Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case at hand involves a dispute over the interpretation of a will left by Robert Pettengill Beckey, who was survived by his three children, Sandra L. Arthur, Angela M. Beckey, and Timothy E. Beckey. The will included specific instructions for dividing real property located at 848 Allen Pond Rd., Greene, ME, among the three children. However, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court found that the Probate Court erred in its interpretation of the will, particularly regarding Angela's share.Specifically, Angela's share was described in the will as "1/3 of property located at 848 Allen Pond Rd., minus the valuation of a piece of land on water by property line of 'Caron's'". The Probate Court had ruled that this description was ambiguous and that Angela's share therefore fell into the residue of the estate, to be divided equally among the three children. However, the Supreme Judicial Court found that the ambiguity of the "minus" clause was irrelevant because Robert never conveyed any part of the land to Angela. Therefore, Angela was entitled to a one-third share of the Allen Pond Road property’s value without any reduction.The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the Probate Court's ruling was not consistent with Robert's intent for his children to receive equal shares of the property's value. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Estate of Robert Pettengill Beckey" on Justia Law

The Maine Supreme Court considered a case where Virginia and Joel Parker, a couple who secure some of their food through hunting, challenged the constitutionality of Maine's longstanding ban on Sunday hunting. The Parkers argued that the ban conflicted with the recently enacted right-to-food amendment to the Maine Constitution, which they interpreted as including a right to hunt for food.The Superior Court had dismissed the Parkers' complaint on the grounds that it failed to state a claim. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Court held that the Parkers did present a justiciable claim for a declaratory judgment, and therefore the dismissal by the Superior Court was in error.However, on the question of the constitutionality of the Sunday hunting ban, the Maine Supreme Court found that the ban did not conflict with the right-to-food amendment. The court held that while the amendment does create a limited right to hunt for food, this right does not extend to situations where hunting is illegal. Given that the Sunday hunting ban makes hunting on Sundays illegal, the court concluded that the ban falls within the 'poaching' exception provided in the amendment. Therefore, the court ruled that the Sunday hunting ban is constitutional. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for entry of judgment declaring the challenged statute to be constitutional. View "Virginia Parker v. Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife" on Justia Law

In the case before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, Christopher O’Donnell, as the personal representative of the estate of Erica J. O’Donnell, appealed a judgment from the York County Probate Court. The court had approved a referee's report regarding the distribution of the estate. O’Donnell contested several aspects of the report, including the application of the intestacy succession provisions of Title 18-A of the Maine Revised Statutes to Erica J. O’Donnell's estate and the court’s decision to adopt the referee's report without holding a hearing on O’Donnell's amended objection.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court concluded that the intestacy succession provisions of Title 18-A, not Title 18-C, applied because Erica J. O’Donnell died before the effective date of Title 18-C. The court also rejected O’Donnell's argument that he was deprived of a hearing on the referee’s report, finding that a hearing was held after the referee's report and O’Donnell's objections were received. The court ruled that O’Donnell's amended objection lacked the required level of specificity to preserve his objection to the plan of distribution. View "Estate of Erica J. O'Donnell" on Justia Law

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court addressed an appeal from Citibank, N.A., challenging a District Court judgment in favor of the defendant, Ashley Moser, in a case related to the collection of credit card debt. The bank argued that the judgment violated its procedural due process rights due to insufficient notice about a hearing scheduled on April 12, 2023.The court had issued notices for both a 'first mediation' and a 'debt collection hearing' on the same day, at the same time, and in the same room. On the hearing day, Citibank's counsel attended without a representative from the bank, assuming that the case was scheduled for mediation and not a final hearing. The court proceeded with the hearing and entered a judgment in favor of Moser, as Citibank failed to satisfy its burden of proof.Citibank appealed, claiming the notices were ambiguous and violated its right to procedural due process. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Citibank, noting that the competing notices created an impossibility of both a mediation and a hearing taking place simultaneously. It ruled that the ambiguity in the notices and the court's subsequent judgment denied Citibank the required notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Citibank, N.A. v. Moser" on Justia Law

In this case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed a decision by the District Court granting Camille J. Moulton's motion for summary judgment against J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. Moulton's property in Buckfield was subject to a mortgage held by J.P. Morgan. When Moulton stopped making payments on her loan, J.P. Morgan sent her a notice of default and right to cure. However, the notice overstated the amount required to cure the default due to an amount held in suspense by the bank, and was thus deemed deficient by the court.The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the District Court's decision that the notice was deficient and affirmed that portion of the judgment. However, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the District Court's judgment that required J.P. Morgan to discharge the mortgage, as there was no basis for the lower court to declare the effect of its judgment without a specific claim for declaratory relief. The court did not disturb the lower court's award of reasonable attorney fees to Moulton for defending against the foreclosure claim. The holding of this case is that a notice of default and right to cure is deficient if it does not clearly inform the borrower of the amount required to cure the default. If a lender has not complied with the prerequisites to acceleration, a court cannot conclude that initiation of a foreclosure action nevertheless accelerates the note balance. When a court enters summary judgment against a lender or dismisses the lender’s foreclosure claim due to a deficient notice, it does not preclude the lender from bringing a future foreclosure claim based on a future default, nor does it discharge the entire mortgage or effect a transfer of title. View "J.P. Morgan Acquisition Corp. v. Moulton" on Justia Law

