. Because the complaint adequately pleaded facts to state a cause of action for a writ of mandate and for injunctive relief, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment. View "HNHPC v. Dept. of Cannabis Control" on Justia Law

This appeal arises out of a commercial property insurance policy (“Policy”) that Oregon Clinic, P.C. (“Oregon Clinic”) purchased from Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company (“Fireman’s Fund”). The Policy provides Oregon Clinic, a medical provider with more than fifty locations in Oregon, with coverage for a reduction of business income only if its insured property suffers “direct physical loss or damage.” In March 2020, after the COVID-19 pandemic began, Oregon Clinic, like hundreds of other insured businesses nationwide, sought coverage under its Policy. It alleged that it suffered “direct physical loss or damage” because of the COVID-19 pandemic and related governmental orders that prevented it from fully making use of its insured property. Fireman’s Fund denied coverage. Oregon Clinic then sued Fireman’s Fund in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. At Oregon Clinic’s request, the Ninth Circuit certified to the Oregon Supreme Court the interpretation of “direct physical loss or damage” under Oregon law and stayed proceedings. The Oregon Supreme Court declined the certification request.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that the Oregon Supreme Court would interpret “direct physical loss or damage” to require physical alteration of property, consistent with the interpretation reached by most courts nationwide. Because Oregon Clinic failed to state a claim under this interpretation and because the amendment would be futile, the panel affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "THE OREGON CLINIC, PC V. FIREMAN'S FUND INS. CO." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant FAT Brands Inc. alleged that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to defraud Plaintiff by misleading it as to the source and certainty of deal funding. On appeal, FAT Brands Inc. argues that the district court (Furman, J.) erred by dismissing claims against Defendants-Appellees Kristina Fields and Mickey Edison for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2); claims against Defendants-Appellees SJ Global Investments Worldwide, Ltd., SJ Global Investments, Ltd., Peter Samuel, and Neil Walsh for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6); and separate claims against Defendant-Appellee Wesley Ramjeet for failure to state a claim.   The Second Circuit vacated in part and affirmed in part the district court’s decision and remanded. The court held that FAT Brands plausibly alleged a conspiracy in which both Fields and Edison joined and participated. As such, the court turned to the three additional requirements to establish personal jurisdiction over a co-conspirator under New York law (awareness, benefit, and direction or control). The court held that all three are satisfied. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court’s order dismissing Count IV against Fields and Edison.   Further, the court wrote that because FAT Brands adequately alleged that the SJ Global Defendants conspired with the PPMT Defendants to commit the fraud, it states a claim against the SJ Global Defendants for the primary fraud tort as well. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court’s order dismissing Count IV against the remaining SJ Global Defendants. View "FAT Brands Inc. v. Ramjeet et al." on Justia Law

Barber Group, Inc., doing business as Barber Honda (Barber)—a car dealer in Bakersfield, California—brought an establishment protest to the California New Motor Vehicle Board (Board), challenging a decision by American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Honda) to open a new dealership about nine miles away. The Board overruled Barber’s protest, and the trial court denied Barber’s petition for administrative mandate challenging the Board’s decision. On appeal, Barber argued the Board prejudicially erred when it: (1) relied on Honda’s dealer performance standards at the protest hearing without first deciding whether those standards were reasonable; (2) permitted the proposed new dealership to exercise a peremptory challenge to an administrative law judge initially assigned to the protest hearing, contrary to notions of fairness and the Board’s own order in the matter; and (3) denied Barber’s request that it take official notice of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Barber Group, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd." on Justia Law

