Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Bank brought this foreclosure action against Mortgagor. Mortgagor filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Bank’s notices of right to cure were deficient because they did not satisfy the requirements of Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6111(1-A). The court concluded that the notice of right to cure did not comply with statutory requirements and dismissed the complaint without prejudice so that Bank could send notice in compliance with section 6111. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint but remanded with instructions to correct the order so that it provides for a dismissal with prejudice, holding that the court erred by stating that the dismissal was without prejudice because the dismissal was an adjudication on the merits, and therefore, it was with prejudice. View "U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Mackenzie" on Justia Law

Arvest Bank petitioned for mandamus relief, seeking to have the Autauga Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Arvest's motion to quash a writ of execution obtained by Iberiabank f/k/a Capitalsouth Bank ("Iberia") against real property owned by Evelyn Niland ("Evelyn"). Thomas Karrh, II transferred the property Iberia wanted to sell to Evelyn and her husband Raymond Niland as joint tenants with right of survivorship. The Nilands quitclaimed the property to Evelyn, removing Raymond from the title. Raymond stopped paying an existing debt to Iberia. Iberia obtained a judgment against Raymond for close to $125,000. Iberia filed a lien against all of Raymond's property. Evelyn transferred the property back to herself and Raymond, attempting to create a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. At the same time Evelyn tried this transfer, she and her husband executed a mortgage to Arvest Bank. Iberia secured a writ of execution against the property; Arvest intervened to try to quash a sheriff's sale of the property. Raymond died shortly thereafter. The trial court granted the intervention and stayed the sale proceedings, but after Iberia opposed these actions, the sheriff's sale was permitted to proceed. Finding that Evelyn indeed did create a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship, the Supreme Court found that Iberia's interest was extinguished with Raymond's death, and that Iberia could not attach its writ to the property. The order denying Arvest's motion to quash the writ of execution was reversed and the case remanded for the trial court to grant Arvest's request. View "Ex parte Arvest Bank." on Justia Law

In 2005, Connor Libby and Elena Chapa (collectively, Defendants) signed credit card agreements with Federated Capital Corporation’s predecessor-in-interest, a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. The agreements contained a forum selection clause and choice of law provision that adopted Utah substantive and procedural law to govern any dispute under the contract. The agreements required Defendants to make monthly payments to the address specific on their billings statements, and each billing statement required Defendants to send their payments to an address in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Defendants defaulted in 2006. In 2012, Federated filed separate claims in separate proceedings against Defendants. In each proceeding, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, ruling that Utah’s borrowing statute required the court to apply Pennsylvania’s four-year statute of limitations, thereby barring Federated’s claims. Federated appealed, arguing that the agreement’s forum selection clause precluded the application of Utah’s borrowing statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the borrowing statute applied to and barred Federated’s causes of action. View "Federated Capital Corp. v. Libby" on Justia Law

The lender Cenlar FSB appealed a judgment in favor of the borrowers Laurie and Joseph Malenfant, Jr. in the lender’s second action for a judgment on the note and foreclosure, after the first was dismissed with prejudice. The lender argued that the first dismissal could not be interpreted as vacating the judgment on the note and for foreclosure that the trial court had previously issued in that case. Alternatively, the lender contended that its notice of default in the initial foreclosure action was sufficient to satisfy its notice obligation in connection with its second foreclosure action. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of the first action on the promissory note and complaint for foreclosure did effectively vacate that court’s prior judgment for lender on the note and for foreclosure. Furthermore, the lender was not, on this record, entitled to pursue a second action because it had not taken any steps to reinstate borrower’s monthly payment obligations after lender had accelerated the note. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Cenlar FSB v. Malenfant, Jr." on Justia Law

Richard George, Steven Leavitt, Sandra Leavitt, and Darrell Dalton appealed the district court’s dismissal of their putative class action against Urban Settlement Services, d/b/a Urban Lending Solutions (Urban) and Bank of America, N.A. (BOA). Plaintiffs asserted a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against BOA and Urban. Plaintiffs also brought a promissory estoppel claim against BOA. Both claims arose from the defendants’ allegedly fraudulent administration of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). The district court granted the defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss both claims, denied the plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend their first amended complaint, and dismissed the case. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs’ first amended complaint stated a facially plausible RICO claim against BOA and Urban and a facially plausible promissory estoppel claim against BOA. As such, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. This reversal mooted plaintiffs’ challenge to the district court’s denial of their request to further amend the complaint. View "George v. Urban Settlement Services" on Justia Law

