Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff worked as a longshoreman as early as 1998 and worked regularly for Cooper from 2008 through the date of his injury on June 22, 2018, never going more than a week and a half without working. He performed various jobs including operating a front-end loader and track hoe, flagging cranes, and loading barges. Employer classified Plaintiff as a non-assigned employee, meaning he was not assigned to a specific vessel. Employer has other employees who are assigned to vessels.Plaintiff was hurt when he fell to the deck of a ship he was working on. He filed suit against Employer in federal district court in November 2020, alleging that he was a seaman and a member of the crew, and bringing claims of Jones Act negligence, failure to pay maintenance and cure, and unseaworthiness. In the alternative, Plaintiff alleged that if he was not a seaman and was covered by the LHWCA.The District Court found Plaintiff failed to cite evidence that showed a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was a seaman and, alternatively, as to vessel negligence.The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Plaintiff did not have a connection to the ship he was working on at the time he was injured, and that he could not establish vessel negligence. View "Johnson v. Cooper T. Smith Stevedoring" on Justia Law

Deltech Corp. (“Deltech”), a chemical manufacturer, joins here with Stolt-Nielsen USA, Inc., and Stolt Tank Containers B.V. (together, “Stolt”), a shipping concern, to challenge the district court’s determination that they alone bear liability for damages caused by an explosion and fire that took place in June 2012 aboard the ocean-going vessel M/V MSC Flaminia. In the first phase of a three-part proceeding, the district court addressed the causes of the explosion. It determined that the decision to ship DVB-80 from New Orleans Terminal rather than a northeastern port, the early filling of the DVB-80 containers and their early transport to New Orleans Terminal, the conditions in which the tanks of DVB-80 were kept at New Orleans Terminal, and their placement and stowage onboard the Flaminia were the primary causes of the explosion. It exculpated other parties to the shipping transaction from legal liability. It is this decision that Deltech and Stolt challenge now in an interlocutory appeal.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court reversed the district court’s determination that Deltech and Stolt are strictly liable under Section 4(6) of the Carriage of Goods at Sea Act (“COGSA”), but the court affirmed its ruling that Deltech and Stolt are liable under a failure-to-warn theory pursuant to Section 4(3).  As to the other defendants, the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the carrier and related shipowner interests were not negligent in their treatment of the shipment and that New Orleans Terminal too, was not negligent. The court also affirmed the district court’s determination that Stolt has not stated a claim against its subcontractor. View "In re: M/V MSC Flaminia" on Justia Law

17 people were killed a commercial tourism duck boat operating on Table Rock Lake in the Ozarks, sank during a storm. The government charged the captain and the managers of the duck boat company, with felony counts of “seaman’s manslaughter” under 18 U.S.C. Section 1115 and misdemeanor counts of operating a vessel in a grossly negligent manner. The government alleged that the charged offenses occurred on “Table Rock Lake, a navigable water of the United States within the Western District of Missouri and within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States.” The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, adopting a report and recommendation that concluded the prescriptive reaches of Sections 1115 and 2302(b) is defined by admiralty law and do not cover the alleged conduct. The government appealed the dismissal.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a review of the statute’s history leads to the conclusion that the origins of seaman’s manslaughter are in the admiralty jurisdiction of federal courts. Here, the government objected to the district court’s reliance on Edwards as binding precedent regarding the status of Table Rock Lake and argued that the evidence of commercial activity on Table Rock Lake presented, in this case, established that the lake is navigable in fact. However, before deferring to Edwards, the district court reviewed all of the evidence submitted by the parties and found that the nature and frequency of commercial shipping on the lake had not substantially changed since the Edwards decision. Thus, the court wrote that it detects no clear error in the district court’s finding or conclusion. View "United States v. Kenneth McKee" on Justia Law

