Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

NonDoc Media and William W. Savage III submitted open records requests to the University of Oklahoma seeking two reports prepared by the law firm Jones Day. The reports resulted from investigations into allegations of misreporting alumni donor data and possible sexual misconduct involving high-ranking University officials. Jones Day was retained under an attorney-client relationship, and the reports included confidential interviews and legal analysis. Portions of the reports were provided to law enforcement under joint-interest agreements and excerpts of the sexual misconduct report were shared with the parties involved pursuant to Title IX protocols.The District Court of Cleveland County conducted an in camera review of both reports. It granted summary judgment in favor of the University, finding the documents protected by attorney-client privilege. The court also found that the reports were exempt under the Open Records Act’s personnel record exemption, and that the sexual misconduct report was further protected by work-product and informer privileges. The court did not find that the University had waived any of these protections, and rejected NonDoc’s arguments to the contrary. NonDoc appealed, and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma retained the case.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the summary judgment de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privilege protects the reports from disclosure, and clarified that the privilege does not expire when the underlying investigation or action concludes. The court also found that the University did not waive the privilege by sharing the reports with law enforcement under joint-interest agreements or by limited disclosure required by law. Summary judgment for the University was affirmed. View "NONDOC MEDIA v. STATE Ex Rel. BOARD OF REGENTS of the UNIV. of OKLAHOMA" on Justia Law

Margaret Woods, proceeding without an attorney, sued her former employer STS Services, L.L.C., after being terminated from her job. In her Third Amended Complaint, Woods alleged that she was fired because she is a black woman and replaced by white men. Earlier versions of her complaint included claims for breach of contract and race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which she abandoned, leaving only claims of race and sex discrimination under Title VII. Woods did not provide factual details about her qualifications for the position from which she was terminated.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas reviewed Woods’s successive complaints. Each time, the district court dismissed her complaints for failure to state a claim but allowed her opportunities to amend and refile. Woods submitted her Second Amended Complaint late, which was also dismissed. Her Third Amended Complaint was timely, but again found deficient for failing to plead facts regarding her qualifications. The court gave her another chance to amend, but Woods did not file a Fourth Amended Complaint within the deadline, or at all. The district court ultimately dismissed the case with prejudice and entered judgment in favor of STS Services, assessing costs against Woods.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that Woods failed to state a Title VII claim because her complaint did not include sufficient factual allegations to establish that she was qualified for her position, a necessary element of a prima facie case under Title VII. The Fifth Circuit also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Woods’s complaint with prejudice after repeated deficiencies and failures to amend. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Woods v. STS Services" on Justia Law

Several senior financial advisors resigned from a national investment advisory firm’s Des Moines branch to join a competitor that was opening a new local office. After their departure, nearly all remaining advisors at the branch also resigned en masse and joined the competitor, which offered substantial incentives. The resignations occurred despite restrictive covenants in the former advisors’ employment contracts, which limited their ability to solicit clients, disclose confidential information, and recruit other employees. The competitor and the departing advisors soon began servicing many of their former clients, resulting in a substantial loss of business for their previous employer.Following these events, the original firm filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, alleging breach of contract, tortious interference, and theft of trade secrets. The district court initially denied a temporary restraining order but later granted a broad preliminary injunction. This injunction prohibited the former advisors from servicing or soliciting covered clients, using confidential information, or recruiting employees, and it barred the competitor from using confidential information or interfering with employment agreements. The defendants sought a stay but were denied by both the district court and the appellate court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the preliminary injunction. The appellate court determined that the record did not show a likelihood of irreparable harm that could not be compensated by money damages, as required for preliminary injunctive relief. The court found that the alleged financial harms were calculable and that the claimed destruction of the Des Moines branch had already occurred, rendering injunctive relief ineffective for preventing future harm. The Eighth Circuit therefore vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Choreo, LLC v. Lors" on Justia Law

