Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Ripple Analytics Inc. operated a software platform for human resources functions and originally owned the federal trademark for the word “RIPPLE®” in connection with its software. In April 2018, Ripple assigned all rights, title, and interest in its intellectual property, including the trademark, to its Chairman and CEO, Noah Pusey. Meanwhile, People Center, Inc. began using the name “RIPPLING” for similar software, though it abandoned its own trademark registration effort. Ripple later sued People Center for trademark infringement and unfair competition, claiming ownership of the RIPPLE® mark.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York reviewed the case. During discovery, Ripple produced the assignment agreement showing that Pusey, not Ripple, owned the trademark. People Center moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, arguing Ripple was not the real party in interest. The district court dismissed Ripple’s trademark infringement claim with prejudice, dismissed its unfair competition claims without prejudice for lack of standing, and denied Ripple’s motion to amend its complaint, finding the proposed amendment futile because it did not resolve the standing issue.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Ripple was not the real party in interest for the trademark infringement claim, as ownership had been assigned to Pusey, who failed to ratify or join the action. The court also held that Ripple lacked standing to pursue unfair competition claims under federal and state law, as it no longer had a commercial interest in the trademark. The denial of Ripple’s motion to amend was upheld because the amendment would not cure the standing defect. The court further found that the district court’s interlocutory order allowing People Center to amend its answer was not properly before it on appeal. View "Ripple Analytics Inc. v. People Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and defendant were business associates who sought to purchase three restaurants known as Jib Jab. Plaintiff, with a background in investing, initiated negotiations and sought a partner with restaurant experience, leading to an oral agreement with defendant. Plaintiff was to handle acquisition terms and financing, while defendant would manage operations. No written partnership agreement was executed. Both parties made several unsuccessful attempts to secure financing, including SBA loans, but neither was willing to personally guarantee the loan, and plaintiff refused to pay off defendant’s unrelated SBA debts. Eventually, defendant proceeded alone, secured financing, and purchased Jib Jab through an entity he formed, without plaintiff’s involvement.Plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, alleging the formation of a common law partnership and asserting direct and derivative claims against defendant and the purchasing entity, including breach of partnership agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, misappropriation of business opportunity, and requests for judicial dissolution and accounting. Defendants moved for partial judgment on the pleadings, resulting in dismissal of all derivative claims, certain direct claims, and claims for constructive trust. The remaining claims were plaintiff’s direct claims for breach of partnership agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, and claims for judicial dissolution and accounting.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the Business Court’s orders. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of derivative claims, holding that North Carolina law does not permit derivative actions by a general partner on behalf of a general partnership. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of conclusory tortious interference claims and upheld the Business Court’s decision to strike portions of plaintiff’s affidavit and disregard an unsworn expert report. Finally, the Supreme Court modified and affirmed summary judgment for defendants, holding that no partnership existed due to lack of agreement on material terms, and that plaintiff failed to show he could have completed the purchase but for defendant’s actions. View "Cutter v. Vojnovic" on Justia Law

This case arose from a complex series of shareholder derivative actions involving a mineral rights holding company. The litigation began in March 2014, alleging self-dealing by the company’s corporate counsel and majority shareholder. Over the years, multiple complaints and counterclaims were filed, and the cases were consolidated. The original defendant, Paul, was dismissed from the case in 2016 but was later named as a counterdefendant in an amended counterclaim filed in 2020, after control of the company shifted. During Paul’s absence from the litigation, the remaining parties agreed to waive the five-year rule for bringing a case to trial under NRCP 41(e)(2)(B).The Second Judicial District Court, after considering Paul’s 2024 motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution under NRCP 41(e)(2)(B), denied the motion. The district court reasoned that the 2020 amended counterclaim constituted a new action, thereby restarting the five-year period, and that the parties’ earlier waiver of the five-year rule applied to Paul as well.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case on a petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that the five-year period for bringing an action to trial under NRCP 41(e)(2)(B) begins with the filing of the initial complaint, regardless of subsequent procedural developments. The court further clarified that a waiver of the five-year rule by some parties does not bind parties who did not join in the waiver. The court also determined that the amended counterclaim did not constitute a new action for purposes of the rule. As a result, the Supreme Court of Nevada granted the petition and directed the district court to dismiss the action against Paul, with the district court to determine whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice. View "Paul v. District Court" on Justia Law

