Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Kahl v. Polkow
David Polkow rented a residential home from Frank Kahl under a written lease agreement that transitioned to a month-to-month basis after its initial term. In 2022, they signed a new three-year lease. Frank later transferred his interest in the property to the Frank J. Kahl Revocable Trust, with his son David Kahl managing the property as trustee after Frank's death. In January 2023, David Kahl filed an eviction action against Polkow, seeking possession of the property, damages for delinquent rent, and attorney fees.The Yellowstone County Justice Court awarded Kahl possession of the property and attorney fees but denied the request for delinquent rent. Kahl then sought additional damages for property damage, which led to a hearing where he claimed $128,644.07 in damages. The Justice Court awarded Kahl $58,753.73 in damages, plus interest and attorney fees, despite Polkow's objection that the amount exceeded the court's $15,000 jurisdictional limit. Polkow appealed to the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, which affirmed the Justice Court's decision, interpreting that the court had concurrent jurisdiction with the district court for landlord-tenant disputes.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Supreme Court held that the Justice Court lacked jurisdiction to award damages exceeding the $15,000 limit imposed by § 3-10-301, MCA. The court clarified that the concurrent jurisdiction statutes did not override this limit. The case was remanded for the Justice Court to vacate the damages award and dismiss the claim for compensatory damages without prejudice, allowing Kahl to refile in District Court. The award of attorney fees and costs was affirmed. View "Kahl v. Polkow" on Justia Law
Stensvad v. Newman Ayers Ranch
Vernon K. Stensvad, the plaintiff, owns a small cattle herd and entered into a Grazing Lease Contract with Newman Ayers Ranch, Inc. in July 2022. The contract stipulated that Stensvad would graze his cattle on Ayers Ranch's property for a fee, with higher winter rates to be determined. Stensvad paid the fees for July and August but later agreed orally to perform labor in exchange for reduced fees. Disputes arose over the quality of Stensvad's work and the amount owed. In October 2023, Ayers Ranch issued an agister’s lien for $78,662.50, seizing Stensvad’s herd. Stensvad sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the sale of his cattle under the lien.The Seventh Judicial District Court in Prairie County granted Stensvad’s application for a preliminary injunction, ordering the cattle to be moved to a third-party feed lot. Ayers Ranch appealed, arguing that the District Court failed to consider all four factors required for a preliminary injunction under Montana law and that a preliminary injunction was not an appropriate remedy for challenging an agister’s lien.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the District Court manifestly abused its discretion by not addressing all four factors of the preliminary injunction standard. The Supreme Court clarified that under the revised standard, a party must satisfy all four factors: likelihood of success on the merits, likelihood of irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest. The Court adopted the "serious questions" test from the Ninth Circuit, allowing for flexibility in evaluating these factors. The case was remanded for the District Court to make supplemental findings consistent with this standard. The Supreme Court also held that a preliminary injunction is an appropriate remedy to challenge an agister’s lien and that Stensvad did not have an adequate remedy at law. View "Stensvad v. Newman Ayers Ranch" on Justia Law
In re C.F. and T.F.