In Maine, former President Donald J. Trump submitted a petition for his candidacy for the Republican Party’s presidential primary. Three challengers subsequently claimed that Trump was disqualified from running because he had previously sworn to support the U.S. Constitution as President and then engaged in insurrection, which they argued precluded him from holding office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Secretary of State held a hearing and decided that Trump was not qualified to appear on the ballot. Trump appealed this decision to the Superior Court, which remanded the matter back to the Secretary of State for a new ruling after the Supreme Court reaches a decision in a related case. The Secretary of State and the three challengers appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, which dismissed the appeal as interlocutory and not justiciable, holding that it was not from a final judgment. The court reasoned that uncertainties regarding issues of federal law pervaded the proceedings and were likely to require additional proceedings. The court deemed that an immediate review would likely result in an advisory opinion and could cause additional delay that the existing interlocutory order might avoid. View "Trump v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

In the case before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, the dispute involved U.S. Bank, N.A. (the Bank) and Charles D. Finch. The Bank had a mortgage on Finch's property due to a loan he had taken out. When Finch defaulted on the loan, the Bank initiated foreclosure proceedings. However, the Superior Court ruled in favor of Finch, finding that the Bank's notice of default did not comply with the requirements of the Maine foreclosure statute, specifically 14 M.R.S. § 6111. Following this, Finch asked the court to rule that the Bank's mortgage was unenforceable and to order the Bank to discharge the mortgage. The court agreed with Finch, citing the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Pushard v. Bank of America.The Bank appealed this decision, arguing that the Pushard decision should be overturned, and that even if it cannot foreclose on the property, it should not be required to discharge the mortgage.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, revisiting its decision in Pushard, determined that a lender cannot accelerate a loan balance or commence a foreclosure action without having the statutory and contractual right to do so. This effectively overruled the holding in Pushard that a lender could accelerate the note balance by filing a foreclosure action, even if they lacked the statutory right to do so.The court found that when a lender fails to prove it has issued a valid notice of default or that the borrower breached the contract, the parties are returned to the positions they held before the filing of the action. Therefore, a subsequent foreclosure action based on a different notice of default and a different allegation of default would assert a different claim and would not be barred.The court ultimately vacated the judgment requiring the Bank to discharge the mortgage and remanded the case for entry of a judgment in the Bank's favor on Finch's complaint. The judgment dismissing the Bank's unjust enrichment counterclaim was affirmed. The court concluded that while a lender must strictly comply with the statutory notice requirements in a foreclosure action, a borrower is not automatically entitled to a "free house" if the lender makes a mistake in the notice of default. View "Finch v. U.S. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The case involves Billie S., who appealed from a judgment by the District Court (Bangor, Roberts, J.) which terminated her parental rights to her children pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2) (2023). The mother argued that the judgment did not provide sufficient independent findings of fact to support the termination of her parental rights. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the mother's contention.The trial court based its decision on evidence from various sources including the Department of Health and Human Services caseworker's testimony, guardian ad litem reports, and the petitions for termination. However, the judgment simply incorporated the entirety of these sources as its "specific findings" instead of providing an independent articulation of the specific facts that formed the basis of the court’s ultimate findings regarding the mother’s parental unfitness and the best interests of the children.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that these were not the “specific findings of fact” required by Rule 52(a) or prior decisions. The court could not infer factual findings in a termination case when the adequacy of the findings was the issue at hand. As a result, the court vacated the judgment due to its lack of adequate findings that would sufficiently inform the mother and the court of the reasoning behind the decision. The case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Children of Billie S." on Justia Law

In this case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court was called to determine issues regarding the distribution of assets under a will and trust, and personal jurisdiction. The case arose from a dispute between two brothers, John R. Luongo and Michael A. Luongo Jr., regarding their mother's estate and a trust she established. The Superior Court had previously divided the property of the estate between the brothers and dismissed two counts of John's complaint, arguing that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Michael.Upon review, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court determined that the Superior Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to distribute the assets under the will and the related trust. The authority to resolve disputes over the distribution of assets under a will rests solely with the Probate Court. Therefore, the court vacated the lower court's order distributing the assets of the estate.Regarding personal jurisdiction, the court found that the Superior Court correctly concluded that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Michael for claims related to the trust. This was due to the fact that the trust was established as a Massachusetts trust with its principal place of administration in Massachusetts and the process to transfer the trust’s administration to Maine was not completed by either trustee.The court affirmed the dismissal of Counts 1 and 3 of John’s complaint, related to the trust, but vacated the judgment in all other respects, including Michael’s counterclaim for conversion. The case was remanded for dismissal of the remaining counts of John’s complaint and Michael’s counterclaim for conversion. View "Luongo v. Luongo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court affirming the decision of the Belfast Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) to issue five permits to Nordic Aquafarms in connection with a proposed land-based salmon aquaculture preoject, holding that the ZBA erred as a matter of law in determining that Upstream Watch did not have standing to appeal.In dismissing the appeal, the ZBA determined that Upstream, a not-for-profit corporation dedicated to the restoration of Maine mid-coast rivers and streams, had not demonstrated a particularized injury sufficient to establish standing. The superior court dismissed Upstream's complaint for judicial review, ruling that the ZBA correctly found that Upstream had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies because it did not file a cognizable appeal with the ZBA. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the case, holding that, as a matter of law, the administrative record sufficiently demonstrated that Upstream had standing to appeal to the ZBA. View "Upstream Watch v. City of Belfast" on Justia Law