Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's complaint for relief in the nature of mandamus and for extraordinary relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying relief.On March 31, 2017, judgment entered against Petitioner in the underlying superior court case. Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the judgment. After the motion to vacate was denied Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to recuse. Both motions were denied. Petitioner then filed her complaint for relief in the nature of mandamus and for extraordinary relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that where Petitioner had an adequate alternative avenue to obtain the relief sought - an appeal to the Appeals Court - and chose not to pursue that avenue, Petitioner was not entitled to invoke the extraordinary relief set forth in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. View "Harrington v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co." on Justia Law

Pentagon Federal Credit Union ("PenFed") appealed a circuit court judgment entered in favor of Susan McMahan. McMahan and her husband purchased property in Loxley, Alabama in 2005. The purchase mortgage was provided by Wells Fargo bank, and a second mortgage was granted in favor of PenFed. In pertinent part, the PenFed mortgage stated "At no time shall this mortgage, not including sums advanced to protect the security of this mortgage, exceed $55,000.00. ... [PenFed] shall be subrogated to the rights of the holder of any previous lien, security interest, or encumbrance discharged with funds advanced by [PenFed] regardless of whether these liens, security interests or other encumbrances have been released of record." In 2014, the McMahans filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection, listing both the Wells Fargo and PenFed mortgages. Both Wells Fargo and PenFed ultimately foreclosed on the mortgages. The McMahans' bankruptcy case was dismissed in late 2015. The Wells Fargo debt/lien and the PenFed debt were not discharged in the bankruptcy proceedings. PenFed filed suit against Wells Fargo to quiet title as the first lien holder to the McMahan property by virtue of the PenFed mortgage, the foreclosure deed, and the erroneous legal description in the Wells Fargo mortgage. PenFed did not notify or make McMahan a party to that lawsuit. That lawsuit was never tried to conclusion but was settled, and PenFed paid Wells Fargo $91,256.54 to satisfy the [Wells Fargo] note and in exchange for a cancellation and release of the Wells Fargo mortgage. PenFed did not acquire the right to enforce the Wells Fargo note and/or mortgage. Within one year of the foreclosure, PenFed sold the property, leaving the McMahans with a deficiency balance of $14,433.41. PenFed's calculation of the post-foreclosure-sale surplus proceeds excluded the $91,256.54 that PenFed paid to Wells Fargo to satisfy the Wells Fargo note and cancel the Wells Fargo mortgage. In 2018, McMahan sued PenFed, alleging PenFed's sale of the property to third-party purchasers created excess proceeds greater than what PenFed was entitled to received under the original note. The circuit court concluded PenFed could not exclude the surplus proceeds it paid to Wells Fargo to settle the Wells Fargo mortgage. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred in characterizing the doctrine of unjust enrichment as an affirmative defense. Accordingly, PenFed did not waive the defense of unjust enrichment by failing to plead it in its responsive pleadings. Instead, PenFed raised the argument to the circuit court at trial and in its trial brief; the argument was properly before the circuit court. Judgment was reversed for further consideration of the merits of PenFed's unjust-enrichment argument. View "Pentagon Federal Credit Union v. McMahan" on Justia Law

Brad Dupree sued PeoplesSouth Bank ("PeoplesSouth"), alleging that PeoplesSouth wrongfully gave the proceeds of a $100,000 certificate of deposit to his father, not him. Jimmy Dupree was Brad's father. In 1993, Jimmy opened the CD at issue here; it was issued in both Brad's and Jimmie's names. Handwritten edits on the CD later reversed the order of the names to "Jimmy Dupree and Brad Dupree" and also replaced Brad's taxpayer ID number with Jimmy's taxpayer ID number. A handwritten note, dated December 1993 on the back of the CD stated "changed order of names to report interest under Jimmy's SS#." No evidence was offered as to who made the handwritten changes, and they were not initialed by either Jimmy or Brad. Brad was a minor at the time the CD was issued and did not contribute any money to the purchase of the CD. In November 2010, before filing this case, Brad, his mother, and his stepbrother sued Jimmy alleging Jimmy had wrongfully converted certain personal property, including the CD. In 2012, while the 2010 action was pending, Jimmy cashed the CD without notifying Brad. PeoplesSouth issued a cashier's check payable to the order of "Jimmy Dupree or Brad Dupree" for the amount of the CD less amounts set off by PeoplesSouth related to Jimmy's business loan. Jimmy cashed the check and then spent the funds. Brad learned during mediation of the 2010 action that Jimmy had cashed in the CD and was advised by the mediator to sue PeoplesSouth. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the bank. Brad appealed, arguing he should have won on his breach-of-contract claim and awarded $100,000 in damages. The Alabama Supreme Court determined that without any rights in the CD by virtue of an inter vivos gift, Brad could not show he was damaged by PeoplesSouth's alleged nonperformance, and he was therefore unable to prevail on his breach-of-contract claim. Judgment in favor of the bank was affirmed. View "Brad Dupree v. PeoplesSouth Bank" on Justia Law

