Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

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In 2016, the Mississippi legislature passed S.B. 2162, which abolished the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority (JMAA) and created the Jackson Metropolitan Area Airport Authority (Authority). The new Authority would be governed by nine commissioners, with only two selected by the Jackson city government. The JMAA commissioners, along with Jackson’s Mayor and City Council, intervened in a suit to enjoin enforcement of the law, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Mississippi Constitution. They claimed S.B. 2162 diluted the voting rights of Jackson citizens and altered the airport’s management for race-based reasons.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi initially upheld the plaintiffs' standing and ordered discovery, which the legislators resisted, citing legislative privilege. On the first appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing, as they failed to demonstrate injury to a legally protected interest. The case was remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice. Plaintiffs amended their complaint to address the standing issue, and the district court again ordered discovery. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s privilege ruling but later dismissed the appeal as moot when none of the plaintiff-commissioners held their positions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to sue. The court held that the plaintiffs' alleged injuries were institutional rather than personal, as the injury affected the JMAA as an entity. The court also found that the plaintiffs did not have a protected property interest in their positions or the associated per diem and travel reimbursements. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss. View "Jones v. Reeves" on Justia Law

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Bettie Blauser filed an appeal referencing a purported judgment of dismissal, which was actually an unsigned minute order from the final day of a jury trial. The minute order indicated that the court granted a motion for nonsuit regarding the First Amended Complaint and dismissed the First Amended Cross-Complaint without prejudice upon the cross-complainant's request.The Superior Court of Orange County issued the minute order, but it was not labeled as a judgment nor did it purport to enter judgment. The court invited the parties to brief the appealability of the order, raising concerns that the order was not appealable. The appellant was also invited to obtain a judgment of dismissal from the trial court to proceed with the appeal. However, the appellant filed a notice of entry of judgment or order, attaching the same minute order with the trial court's signature and the phrase "it is so ordered" added.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and determined that the signed minute order was still not an appealable judgment. The court emphasized that an appealable order or judgment is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal. The court cited the case Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale, which highlighted the necessity of a document identified as a "judgment" to trigger an appeal. The court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, allowing the appellant to file a notice of appeal from the judgment once it is properly entered by the trial court. The court urged trial courts to enter separate, signed documents clearly labeled as judgments or orders of dismissal to avoid confusion and ensure clarity for parties and attorneys. View "Blauser v. Dubin" on Justia Law

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Carey Dale Grayson, an Alabama prisoner, sought a preliminary injunction to halt his scheduled execution by nitrogen hypoxia, arguing that the method violated the Eighth Amendment due to the risk of conscious suffocation and other potential harms. Grayson proposed alternative methods of execution, including nitrogen gas with sedation and a sequential injection of ketamine followed by fentanyl.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied Grayson's motion, finding that he did not demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim. The court held an evidentiary hearing where expert testimonies were presented. The court found that Grayson's evidence was speculative and did not show that the nitrogen hypoxia protocol created an unacceptable risk of pain. The court also found that the proposed alternatives were not feasible or readily implemented.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction, agreeing that Grayson failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. The court noted that the district court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous and that the nitrogen hypoxia protocol had been successfully used in previous executions without evidence of conscious suffocation or other significant issues. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. View "Grayson v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

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In this case, a fire destroyed the building where Cory Michael Hoehn and his roommate lived. The building’s insurer, California Capital Insurance Company, determined that careless smoking caused the fire and sued Hoehn and his roommate for negligence, seeking damages. The company attempted to serve Hoehn with the complaint and summons, but the service was allegedly improper. A default judgment was entered against Hoehn in April 2011. In January 2020, Hoehn learned of the default judgment when his wages were garnished and promptly moved to set aside the judgment, claiming he was never properly served.The Placer County Superior Court denied Hoehn’s motion, ruling it was time-barred because it was filed more than two years after the default judgment. The court also found no extrinsic fraud or mistake. The Court of Appeal affirmed, relying on precedent that a motion to vacate a judgment for improper service must be made within two years if the judgment is not void on its face.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to determine the validity of the two-year time limit for such motions. The court held that the judicially created rule imposing a two-year limit on motions to vacate void judgments for improper service is not supported by the statute’s text, legislative intent, or sound justification. The court concluded that a motion to vacate a judgment void for lack of proper service under section 473(d) is not subject to a two-year limitation. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Cal. Capital Ins. Co. v. Hoehn" on Justia Law