In 2008, Intervenors-Appellees Caterpillar Financial Services Asia Pte Ltd (“Caterpillar”) and Eksportfinans ASA (“Eksportfinans”) provided a loan to Marfield Limited Incorporated (“Marfield”) for the construction of an offshore construction vessel. To secure payment of this loan, Marfield executed and delivered a First Preferred Naval Mortgage to Eksportfinans and a Second Preferred Naval Mortgage to Caterpillar on December 19, 2008. As further security for outstanding sums owed to Caterpillar, Marfield executed a Third Preferred Naval Mortgage on April 17, 2014, encumbering the vessel. The vessel was flagged in Panama, so all three of those mortgages were submitted to the Panama government.In 2012, Caterpillar and Intervenor-Appellee the Norwegian Government (“Norway”) provided a loan to Shanara Maritime International S.A. (“Shanara”) for the construction of another offshore construction vessel. Once both vessels were complete, there were chartered until early 2014, when the Mexican government seized them. On February 28, 2014, Marfield and Shanara terminated their bareboat charters of the vessels, and the vessels remained in the Mexican government’s custody. Shanara and Marfield could not generate revenue on the vessels and began to fall behind on their loan payments to IntervenorsAppellees Caterpillar, Norway, KFW, and Eksportfinans (collectively, the “Lenders”). Shortly after that, the Mexican government separately seized the vessels in connection with the bankruptcy.Subsequently, the district court entered findings, including that (1) Marfield and Shanara are in default under the loan agreements; and (2) the Lenders’ preferred ship mortgages related to said default outrank Plaintiff's state-created liens arising from PLaintiff's attachment of the vessells under Texas state law. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding no clear error. View "Corporativo Grupo v. Marfield Ltd" on Justia Law

Two years after an unfortunate single-boat accident, one of the boat’s two occupants died as a result of his injuries. The boat in which he was a passenger had struck a warning sign that was totally submerged at the time of the allision between the boat and sign. His estate and survivors sued the companies responsible for the sign in question. The district court granted summary judgment to the Defendants on the ground that the incident occurred on water governed by Louisiana law rather than federal. The parties agreed that if Louisiana law governs, the claims are barred. At issue in this appeal is whether or not the allision occurred in “navigable” waters such that federal law governs   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that navigational servitude relates to actualities – “the waters below the ordinary high-water mark,” “the line of the shore,” and so forth, id. – rather than potentialities. Should the Corps permanently flood the Refuge, the water there would likely be navigable. But as the parties agree that the Corps has not, in fact, permanently flooded the refuge, the water may not be said to be navigable under this theory. Further, the unvegetated channel establishes the ordinary high-water mark of the Bayou; water outside of that channel is not navigable. Moreover, Plaintiffs here failed to present even slight evidence concerning a commercial purpose for the channel in question. Accordingly, the court found that the water in which the allision occurred was not navigable and summary judgment was proper. View "Newbold v. Kinder Morgan SNG Operator" on Justia Law

A yacht owned by Raiders ran aground. Raiders had insured the vessel with GLI, which denied coverage stating the yacht’s fire-extinguishing equipment had not been timely recertified or inspected notwithstanding that the vessel’s damage was not caused by fire. GLI sought a declaratory judgment that Raiders’ alleged failure to recertify or inspect its fire-suppression equipment rendered the policy void from its inception. Raiders responded with five counterclaims, including three extra-contractual counterclaims arising under Pennsylvania law for breach of fiduciary duty, insurance bad faith, and breach of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law.Concluding the policy’s choice-of-law provision mandated the application of New York law and precluded Raiders’ Pennsylvania law-based counterclaims, the district court dismissed those claims. The court rejected Raiders’ argument that applying New York law would contravene Pennsylvania public policy, thereby making the choice-of-law provision unenforceable under Supreme Court precedent (Bremen (1972)), which held that under federal admiralty law a forum-selection provision is unenforceable “if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought.” The Third Circuit vacated. Bremen’s framework extends to the choice-of-law provision at issue; the district court needed to consider whether Pennsylvania has a strong public policy that would be thwarted by applying New York law. View "Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co LLC" on Justia Law

