Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Empower Oversight Whistleblowers & Research, a nonprofit organization, filed a motion to intervene in a closed grand jury proceeding and sought to unseal Department of Justice applications for non-disclosure orders related to a 2017 grand jury subpoena for Google account records. At the time of the subpoena, Jason Foster, Empower’s founder, was the Chief Investigative Counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee, investigating alleged misconduct at the Department. Google notified Foster in 2023 that a subpoena and non-disclosure order had been issued and extended multiple times. Empower argued that the applications should be unsealed, claiming they were judicial records subject to public access under common law and the First Amendment, and that grand jury secrecy had been waived due to public disclosures.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia permitted Empower to intervene but granted only partial unsealing. It held that the applications were ancillary grand jury records protected by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(6), limiting unsealing to jurisdictional and legal standard sections. The court found no waiver of secrecy, as disclosures were not sufficiently public to meet the threshold established by precedent. Most of the documents remained sealed, and Empower appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the applications were covered by Rule 6(e)(6), which displaces any common law or First Amendment right of access, and that grand jury secrecy had not been waived by the disclosures identified by Empower. The court also declined to review new evidence (the December 2024 OIG report) not presented to the district court but remanded the case for the lower court to consider whether to allow Empower to amend its motion and supplement the record with the OIG report. View "In re: Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2705(b)" on Justia Law

Premium Healthcare Solutions, LLC, an Illinois company, had two competing judgment creditors: Vivek Bedi and MedLegal Solutions, Inc. Bedi obtained a state court judgment against “Premier Healthcare Solutions, LLC” in 2022, which was a misnomer for Premium. His lien on Premium’s assets was thus not discoverable to other creditors. MedLegal, a medical billing company, later secured an arbitration award and a federal court judgment against Premium in 2024 after discovering Premium had breached their contract. Both Bedi and MedLegal initiated collection efforts targeting Premium’s assets, particularly its accounts receivable managed by third parties.After Bedi discovered the misnomer in his judgment, he obtained a corrective order in Illinois state court in September 2024, amending his judgment nunc pro tunc to name Premium as the debtor and making the correction effective as of the original judgment date. Concerned that Bedi’s corrected judgment might threaten its priority, MedLegal sought a federal court order establishing its claim as superior. In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Bedi intervened but focused his opposition on jurisdictional grounds, invoking the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The district court rejected this argument and granted MedLegal’s motion for partial summary judgment, ruling MedLegal’s interest as superior. The court subsequently issued a turnover order requiring certain third parties to transfer Premium’s assets to MedLegal.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that appellate jurisdiction was proper because the February 11, 2025, turnover order was a final decision. The Seventh Circuit also found that Rooker-Feldman did not bar the district court’s jurisdiction, as MedLegal was not a party to the prior state court action. Finally, because Bedi failed to raise any substantive arguments on priority in the district court, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s turnover order in favor of MedLegal. View "Bedi v Premium Healthcare Solutions LLC" on Justia Law

An employee of a New York City tour company was terminated in 2012, allegedly for attempting to unionize. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) began investigating the termination, and in 2013, its adjudicative body found the discharge violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), ordering the company to reinstate the employee and compensate him for lost earnings. After a brief reinstatement and a second termination, further proceedings led to a backpay judgment against the company and several affiliates, including some of the current appellants. When the judgment debtors failed to pay, the NLRB issued administrative subpoenas seeking documents to determine whether the appellants could be held liable for the judgment. The appellants did not comply with these subpoenas.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the NLRB’s application to enforce the subpoenas. The court rejected the appellants’ arguments concerning lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and improper venue, holding that the NLRA authorized nationwide service of process and that the inquiry was conducted in the Southern District of New York. The court denied the appellants’ motion to transfer the case to the Southern District of Texas and awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to the NLRB, later specifying the amount.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the district court had subject-matter and personal jurisdiction to enforce the subpoenas, and that venue was proper. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to transfer the case or by awarding fees and costs based on the appellants’ repeated evasion of service and failure to comply. However, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s subsequent order fixing the amount of fees and costs, as no timely notice of appeal was filed for that order. The judgment was thus affirmed in part and dismissed in part. View "Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Universal Smart Conts., LLC" on Justia Law

