Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging seven causes of action against TFMI. Plaintiff alleged he entered into two oral contracts with TFMI for which he has not been paid – one for his management of TFMI farms located in Arizona and New Mexico (out-of-state management services) and the other for consulting services he rendered in connection with the management of TFMI orchards located in California (instate consulting services). The trial court entered judgment in favor of TFMI and against Schmidt.   The Fifth Appellate District reversed the trial court’s judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint alleging seven causes of action against TFMI. The court held that the trial court erred in applying California law instead of Illinois law in determining whether to enforce the forum selection provision. The court held that in the interests of justice, it is best to remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration of the issue. Moreover, the parties themselves did not apply the correct law in arguing for or against the motion to quash and, thus, may not have submitted evidence they might now consider relevant to the court’s determination. Accordingly, the court explained it believes the trial court should entertain and consider additional briefing and evidence from each of the parties concerning the application of Illinois law to the question of whether the trial court should exercise, or decline to exercise, jurisdiction over claims involving the assigned Summit Gold invoices. View "Schmidt v. Trinut Farm Management" on Justia Law

Baker Sales, Inc. (“BSI”) obtained two loans from Newtek Small Business Finance, Inc. (“Newtek”) which were secured by mortgages on BSI’s commercial property. Robert and Elsa Baker (collectively “the Bakers”) executed agreements unconditionally guaranteeing payment of all amounts owed on the loans. These agreements were secured by conventional mortgages on the Bakers’ home. BSI filed for bankruptcy approximately two years later. Newtek filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding for the total amount of the outstanding balance of the loans. The bankruptcy court granted Newtek’s motion to lift the automatic bankruptcy stay. Newtek then filed a petition for executory process in state court against BSI and the Bakers requesting seizure and sale of BSI’s commercial property without the benefit of appraisal. Newtek purchased the seized property at a sheriff’s sale; the bankruptcy case was subsequently closed. Newtek filed the suit at issue here, seeking to foreclose on the Bakers’ home. The trial court issued a judgment preliminarily enjoining the sale of the Bakers’ home and converted the proceeding from executory to ordinary. The Bakers filed a petition seeking a declaration under the Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act (“LDJA”) that as the underlying debt was extinguished, Newtek could no longer pursue them as sureties. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari review to determine whether a creditor’s recovery in a deficiency judgment action was barred against a surety when a creditor forecloses on property through a judicial sale without appraisal. Harmonizing the LDJA with the law of suretyship, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal that such recovery was barred. View "Newtek Small Business Finance, LLC v. Baker" on Justia Law

Mallory worked as a Norfolk mechanic for 20 years in Ohio and Virginia. After leaving the company, Mallory moved to Pennsylvania, then returned to Virginia. He attributed his cancer diagnosis to his work and sued Norfolk under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, in Pennsylvania state court. Norfolk, incorporated and headquartered in Virginia, challenged the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction. Mallory noted that Norfolk manages over 2,000 miles of track, operates 11 rail yards, runs locomotive repair shops in Pennsylvania, and has registered to do business in Pennsylvania in light of its "regular, systematic, extensive” operations there. Pennsylvania requires out-of-state companies that register to do business to agree to appear in its courts on “any cause of action” against them. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 5301(a)(2)(i), (b). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania law violated the Due Process Clause.The Supreme Court vacated. Pennsylvania law is explicit that qualification as a foreign corporation shall permit state courts to exercise general personal jurisdiction over a registered foreign corporation. Norfolk has complied with this law since 1998 when it registered to do business in Pennsylvania. Norfolk's “Certificate of Authority” from the Commonwealth conferred both the benefits and burdens shared by domestic corporations, including amenability to suit in state court on any claim. For more than two decades, Norfolk has agreed to be found in Pennsylvania and answer any suit there. Suits premised on these grounds do not deny a defendant due process of law. Regardless of whether any other statutory scheme and set of facts would establish consent to suit, this state law and these facts fall within Supreme Court precedent. View "Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified a question of South Carolina Supreme Court to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Metal Recycling Services, LLC, hired an independent contractor - Norris Trucking, LLC - to transport scrap metal. A truck driver employed by Norris Trucking hit the car Lucinda Ruh was driving and injured her. Ruh sued Metal Recycling Services and its parent company, Nucor Corporation, in state court. The defendants removed the case to the federal district court, which granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding Ruh did not allege an employer-employee relationship between the defendants and Norris Trucking or its driver, nor did she otherwise allege any basis on which the defendants could be liable for the negligence of their independent contractor. The district court delayed entry of judgment to allow Ruh to seek leave to amend her complaint. Ruh then moved to amend her complaint to add a claim that Metal Recycling Services itself was negligent in selecting Norris Trucking to transport the scrap metal. The district court denied the motion to amend and dismissed the complaint. The federal appellate court asked the South Carolina Supreme Court whether an employer could be subject to liability for harm caused by the negligent selection of an independent contractor. The Supreme Court responded in the affirmative: an independent contractor relationship may be subject to liability for physical harm proximately caused by the principal's own negligence in selecting the independent contractor. View "Ruh v. Metal Recycling Services, LLC" on Justia Law

