Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Banking
by
Markisha Lattimore obtained a judgment exceeding $20 million against Kim Brothers Kickin’ Kids, LLC. Instead of collecting directly from Kickin’ Kids, Lattimore initiated garnishment actions against twelve financial services companies, including RBC Global Asset Management (U.S.), Inc. (Global), using a garnishment summons form for financial institutions. Global, a registered investment advisor, did not respond to the summons, leading Lattimore to move for a garnishment default judgment for the full amount. Global claimed it did not receive the motion and did not respond. The State Court of Fulton County entered a default judgment against Global.The State Court of Fulton County denied Global’s motion to set aside the default judgment. The court ruled that Global was a financial institution, that Lattimore used the correct summons form, and that Global waived any defect in the form used. Global argued that it was not a financial institution as defined by the statute and that the incorrect summons form invalidated the garnishment action, thus failing to establish personal jurisdiction. The court also ruled that Global could not challenge the constitutionality of the default judgment in its motion to set aside.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and reversed the lower court’s decision. The court held that Global, as a registered investment advisor, did not meet the statutory definition of a financial institution. Therefore, Lattimore used the wrong summons form, rendering the garnishment invalid and failing to obtain personal jurisdiction over Global. The court concluded that the State Court of Fulton County abused its discretion in denying Global’s motion to set aside the default judgment. The judgment was reversed. View "RBC GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT (U.S.) INC. v. LATTIMORE" on Justia Law

by
Kevin and Gretchen Higdon, residents of Missouri, opened a joint bank account in Missouri, which was later held by Equity Bank. M & I Marshall & Ilsley Bank obtained a judgment against Kevin in Missouri and sought to garnish the Higdons' account in Kansas to satisfy the judgment. The account was listed as "Joint (Right of Survivorship)" under Missouri law, which presumes a tenancy by the entirety for married couples, meaning the account could not be garnished for a judgment against only one spouse.The Johnson County District Court in Kansas denied the Higdons' motion to quash the garnishment, applying Kansas law, which does not recognize tenancy by the entirety. The court held that the account was a joint tenancy, allowing M & I Bank to garnish Kevin's half of the account. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, focusing on the procedural nature of garnishment under Kansas law.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the issue of account ownership was substantive, not procedural. The court applied the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws, which directs that the law of the state where the property interest was created (Missouri) should govern. Under Missouri law, the account was held as a tenancy by the entirety, and thus, M & I Bank could not garnish it for a judgment against Kevin alone.The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the case with directions to return the garnished funds to the Higdons, holding that Missouri law applied to the ownership of the account, preventing the garnishment. View "M & I Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Higdon" on Justia Law

by
A former employee of Credit Suisse, John Doe, filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) alleging that the bank failed to disclose ongoing criminal conduct to the United States, thereby avoiding additional penalties. This followed Credit Suisse's 2014 guilty plea to conspiracy charges for aiding U.S. taxpayers in filing false tax returns, which included a $1.3 billion fine. Doe claimed that Credit Suisse continued its illegal activities post-plea, thus defrauding the government.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted the government's motion to dismiss the case. The government argued that Doe's allegations did not state a valid claim under the FCA and that continuing the litigation would strain resources and interfere with ongoing obligations under the plea agreement. The district court dismissed the action without holding an in-person hearing, relying instead on written submissions from both parties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the "hearing" requirement under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) of the FCA can be satisfied through written submissions and does not necessitate a formal, in-person hearing. The court found that Doe did not present a colorable claim that his constitutional rights were violated by the dismissal. The court emphasized that the government has broad discretion to dismiss qui tam actions and that the district court properly considered the government's valid reasons for dismissal, including resource conservation and the protection of privileged information. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court's dismissal was appropriate and affirmed the judgment. View "United States ex rel. Doe v. Credit Suisse AG" on Justia Law

