Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Lakeridge. a corporation with a single owner (MBP), filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, owing U.S. Bank $10 million and MBP $2.76 million. Lakeridge submitted a reorganization plan, proposing to impair the interests of both. U.S. Bank refused, blocking Lakeridge’s reorganization through a consensual plan, 11 U.S.C. 1129(a)(8). Lakeridge then turned to a “cramdown” plan, which would require consent by an impaired class of creditors that is not an “insider” of the debtor. An insider “includes” any director, officer, or “person in control” of the entity. MBP, unable to provide the needed consent, sought to transfer its claim to a non-insider. Bartlett, an MBP board member and Lakeridge officer, offered MBP’s claim to Rabkin for $5,000. Rabkin purchased the claim and consented to Lakeridge’s proposed reorganization. U.S. Bank objected, arguing that Rabkin was a nonstatutory insider because he had a “romantic” relationship with Bartlett. The Bankruptcy Court, Ninth Circuit, and Supreme Court rejected that argument. The Ninth Circuit correctly reviewed the Bankruptcy Court’s determination for clear error (rather than de novo), as “mixed question” of law and fact: whether the findings of fact satisfy the legal test for conferring non-statutory insider status. The standard of review for a mixed question depends on whether answering it entails primarily legal or factual work. Using the Ninth Circuit’s legal test for identifying such insiders (whether the transaction was conducted at arm’s length, i.e., as though the parties were strangers) the mixed question became: Given all the basic facts, was Rabkin’s purchase of MBP’s claim conducted as if the two were strangers? Such an inquiry primarily belongs in the court that has presided over the presentation of evidence, i.e., the bankruptcy court. View "U. S. Bank N. A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC" on Justia Law

After a Montana state court issued a series of judgments against Donald Tangwall and his family, the family members transferred two pieces of property to the “Toni 1 Trust,” a trust allegedly created under Alaska law. A Montana state court and an Alaska bankruptcy court found that the transfers were made to avoid the judgments and were therefore fraudulent. Tangwall, the trustee of the Trust, then filed this suit, arguing that Alaska state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over such fraudulent transfer actions under AS 34.40.110(k). The Alaska Supreme Court concluded this statute could not unilaterally deprive other state and federal courts of jurisdiction, therefore it affirmed dismissal of Tangwall’s complaint. View "Toni 1 Trust v. Wacker" on Justia Law

After a Montana state court issued a series of judgments against Donald Tangwall and his family, the family members transferred two pieces of property to the “Toni 1 Trust,” a trust allegedly created under Alaska law. A Montana state court and an Alaska bankruptcy court found that the transfers were made to avoid the judgments and were therefore fraudulent. Tangwall, the trustee of the Trust, then filed this suit, arguing that Alaska state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over such fraudulent transfer actions under AS 34.40.110(k). The Alaska Supreme Court concluded this statute could not unilaterally deprive other state and federal courts of jurisdiction, therefore it affirmed dismissal of Tangwall’s complaint. View "Toni 1 Trust v. Wacker" on Justia Law

SPV, the assignee of Optimal Strategic, filed suit against UBS and its affiliated entities and individuals (collectively, Access), alleging that UBS and Access aided and abetted the Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC and Bernard L. Madoff by sponsoring and providing support for two European-based feeder funds. The district court subsequently denied SPV's motion to remand the matter to state court and then granted separate motions to dismiss the complaint. The Second Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over this appeal; this litigation was "related to" the Madoff/BLMIS bankruptcies; the USB defendants lacked sufficient contacts with the United States to allow the exercise of general jurisdiction; the connections between the USB Defendants, SPV's claims, and its chosen New York forum were too tenuous to support the exercise of specific jurisdiction; and the court rejected SPV's two different theories of proximate cause. View "SPV OSUS Ltd. v. UBS AG" on Justia Law

SPV, the assignee of Optimal Strategic, filed suit against UBS and its affiliated entities and individuals (collectively, Access), alleging that UBS and Access aided and abetted the Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC and Bernard L. Madoff by sponsoring and providing support for two European-based feeder funds. The district court subsequently denied SPV's motion to remand the matter to state court and then granted separate motions to dismiss the complaint. The Second Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over this appeal; this litigation was "related to" the Madoff/BLMIS bankruptcies; the USB defendants lacked sufficient contacts with the United States to allow the exercise of general jurisdiction; the connections between the USB Defendants, SPV's claims, and its chosen New York forum were too tenuous to support the exercise of specific jurisdiction; and the court rejected SPV's two different theories of proximate cause. View "SPV OSUS Ltd. v. UBS AG" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Adrian and Angela Lee asked the bankruptcy court to declare that the automatic stay in Adam and Jennifer Peeples’ bankruptcy case applied to a separate lawsuit Adrian Lee filed in state court against defendant Scott McCardle. The Lees also asserted that the automatic stay prevented McCardle from collecting attorney’s fees levied against Adrian Lee in that state-court lawsuit. The Lees sought damages against McCardle for willfully violating the automatic stay. The bankruptcy court found, and the district court agreed, that the automatic stay didn’t apply to the state-court lawsuit, thus granting summary judgment to McCardle. The Lees appealed, arguing that the district court erred in ruling that the automatic stay didn’t apply. The Tenth Circuit did not reach that question; instead, the Court vacated the district court’s judgment against Angela Lee because she lacked Article III standing to bring this lawsuit, and affirm summary judgment against Adrian Lee because his claims didn’t fall within the Bankruptcy Code’s “zone of interests.” View "Lee v. McCardle" on Justia Law

