Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
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A group of power providers contested orders from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that permitted a new auction rule to retroactively apply to a pending auction. The petitioners argued that this violated the filed rate doctrine, which forbids retroactive rates. The auction, administered by the PJM Interconnection LLC (PJM), aimed to ensure reliable electric supply at competitive prices. PJM halted the auction, seeking FERC's permission to amend certain auction parameters it had already posted, which, if left uncorrected, might have led to a high clearing price for a specific region. FERC approved the amendment and allowed it to apply to the halted auction, which the petitioners challenged. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with the petitioners, stating that the amendment was retroactive as it altered the legal consequence attached to PJM's past action in the auction. The court granted the petitions and vacated the portion of FERC's orders that allowed the amendment to apply to the auction in question. View "NRG Power Marketing v. FERC" on Justia Law

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The court case involves Ferrellgas, L.P., which was appealing against an order enforcing a subpoena issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The subpoena was part of an EEOC investigation into a discrimination charge filed by an employee, alleging that Ferrellgas had engaged in discriminatory hiring, pay, and termination practices.Ferrellgas contended that the subpoena was improperly served, was facially invalid due to procedural errors, was overly broad, and would impose an undue burden. Ferrellgas also argued that the subpoena sought information on hiring practices, which was irrelevant to the specific discrimination charge. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected all of Ferrellgas's arguments.The Court found that the subpoena was served properly, despite Ferrellgas's claims to the contrary. It also ruled that the procedural errors in the subpoena were harmless and did not preclude its enforcement. The Court concluded that the subpoena was not overly broad, as the information sought could shed light on the alleged discriminatory practices. The Court also held that Ferrellgas failed to demonstrate that complying with the subpoena would impose an undue burden.In conclusion, the Court affirmed the district court's order enforcing the EEOC's subpoena, deciding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. View "EEOC v. Ferrellgas, L.P." on Justia Law

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In June 2020, the City of Claremont received a request for the disclosure of governmental records related to former police officer Jonathan Stone. Stone appealed a decision from the Superior Court ordering the City to disclose thirteen internal affairs investigation reports and four sets of correspondence between the New Hampshire Police Standards and Training Council (PSTC) and the City.Stone argued that the City violated a 2007 Stipulated Award when the City Manager sent a letter to a journalist responding to the request for certain government records. He also argued that the City Manager's letter incorrectly indicated the number of sustained reports that the City located pertaining to him, and that the City violated the Stipulated Award when it did not destroy certain internal affairs reports.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire concluded that the 2007 Stipulated Award did not prohibit the disclosure of the requested records and that Stone waived any argument that the records would otherwise be exempt from disclosure. Thus, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to disclose the records. View "Stone v. City of Claremont" on Justia Law

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In this case, Officer Ashton Lambert struck and killed Gregory Graham with his police cruiser while responding to a call. Graham's estate sued Lambert, the City of Fayetteville, and the Fayetteville Police Department, alleging negligence, gross negligence, and wrongful death.The trial court denied the City and Lambert's motions for summary judgment, arguing that governmental and public officer immunity barred the estate's claims. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, leading to an appeal to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals had improperly analyzed the summary judgment order. The Court of Appeals had focused on the sufficiency of the estate's complaint, rather than the presence of a genuine factual dispute. This was incorrect, as the court should have asked whether the evidence raised a genuine factual dispute on the existence and extent of the City’s waiver of immunity.The Supreme Court also found that the estate's claim that section 20-145 waived the city's governmental immunity failed as a matter of law. The statute, which exempts police officers from speed limits when chasing or apprehending criminal absconders, does not shield officers for their gross negligence. However, the statute does not contain clear language withdrawing immunity from a discrete government body.The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to analyze whether there was a genuine issue of material fact on whether the City waived governmental immunity by purchasing liability insurance. The court also clarified that section 20-145 does not waive the City’s governmental immunity for its officers’ grossly negligent driving. The Estate’s claim against the City remains intact unless otherwise waived by the purchase of liability insurance. View "Est. of Graham v. Lambert" on Justia Law

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Christine M. Nordgren's parental rights were terminated in a Minnesota state court. Instead of appealing this decision, she filed a federal lawsuit against the Minnesota Department of Human Services, Hennepin County, and various other parties involved in her case, alleging a range of constitutional, federal, and state claims. She sought multiple forms of damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs. The district court dismissed all federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims. Nordgren then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which the district court interpreted as a request to reconsider and amend her pleadings, and denied it. Nordgren appealed this decision.The Hennepin County defendants moved to dismiss Nordgren's appeal as untimely, arguing that she did not appeal the judgment in a timely manner and that the district court's order denying her motion for reconsideration was not separately appealable and did not extend the appeal period. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed with the defendants, determining that Nordgren's motion did not qualify as an appealable motion under Rule 59(e), which is designed to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. As such, the appeal period began on the date the judgment was entered, and Nordgren's notice of appeal, filed beyond the 30-day appeal period, was untimely.Therefore, the Court of Appeals dismissed Nordgren's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Nordgren v. Hennepin County" on Justia Law