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Chad Sheller, as the personal representative of the estate of his son Daniel Elias Sheller, sought attorneys' fees after voluntarily dismissing a Vaccine Act petition. Daniel passed away at two months old, two days after receiving several vaccinations. Sheller filed for compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, relying on the "Triple Risk Model" of vaccine-triggered sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) proposed by Dr. Douglas Miller. This model had previously been accepted in another case, Boatmon v. Secretary of Health & Human Services.The Special Master denied Sheller's request for attorneys' fees, concluding that the Triple Risk Model did not provide a reasonable basis for the claim. The United States Court of Federal Claims affirmed this decision. The Special Master also struck certain medical articles from the record, which were submitted after the petition was dismissed, deeming them irrelevant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Special Master abused his discretion by not considering whether the Triple Risk Model was a reasonable basis at the time of filing, given its prior acceptance in the Boatmon case. The court noted that the model was plausible and had succeeded before another special master, making it a reasonable basis for the petition when filed. The court also found that the Special Master did not abuse his discretion in striking the medical articles, as he assessed their relevance appropriately.The Federal Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case for the Special Master to determine, in his discretion, whether attorneys' fees should be granted, considering the Vaccine Act's objective of maintaining access to qualified legal assistance. View "SHELLER v. HHS " on Justia Law

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The case involves a First Amendment challenge to a policy in Caldwell County, Texas, which categorically excludes the press and the public from observing criminal pretrial proceedings known as magistrations. The plaintiffs, two nonprofit news organizations and an advocacy organization, argued that this policy violates their First Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings. The district court agreed, finding the policy unconstitutional and granting a preliminary injunction to prevent its enforcement.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially reviewed the case. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the policy and demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment claim. The court issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining the County from enforcing its policy of closing magistrations to the press and public, except in extraordinary circumstances and as constitutionally permitted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case on appeal. The County argued that the district court erred in finding that the plaintiffs had standing and in determining that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, agreeing that the plaintiffs had standing and that there is a presumptive First Amendment right of access to magistrations. The court applied the "experience and logic" test, finding that both historical practice and the positive role of public access in the functioning of bail hearings supported the plaintiffs' claim. The court concluded that the district court did not err in its determinations and upheld the preliminary injunction. View "Texas Tribune v. Caldwell County" on Justia Law

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Allison Littlefield filed a verified petition against her brothers, Scott and David Littlefield, and her aunt, Denise Sobel, who are co-trustees of The Pony Tracks Ranch Trust. The petition sought their removal as co-trustees, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and the Trust, and requested declaratory and injunctive relief. Allison claimed that the appellants misused Trust funds, concealed information, converted her personal property, restricted her use of the Ranch, and failed to address misconduct by an employee, Stacey Limbada, who allegedly harassed Allison and her husband.The San Mateo County Superior Court denied the appellants' special motion to strike the petition under California's anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that the appellants failed to show that Allison's petition arose from protected activity. The court also denied Allison's request for attorney's fees, finding that the motion was not frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, agreeing that the appellants did not meet their burden of showing that the petition was based on protected activity. The court noted that the appellants' motion failed to identify specific allegations of protected activity and improperly sought to strike the entire petition or all causes of action without distinguishing between protected and unprotected conduct.However, the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of Allison's request for attorney's fees, finding that the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous. The court held that any reasonable attorney would agree that the motion was totally devoid of merit, as it did not demonstrate that the petition sought to impose liability based on protected activity. The case was remanded for a determination of the appropriate award of attorney's fees for Allison. View "Littlefield v. Littlefield" on Justia Law