In 2000, the Fasslers obtained a Wells Fargo (WF) home equity line of credit (HELOC), secured by a deed of trust (DOT). In 2003, they secured a $530,000 World Savings home loan, then obtained another WF HELOC. In 2004, they refinanced, using a $682,500 Countrywide Loan (secured by a DOT) to pay off World Savings and eliminate the HELOC balances. WF never issued any reconveyance of its DOTs. In 2005-2008, the Fasslers drew upon both HELOCs; as of 2016, the outstanding balances totaled over $224,000. In 2007, they refinanced the Countrywide Loan with a $1 million WaMu loan They defaulted. WaMu foreclosed. In 2008, LaSalle obtained title at a nonjudicial foreclosure auction. The following month, WF recorded a notice of default and election to sell under its DOT. The Huangs purchased the property from LaSalle in February 2009. In August 2009, WF recorded its notice of trustee’s sale. The Huangs received the notice when it was posted on their door.The Huangs' suit to quiet title was rejected as time-barred because, more than three years before they filed suit, they were aware of a recorded notice of trustee’s sale. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the notice of sale did not disturb or otherwise interfere with the Huangs’ possession sufficiently to start the running of the limitations period. After receiving the notice of sale, the Huangs provided it to their title insurer. The trustee’s sale did not take place as scheduled; the Huangs heard nothing substantive about the matter for years, while they continuously lived in the home. View "Huang v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The National Credit Union Administration Board ("NCUAB"), the self-appointed conservator of Citizens Community Credit Union ("Citizens"), repudiated a letter of credit Citizens issued to Granite Re, Inc. Granite filed a complaint for damages against the NCUAB, claiming wrongful repudiation and wrongful dishonor of a letter of credit. The NCUAB moved to dismiss with prejudice, arguing 12 U.S.C. 1787(c) authorized it to repudiate the letter of credit with no liability for damages, and section 1787(c) preempted conflicting North Dakota Law. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The Eighth Circuit determined that were it to adopt the NCUAB's construction of section 1787(c), the NCUAB could "quietly appoint itself conservator and repudiate letters of credit with no liability to the injured beneficiary. Absent the ability to predict an impending conservatorship, a clean letter-of-credit beneficiary like Granite is subject to repudiation with no recourse." The Court determined NCUAB's construction was inconsistent with the language of the statue, which provided a limited remedy for damages determinable at the point of conservatorship, but did not negate recovery entirely. The Court also determined it was premature to declare section 1787(c) preempted North Dakota law. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Granite Re, Inc. v. Nat'l Credit Union Adm. Board" on Justia Law

