Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves American Collection Systems, Inc. (ACS), a Wyoming corporation, and Lacy D. Judkins. ACS had obtained a default judgment against Judkins in 2010. However, ACS failed to execute the judgment for over five years, causing it to become dormant under Wyoming law. In 2022, ACS filed a motion to revive the dormant judgment. The district court revived the judgment but declined to award post-judgment interest. ACS then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment to include post-judgment interest, which the district court denied. ACS appealed, arguing that the district court was legally required to award post-judgment interest.The Supreme Court of Wyoming found that it only had jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of ACS's motion to alter or amend the judgment, not the underlying judgment itself. The court noted that ACS's notice of appeal specifically identified only the post-judgment order as the order being appealed.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Wyoming determined that the district court had misapprehended the controlling law when it denied ACS's request for mandatory post-judgment interest. The court held that the district court abused its discretion because its decision to deny the motion to alter or amend the judgment was based on erroneous legal conclusions. The Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to enter an amended judgment that includes the post-judgment interest through the date the judgment became dormant. View "American Collection Systems, Inc. v. Judkins" on Justia Law

The case involves J and L Farms, Inc. (J&L), a South Dakota company, and First Bank, a Florida banking corporation. J&L had an ongoing business relationship with Jackman Wagyu Beef, LLC (Jackman), a Florida-registered company, where Jackman would purchase cattle from J&L. In 2018, Jackman proposed a change in their payment terms, offering to pay for the cattle within 30 days of placing an order, instead of paying prior to the cattle being shipped. To secure each payment, Jackman proposed that J&L would be given a bank guarantee from First Bank. First Bank issued three separate guaranty letters to J&L to secure payment for the sale of cattle. However, Jackman failed to provide full payment for two orders, and First Bank refused to satisfy the outstanding balance.The circuit court of the Fifth Judicial Circuit in Brown County, South Dakota, entered a default judgment against Jackman after it failed to plead or defend against J&L’s complaint. First Bank filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that it did not have sufficient minimum contacts for a South Dakota court to exercise personal jurisdiction over it. The circuit court denied the motion.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court's decision. The Supreme Court found that First Bank had sufficient minimum contacts with South Dakota to establish personal jurisdiction. The court reasoned that First Bank purposefully availed itself of the privileges of acting in South Dakota by issuing three guaranty letters to J&L, a South Dakota company, to facilitate the purchase of South Dakota cattle. The court also found that the cause of action against First Bank arose from its activities directed at South Dakota, and that the acts of First Bank had a substantial connection with South Dakota, making the exercise of jurisdiction over First Bank reasonable. View "J&l Farms" on Justia Law

Leslie Atkinson purchased a 2003 Chevrolet Avalanche through a retail installment sales contract, which granted the seller a security interest in the vehicle. The seller assigned the sales contract and the security interest to Credit Acceptance Corporation. When Atkinson defaulted on her payments, Credit Acceptance hired Carolina Repo to repossess the vehicle. During the repossession, Atkinson attempted to drive off in the vehicle, leading to a confrontation with the Carolina Repo representative. The representative called the Harnett County Sheriff’s Office for assistance, and Deputy Brent Godfrey arrived on the scene. Godfrey ordered Atkinson out of the vehicle so that the Carolina Repo representative could repossess it.Atkinson sued Godfrey and Sheriff Wayne Coats under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. She claimed that Godfrey, in his individual capacity, violated her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures of property by facilitating Carolina Repo’s repossession. She also alleged that Coats, in his official capacity as the sheriff, failed to train officers and created policies that deprived her of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable seizures of property.The defendants moved to dismiss Atkinson’s § 1983 claim, asserting that Atkinson did not allege facts showing they acted under color of law, that Godfrey was entitled to qualified immunity, and that, without an underlying constitutional violation, Atkinson failed to bring an actionable claim against the Sheriff’s Office through Coats in his official capacity. The district court denied the motion, finding it could not determine as a matter of law that Godfrey’s actions did not constitute state action, that Godfrey was entitled to qualified immunity, and that the Sheriff’s Office’s liability could be ruled out. Godfrey and Coats appealed the district court’s denial of their motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Godfrey’s motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The court found that neither the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit, the highest court of North Carolina, nor a consensus of other circuit courts of appeals had determined that conduct similar to that of Godfrey was unconstitutional. Therefore, the right alleged to be violated was not clearly established. The court remanded the case with instructions to grant Godfrey’s motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the appeal with respect to the claim against Coats, as the issues it presented were not inextricably intertwined with the resolution of the qualified immunity issues. View "Atkinson v. Godfrey" on Justia Law