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The case involves the San Diego City Attorney filing a complaint against Experian Data Corp. for violating the unfair competition law (UCL) by failing to promptly notify consumers of a data breach as required by Civil Code section 1798.82(a). The City Attorney sought civil penalties and injunctive relief. The UCL claim is subject to a four-year statute of limitations, and the key issue is whether the discovery rule can delay the accrual of this non-fraud civil enforcement action.The Superior Court of Orange County initially overruled Experian's demurrer, which argued the complaint was time-barred. The court found the complaint did not show on its face that the UCL claim accrued before March 6, 2014. However, the court later granted Experian's motion in limine to exclude evidence relating to civil penalties, concluding the discovery rule did not apply to the UCL claim because it was a non-fraud claim and an enforcement action seeking civil penalties. The court also denied the City Attorney's motion for reconsideration and motion to file a Third Amended Complaint.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the discovery rule can apply to delay the accrual of the UCL claim. The court found that the nature of the claim, the enforcement action seeking civil penalties, and the involvement of a governmental entity did not preclude the application of the discovery rule. The court noted that the discovery rule has been applied to various types of claims, including those involving civil penalties and enforcement actions by governmental entities.The appellate court reversed the trial court's orders granting Experian's motion in limine and denying reconsideration. The case was remanded for the trial court to reconsider the application of the discovery rule and determine when the UCL claim accrued based on the actual or constructive knowledge of the relevant actors. The trial court was also directed to reconsider the City Attorney's request to file a Third Amended Complaint. View "People v. Experian Data Corp." on Justia Law

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Horace Crump, an inmate at Lakeland Correctional Facility in Michigan, filed a § 1983 lawsuit against several prison employees, alleging they withheld treatment for his multiple sclerosis. The key issue at this stage is whether Crump can proceed with his lawsuit without paying the filing fee upfront, as he sought to proceed in forma pauperis due to his inability to pay.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed Crump's complaint, citing the Prison Litigation Reform Act's three-strikes rule, which disqualifies prisoners from proceeding in forma pauperis if they have had three or more prior actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failing to state a claim. Crump appealed, disputing two of the three strikes counted against him.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and focused on whether Crump's prior dismissals counted as strikes under the Act. The court found that Crump's previous cases, which included dismissals for failure to state a claim and decisions not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, did not count as strikes. The court reasoned that the Act's language refers to entire actions being dismissed on specific grounds, not individual claims. Additionally, dismissals based on Eleventh Amendment immunity do not count as strikes under the Act.The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing Crump's lawsuit to proceed without the upfront payment of the filing fee. View "Crump v. Blue" on Justia Law

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Tremonti Perry, while incarcerated at Southeast Correctional Center, experienced a severe medical emergency that resulted in him being placed in a medically induced coma for a month. Several years after recovering, Perry filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the prison's warden, the Missouri Department of Corrections Director, and two medical-care contractors, alleging Eighth Amendment violations due to deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Perry admitted he did not use the prison’s administrative remedy, which required filing a complaint within fifteen days of the incident, but argued that his coma made it impossible to meet this requirement.The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Perry had not exhausted his available remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). They acknowledged that the grievance process was unavailable to Perry during his coma and a reasonable period afterward but contended that Perry should have made a diligent effort to exhaust his claims once he recovered. The district court agreed with the Defendants and dismissed the complaint, concluding that Perry could have filed a grievance after his medical conditions resolved.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court determined that the prison’s administrative grievance process was unavailable to Perry due to his physical incapacity during the coma and the prison’s rules not allowing late filings. The court rejected the Defendants' arguments that Perry could have filed an untimely grievance or that the grievance deadline was perpetually renewed due to ongoing medical issues. The court also denied the Defendants' motion to supplement the record with new evidence. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Perry’s complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Perry v. Precythe" on Justia Law