Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Borrowers brought suit alleging that their lending bank had engaged in fraudulent real estate lending practices. The bank responded that statutes of limitations barred the borrowers’ fraud claims. Following an evidentiary hearing to establish relevant dates for the statutes of limitations inquiry, the superior court entered judgment and awarded attorney’s fees in the bank’s favor. The borrowers appealed, arguing that the superior court erred in its factual and legal determinations and otherwise violated their due process rights. Finding no reversible error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s rulings. View "Taffe v. First National Bank of Alaska" on Justia Law

Five Star Credit Union ("Five Star") attempted for over a decade to collect a debt owed by William Elliott. Five Star obtained a judgment against Elliott in 2011, but he never paid. In 2017, Five Star sought to garnish Elliott's wages by filing a process of garnishment against Elliott's employer, The Elliott Law Group, P.A. ("ELG"), a law firm under Elliott's complete control. ELG opposed the process of garnishment. Following a hearing, the trial court found that the assertions in ELG's opposition were untrue and ordered that Elliott's income from ELG be garnished. Elliott and ELG appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the appellants' arguments lacked merit, and affirmed the trial court. View "Elliott Law Firm Group, P.A. v. Five Star Credit Union" on Justia Law

In 2012, California enacted legislation known as the California Homeowner Bill of Rights, or HBOR, which imposed specific limitations regarding the nonjudicial foreclosure of owner-occupied residential real property. The trial court granted Rosana Bustos’ ex parte application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and order to show cause regarding preliminary injunction, which sought to prevent a trustee’s sale of her home due to several alleged violations of the HBOR related to her submission of a loan modification application. Central to Bustos’ application was a “blatant violation” of the HBOR’s prohibition against dual tracking--when a mortgage servicer continues foreclosure proceedings while reviewing a homeowner’s application for a loan modification. After the trial court denied Bustos’ request for a preliminary injunction and vacated the TRO, it awarded her $4,260 in attorney fees and costs, finding Bustos was a “prevailing borrower” under the HBOR because she obtained injunctive relief in the form of a TRO against her mortgage servicer, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. On appeal, Wells Fargo argued the trial court erred in interpreting Civ. Code section 2924.12 as authorizing an award of attorney fees and costs to a borrower who obtains a TRO enjoining a trustee’s sale of his or her residence. Wells Fargo alternatively contended the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs to Bustos under the circumstances of this case. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Bustos v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

After Ellen Gittel Gordon defaulted on her mortgage, the loan servicer initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings to sell her home at auction. Gordon submitted multiple loan modification applications and appeals in an attempt to keep her home but ultimately, all were rejected. As a result, Gordon initiated the underlying action in district court to enjoin the foreclosure sale. Upon the filing of a motion to dismiss that was later converted to a motion for summary judgment, the district court dismissed Gordon’s action and allowed the foreclosure sale to take place. Gordon timely appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded none of the reasons Gordon offered were sufficient to reverse the district court judgment, and affirmed dismissal of Gordon’s complaint. View "Gordon v. U.S. Bank" on Justia Law

Brintley is blind. To navigate the internet, she uses a screen reader that scans webpages and narrates their contents. The technology struggles with some material, especially pictures and video. With some effort, companies can make their websites fully screen-reader compatible. The credit unions, established under Michigan law, maintain a limited brick-and-mortar presence; both operate websites. Brintley tried to browse these websites but found her screen reader unable to process some of their content. A “tester” of website compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, Brintley sued the credit unions, seeking compensatory and injunctive relief, arguing that the websites were a “service” offered through a “place of public accommodation,” entitling her to the “full and equal enjoyment” of the websites. 42 U.S.C. 12182(a). The district court rejected an argument that Brintley failed to satisfy Article III standing. The Sixth Circuit reversed. To establish standing, Brintley must show that she sustained an injury in fact, that she can trace the injury to the credit unions’ conduct, and that a decision in her favor would redress the injury. Brintley must show an invasion of a “legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent” and that affects her in some “personal and individual way.” Brintley lacks eligibility under state law to join either credit union and her complaint does not convey any interest in becoming eligible to do so. View "Brintley v. Belle River Community Credit Union" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of JMPC's motion to compel certain post-judgment discovery. The court held that, although the district court's reliance on the June 2011 date as relevant to DTC's knowledge of any potential claims by JPMC was clearly erroneous, the error was harmless. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by tying discovery to a time period associated with the Cathay agreement; the district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting discovery to the 2012 breach and the amount of the judgment specifically tied to that one breach; and the district court's proportionality determination was reasonable. View "JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Datatreasury Corp." on Justia Law

