Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Defendants, Nikolaos Pappas and Ascend Medical, Inc. (Ascend), appealed multiple orders of the Superior Court ruling that they misappropriated trade secrets of plaintiff Vention Medical Advanced Components, Inc. d/b/a Advanced Polymers, a Vention Medical Company (Vention), in violation of the New Hampshire Uniform Trade Secrets Act, RSA chapter 350-B (2009) (UTSA). Vention cross-appealed the trial court’s denial of its request for attorney’s fees. Vention is a medical components manufacturer in the medical device industry. Vention makes medical balloons, medical tubing, and heat shrink tubing (HST). Pappas began working at Vention after he graduated from the University of Massachusetts Lowell with a bachelor of science degree in plastics engineering and a master’s degree in innovative and technological entrepreneurship. Prior to working at Vention, Pappas had neither specifically studied HST nor had any experience working with HST. In December 2013, after working for Vention for about ten years, Pappas resigned from the company. During his employment, Pappas was exposed to Vention’s confidential HST technology and information. He also had knowledge of Vention’s business and marketing information and strategies, including the sales volumes for Vention’s various products. At the time he resigned, he was serving as the engineering manager of the HST department. At some point before Pappas resigned, he consulted with an attorney about his obligations under the confidentiality agreement. Almost immediately after leaving Vention, Pappas established Ascend. In late December 2013 and January 2014, the defendants began working with a website developer, communicated with one equipment vendor, and provided an initial machine design to a second equipment vendor. This design included extensive detail and critical specifications of the equipment they wanted built. By August 2014, the defendants began actively marketing HST. After the defendants launched their HST line, Vention requested information about the products. The defendants sent Vention samples of their HST in August and September 2014. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found the trial court determined that the defendants neither willfully and maliciously misappropriated Vention’s trade secrets nor made a bad-faith claim of misappropriation, and there was support in the record for these determinations. Based upon its review of Vention’s arguments and the record, the Supreme Court could not say it was “clearly untenable” or “clearly unreasonable” for the trial court to decline to award fees for bad faith litigation. Accordingly, the Court found no reversible error and affirmed the Superior Court. View "Vention Medical Advanced Components, Inc. v. Pappas" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on whether records containing trade secrets were categorically excluded from public disclosure under the Public Records Act (PRA), ch. 42.56 RCW. Respondents Lyft Inc. and Rasier LLC operated car-hailing or "transportation networking companies" (TNC) in several locations, including the city of Seattle (City). After the City passed a 2014 ordinance that limited the number of TNC drivers active at any given time, Lyft and Rasier (collectively L/R) organized a coalition to overturn the ordinance through a voter referendum. In response to mediation among the City, L/R, and taxi and for-hire stakeholders in the ground transportation industry, the referendum proposal was withdrawn. The parties agreed that L/R would submit quarterly standardized reports to the City that include the total number of rides, the percentage of rides completed in each zip code, pick-up and drop-off zip codes, the percentage of rides requested but unfulfilled, collision data, and the number of requested rides for accessible vehicles. In response to L/R concerns regarding data confidentiality, a mediation provision stated that "'[t]he city will work to achieve the highest possible level of confidentiality for information provided within the confines of state law.'' In January 2016, appellant Jeff Kirk, a resident of Texas, submitted a PRA request to the City seeking L/R reports for the final two quarters of 2015. Specifically, Kirk sought release of records submitted by L/R to the City as required by SMC 6.310.540, including the percentage and number of rides picked up in each zip code, and the pick-up and drop-off zip codes of each ride. L/R insisted their quarterly zip code reports to the City consisted of trade secrets protected under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA). The Washington Supreme Court held those records were not categorically excluded from disclosure: applying the injunction standard set forth in RCW 42.56.540, such records may be enjoined from disclosure only if disclosure would clearly not be in the public interest, and would substantially and irreparably damage a person or a vital government interest. The superior court erred by applying the general injunction standard of Civil Rule (CR) 65, and by not adequately considering the PRA's more stringent standard. View "Lyft, Inc. v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of South Carolina law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Sarah Hartsock was killed in an automobile crash on Interstate 26 in Calhoun County, South Carolina. Her personal representative, Theodore Hartsock, Jr., brought a survival and wrongful death action asserting claims under South Carolina law for negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. Hartsock alleged that the vehicle in which Mrs. Hartsock was riding was struck head-on by another vehicle. That vehicle had crossed the median after suffering a blowout of an allegedly defective tire that Goodyear Dunlop Tires North America Ltd. and Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company [collectively "Goodyear"] designed, manufactured, and marketed. The federal court had subject-matter jurisdiction based upon complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and damages alleged to be greater than $75,000. During pretrial discovery a dispute arose between the parties over certain Goodyear material relating to the design and chemical composition of the allegedly defective tire. Goodyear objected to producing this material, asserting that it constituted trade secrets. The district court eventually found, and Hartsock did not dispute, that the material did, in fact, constitute trade secrets. However, the court ordered Goodyear to produce the material subject to a confidentiality order. In doing so, the court applied federal discovery standards, rejecting Goodyear's contention that South Carolina trade secret law applied. The federal appellate court asked the South Carolina Supreme Court whether South Carolina recognized an evidentiary privilege for trade secrets. The South Carolina Court responded yes, but that it was a qualified privilege. View "Hartsock v. Goodyear" on Justia Law