Several individuals who reside in DeKalb County, Georgia, outside the city limits of Atlanta, opposed the construction of a new public safety training facility on city-owned land and wished to collect signatures for a referendum petition to repeal the city ordinance authorizing the lease for the facility. Atlanta’s municipal code required that signature gatherers for such petitions be residents of the City of Atlanta. Because they did not meet this residency requirement, the plaintiffs filed suit against the City, arguing that the restriction violated their First Amendment rights. They sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the residency requirement, as well as other relief connected to the signature collection process.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted the preliminary injunction, enjoining Atlanta from enforcing the residency requirement for signature gatherers. The court also ordered the City to issue new petitions without the residency restriction and restarted the 60-day signature collection period, while counting previously collected signatures. The City appealed the injunction and obtained a stay from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm sufficient for injunctive relief. The court specified that, under Kemp v. City of Claxton, 496 S.E.2d 712 (Ga. 1998), Georgia law does not allow the use of a referendum petition to challenge or repeal a city ordinance unless it amends the city charter. Because the plaintiffs could not lawfully utilize the referendum process for their intended purpose, they lacked a right to the process and consequently could not show irreparable injury. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Baker v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

An information security executive was hired by a financial institution to improve its internal controls but was later terminated. During her tenure, a subordinate raised concerns about compliance, which led to an internal audit and ultimately contributed to the decision to fire her. She believed her firing was motivated by sex discrimination and defamatory statements made by colleagues regarding her job performance. She first filed a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission, then a federal lawsuit against her employer and several individuals, alleging discrimination, defamation, and other claims. Most of her claims, including defamation, were dismissed by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa for failure to state a claim, and summary judgment was granted to the defendants on the remaining claims. She did not appeal.Several months after her federal lawsuit concluded, she filed a new defamation action in the Iowa District Court for Polk County against a different set of coworkers, based on statements and internal reports from more than three years prior. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were barred by Iowa’s two-year statute of limitations for injuries to reputation. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the limitations period began at publication or, alternatively, that she was on inquiry notice of the claims by the time she filed her first lawsuit.On appeal, the Iowa Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the discovery rule might apply to defamation claims and that factual issues about notice precluded dismissal. Upon further review, the Iowa Supreme Court vacated the appellate decision and affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the plaintiff was on inquiry notice of her defamation claims more than two years before filing suit, so the claims were time-barred regardless of the discovery rule’s application. View "Betz v. Mathisen" on Justia Law

Milliman, Inc. operates a service that compiles consumer medical and prescription reports, which are then sold to insurers for underwriting decisions. The named plaintiff, James Healy, applied for life insurance, but Milliman provided a report to the insurer containing another person's medical records and social security number. This erroneous report flagged Healy as high risk for several serious medical conditions he did not actually have, resulting in the denial of his insurance application. Healy attempted to correct the report, but Milliman did not timely investigate or remedy the errors.Healy filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, alleging that Milliman’s procedures violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act by failing to ensure maximum possible accuracy. The district court certified an “inaccuracy class” for those whose reports included mismatched social security numbers and risk flags. Milliman moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that Healy needed to show class-wide standing at this stage. The district court agreed, finding under TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), that Healy had failed to present direct evidence of concrete injury on a class-wide basis, and dismissed the inaccuracy class.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that, following class certification in damages actions, both named and unnamed class members must present evidence of standing at summary judgment. However, the court clarified that plaintiffs may rely on either direct or circumstantial evidence, and need only show that a rational trier of fact could infer standing, not that standing is conclusively established. The panel reversed the district court’s partial summary judgment and remanded for reconsideration under the correct summary judgment standard. View "HEALY V. MILLIMAN, INC." on Justia Law

A privately held Nebraska S corporation had two classes of stock: Class A voting shares and Class B nonvoting shares. In 2023, the corporation sold substantially all its assets to a third party in a transaction structured as a disposition of assets, with proceeds distributed to all shareholders. The board unanimously approved the transaction, and the majority of both classes of shares voted in favor, except for some Class A and Class B shareholders, who opposed or abstained. Following closing, Class B shareholders received their cash proceeds but subsequently notified the corporation of their intent to assert appraisal rights, seeking a higher payment per share.The District Court for Sarpy County was presented with cross-motions for partial summary judgment regarding whether Class B nonvoting shareholders were entitled to appraisal rights under Nebraska’s Model Business Corporation Act (NMBCA) following the asset sale. The district court found that the relevant statute (§ 21-2,172(a)(3)) limited appraisal rights for a disposition of assets to shareholders “entitled to vote on the disposition,” and therefore determined that Class B shareholders lacked such rights. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the corporation and related parties, dismissed certain third-party defendants, and certified the judgment for immediate appeal pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1).On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and its certification for abuse of discretion. The court held that only Class A voting shareholders were entitled to appraisal rights in connection with the disposition of assets, as the statute unambiguously limited such rights to voting shareholders. The court also found no express grant of appraisal rights to Class B shareholders in the articles of incorporation. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Streck, Inc. v. Ryan" on Justia Law