The three plaintiffs in this case had each rented rooms at an extended-stay motel for some time. They fell behind on their rent and were threatened with immediate eviction. They sued to stop that from happening, claiming that they were in a landlord-tenant relationship with the motel and could not be evicted without dispossessory proceedings in court. The motel argued that it had signed agreements with the plaintiffs that foreclosed their claims because, among other things, the agreement stated that their relationship was one of “Innkeeper and Guest,” and “not . . . Landlord and Tenant.” The trial court agreed with plaintiffs, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's opinion and remanded with direction for the trial court to determine the parties' relationship under the proper legal framework. View "Efficiency Lodge, Inc. v. Neason, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Carrington Mortgage Services on behalf of the United States for alleged violations of the False Claims Act. Calderon is a former employee of Carrington. She alleged that Carrington made false representations to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the course of certifying residential mortgage loans for insurance coverage from the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Carrington moved for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff did not meet her evidentiary burden on two elements of False Claims Act liability. The district court sided with Carrington on both elements and granted summary judgment, disposing of Plaintiff’s lawsuit.   The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Plaintiff does have sufficient proof of materiality. However, the court agreed that she has not met her burden of proof on the element of causation. The court explained that on the present record, it is not clear how a factfinder would even spot the alleged false statement in each loan file, let alone evaluate its seriousness and scope. And though Plaintiff asserted that the misrepresentations, in this case, are of the type identified in Spicer, the court did not see much in the record to support that point other than Plaintiff’s assertions. Without more evidence from which a jury could conclude that Carrington’s alleged misrepresentations in each loan caused the subsequent defaults, the nature of those misrepresentations is not enough to get past summary judgment. View "Michelle Calderon v. Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC" on Justia Law