Google agreed with competitors, such as Apple, not to initiate contact to recruit each others' employees. In 2010, the Department of Justice filed a civil antitrust action, alleging that the agreements illegally diminished competition for tech employees, denying them job opportunities and suppressing wages. On the same day, the companies entered into a stipulated judgment, admitting no liability but agreeing to an injunction prohibiting the "no cold call" arrangements. Google posted a statement online announcing the settlement and denying any wrongdoing, with a link to a Department of Justice press release, describing the settlement terms. There was widespread media coverage. In 2011, class action lawsuits were filed against the companies by employees who alleged that the cold calling restrictions had caused them wage losses. A consolidated action sought over $3 billion in damages on behalf of more than 100,000 employees. A derivative suit, filed by shareholders in 2014, claimed that the company suffered financial losses resulting from the antitrust and class action suits and that the agreements harmed the company’s reputation and stifled innovation. Based on a three-year statute of limitations, the trial court dismissed. The court of appeal affirmed, finding the suit untimely because plaintiffs should have been aware of the facts giving rise to their claims by at least the time of the Department of Justice antitrust action in 2010. View "Police Retirement System of St. Louis v. Page" on Justia Law

The federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act), 29 U.S.C. 651 et seq., does not preempt unfair competition and consumer protection claims based on workplace safety and health violations when, as in California, there is a state plan approved by the federal Secretary of Labor.The Division of Occupational Safety and Health charged Solus Industrial Innovations, LLC with five violations of state occupational safety and health regulations. The District Attorney of Orange County subsequently filed this action for civil penalties under the state’s unfair competition law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200, and fair advertising law (FAL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17500. The court of appeal concluded that the federal OSH Act preempted the district attorney’s UCL and FAL claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no implied or express preemption of the district attorney’s UCL and FAL claims. View "Solus Industrial Innovations, LLC v. Superior Court of Orange County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed as modified the district court’s order dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff, an attorney, filed a complaint for breach of contract against Defendant. The trial court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint including claims for tortious conversion and a violation of Nebraska’s Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding (1) neither general nor specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant existed; but (2) the district court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice. The court modified the district court’s order to a dismissal without prejudice. View "Nimmer v. Giga Entertainment Media, Inc." on Justia Law