The parties in this case entered into a settlement agreement in 2005 to resolve a longstanding water rights dispute between their respective parcels, providing that future disputes would be resolved by mediation and, if necessary, binding arbitration before a retired judge with water law expertise in San Diego County. The agreement included provisions for attorney fees for the prevailing party in certain circumstances. In 2016, a new dispute arose over groundwater resources and the parties proceeded to arbitration. During the arbitration, the arbitrator withdrew after Lodge filed demands for disqualification, leaving the dispute unresolved. While the Barbanell entities sought a replacement arbitrator, Lodge initiated a separate lawsuit asserting the same claims as those in arbitration. The Barbanell entities then filed a distinct action, petitioning the Superior Court of San Diego County to appoint a new arbitrator.The Superior Court of San Diego County granted the Barbanell entities’ petition to appoint a new arbitrator and entered judgment in their favor, designating them as prevailing parties entitled to seek attorney fees. Upon subsequent motion, the court found that the settlement agreement entitled the Barbanell entities to recover reasonable attorney fees incurred in obtaining the appointment of a new arbitrator, and awarded them $68,800 in fees. An amended judgment was issued to reflect this award.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed only the postjudgment award of attorney fees. It affirmed the Superior Court’s decision, holding that the Barbanell entities were prevailing parties in the discrete action to appoint an arbitrator and were entitled to attorney fees under the settlement agreement and Civil Code section 1717. The appellate court clarified that the presence of related claims pending elsewhere did not preclude a fee award for this separate, concluded action. View "Barbanell v. Lodge" on Justia Law

The Clark County Department of Family Services filed a petition under Nevada law seeking protection for three minor children, alleging they were in need of protection from their father and stepmother. The allegations against the stepmother were withdrawn prior to trial. The juvenile court in Clark County conducted a full evidentiary hearing regarding the father and ultimately found that the allegations were not proven by a preponderance of the evidence, resulting in dismissal of the petition against him.Following this dismissal, both the Department and the minor children appealed the juvenile court’s order to the Supreme Court of Nevada. However, concerns arose regarding the appealability of such an order, as prior precedent—specifically In re A.B., 128 Nev. 764—held that orders from juvenile proceedings concerning child custody were not substantively appealable under Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure (NRAP) 3A. The Supreme Court temporarily halted the appeal and directed appellants to show cause why jurisdiction existed.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Nevada found that the jurisdictional analysis in In re A.B. was flawed. The court determined that an order completely dismissing and thus finally resolving a petition for child protection under NRS Chapter 432B meets the definition of a final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(1), because it disposes of all issues in the case. The court overruled In re A.B. to the extent that it held such orders were unappealable, clarifying that NRAP 3A(b)(1) allows an appeal from a final judgment entered by a district court—even when it arises from juvenile proceedings involving child custody. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the order dismissing the petition is appealable and allowed the appeal to proceed. View "IN RE: N.D." on Justia Law

Tony petitioned for formal probate of his mother Judith’s will and codicil, which left her entire estate to him and specifically disinherited her other children, Rick, Sandy, and Beth. The siblings objected, alleging that the will was the product of undue influence, among other claims. The dispute centered on family dynamics and prior business conflicts between Tony and Rick, including previous litigation over property and asset division. In the prior case, the court made adverse findings about Tony’s credibility and honesty regarding his dealings with Rick.The siblings, as respondents, successfully moved in the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Todd County, for the admission of the prior court’s findings and conclusions under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, arguing these were relevant to the undue influence claim. The circuit court admitted almost all of the findings from the prior case as conclusively established, including negative credibility determinations about Tony. The jury in the undue influence trial was instructed to accept these findings as true, and ultimately found that Tony had unduly influenced Judith, invalidating the will.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed whether the circuit court properly applied collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred by admitting the prior findings wholesale, as the issues in the prior litigation were not identical to those in the undue influence case and the credibility determinations were not essential to the prior judgment. The Supreme Court found this error was prejudicial, as it likely impacted the jury’s assessment of Tony’s credibility, a central issue in the undue influence claim. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. View "Estate Of O'Neill" on Justia Law