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company sought to appeal a circuit court order in a foreclosure action it brought against Dortha and Randy Karr. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the order appealed from was not a final judgment, thus it dismissed the Bank's appeal. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Karr" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Robert Weimer, Jr., purchased real property in Carnelian Bay in 1993. He refinanced the mortgage in 2006 with a loan from defendant Bank of America, N.A. (BANA). After defaulting, plaintiff entered into a loan modification process with BANA. Subsequently, loan servicing was transferred, successively, to defendants Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (SLS) and Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (Nationstar). According to plaintiff, BANA, SLS, and Nationstar successively each engaged in deliberate and negligent misconduct in the loan modification process. In 2014, BANA transferred beneficial interest in the loan to defendant U.S. Bank, N. A. (U.S. Bank), as trustee for the Certificateholders of Banc of America Funding Corporation Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2007-7. Eventually, Nationstar, acting as U.S. Bank’s agent, recorded a notice of trustee’s sale and had an agent enter onto the property and change the locks. After plaintiff commenced this action, BANA, U.S. Bank, and Nationstar demurred to a first amended complaint. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend as to BANA, concluding that the action against it was time-barred. As to the other defendants, the court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend. Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, asserting intentional and negligent misrepresentation, negligence, trespass to land, seeking declaratory relief, and asserting violations of the unfair competition law. U.S. Bank and Nationstar demurred, SLS separately demurred, and the trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend. On appeal, plaintiff contended the trial court erred in concluding that the action against BANA was time-barred because BANA’s actions were part of a civil conspiracy with the other defendants, and the timeliness of plaintiff’s action against BANA must be measured from the last overt act. Plaintiff further asserted the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrers to the second amended complaint because he sufficiently stated each cause of action. Furthermore, plaintiff asserted the trial court should have granted him leave to amend, however, he largely contended his complaint required no amendment. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded that the action as asserted against BANA was indeed time-barred. The Court further concluded plaintiff sufficiently stated causes of action sounding in intentional and negligent misrepresentation and violations of the unfair competition law against the remaining defendants. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court concluded the remaining defendants had a duty of care and that plaintiff sufficiently stated a cause of action for negligence against them. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgments of dismissal as to U.S. Bank, SLS, and Nationstar and reversed the orders sustaining the demurrers as to the causes of action in the second amended complaint for intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and violations of the unfair competition law. In all other respects, the judgments were affirmed. View "Weimer v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellants Jerry and JoCarol Losee appeal the district court’s decision granting Deutsche Bank National Trust Company’s motion for summary judgment, arguing the district court erred by refusing to consider their “Chain of Title Analysis” as inadmissible hearsay. The Losees also argue the district court erred in failing to rule on two of their claims against Deutsche Bank. In 2009, the Losees became delinquent in their mortgage payments, eventually defaulting on their home mortgage loan. Over two years after the foreclosure sale was supposed to take place, a second notice of default was recorded on April 20, 2014. However, the foreclosure sale was postponed when the Losees requested a loss mitigation review. The owner of the loan would not allow loan modification, so the Losees were advised that a short sale of the property was the only loss mitigation available. On August 17, 2015, this case commenced when the Losees, acting pro se, filed their “Original Petition for Breach of Contract, Slander of Title for Declaratory Judgment and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Application for Temporary Injunction” (“Complaint”) with the district court. In 2017, the Losees submitted a “Notice of Filing for Judicial Review,” to which they attached a “Chain of Title Analysis.” The “Chain of Title Analysis” was a report resulting from a mortgage fraud investigation conducted by a private investigation company they hired. The district court granted the Bank's motion for summary judgment, concluding there was no breach of the Deed of Trust, title to the property had not been slandered or become clouded by assignment, and that the Chain of Title Analysis was inadmissible hearsay not appropriate for consideration by the court on summary judgment. The Idaho Supreme Court found no reversible error in the district court's grant of summary judgment and affirmed. View "Losee v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust" on Justia Law

Patricia Devine sued to invalidate a foreclosure sale that divested her interest in a property located in Elberta, Alabama. The trial court explained that the foreclosure was lawful and that Devine's lawsuit was, in any event, barred by the statute of limitations and precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. Devine insisted on appeal that the foreclosure was illegal and therefore void, but the Alabama Supreme Court found she failed to address the trial court's application of the statute of limitations and the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court was therefore affirmed. View "Devine v. Bank of New York Mellon Company" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the 2007-2009 financial crisis and recession. In 2005 and 2007, Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle purchased for residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) from investment bank Credit Suisse. Federal Home Loan also bought certificates from Barclays Bank. In 2009, Federal Home Loan separately brought suit under the Securities Act against Credit Suisse and Barclays. Federal Home Loan alleged Credit Suisse and Barclays each had made untrue or misleading statements relating to the certificates it purchased. n each case, the investment banks moved for summary judgment, which was granted. Federal Home Loan sought review of each case, arguing that reliance on the statements wasn't an element under the Act. The Washington Supreme Court concurred and concluded a plaintiff need not prove reliance under the Act. the Court of Appeals was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Fed. Home Loan Bank of Seattle v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC" on Justia Law