A waste hauling company operating in Kansas City brought suit against a mobile waste compaction business and its franchisor. The waste hauler owns containers that are leased to customers, who sometimes contract separately with the compaction company to compress waste inside those containers. The hauler alleged that the compaction company’s activities damaged its containers and interfered with its business relationships. The hauler sought various forms of relief, including damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and nominal damages, but ultimately disavowed any claim for actual monetary damages, citing a lack of evidence to support such damages.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied the hauler’s request for a temporary restraining order, finding no irreparable harm. During discovery, the hauler admitted it could not identify or quantify any actual damages and stipulated it was not seeking damages outside Kansas City. The district court granted the compaction company’s motion to strike the hauler’s jury demand, holding that the hauler had not presented evidence of compensatory damages, that nominal damages were unavailable under Missouri law for the claims asserted, and that the remaining claims were equitable in nature. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for the compaction company and its franchisor, finding the hauler failed to prove essential elements of its claims, including actual damages and direct benefit conferred for unjust enrichment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the hauler was not entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment because it failed to present evidence of compensatory damages and nominal damages were not available for its claims under Missouri law. The court also affirmed judgment for the compaction company on the trespass to chattels and unjust enrichment claims, finding the hauler failed to prove dispossession, damages, or a direct benefit conferred. View "Allied Services v. Smash My Trash, LLC" on Justia Law

A publicly traded reinsurance company experienced significant financial losses over a two-year period due to adverse developments with its largest client, which led to higher-than-expected claim payouts and a dramatic drop in its stock price. Investors, represented by a pension trust and a bank, alleged that the company committed securities fraud by making misleading statements about the adequacy of its reserve funds. Specifically, they claimed the company failed to disclose historical data indicating that its reserves were insufficient, even though it knew of this adverse information.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey initially denied the company’s motion to dismiss, allowing limited discovery focused on whether the company intentionally omitted the historical loss ratio information. The Magistrate Judge restricted discovery to a narrow scope, declining to require production of all underlying data, and the District Court affirmed this limitation. After this limited discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment for the company, holding that the reserve statements were not misleading as a matter of law because the company had considered the historical data and the omitted information did not “totally eclipse” other factors in the reserve calculations.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the District Court erred in its application of the materiality standard and in denying further discovery. The Third Circuit found that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to whether the omission of adverse historical data was material to investors, given the company’s dependence on its largest client and the significance of historical trends in its reserve-setting process. The court vacated the summary judgment and remanded for full discovery and further proceedings, clarifying that materiality is a context-specific inquiry and that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence to proceed. View "Boilermaker Blacksmith National Pension Trust v. Maiden Holdings Ltd" on Justia Law

A trading company and a base oil manufacturer entered into a sales agreement in 2016, under which the manufacturer would serve as the exclusive North American sales representative for a high-quality base oil product distributed by the trading company. The agreement included noncompete provisions and was set to expire at the end of 2021. In late 2020, suspicions arose between the parties regarding potential breaches of the agreement, leading to a series of letters in which the trading company accused the manufacturer of selling a competing product and threatened termination if the alleged breach was not cured. The manufacturer responded by denying any breach and, after further correspondence, declared the agreement terminated. The trading company agreed that the agreement was terminated, and both parties ceased their business relationship.The trading company then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging antitrust violations, breach of contract, business disparagement, and misappropriation of trade secrets. The manufacturer counterclaimed for breach of contract and tortious interference. After a bench trial, the district court found in favor of the manufacturer on the breach of contract and trade secret claims, awarding over $1.3 million in damages. However, the court determined that the agreement was mutually terminated, not due to anticipatory repudiation by the trading company, and denied the manufacturer’s request for attorneys’ fees and prevailing party costs.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the trading company did not commit anticipatory repudiation and that the agreement was mutually terminated. The Fifth Circuit also affirmed the denial of prevailing party costs under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the appellate court vacated the denial of attorneys’ fees under the agreement’s fee-shifting provision and remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "Penthol v. Vertex Energy" on Justia Law

A group of institutional investors brought a class action lawsuit against a pharmaceutical company and several of its officers, alleging violations of federal securities laws after the company’s share price dropped significantly following the rejection of a takeover bid and subsequent negative financial disclosures. One large investor, Sculptor, intended to pursue its own individual lawsuit rather than participate in the class action. The District Court certified the class and issued a notice specifying the procedure and deadline for class members to opt out. Although Sculptor intended to opt out, its counsel failed to submit the required exclusion request by the deadline. Both Sculptor and the company proceeded for years as if Sculptor had opted out, litigating the individual action and treating Sculptor as an opt-out plaintiff.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey later approved a class settlement, which prompted the discovery that Sculptor had never formally opted out. Sculptor then sought to be excluded from the class after the deadline, arguing that its conduct showed a reasonable intent to opt out, that its failure was due to excusable neglect, and that the class notice was inadequate. The District Court rejected these arguments, finding that only compliance with the court’s specified opt-out procedure sufficed, that Sculptor’s neglect was not excusable under the relevant legal standard, and that the notice met due process requirements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Third Circuit held that a class member must follow the opt-out procedures established by the district court under Rule 23; a mere “reasonable indication” of intent to opt out is insufficient. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying Sculptor’s late opt-out request and concluded that the class notice satisfied due process. View "Perrigo Institutional Investor Group v. Papa" on Justia Law