This case involves Commerzbank AG, a German bank, and U.S. Bank, N.A., an American bank. Commerzbank sued U.S. Bank, alleging that it had failed to fulfill its duties as a trustee for residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) that Commerzbank had purchased. The case revolved around three main issues: whether Commerzbank could bring claims related to trusts with "No Action Clauses"; whether Commerzbank's claims related to certificates held through German entities were timely; and whether Commerzbank could bring claims related to certificates it had sold to third parties.The district court had previously dismissed Commerzbank's claims related to trusts with No Action Clauses, granted judgment in favor of U.S. Bank on the timeliness of Commerzbank's claims related to the German certificates, and denied Commerzbank's claims related to the sold certificates. Commerzbank appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions on the timeliness of the German certificate claims and the denial of the sold certificate claims. However, it vacated the district court's dismissal of Commerzbank's claims related to trusts with No Action Clauses and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court found that Commerzbank's failure to make pre-suit demands on parties other than trustees could be excused in certain circumstances where these parties are sufficiently conflicted. View "Commerzbank AG v. U.S. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The case involves 21 U.S. citizens and the family of a deceased U.S. citizen who were victims of rocket attacks by the Hizbollah terrorist organization in Israel in 2006. The plaintiffs allege that the Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB) provided financial services to Hizbollah, including facilitating millions of dollars in wire transfers through a New York-based correspondent bank. In 2011, LCB and Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL (SGBL), a private company incorporated in Lebanon, executed a purchase agreement where SGBL acquired all of LCB's assets and liabilities. In 2019, the plaintiffs brought similar claims against SGBL, as LCB's successor, in the Eastern District of New York for damages stemming from the 2006 attacks.The federal district court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction over SGBL. The court interpreted several Appellate Division and federal decisions to allow imputation of jurisdictional status only in the event of a merger, not an acquisition of all assets and liabilities. On appeal, the Second Circuit certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals, asking whether an entity that acquires all of another entity's liabilities and assets, but does not merge with that entity, inherits the acquired entity's status for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction, and under what circumstances the acquiring entity would be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New York.The New York Court of Appeals answered the first question affirmatively, stating that where an entity acquires all of another entity's liabilities and assets, but does not merge with that entity, it inherits the acquired entity's status for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction. The court declined to answer the second question as unnecessary. The court reasoned that allowing a successor to acquire all assets and liabilities, but escape jurisdiction in a forum where its predecessor would have been answerable for those liabilities, would allow those assets to be shielded from direct claims for those liabilities in that forum. View "Lelchook v Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, PennyMac Loan Services, LLC, a mortgage company, held a mortgage interest in a property in Coventry, Rhode Island. The mortgagor, Domenico Companatico, failed to pay 2018 fire district taxes, leading to a tax sale auction where the property was sold to Roosevelt Associates, RIGP. Roosevelt later filed a petition to foreclose any right of redemption, and the Superior Court clerk issued a citation notifying interested parties. The citation did not include a street address for the property. Despite receiving the citation, PennyMac failed to respond and was defaulted. A Superior Court justice entered a final decree foreclosing the right of redemption, and Roosevelt sold the property to Coventry Fire District 5-19, RIGP, which later sold it to Clarke Road Associates, RIGP.PennyMac filed an action to challenge the foreclosure decree, arguing that the citation failed to provide adequate notice, thus denying PennyMac its right to procedural due process. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and a second trial justice concluded that PennyMac had received adequate notice of the petition to foreclose all rights of redemption. The justice also found that the fire district taxes constituted a superior lien on the property and that PennyMac is statutorily barred from asserting a violation of the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the amended judgment of the Superior Court. The court found that the citation, despite lacking a street address, did not constitute a denial of due process. The court also concluded that PennyMac's claim under the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act was barred due to its failure to raise any objection during the foreclosure proceeding. Finally, the court determined that the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota did not alter the outcome of this case. View "PennyMac Loan Services, LLC v. Roosevelt Associates, RIGP" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of plaintiffs who claimed that the defendant, Bank of America, fraudulently denied them mortgage modifications under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) and then foreclosed on their homes. The plaintiffs filed their complaint in May 2018 and their amended complaint in March 2019, alleging claims based on common law fraud, fraudulent concealment, intentional misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, conversion, unjust enrichment, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and, in the alternative, negligence.However, the Supreme Court of North Carolina found that the plaintiffs' claims were time-barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. The court held that the statutes of limitations for all of plaintiffs’ claims, except for their unfair and deceptive trade practices claim, started to run at the latest by the date that each plaintiff lost his or her home. Each plaintiff lost his or her home sometime between April 2011 and January 2014. Thus, the latest point in time any plaintiff could have filed a complaint was January 2017, or in the case of an unfair and deceptive trade practices claim, January 2018. Plaintiffs did not file their original complaint until May 2018. Therefore, their claims are time-barred.The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations for their fraud claims beyond the dates of their foreclosures. The court found that the plaintiffs were on notice of the defendant's alleged fraud by the time they lost their homes, and they should have investigated further. The court therefore reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint. View "Taylor v. Bank of America, N.A" on Justia Law