The petitioner, J.F., appealed the Circuit Court of Kanawha County's order terminating his parental rights to his children, C.F. and T.F. The case began when the Department of Human Services (DHS) filed an abuse and neglect petition against J.F. after he was arrested for various charges, including child neglect. The petition alleged that J.F. had committed acts of domestic violence and verbal abuse in the presence of C.F. T.F. was living with his paternal grandparents under a legal guardianship at the time. The petition included historical allegations of domestic violence involving T.F.'s mother, M.H., and J.F., but no recent allegations involving T.F.The Circuit Court adjudicated J.F. as an abusive and neglectful parent and found both children to be abused and neglected. At the disposition hearing, the court terminated J.F.'s parental rights, citing his incarceration and denial of the abuse, which prevented DHS from providing remedial services. The court also denied J.F. post-termination visitation with his children.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. The court found that the Circuit Court failed to make specific findings regarding T.F. being an abused or neglected child, as required by West Virginia Code § 49-4-601. The court noted that T.F. was living with non-abusive guardians and that the allegations of domestic violence involving T.F. were outdated. Consequently, the court vacated the Circuit Court's adjudicatory and dispositional orders concerning T.F. and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if T.F. met the statutory definition of an abused or neglected child.The court affirmed the termination of J.F.'s parental rights to C.F., agreeing with the lower court's findings that the conditions of abuse and neglect were unlikely to improve due to J.F.'s denial of the circumstances. The court also upheld the denial of post-termination visitation, finding no evidence of a close emotional bond between J.F. and his children or that continued contact would not be detrimental to their well-being. View "In re C.F. and T.F." on Justia Law
RNC v. North Carolina State Board of Elections
The case involves the Republican National Committee (RNC) and the North Carolina Republican Party (NCGOP) filing two state law claims against the North Carolina State Board of Elections (State Board) and its members. The claims, one statutory and one constitutional, allege that the State Board failed to comply with the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), which mandates certain voter registration and maintenance procedures. The Democratic National Committee (DNC) intervened as a defendant. The plaintiffs argue that the State Board's noncompliance with HAVA led to improper voter registrations, potentially affecting 225,000 voters.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina initially reviewed the case. The district court found it had original jurisdiction over the state statutory claim but not the state constitutional claim. It dismissed the statutory claim, ruling that the relevant statutory provision did not provide a private right of action. Consequently, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state constitutional claim and remanded it to state court, also holding that Section 1443 did not provide a valid basis for removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court's remand order was improper. It found that the district court possessed original jurisdiction over the state constitutional claim under Section 1331 because the claim contained an embedded federal question. The court also determined that removal was permissible under Section 1441. Additionally, the court held that the defendants validly removed the constitutional claim pursuant to Section 1443(2), which allows for removal in cases involving the refusal to perform an act on the grounds that it would be inconsistent with laws providing for equal rights. The court reversed the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "RNC v. North Carolina State Board of Elections" on Justia Law
USA V. NASRI
The United States government initiated a civil forfeiture action to recover funds from Younes Nasri, a Canadian citizen residing in Dubai, alleging that the funds were ill-gotten gains from criminal activities. Nasri, who was indicted on racketeering and drug conspiracy charges, claimed innocent ownership of the assets held in foreign bank accounts. He argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the assets because neither he nor the assets had any ties to the United States.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California granted the government's motion to strike Nasri's claim under the fugitive disentitlement statute, finding that it had in rem jurisdiction over the assets. The court also determined that the fugitive disentitlement statute did not violate due process and that Nasri qualified as a fugitive under the statute. Nasri appealed the decision, challenging the court's jurisdiction and the application of the fugitive disentitlement statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that due process requires a court to have control or constructive control over the property in a forfeiture action to establish in rem jurisdiction. The court found that the district court's exercise of in rem jurisdiction over the foreign assets, without sufficient control or possession, violated due process principles. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for the lower court to assess whether it had control or constructive control over the assets to satisfy due process requirements when asserting in rem jurisdiction. View "USA V. NASRI" on Justia Law
Cosenza v. City of Worcester, MA
In 2002, Natale Cosenza was convicted by a Massachusetts state court jury of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon and armed burglary. The prosecution's case heavily relied on the victim, Melissa Horgan, identifying Cosenza from a photo array administered by Worcester police. In 2016, state courts granted Cosenza a new trial, and in 2017, they suppressed the photo array evidence, leading the Commonwealth to drop the charges.Cosenza then filed a federal civil rights lawsuit in 2018 against the City of Worcester, alleging that the City had a policy of not properly training its officers on photo arrays and other investigative techniques, which he claimed violated his constitutional rights. The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding no evidence of deliberate indifference to Cosenza's constitutional rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that there was no evidence Worcester had a policy of not training its officers on photo arrays. The court noted that officers received training at a police academy and on-the-job training, and that the law at the time did not clearly establish the procedures Cosenza argued were required. The court also found no evidence that the City had a policy of fabricating or suppressing evidence. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the City of Worcester. View "Cosenza v. City of Worcester, MA" on Justia Law