The case centers on Orlando González Tomasini, who filed civil rights and tort claims against the United States Postal Service, his former employer, alleging that psychological and medical conditions prevented him from working. His then-wife, Juliette Irizarry-Miranda, was initially a co-plaintiff but eventually became a defense witness after a contentious divorce and ongoing custody dispute over their son. On the eve of trial, the Postal Service accused González of witness tampering, specifically of seeking to dissuade Irizarry from testifying by conditioning custody concessions on her refusal to take the stand. Irizarry recorded part of a phone call between them, and the Postal Service submitted this as evidence.Prior to the current appeal, the case was heard in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, where a magistrate judge presided by consent of the parties. The magistrate judge held a three-day evidentiary hearing to address the witness tampering allegations. After hearing testimony from González, Irizarry, and a social worker, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that González had engaged in witness tampering. As a sanction for this fraud on the court, the magistrate judge dismissed González’s case.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court's decisions. The First Circuit affirmed the district court in all respects, holding that the evidentiary hearing was appropriately ordered, the finding of witness tampering was not clearly erroneous, and the sanction of dismissal was within the court’s discretion. The appellate court found that González’s conduct constituted a fraud on the court, justifying dismissal, especially given the egregiousness of the witness tampering and its potential impact on the integrity of judicial proceedings. Judgment was affirmed for the Postal Service. View "Gonzalez Tomasini v. Steiner" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, who provided subadvisory investment services and loaned $1.5 million to FolioMetrix (personally guaranteed by two individuals), later engaged with defendants involved in a proposed merger of investment firms. Plaintiffs alleged that during merger negotiations, defendant Putnam promised to relieve the original borrowers of their obligations and personally assume the debt. Subsequent communications referenced intentions to transfer the loan liability to the new entity, but when plaintiffs sought a formal promissory note, defendants refused. Ultimately, defendants did not repay any portion of the loan.Plaintiffs filed suit in the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco in March 2019, alleging breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. At trial, the central dispute was whether defendants had agreed to assume the loan obligations under the promissory note. Plaintiffs argued that the agreement was formed through emails and conduct, while defendants denied any assumption of liability. The jury found in favor of defendants, determining no contract was formed and no promise was made to repay the loans. Following trial, the court awarded defendants attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717, based on a fee provision in the original promissory note, after reducing the requested amount.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, addressed several issues. It ruled that the automatic bankruptcy stay did not preclude resolution of the appeal because the debtor (NAI) was the plaintiff rather than a defendant. The court rejected plaintiffs’ claims of error regarding jury instructions on contract formation, finding insufficient argument and no prejudice. It affirmed the attorney fee award, concluding the action was “on the contract” containing the fee provision, and held the fee amount was within the trial court’s discretion. The judgment and fee order were affirmed. View "Navellier v. Putnam" on Justia Law

In this case, the central issue arose during a countervailing duty investigation into phosphate fertilizers imported from Morocco and Russia. The International Trade Commission (Commission) collected information through questionnaires sent to various parties, including domestic and foreign producers. The Commission’s longstanding practice was to automatically designate all questionnaire responses as confidential, regardless of whether the submitting party requested confidentiality or whether the information would qualify for such treatment under the relevant statute. This led to heavy redactions in the administrative record when the investigation was challenged in court.A Moroccan producer, OCP S.A., sought review of the Commission’s injury determination in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT). The CIT initially remanded the injury determination due to insufficient evidentiary support. When the remand record again included substantial redactions, the CIT held a hearing to scrutinize the Commission’s confidentiality designations. After reviewing arguments from the Commission and affected parties, the CIT concluded that the Commission’s practice of automatically treating all questionnaire responses as confidential was unauthorized by law. The CIT found that much of the redacted information was either publicly available, generalized, or outdated, and thus not entitled to confidential treatment, with only a small portion warranting protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s Confidentiality Opinion and Order. The Federal Circuit held that the governing statute does not abrogate the common law right of public access to judicial records and that the Commission’s blanket confidentiality rule conflicts with statutory requirements, which demand public disclosure of non-confidential information and proper justification for confidentiality. The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s order that required the Commission to comply with statutory standards for confidentiality and to cease automatic confidential designation of questionnaire responses. View "In re United States" on Justia Law

In a dispute concerning antidumping and countervailing duties on mattresses imported from several countries, the U.S. International Trade Commission determined that domestic industry suffered material injury from imports sold at less than fair value and from subsidized imports. The Commission treated certain information submitted in response to its questionnaires as confidential. After the Court of International Trade issued a public opinion sustaining the Commission’s injury determination, it did not redact information the Commission had deemed confidential. The Commission requested retraction of the public opinion and sought redactions for specific company names and numerical data, arguing these deserved confidential treatment.The parties jointly moved for redaction, relying on the Commission’s practice of treating questionnaire data as confidential and citing statutory provisions. The Court of International Trade denied the motion, reasoning that the information was either publicly available or not linked to specific entities, and that some claims of confidentiality had been waived due to procedural oversight. The court also emphasized the common law right of access and transparency, but did not specifically address the statutory authority for disclosure.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the denial of the joint motion. The court found the case moot because the allegedly confidential information had already been publicly disclosed more than two years earlier, rendering any relief unavailable. The Federal Circuit held that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness did not apply, as the companion case decided that day resolved the same confidentiality issues. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded. View "In re United States" on Justia Law