The case originated from a lending relationship between Jeffrey Frye and his companies, The Wall Guy, Inc., and JR Contractors, and First State Bank. After the relationship soured, both parties sued each other, leading to nearly a decade of litigation involving two state-court lawsuits, a jury trial, post-trial motions, removal to federal district court, and motions practice in that court. However, the appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit were dismissed due to a lack of jurisdiction.The court determined that the plaintiffs had not properly invoked the court's appellate jurisdiction. The plaintiffs had filed a notice of appeal before the district court had announced a decision on a future or pending motion, which under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(B)(ii), was insufficient to give the appellate court jurisdiction over a later order related to that motion.The court also determined that the plaintiffs had not established a timely notice of appeal regarding other orders. The court emphasized that while the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should be liberally construed, they cannot be ignored, especially when they implicate the court's appellate jurisdiction. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not met their burden to establish appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals. View "The Wall Guy, Inc. v. FDIC" on Justia Law

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court addressed an appeal from Citibank, N.A., challenging a District Court judgment in favor of the defendant, Ashley Moser, in a case related to the collection of credit card debt. The bank argued that the judgment violated its procedural due process rights due to insufficient notice about a hearing scheduled on April 12, 2023.The court had issued notices for both a 'first mediation' and a 'debt collection hearing' on the same day, at the same time, and in the same room. On the hearing day, Citibank's counsel attended without a representative from the bank, assuming that the case was scheduled for mediation and not a final hearing. The court proceeded with the hearing and entered a judgment in favor of Moser, as Citibank failed to satisfy its burden of proof.Citibank appealed, claiming the notices were ambiguous and violated its right to procedural due process. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Citibank, noting that the competing notices created an impossibility of both a mediation and a hearing taking place simultaneously. It ruled that the ambiguity in the notices and the court's subsequent judgment denied Citibank the required notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Citibank, N.A. v. Moser" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Texas examined whether a lender could rescind a loan acceleration and reaccelerate the loan simultaneously, thereby resetting the foreclosure statute of limitations under the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 16.038. The plaintiffs, Linda and Thomas Moore, defaulted on their home loan, leading to an acceleration of the loan by the lenders, Wells Fargo Bank and PHH Mortgage Corporation. The lenders subsequently issued notices rescinding the acceleration and then reaccelerating the loan. The Moores sued, arguing that the foreclosure statute of limitations had run out because the lenders' rescission notices also included notices of reacceleration. The federal district court ruled against the Moores, leading to their appeal and the subsequent certification of questions to the Supreme Court of Texas by the Fifth Circuit. The key question was whether simultaneous rescission and reacceleration could reset the limitations period under Section 16.038.The Supreme Court of Texas held that a rescission that complies with the statute resets the limitations period, even if it is combined with a notice of reacceleration. The court reasoned that the statute doesn't require the rescission notice to be separate from other notices, nor does it impose a waiting period between rescission and reacceleration. The court's ruling means that lenders can rescind and reaccelerate a loan simultaneously, thereby resetting the foreclosure statute of limitations. View "MOORE v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A." on Justia Law