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In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the relator, Kimani Ware, an inmate, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”), Trumbull Correctional Institution (“TCI”), and several of its employees, to respond to six of his public-records requests, and to award him statutory damages and court costs.Concerning each of the six requests, the respondents argued that they were not required to provide the requested records because Ware did not identify them as formal public-records requests. The court disagreed, stating that the Public Records Act does not require a requester to formally label a request as a “formal public records request”.Regarding the May 29, 2021 and October 6, 2021 requests, the court denied Ware's writ and the request for statutory damages, as the respondents had provided evidence that they provided the requested records. However, for the June 3, 2022 and June 19, 2022 requests, the court granted the writ and awarded Ware $1,000 in statutory damages for each request, as the respondents did not provide the requested documents.As for the June 5, 2022 and July 23, 2022 requests, the writ and the request for statutory damages were denied since Ware did not submit these two requests to the proper records custodians.Lastly, the court denied respondents’ motion to declare Ware a vexatious litigator, stating that respondents had not shown that Ware has “habitually, persistently, and without reasonable cause engage[d] in frivolous conduct". View "State ex rel. Ware v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr." on Justia Law

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In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the plaintiff, Lebene Konan, alleged that the United States Postal Service (USPS) employees intentionally withheld her mail for two years. Konan, who is African American, owned two properties in Texas that she rented out to tenants. She claimed that USPS employees, Jason Rojas and Raymond Drake, deliberately failed to deliver mail to these residences because they didn't like the idea of a black person owning those properties.Konan filed a lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and also alleged violations of her equal protection rights. The district court dismissed her claims due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Konan appealed the decision.The Appeals Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. It ruled that the district court erred in dismissing Konan's FTCA claim, finding that the postal-matter exception to the FTCA's immunity waiver did not apply to intentional acts such as those alleged. The court ruled that Konan's claims did not constitute a "loss," "miscarriage," or "negligent transmission" of mail, which are covered by the exception, as they involved intentional non-delivery of mail.However, the court agreed with the district court's dismissal of Konan's equal protection claims. The court held that Konan did not provide sufficient facts to support her assertion that the USPS employees continued to deliver mail to similarly situated white property owners while denying her mail delivery. It also held that her claims were barred by the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine, which precludes conspiracy claims against multiple defendants employed by the same governmental entity. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of Konan's equal protection claims. View "Konan v. USPS" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Ilya Kovalchuk, was driving his vehicle when off-duty police officer Matthew Ward began driving erratically behind him, ordered him to pull over, and held Kovalchuk at gunpoint without any justification. Kovalchuk filed a lawsuit against Ward and the City of Decherd, Tennessee, alleging that Ward violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that the City’s failure to investigate Ward’s background before hiring him led to Kovalchuk’s injuries. The district court dismissed the claims against the City, finding that Kovalchuk failed to adequately plead allegations supporting municipal liability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court determined that in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege facts that, if accepted as true, are sufficient to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. The court found that Kovalchuk did not plausibly allege that the City of Decherd was deliberately indifferent to a known or obvious consequence of its decision to hire Ward. According to the court, Kovalchuk's allegations of "issues," "concerns about [Ward’s] demeanor and professionalism," and his "fail[ure] to complete [a] training program" were insufficient to establish a causal link between Ward's hiring and Kovalchuk's injury. The court further stated that a plaintiff cannot use discovery to bridge the gap between a deficient pleading and the possibility that a claim might survive upon further investigation. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Kovalchuk's claims against the City of Decherd. View "Kovalchuk v. City of Decherd" on Justia Law

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This case was before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit where the City of Huntington and Cabell County Commission (plaintiffs) brought a suit against AmerisourceBergen Drug Corporation, Cardinal Health, Inc., and McKesson Corporation (defendants), three distributors of opioids. The plaintiffs alleged that these companies perpetuated the opioid epidemic by repeatedly shipping excessive quantities of opioids to pharmacies, thus creating a public nuisance under West Virginia common law. The district court ruled in favor of the distributors, holding that West Virginia’s common law of public nuisance did not cover the plaintiffs’ claims.After a bench trial in 2021, the district court held that the common law of public nuisance in West Virginia did not extend to the sale, distribution, and manufacture of opioids. The court found that the application of public nuisance law to the sale, marketing, and distribution of products would invite litigation against any product with a known risk of harm, regardless of the benefits conferred on the public from proper use of the product. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ proposed remedy, a 15-year “Abatement Plan” developed by an expert in opioid abatement intervention. The court held that this relief did not qualify as an abatement as it did not restrict the defendants' conduct or their distribution of opioids but generally proposed programs and services to address the harms caused by opioid abuse and addiction.The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia: Under West Virginia’s common law, can conditions caused by the distribution of a controlled substance constitute a public nuisance and, if so, what are the elements of such a public nuisance claim? View "City of Huntington v. Amerisourcebergen Drug Corporation" on Justia Law

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The case centers around Laurie Smith, a former sheriff of Santa Clara County, who was investigated for bribery and other crimes related to the processing of concealed firearms licenses. Although she was not criminally charged, a civil grand jury presented an accusation charging her with misconduct in office. A month-long trial ensued, following which Smith retired and moved to dismiss the removal proceedings on the grounds of mootness. However, the trial court denied her motion, and Smith was found guilty on six counts, leading to a judgment of removal.Smith appealed, arguing that the removal proceedings were moot as she had already retired. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, disagreed. Despite her retirement, the judgment of removal had consequential implications: it barred Smith from jury service under section 203, subdivision (a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which excludes individuals convicted of malfeasance in office. In her removal trial, the jury found Smith guilty of perjury, a form of malfeasance in office.Smith contended that the literal language of these statutes should be disregarded because removal proceedings are not criminal cases. However, the court concluded that Smith's retirement did not render the removal proceedings moot because her conviction in those proceedings barred her from serving on a jury. The judgment of removal was thus affirmed. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law