Several newly elected members joined a school district’s board of education in late 2021. Their priority was to make Merit Academy a charter school within the district. After previous unsuccessful attempts, the board moved forward with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to streamline the process. The agenda for the January 26, 2022, meeting where the MOU was discussed did not clearly indicate this topic, being labeled only as "BOARD HOUSEKEEPING." The board approved the MOU at this meeting. Subsequent meetings in February and April further addressed the MOU, with the April meeting involving a detailed discussion and statements from each board member.After the January meeting, a community member, Erin O’Connell, filed suit alleging a violation of Colorado’s Open Meetings Law (COML) due to insufficient public notice. The District Court initially granted an injunction requiring the board to provide clearer agendas. Later, upon summary judgment, the District Court found that the board cured the COML violation at the April meeting, which was properly noticed and involved substantive reconsideration. The court held O’Connell was not a prevailing party and denied her request for attorney fees.On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed most of the district court’s rulings. It upheld the “cure doctrine,” allowing public bodies to remedy prior open meetings violations by holding a subsequent compliant meeting, provided it is not a mere “rubber stamp.” The Court of Appeals also found that the doctrine does not distinguish between intentional and unintentional violations and that the April meeting cured the earlier violation. It denied O’Connell costs and attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed that the cure doctrine is consistent with the COML and longstanding precedent, and applies regardless of the violation’s intent. However, it reversed regarding attorney fees, holding that because O’Connell proved a violation that was not cured until after suit was filed, she is the prevailing party and entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. The case was remanded for determination and award of such fees. View "O'Connell v. Woodland Park Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The dispute centers on an attorney’s contingency fee agreement concerning legal representation for heirs of an Alaska Native allotment. After the attorney successfully represented the heirs in a federal lawsuit against the government for mismanagement of oil and gas leases, a fee dispute arose. The attorney sued one heir in federal court, claiming unpaid fees under the agreement. That heir moved to compel arbitration of the fee dispute pursuant to Alaska Bar Rules, and the federal court stayed the litigation pending arbitration.An Alaska Bar Association arbitration panel was convened. Bar Counsel advised the panel to limit its review to whether the amount of the attorney’s fee was reasonable, excluding issues of enforceability of the agreement, such as claims of duress or illegality under federal Indian law. The panel accepted this narrowed scope and ultimately found the attorney’s fee reasonable, declining to address other challenges. The panel also chose not to refer any ethical concerns to Bar Counsel for disciplinary review.The heir petitioned the Alaska Superior Court (Second Judicial District, Utqiaġvik) to vacate the arbitration award, arguing the panel exceeded its authority, was not impartial, and that the fee agreement was unenforceable. The superior court confirmed the arbitration panel’s decision, finding the panel’s scope limitation a reasonably possible interpretation of its authority under the Bar Rules. The court also awarded the attorney enhanced attorney’s fees for costs incurred in the post-arbitration proceedings, citing Alaska Civil Rule 82.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that a fee arbitration panel’s decision to narrow its review to the reasonableness of a fee is proper if it is a reasonably possible interpretation of the panel’s authority. Additionally, it held that attorney’s fees may be awarded under Civil Rule 82 for post-arbitration proceedings governed by the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act. View "Koponen v. Romanov" on Justia Law

A member of the governing board of a public water district was the subject of internal investigations after allegations of misconduct by district staff, as well as allegations made by that board member against staff. Two lengthy confidential reports, prepared by outside counsel, documented the results of these investigations. The board member was permitted to review, but not remove, the reports from a secure location at the district’s offices. Contrary to these restrictions, the board member took the reports without permission, later making extensive annotations on them. Repeated requests for their return were unsuccessful, leading to her censure by the board.The Santa Clara County Superior Court, upon the district's application under California’s claim and delivery law, granted a writ of possession and a turnover order directing the board member to return the reports. The board member stayed enforcement by posting a counterbond as allowed by statute. While the turnover order was stayed, the district sought a preliminary injunction under the general injunction statutes, again seeking return of the reports. After a hearing, the Superior Court granted a mandatory preliminary injunction requiring turnover of the reports, permitting the board member to redact her handwritten notes.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the appeal from the order granting the preliminary injunction. The court held that the claim and delivery statutory scheme does not preclude a party from seeking injunctive relief for the recovery of personal property, even after a writ of possession has been issued and stayed by a counterbond. The appellate court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a likelihood of the district’s success on its conversion claim and in concluding that the balance of harms favored the district. The order granting the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. v. Eisenberg" on Justia Law