A Luxembourg-based investment fund and its former General Partner became embroiled in a complex dispute following a contentious split among the fund’s founders. The fund, originally managed by Novalpina Capital Partners I GP S.À.R.L. (Novalpina), saw its General Partner position transferred to Treo NOAL GP S.à.r.l. (Treo) after a vote by limited partners, including the Oregon Public Employees Retirement Fund (OPERF). The fund’s structure involved multiple entities and significant investments, with allegations of improper conduct and maneuvers by both sides during the transition. Novalpina and Treo subsequently initiated several lawsuits in Luxembourg, including actions over control of the fund and claims for financial entitlements.Novalpina filed an ex parte petition in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, seeking discovery from Oregon officials for use in foreign proceedings, specifically the Veto Right Litigation and a contemplated fraud claim. Treo, Langdon, and Read intervened, and the district court granted the petition, finding statutory and discretionary factors favored Novalpina. The parties negotiated a protective order, which allowed use of the documents in litigation related to the events described in the petition. After Novalpina used the documents in additional foreign proceedings, Treo moved for reconsideration of the discovery grant and to modify the protective order, arguing misuse and misrepresentation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of Treo’s motions. The Ninth Circuit held that documents produced under § 1782 for use in specified foreign proceedings may be used in other proceedings unless the district court orders otherwise. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Treo’s motion for reconsideration or its request to modify the protective order, affirming the district court’s rulings. View "NOVALPINA CAPITAL PARTNERS I GP S.A.R.L V. READ" on Justia Law

P&J Beverage Corporation filed a lawsuit against the City of Columbus, seeking to prevent the city from issuing an alcoholic beverage license to The Bottle Shop, LLC, and later sought to revoke the license after it was issued. P&J argued that The Bottle Shop’s location was too close to a daycare, which it claimed qualified as a “school” under city ordinances. The trial court granted summary judgment to P&J, invalidating The Bottle Shop’s license and enjoining its operation. The Bottle Shop’s attorney then emailed P&J’s attorney, referencing a potential claim for wrongful injunction if the appellate court reversed the trial court’s order, and requested a stay of the injunction pending appeal. P&J declined, and The Bottle Shop’s motion for a stay was denied by the trial court but later granted by the Court of Appeals, which ultimately reversed the trial court’s decision on the merits.Subsequently, The Bottle Shop sued P&J for both abusive litigation and wrongful injunction, seeking damages, attorney fees, and punitive damages. At trial, The Bottle Shop presented evidence of lost revenue, overhead costs, and attorney fees incurred during the period it was closed. The jury awarded substantial damages, attorney fees, and punitive damages. The trial court entered judgment accordingly. P&J moved for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing, among other things, that The Bottle Shop failed to provide the statutory notice required for an abusive litigation claim. The trial court denied these motions, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the email satisfied the statutory notice requirement.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that the email sent by The Bottle Shop did not satisfy the statutory notice requirement under OCGA § 51-7-84 (a) for an abusive litigation claim, as it failed to identify the civil proceeding as abusive litigation. The Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine what portion of the damages, if any, remain valid. View "P& J BEVERAGE CORPORATION v. THE BOTTLE SHOP, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in state court against Defendants, alleging violations of state securities laws. Defendants removed the case to federal court under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), arguing that the case involved covered securities. Plaintiffs amended their complaint to exclude any claims related to covered securities, leading the district court to remand the case to state court. After three years of state court litigation, Defendants removed the case again, citing an expert report that allegedly identified covered securities. The district court remanded the case again and awarded Plaintiffs $63,007.50 in attorneys' fees.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina initially denied Plaintiffs' motion to remand but later granted it after Plaintiffs amended their complaint. The court found that the amended complaint excluded any claims related to covered securities, thus SLUSA did not apply, and no federal question remained. After Defendants removed the case a second time, the district court remanded it again and awarded attorneys' fees, finding the second removal lacked a reasonable basis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's award of attorneys' fees. The court held that the second removal was improper because the amended complaint explicitly excluded claims related to covered securities, and thus SLUSA did not apply. Additionally, the court found that the removal was objectively unreasonable, as the district court had already addressed the issues in its first remand order. The Fourth Circuit also denied Plaintiffs' request for additional attorneys' fees for defending the appeal, stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) does not authorize fee awards on appeal. View "Black v. Mantei & Associates, Ltd." on Justia Law