To track accounting, payroll, inventory, sales, parts, service, finance, and insurance, auto dealerships use computerized dealer‐management systems. Some systems use open architecture, under which third parties have some access to dealer‐originated data in the system. Others use closed architecture, under which that type of data scraping is forbidden under the license. One provider, CDK, decided to change from an open system to a closed system. CDK and another provider, Reynolds, entered into agreements to ease the transition, which allowed their subsidiaries (Authenticom’s competitors) continued access to the data. Authenticom, in the business of collecting data from dealer‐management systems and selling or using it for applications, sued under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Because Authenticom’s loss of access to the data was imperiling its survival, it obtained preliminary injunctions. CDK and Reynolds took an interlocutory appeal. The Seventh Circuit vacated the injunctions, which did not focus on the agreements that are the focus of Authenticom’s lawsuit. Instead, they address the measures that the court believed necessary to “extend a lifeline to Authenticom, to maintain its viability until this case is finally decided on the merits.” The court ordered the defendants to enter into a new arrangement with Authenticom, rather than simply barring implementations of the challenged agreement. View "Authenticom, Inc. v. Reynolds and Reynolds Co." on Justia Law

First Western Capital Management (“FWCM”), and its parent company First Western Financial, Inc. (collectively, “First Western”), sought a preliminary injunction against former employee Kenneth Malamed for misappropriating trade secrets. In 2008, FWCM acquired Financial Management Advisors, LLC (“FMA”), an investment firm Malamed founded in 1985 primarily to serve high net worth individuals and entities such as trusts and foundations. After selling FMA, Malamed worked for FWCM from 2008 until FWCM terminated him on September 1, 2016. In early 2016, a committee of FWCM directors began discussing the possibility of selling FWCM to another company. Although Malamed was not involved in these discussions, he learned about the potential sale and, in a meeting with other FWCM officers, expressed his displeasure with the buyer under consideration. Following the meeting, Malamed emailed his assistant asking her to print three copies of his client book, which contained the names and contact information for approximately 5,000 FWCM contacts. Of these contacts, 331 were current FWCM clients and roughly half of those had been clients of FMA before First Western acquired it. The printout also contained spreadsheets that included, among other information, client names, the total market value of their holdings under management, and the fees being charged by FWCM. On September 1, 2016, shortly after Malamed’s employment contract expired, First Western fired him. That same day, First Western served him with a complaint it had filed in federal court a month earlier, alleging misappropriation of trade secrets under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (“DTSA”), and the Colorado Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“CUTSA”), breach of employment contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. First Western moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to prevent Malamed from soliciting FWCM’s clients. The district court excused First Western from demonstrating irreparable harm (one of the four elements a party seeking injunctive relief is typically required to prove) and granted the injunction. As applied here, the Tenth Circuit determined that if First Western could not show irreparable harm, it cannot obtain injunctive relief. The district court should not have entered the preliminary injunction here. View "First Western Capital v. Malamed" on Justia Law

Cox Cable subscribers cannot access premium cable services unless they also rent a set-top box from Cox. A class of plaintiffs in Oklahoma City sued Cox under antitrust laws, alleging Cox had illegally tied cable services to set-top-box rentals in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits illegal restraints of trade. Though a jury found that Plaintiffs had proved the necessary elements to establish a tying arrangement, the district court disagreed. In granting Cox’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) motion, the court determined that Plaintiffs had offered insufficient evidence for a jury to find that Cox’s tying arrangement "foreclosed a substantial volume of commerce in Oklahoma City to other sellers or potential sellers of set-top boxes in the market for set- top boxes." After careful consideration, the Tenth Circuit ultimately agreed with the district court and affirmed. View "Healy v. Cox Communications" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit joined the Fourth and Sixth Circuits in holding that the collateral-order doctrine does not allow an immediate appeal of an order denying a dismissal motion based on state-action immunity. In this case, SolarCity filed a federal antitrust suit against the Power District, alleging that the Power District had attempted to entrench its monopoly by setting prices that disfavored solar power providers. The district court denied Power District's motion to dismiss the complaint based on the state-action immunity doctrine. Accordingly, the panel dismissed the interlocutory appeal based on lack of jurisdiction. View "SolarCity Corp. v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District" on Justia Law