by
Juan Jose Paramo, the defendant-appellant, is involved in a legal dispute with Banco Mercantil de Norte, S.A. and Arrendadora y Factor Banorte, S.A. de C.V. (the Banorte Parties). The Banorte Parties allege that Paramo committed large-scale fraud in Mexico and fled to the United States. They are pursuing a civil lawsuit in Mexico and sought discovery in the U.S. under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to locate and seize Paramo’s assets. The Banorte Parties filed an ex parte request for discovery assistance, which the district court granted, authorizing subpoenas for Paramo and two other individuals.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted the Banorte Parties' petition and authorized the subpoenas. Paramo filed a motion to quash the subpoenas, arguing that the discovery request was overly broad and that the Intel factors favored him. The district court denied Paramo’s motion in a brief order without waiting for his reply or holding a hearing. Paramo appealed the decision, arguing that the district court failed to provide reasoning for its denial and violated local rules by not allowing him to file a reply.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to provide any reasoning for its decision to deny Paramo’s motion to quash. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that district courts must explain their decisions when granting or denying motions to quash § 1782 subpoenas to allow for effective appellate review. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to provide a reasoned decision. The court did not address the substantive arguments regarding the Intel factors or the scope of the discovery request. View "Banco Mercantil de Norte, S.A. v. Paramo" on Justia Law

by
In 2019, Tamika Miller filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Citibank, alleging that the bank violated 2015 consent orders by hiding failures in its management of third-party risks to avoid paying regulatory fines. Miller claimed that Citibank altered audit reports to downplay compliance violations, thereby avoiding penalties. The United States declined to intervene in June 2020. In October 2020, Citibank entered into a new consent order with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and paid a $400 million civil penalty. Miller sought a share of this penalty, arguing it was an alternate remedy for her qui tam claim.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted Citibank's motion to dismiss Miller's complaint for failure to state a claim and denied her motion for a share of the $400 million penalty. The court found that Miller failed to allege an "obligation" to pay the government as required by the FCA and did not meet the particularity requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The court also denied Miller's request for leave to amend her complaint, concluding that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Miller failed to state a reverse false claim because she did not allege an established duty for Citibank to pay the government. The court also found that Miller's complaint did not meet the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) as it failed to identify specific false statements or reports. Consequently, Miller was not entitled to a share of the $400 million penalty, and the district court did not err in denying her leave to amend her complaint. View "Miller v. United States, Citibank, N.A." on Justia Law

by
Dr. Igor DeCastro, a neurosurgeon, worked at the Hot Springs Neurosurgery Clinic for seven years. He claimed that after his initial 18-month salary period, he was supposed to receive compensation based on the net proceeds of his production, less 33% of the clinic's overhead. However, he alleged that he never received more than his base salary because Dr. James Arthur, the clinic's owner, diverted the funds into a "secret account." DeCastro also sued Bank OZK, where the account was held, leading the bank to request the court to determine the rightful owner of the funds.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas dismissed DeCastro's amended complaint for failing to include essential facts, such as specific amounts received, production details, and overhead costs. The court also disbursed the funds to Arthur and denied DeCastro's motions for reconsideration, discovery, and leave to file a second amended complaint. DeCastro's subsequent attempts to revive the case, including a counterclaim in an unrelated contribution action, were dismissed based on res judicata.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that DeCastro's amended complaint lacked sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim for relief. The court noted that the complaint was filled with legal conclusions rather than specific facts about the alleged breach. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of DeCastro's post-dismissal motions, as the employment agreement he later produced did not support his original claims. The court also upheld the dismissal of DeCastro's counterclaim based on res judicata, as it was identical to the previously adjudicated claims. View "DeCastro v. Arthur" on Justia Law

by
A mortgage company, Approved Mortgage Corporation, initiated two wire transfers, but the instructions for the transactions were altered by a third party. The funds were transferred to Truist Bank, which deposited the funds into an account it had previously flagged as suspicious. The funds were then withdrawn in the form of cashier’s checks. Approved Mortgage sued Truist, seeking damages in the amount of the transfers. The company asserted two claims under the Indiana Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which governs the rights, duties, and liabilities of banks and their customers with respect to electronic funds transfers, and a common law negligence claim.The district court dismissed the UCC claims due to lack of privity between Approved Mortgage and Truist, and dismissed the negligence claim as preempted by the UCC. The court held that the UCC does not establish an independent remedy and must be read with another section of the UCC, which entitles a sender to a refund only from the bank which received its payment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the UCC claims, agreeing with the lower court that the UCC does not establish an independent remedy and must be read with another section of the UCC. However, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of the negligence claim, holding that to the extent the negligence claim arises from Truist’s issuance of the cashier’s checks after Truist credited the funds to the suspicious account, the claim is not preempted by the UCC. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Approved Mortgage Corporation v. Truist Bank" on Justia Law