This consolidated appeal arose from personal injuries Adrian Carillo Alcala (“Carillo”) suffered at a potato packaging plant, SunRiver of Idaho, Inc. (“SunRiver”), after his head and shoulders were crushed by a box palletizer designed, manufactured, delivered, and installed by a Dutch company, Verbruggen Emmeloord, B.V. (“VE”), along with its United States affiliate, Verbruggen Palletizing Solutions, Inc. (“VPS”). The box palletizer was one of seven machines SunRiver purchased in a transaction with Volm Companies, Inc. (“Volm”). Because this was a workplace injury, Carillo received worker’s compensation benefits through his employers, SunRiver, Employers Resource Management Company, and Employers Resource of America, Inc.—and the surety American Zurich Insurance Company (collectively “the SunRiver Plaintiffs”). Afterwards, the SunRiver Plaintiffs jointly with, and in the name of Carillo, sued Volm, VE, and VPS. Pursuant to a stipulation and compromise agreement, Volm was dismissed from this suit before this appeal. The district court granted summary judgment to Respondents and dismissed all claims after concluding that VE and VPS were Carillo’s statutory co-employees immune from common law liability under Richardson v. Z & H Construction, LLC, 470 P.3d 1154 (2020). On appeal, the SunRiver Plaintiffs and Carillo argued that the transaction between SunRiver and Volm did not make Carillo, VE, and VPS statutory co-employees because it was a “hybrid” transaction consisting of goods with incidental services under Kelly v. TRC Fabrication, LLC, 487 P.3d 723 (2021). VE and VPS cross-appealed the district court’s denial of attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). The Idaho Supreme Court agreed with the SunRiver Plaintiffs and Carillo. VE and VPS were “third parties” and were not entitled to immunity from suit in tort under the Worker’s Compensation law. The district court’s judgment dismissing all claims was vacated, the grant of summary judgment to VE and VPS was reversed, and this case was remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court also rejected VE’s and VPS’s argument that the SunRiver Plaintiffs’ subrogation interest was barred at summary judgment. The Court found evidence in the record sufficient to create a disputed issue of material fact over whether the SunRiver Plaintiffs had any comparative fault for Carillo’s accident. As for the cross-appeal, the Court vacated the district court’s decision denying attorney fees under section 12-120(3) below because there was not yet a prevailing party. View "Alcala v. Verbruggen Palletizing Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

TOCH, LLC, the owner and operator of Aloft Hotel, alleged that the Tulsa Tourism Improvement District No. 1 was allegedly improperly created because fifty percent or more of the affected hotel owners protested in writing prior to its creation. City of Tulsa and Tulsa Hotel Partners sought summary judgment on this issue and disputed this material fact by submitting affidavits to disprove TOCH's allegation. The trial court granted summary judgment to the City, but the Oklahoma Supreme Court found the trial court erred when it made a factual determination on this controverted fact. "Weighing disputed evidence is not proper on summary judgment." The trial court's decision was therefore reversed. View "TOCH, LLC v. City of Tulsa, et al." on Justia Law

Ritchie Capital Management, LLC fell victim to a massive Ponzi scheme. Ritchie sought recovery outside the receivership. But settlement agreements and bar orders prevent recovery. The district court approved the receivership’s final accounting and a previous bar order. Claiming abuses of discretion, Ritchie appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court ordered the receiver to prepare and file a final accounting. The district court established the requirements that, in its sound discretion, the receiver satisfied in the final accounting. Ritchie fails to identify a clear abuse of discretion in the district court’s approval of the final accounting and, regardless, waived its right to do so. Further, the court held that because bankruptcy-standing doctrine independently prevents Ritchie from bringing claims related to the bankruptcy estate, and because Ritchie can still pursue personal claims against JPMorgan, Ritchie cannot identify a protected right that is deprived here. View "United States v. Ritchie Capital Management, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s employee opened, in Plaintiff’s name, a credit card with Chase and ran up tens of thousands of dollars in debt. The employee also illegally accessed Plaintiff’s bank accounts and used them to partially pay off the monthly statements. When she discovered the scheme, Plaintiff reported the fraud to Chase, but Chase refused to characterize the charges as illegitimate. Plaintiff sued Chase under the Fair Credit Reporting Act for not conducting a reasonable investigation into her dispute. The district court granted summary judgment for Chase because it concluded that Chase’s investigation into Plaintiff’s dispute was “reasonable,” as the Act requires.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff hasn’t shown a genuine dispute of fact whether Chase’s conclusion was unreasonable as a matter of law. The court explained that Chase didn’t need to keep investigating. Nor has Plaintiff explained what Chase should have done differently: whom it should have talked to or what documents it should have considered that might have affected its apparent-authority analysis. That omission dooms Plaintiff’s claim because “a plaintiff cannot demonstrate that a reasonable investigation would have resulted in the furnisher concluding that the information was inaccurate or incomplete without identifying some facts the furnisher could have uncovered that establish that the reported information was, in fact, inaccurate or incomplete.” View "Shelly Milgram v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., et al" on Justia Law