Doherty and Farano formed Worth. The bank loaned Worth $400,000, with their personal guaranties. The bank extended the loan’s maturity date multiple times. Worth defaulted. The bank sued Worth, Farano, and Doherty. Doherty, an attorney, filed an appearance on behalf of himself and Worth and raised affirmative defenses, including that the bank extended the loan without authorization and charged fees and an interest rate not agreed upon. The court entered a default judgment for the loan balance against Farano. Doherty later received a report from a forensic document examiner, opining that his signature had been forged on loan extension paperwork. The bank dismissed its claims against Worth and Doherty without prejudice. Over a year later, Doherty sued the bank and individuals, alleging breach of contract, forgery, excessive fees, fraud, legal malpractice, and malicious prosecution. The trial court dismissed, holding that most of Doherty’s claims were barred by res judicata because he should have brought them in the guaranty action. Before Doherty’s appeal was heard, the bank went into the FDIC receivership. The FDIC removed this action to federal district court, which adopted the Illinois court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Res judicata does not bar Doherty’s claims. None of the cited Illinois cases address this situation; similar cases suggest that applying the doctrine would be inappropriate. Applying res judicata here neither advances the purposes of res judicata nor meaningfully serves the interests of judicial economy. View "Doherty v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation" on Justia Law

The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) creates a cause of action for “borrower[s],” 12 U.S.C. 2605(f). Tara and Nathan Keen got a loan and took out a mortgage when they bought their house. Both of them signed the mortgage; only Nathan signed the loan. The pair later divorced. Nathan gave Keen full title to the house. He died shortly afterward. Although Tara was not legally obligated to make payments on the loan after Nathan died, she made payments anyway so she could keep the house. She later ran into financial trouble, fell behind on those payments, and contacted the loan servicer, Ocwen. After unsuccessful negotiations, Ocwen proceeded with foreclosure. The house was sold to a third-party buyer, Helson. Soon after foreclosure, Tara sued both Ocwen and Helson, alleging that Ocwen violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601, which requires that loan servicers take certain steps when a borrower asks for options to avoid foreclosure. Tara alleged that Ocwen failed to properly review her requests before it foreclosed on her house. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Keen’s RESPA claims. RESPA’s cause of action extends only to “borrower[s].” Keen was not a “borrower” because she was never personally obligated under the loan agreement. View "Keen v. Helson" on Justia Law

Carello is blind. To access online visual content, he uses a “screen reader,” which reads text aloud to him from websites that are designed to support its software. Carello claims that the Credit Union website fails to offer such support. The Illinois Credit Union Act requires that credit union membership be open only to groups of people who share a “common bond,” including “[p]ersons belonging to a specific association, group or organization,” “[p]ersons who reside in a reasonably compact and well-defined neighborhood or community,” and “[p]ersons who have a common employer.” The Credit Union limits its membership to specified local government employees. Membership is required before an individual may use any Credit Union services. Carello is not eligible for, nor has he expressed any interest in, Credit Union membership. He is a tester: he visits websites solely to test Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliance, which prohibits places of public accommodation from discriminating “on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of [their] goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations,” and requires them to make “reasonable modifications” to achieve that standard, 42 U.S.C. 12812(a), (b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Carello’s claim. Carello lacked standing to sue because he failed to allege an injury in fact. View "Carello v. Aurora Policeman Credit Union" on Justia Law

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company ("Deutsche Bank"); MERSCORP, Inc., and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (collectively, "MERS"); and CIS Financial Services, Inc. ("CIS"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for permission, pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P., to appeal the trial court's denial of their motions seeking to dismiss the claims of the plaintiffs-- Walker County and Rick Allison, in his official capacity as judge of probate of Walker County (collectively, "plaintiffs")--seeking class-based relief on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated Alabama counties and judges of probate. At issue was a particular aspect of the mortgage-securitization process. Deutsche Bank served as trustee for numerous residential mortgage-backed security ("RMBS") trusts containing mortgages for properties located in Walker County and other Alabama counties. In this case, plaintiffs initiated the underlying litigation against Deutsche Bank "seeking to recover the benefit [Deutsche Bank allegedly] received by relying on the real property recording systems of the Counties without compensating the Counties for that benefit." Plaintiffs alleged that Alabama law requires mortgage assignments to be recorded; therefore, they maintained, the MERS system used by Deutsche Bank avoided the proper recording of mortgage assignments, along with the payment of the requisite filing fees, and has resulted in lost income to county governments. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded: “We see no intent in the Code section to embrace a mandatory rule that all conveyances, which would include not only real-property conveyances but also apparently all conveyances of personal property, are required to be recorded in the probate court. Instead, 35-4-50 simply states that the probate court is where conveyances that are required by law to be filed must be filed. Section 35-4-51, in turn, is the Code section that provides for the recording of conveyances generally, and it places a duty on only the probate court to accept those filings. The arguments before us demonstrate no legal duty to record mortgage assignments.” View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee of any specific residential mortgage-backed security" on Justia Law