by
The case revolves around a dispute between Treslong Dairy, LLC, First Merchants Bank, the Earl Goodwine Trust, and Jeffrey and Kathie Foster. Treslong Dairy had executed promissory notes with all parties, granting them security interests in various properties. After Treslong defaulted on its note with the Bank, the Bank sued to collect its debt. The Trust and the Fosters (collectively “Farmers”) intervened in the action. When Treslong failed to sell its property, the Bank sought final judgment on its unpaid balance. The Bank sold the haylage and corn silage for $230,000, which was insufficient to satisfy the full judgment. As junior lienholders, the Farmers received no proceeds from the sale. The Farmers then sued the Bank for money damages, claiming that the sale was not conducted in a commercially reasonable manner.The trial court granted the Bank's motion to dismiss the Farmers' case under Rule 41(E), which allows for dismissal of a civil case for a party's failure to move the case along. The Farmers appealed, arguing that the Bank's motion was untimely for Rule 41(E) purposes. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision as to Rule 41(E) but affirmed based on laches.The Indiana Supreme Court agreed with the Farmers. It held that the Bank's motion for dismissal under Rule 41(E) was untimely because it was filed after the Farmers had resumed prosecution by requesting a case-management conference. Therefore, the case could not be dismissed under that rule. The court also rejected the Bank's alternative argument that the equitable doctrine of laches applied. The court reversed the lower court's dismissal order and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Foster v. First Merchants Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

by
The case involves a dispute over a foreclosure judgment. The plaintiff, Susanne P. Wahba, had a loan secured by a mortgage on her property. The defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., acquired the loan and later counterclaimed to foreclose the mortgage. The trial court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed, but the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment and remanded the case for the setting of new law days. On remand, the plaintiff objected to the defendant's motion to reset the law days, arguing that the judgment of strict foreclosure did not account for the substantial increase in property values that had occurred during the appeal. The trial court concluded that it had no authority to revisit the merits of the strict foreclosure judgment, as it was bound by the Appellate Court’s rescript order requiring the setting of new law days. The plaintiff then filed a second appeal with the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's decision.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata from entertaining the plaintiff’s request to modify the judgment of strict foreclosure and order a foreclosure by sale. The court also held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court lacked authority to entertain the plaintiff’s request. The court further held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the plaintiff was required to file a motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure and to present evidence that the value of the subject property had substantially increased since the date of the original judgment before the trial court could exercise that authority. The judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Wahba v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

by
The case involves plaintiffs Ronnie and Sharon Llanes and Michael and Lauren Codie (collectively, Borrowers) who purchased homes with mortgages from Bank of America, N.A. (Lender). After the Borrowers defaulted on their mortgages, the properties were foreclosed upon and sold in nonjudicial foreclosure sales. The Borrowers then sued the Lender for wrongful foreclosure, alleging that the Lender's foreclosures did not comply with Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 667-5 (2008) (since repealed).The case was initially heard in the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit, where the Lender moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Borrowers did not prove damages. The circuit court denied the motion due to factual disputes and lack of clarity in existing law. However, after the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i issued its decision in Lima v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., the Lender renewed its summary judgment motion, arguing that under Lima, the Borrowers’ claims failed as a matter of law because they did not provide evidence of damages that accounted for their pre-foreclosure mortgage debts. The circuit court granted the Lender's renewed motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Borrowers had not proven their damages after accounting for their debts under Lima.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i, the Borrowers argued that the circuit court erred by concluding that they bore the burden of proving their damages and did not meet that burden. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision, holding that outstanding debt may not be counted as damages in wrongful foreclosure cases. The court concluded that the Borrowers did not prove the damages element of their wrongful foreclosure claims, and therefore, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to the Lender. View "Llanes v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law