This case concerns a dispute between the parties over who has priority ownership of property located in Las Vegas. Nevada has a statute that gives a homeowners’ association lien priority over “all other liens and encumbrances” (subject to some limited exceptions) for up to nine months of unpaid HOA fees. NEV. REV. STAT. 116.3116(2)–(3). After the HOA foreclosed on property that Ashley Spencer bought, Weeping Hollow purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. Just over two months after the HOA foreclosure sale, Wells Fargo attempted to foreclose on the property under its 2008 deed of trust. Weeping Hollow filed suit in state court against Spencer, Wells Fargo, and a title insurance company. Wells Fargo removed to federal court. The district court then granted Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss Weeping Hollow’s complaint. After the district court issued its ruling, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an opinion that expressly abrogates the district court’s interpretation of the HOA statute. Under the Nevada Supreme Court’s holding, a foreclosure on an HOA lien extinguishes an earlier-recorded security interest even though the HOA lien was recorded later. The court held that the district court erred in applying the fraudulent-joinder doctrine to this case. Because Spencer was not shown to be fraudulently joined, her presence in the action divests the district court of diversity jurisdiction and the district court must remand the case to state court. Since this case should never have made it into federal court, the court has no reason to address Wells Fargo’s constitutional and state-law arguments. View "Weeping Hollow Ave. Trust v. Spencer" on Justia Law

OneWest commenced a foreclosure action against defendant. The district court denied defendant's cross-motion to dismiss and granted OneWest's motion for summary judgment. The district court held in part that a national bank such as OneWest is a citizen only of the state in which its main office is located - not also of the state of its principal place of business - and that OneWest’s main office is indisputably in California. The court agreed with the district court and joined its sister circuits in holding that, for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction, a national bank is a citizen only of the state in which its main office is located. The court also concluded that OneWest had standing to foreclose based on LSA's assignment of all of its rights that FDIC previously had to defendant's loan as the conservator and receiver of IndyMac Federal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "OneWest Bank, N.A. v. Melina" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-lender Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (as trustee) appealed a superior court decision to grant defendant-borrower Kevin Pinette's motion to dismiss. The lender tried to foreclose on property of Pinette, but the superior court dismissed its claims on foreclosure, the unpaid balance on a promissory note, and a deficiency judgment on the ground that they were barred by claim preclusion, as lender had previously instituted an identical action against borrower in 2013, which had been dismissed for failure to prosecute. On appeal, the lender argued that because the 2013 action did not actually adjudge the enforceability of the note and mortgage, the dismissal did not have preclusive effect. Further, lender urged the Vermont Supreme Court to hold that in the mortgage foreclosure context, dismissals with prejudice did not bar subsequent actions based upon new defaults occurring after dismissal of the prior action. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Deutsche Bank v. Pinette" on Justia Law

In 2014, the trustee under a deed of trust conveyed the Parrish property to the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), which sent the Parrishes a notice to vacate and filed a summons for unlawful detainer in the general district court. The Parrishes alleged that the foreclosure was invalid because their deed of trust incorporated 12 C.F.R. 1024.41(g), which, they asserted, prohibits foreclosure if a borrower submitted a completed loss mitigation application more than 37 days before the foreclosure sale. They alleged that they had submitted such an application. The court awarded Fannie Mae possession. On appeal, Fannie Mae argued that the court should exclude any defense contesting the foreclosure’s validity because the lower court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to try title in a proceeding on unlawful detainer. Fannie Mae contended that because the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction on appeal from the general district court was derivative of the general district court’s jurisdiction, the circuit court also lacked jurisdiction. The court awarded Fannie Mae possession. The Supreme Court of Virginia vacated, restoring the parties to their status quo before the unlawful detainer proceeding. Courts not of record lack power to try title unless expressly conferred by the General Assembly. The court cited Code sections 16.1-77(3) and 8.01-126 and acknowledged the practical implications of its holding. View "Parrish v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n" on Justia Law

222 plaintiffs, homeowners, in 22 related mass actions against various financial institutions and mortgage loan servicers, appeal from an order dismissing those actions after the trial court sustained without leave to amend defendants' demurrers to an “omnibus” third amended complaint. Each mass action involves numerous plaintiffs whose loans originated with and/or were serviced by a single defendant or related affiliates. The omnibus complaint asserted seven causes of action. On appeal, plaintiffs challenge only the trial court's denial of their request for leave to amend their unfair business practices cause of action (the UCL claim) to add factual allegations to support an entirely different theory that was suggested in seven sentences of the 29-page complaint. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint because they failed to show that their proposed additional facts are sufficient to state a UCL claim. Moreover, even if their proposed additional facts were sufficient, they clearly demonstrate that the claim could not be prosecuted as a mass action because the 222 plaintiffs' claims do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 378. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Aghaji v. Bank of America" on Justia Law