The PredictIt Market is an online marketplace that lets people trade on the predicted outcomes of political events. Essentially, it is a futures market for politics. In 2014, a division within the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) issued PredictIt a “no-action letter,” effectively allowing it to operate without registering under federal law. But, in 2022, the division rescinded the no-action letter, accusing PredictIt of violating the letter’s terms but without explaining how. It also ordered all outstanding PredictIt contracts to be closed in fewer than six months. Various parties who participate in PredictIt (collectively, “Appellants”) challenged the no-action letter’s rescission in federal district court and moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court has not ruled on that motion, though, despite PredictIt’s looming shutdown. Appellants sought review, treating the district court’s inaction as effectively denying a preliminary injunction.   The Fifth Circuit concluded that a preliminary injunction was warranted because the CFTC’s rescission of the no-action letter was likely arbitrary and capricious. So, the court remanded for the district court to enter a preliminary injunction while it considers Appellants’ challenge to the CFTC’s actions. The court explained that the DMO’s withdrawal of no-action relief constitutes final agency action. Further, the decision to rescind a no-action letter is not “committed to agency discretion by law.” The court concluded that the revocation of the no-action letter was likely arbitrary and capricious because the agency gave no reasons for it. And the agency’s attempts to retroactively justify the revocation after oral argument—and in the face of our injunction—only underscore why Appellants are likely to prevail. View "Clarke v. CFTR" on Justia Law

This case was the second round of appeals arising from Dalia Rojas’s lawsuit against HSBC Card Services, Inc. and HSBC Technology & Services (USA) Inc. (together, HSBC) for violations of the California Invasion of Privacy Act . Rojas received hundreds of personal calls from her daughter Alejandra, an employee at an HSBC call center, which were recorded by HSBC’s full-time recording system. Rojas alleged HSBC intentionally recorded confidential calls without her consent. She also alleged HSBC intentionally recorded calls to her cellular and cordless phones without her consent. The trial court granted summary judgment to HSBC, and Rojas appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding HSBC had not met its initial burden to show there was no triable issue of material fact on intent. On remand, HSBC made a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer, which Rojas did not accept. The case proceeded to a bench trial, where HSBC relied, in part, on workplace policies that purportedly barred call center agents from making personal calls at their desks to show it did not intend to record the calls. The trial court ultimately entered judgment for HSBC. Pertinent here, the court found Rojas did not prove HSBC’s intent to record. The court also found Rojas impliedly consented to being recorded, and did not prove lack of consent. Rojas appealed that judgment, contending the trial court made several errors in determining she did not prove her Privacy Act claims and that the evidence did not support its findings. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court applied correct legal standards in assessing lack of consent and substantial evidence supports its finding that Rojas impliedly consented to being recorded. Although the Court determined the record did not support the court’s finding that HSBC did not intend to record the calls between Rojas and her daughter, that determination did not require reversal. "What it underscores, however, is that a business’s full-time recording of calls without adequate notice creates conditions ripe for potential liability under the Privacy Act, and workplace policies prohibiting personal calls may not mitigate that risk." View "Rojas v. HSBC Card Services Inc." on Justia Law

The corporate charter of a bank holding company capped at 10% the stock that could be voted by a “person” in any stockholder vote. During a proxy contest for three seats of a staggered board, the CCSB board of directors instructed the inspector of elections not to count 37,175 shares voted in favor of a dissident slate of directors. According to the board, the 37,175 shares exceeded the 10% voting limitation because certain stockholders were acting in concert with each other. If the votes had been counted, the dissident slate of directors would have been elected. The CCSB corporate charter also provided that the board’s “acting in concert” determination, if made in good faith and on information reasonably available, “shall be conclusive and binding on the Corporation and its stockholders.” In a summary proceeding brought by the plaintiffs, the Court of Chancery found: (1) the “conclusive and binding” charter provision invalid under Delaware corporate law; (2) the board’s instruction to the inspector of elections invalid because the individuals identified by the board were not acting in concert; and (3) the board’s election interference did not withstand enhanced scrutiny review. The court also awarded the plaintiffs attorneys’ fees for having conferred a benefit on CCSB. CCSB argued the Court of Chancery erred when it invalidated the charter provision and reinstated the excluded votes. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery: plaintiffs proved that the board breached its duty of loyalty by instructing the inspector of elections to disregard the 37,175 votes. "The charter provision cannot be used to exculpate the CCSB directors from a breach of the duty of loyalty. Further, the court’s legal conclusion and factual findings that the stockholders did not act in concert withstand appellate review." View "CCSB Financial Corp. v. Totta" on Justia Law