Stanley v. Morgan
A police officer, David Stanley, was suspended and transferred by the Lafayette Police Department (LPD) following an investigation into his Facebook posts. Stanley took sick leave for about a year and appealed his suspension to the Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board. He also filed two petitions in state court seeking to enjoin the suspension and transfer. The state district court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO), but the state appellate court dismissed LPD’s appeal of the TRO. Stanley re-filed his petition, but the state district court found he needed to finalize his appeal with the Civil Service Board first. The Civil Service Board later reduced his suspension but upheld his transfer.Stanley then filed a lawsuit in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment violations and retaliation. The district court dismissed his claims as time-barred, determining that the one-year prescriptive period began when Stanley was notified of his suspension on June 11, 2021. The court also concluded that Stanley’s state court petitions did not interrupt the prescription period because they did not assert federal claims or seek monetary damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Stanley’s § 1983 claims accrued when he received notice of the adverse actions, not when the administrative appeal concluded. The court also found that Stanley’s state court petitions did not interrupt the prescription period because they did not provide adequate notice of his federal claims or demand monetary damages. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Stanley’s claims as prescribed. View "Stanley v. Morgan" on Justia Law
We the Patriots v. Grisham
Plaintiffs, consisting of individuals and advocacy organizations, challenged a New Mexico Department of Health (NM DOH) Public Health Order (PHO) that restricted firearm carry in public parks and playgrounds in Albuquerque and Bernalillo County. They argued that the PHO violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico initially issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against parts of the first PHO. After the NM DOH amended the PHO, the plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions against the amended order. The district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the plaintiffs' appeal regarding the public parks restriction was moot because a separate case, Springer v. Grisham, had already granted a preliminary injunction against the same restriction. The court determined that any relief granted would not have a real-world effect since the plaintiffs had already received the relief they sought.Regarding the playgrounds restriction, the court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The court noted that existing city and county regulations independently restricted firearm carry in playgrounds, and the plaintiffs did not demonstrate how enjoining the PHO would allow them to lawfully carry firearms in those areas. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to show that a favorable decision would redress their alleged injuries.The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal, finding that the plaintiffs' claims were either moot or lacked standing. View "We the Patriots v. Grisham" on Justia Law
LOFFMAN V. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Orthodox Jewish families and schools challenged California's requirement that private schools be nonsectarian to provide special education under the IDEA. The families argued this requirement violated their Free Exercise and Equal Protection rights by preventing them from advocating for religious school placements for their children with disabilities. The schools claimed the requirement barred them from certification solely due to their religious affiliation.The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the case, ruling the schools and one family lacked standing and denying the families' motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found the schools did not demonstrate they were "able and ready" to apply for certification and that the nonsectarian requirement did not affect the educational placement of one family's child. However, it held that another family had standing to challenge the requirement.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the schools' and one family's claims for lack of standing but reversed the dismissal of the other families' claims. The court held that the nonsectarian requirement burdened the families' free exercise rights by preventing them from advocating for religious school placements. It found the requirement was not neutral to religion and applied strict scrutiny, concluding the State failed to show the requirement was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. The court vacated the denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded for further consideration of the injunction factors. View "LOFFMAN V. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION" on Justia Law
In re Matter of the Civil Commitment of Benson
Michael Benson was civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program in 1993. In 2020, he petitioned for a reduction in custody, which the Special Review Board recommended denying. Benson then sought a rehearing and reconsideration from the Commitment Appeal Panel (CAP). He filed a motion to cross-examine witnesses and participate in his defense, expressing a preference to proceed pro se. The CAP allowed limited cross-examination by Benson but required his appointed counsel to be present and conduct initial questioning. Benson refused to participate under these conditions, leading the CAP to dismiss his petition.Benson appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, arguing that the right to counsel under Minnesota Statutes section 253D.20 is waivable. The court of appeals affirmed the CAP's decision, holding that the right to counsel in section 253D.20 is not waivable, based on its precedent. The court also noted that Benson forfeited his constitutional arguments by not raising them at the CAP hearing.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether a civilly committed person can waive the right to counsel under section 253D.20. The court concluded that the right to counsel is waivable, provided the waiver is knowing and intelligent. The court found the statutory language ambiguous but interpreted it in light of legislative intent, common law, and constitutional considerations. The court reversed the court of appeals' decision and remanded the case to the CAP to determine if Benson's waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent. If so, the CAP must allow him to represent himself. View "In re Matter of the Civil Commitment of Benson" on Justia Law