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (“NYK”), incorporated and headquartered in Japan, is a major global logistics company that transports cargo by air and sea. On June 17, 2017, the ACX Crystal, a 730-foot container ship chartered by NYK, collided with the destroyer USS Fitzgerald in Japanese territorial waters. Personal representatives of the seven sailors killed sued NYK in federal court, asserting wrongful death and survival claims under the Death on the High Seas Act.  In both cases, the plaintiffs alleged that NYK, a foreign corporation, is amenable to federal court jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) based on its “substantial, systematic and continuous contacts with the United States as a whole. The district court granted NYK’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Plaintiffs’ invitation to craft an atextual, novel, and unprecedented Fifth Amendment personal jurisdiction standard. The court explained that under the Supreme Court’s reigning test for personal jurisdiction, the district court did not err in absolving NYK from appearing in federal court. The court wrote that general jurisdiction over NYK does not comport with its Fifth Amendment due process rights. NYK is incorporated and headquartered in Japan. As a result, exercising general jurisdiction over NYK would require that its contacts with the United States “be so substantial and of such a nature to render [it] at home” in the United States. Here, NYK’s contacts with the United States comprise only a minor portion of its worldwide contacts. View "Douglass v. Nippon Yusen Kabushiki" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife were passengers on a cruise aboard a ship operated by Defendant. A verbal altercation between Plaintiff and another passenger ensued and while the security officer turned to speak to Plaintiff, the other passenger punched Plaintiff in the face.   Plaintiff alleged that Defendant was negligent because it failed to (a) reasonably and properly train security personnel; (b) have adequate security measures, including adequate security presence and surveillance cameras; (c) warn him of the danger of being physically assaulted while onboard the vessel; (d) promulgate and enforce policies and procedures designed to prevent passengers from physically assaulting other passengers; and (e) exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, ruling that there was no evidence suggesting that Defendant had actual or constructive notice of the risk of harm.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Defendant and denied Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions. The court held that Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether Defendant had actual notice that any passengers would attack him. The court reasoned that in the context of passenger-on-passenger violence, a cruise line has a duty to warn and/or protect when it or its employees reasonably apprehend the danger such that the attack was foreseeable. However, while the presence of a security officer during disembarkation connotes some awareness of the importance of order, a verbal dispute does not provide actual notice that a physical assault is to follow. View "Reinier Fuentes v. Classica Cruise Operator Ltd, Inc." on Justia Law

N&W filed a maritime limitation action in federal district court after Plaintiff was injured on a ship owned by N&W Marine Towing. The district court initially stayed Plaintiff from prosecuting claims against N&W in other forums, however, the court lifted its stay after Plaintiff made certain stipulations.The Fifth Circuit reasoned that under the Limitation of Liability Act, shipowners “may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for limitation of liability.” The Limitation Act allows shipowners to limit their liability for an array of incidents, as long as the incident giving rise to liability occurred without the p knowledge of the owner.Here, after N&W filed its limitation action, three parties filed claims: Wooley, Turn Services, and RCC. However, RCC and N&W settled, and Turn Services assigned its claims to Plaintiff, leaving him as the only remaining claimant. The court found that Plaintiff’s stipulation both recognized the district court’s exclusive jurisdiction over the limitation proceeding and stated that Plaintiff would not seek to enforce a damage award greater than the value of the ship and its freight until the district court had adjudicated the limitation proceeding. Thus, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by lifting the stay and allowing Plaintiff to pursue remedies in other forums. Further, the court found that N&W’s arguments regarding removal are not relevant to the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion by lifting the stay. View "Wooley v. N&W Marine Towing" on Justia Law

Nadella Corporation bought a ship, the MV Falcon Carrier, for scrap from Falcon Carrier Shipping Limited. Unbeknownst to Nadella, the ship was encumbered by a $368,000 debt. To recover that debt, the debt holder “arrested” Nadella’s new ship. Nadella then tried to recover that debt from the ship’s seller Falcon Carrier Shipping. Newbrook Shipping—the owner of those two ships arrested by Nadella—sued Nadella in South Africa and was considering another lawsuit in Nevis. Newbrook applied in Maryland federal court for an ex parte order under Sec. 1782 authorizing discovery from Nadella’s purported parent company, Global Marketing Systems. The district court rejected discovery for the speculative “proceeding” in Nevis but then granted the full application.On appeal, Global Marketing argues that the district court substantively erred in granting the entire application and approving service of process. The court stated that Sec. 1782 identifies four mandatory conditions that must be satisfied before an application can be granted. Here, the last condition, that the evidence sought must be “for use” in a foreign proceeding, is not fully satisfied.The court held that Section 1782 gives litigants access to federal courts to obtain discovery for use in international litigation. But that access is not unlimited. The district court erred by granting the full application when it held the speculative proceeding in Nevis did not provide a basis for Sec. 1782 discovery. The court remanded for the district court to consider Global Marketing’s arguments. View "In re: Application of Newbrook" on Justia Law