After Natchez Regional Medical Center (“NRMC”) filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy, H. Kenneth Lefoldt, who had been appointed trustee for the NRMC Liquidation Trust, sued NRMC’s former directors and officers in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, alleging breach of fiduciary duties of care, good faith, and loyalty. The directors and officers sought dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and argued that they were immune under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”). The district court agreed and granted dismissal to the directors and officers. Lefoldt appealed, and the Fifth Circuit certified questions of Mississippi Law to the Mississippi Supreme Court pertaining to the MTCA as the exclusive remedy for a bankruptcy trustee standing in the shoes of a public hospital corporation against the employees or directors of that public corporation. If indeed the MTCA was the exclusive remedy, then did the MTCA permit the trustee to pursue any claims against the officers and directors in their personal capacity? The Mississippi Supreme Court answered the first question in the negative: the MTCA did not furnish the exclusive remedy for the bankruptcy trustee. View "Lefoldt v. Rentfro" on Justia Law

A court may raise judicial estoppel on its own motion in an appropriate case, and therefore, the doctrine is not waived if not pled by the parties.After Plaintiff initiated Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings, he filed a defamation claim against Defendants. Plaintiff subsequently completed the payments required by the Chapter 13 plan, and the bankruptcy court ordered the discharge of his remaining unsecured debts. Defendants moved for summary judgment and then filed a reply brief to Plaintiff’s brief in opposition to the motion, arguing that Plaintiff was judicially estopped from prosecuting his defamation claim because he failed to timely disclose it to the bankruptcy court. The circuit court granted the motion, concluding that the doctrine of judicial estoppel prohibited Plaintiff from prosecuting his defamation claim after taking the position in the bankruptcy court that it did not exist. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the doctrine of judicial estoppel was not waived by Defendants for their failure to raise it in their pleadings; and (2) Plaintiff identified no reversible error in the circuit court’s application of judicial estoppel. View "Eilber v. Floor Care Specialists, Inc." on Justia Law

Debtor filed several unsuccessful lawsuits to invalidate Sandlin Farm's Deutsche Bank mortgage. Debtor, d/b/a Sandlin Farms sought Chapter 12 bankruptcy relief but did not propose to pay that mortgage nor a BoA mortgage on other property. Debtor filed adversary complaints to avoid the liens. The Trustee moved to dismiss the case due to inaccurate monthly reports and Debtor’s inability to generate sufficient income to implement his plan if the liens were valid. The Bankruptcy Court dismissed the Deutsche Bank adversary proceeding, citing res judicata. Debtor voluntarily dismissed the BoA proceeding but did not re-notice the confirmation hearing or amend the plan. The court denied Debtor’s motion to stay pending appeal of the Deutsche Bank dismissal and set a hearing on the Trustee's motion. Debtor resisted scheduling depositions and requested time to find new counsel. The Trustee then sought Dismissal as a Sanction for Failure to Cooperate with Discovery. Debtor did not appear at the hearing. The Bankruptcy Court dismissed (11 U.S.C. 1208(c)) based on inability to present a timely confirmable plan; unreasonable delay; and a continuing loss to the estate without reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. Although Debtor had actual notice of the hearing, it was not reasonably calculated to give him sufficient notice of exactly what issues would be addressed nor an opportunity to be heard. Nonetheless, Debtor failed to refute that cause existed to dismiss the case, so the error was not prejudicial. View "In re: Haffey" on Justia Law

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for extension of time to file notice of appeal pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 8002(d)(1)(B) for failing to show excusable neglect. Appellant filed her motion one business day late as a result of her attorney’s preoccupation with his second job as a church’s music director. The district court concluded that counsel’s explanation for the delay amounted to mere inadvertence and did not constitute excusable neglect. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Appellant’s counsel’s inadvertence did not constitute excusable neglect and that Appellant was bound by counsel's carelessness. View "Sheedy v. Bankowski" on Justia Law