Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Matthew Meinecke, a devout Christian, was arrested twice by Seattle police for refusing to move from public locations where he was reading Bible passages. The first incident occurred at an abortion rally and the second at an LGBTQ pride event. In both instances, Meinecke was asked to move after attendees began to physically assault him. Instead of dealing with the perpetrators, the police arrested Meinecke for obstruction. Meinecke sued the City of Seattle and certain Seattle police officers, seeking to prevent them from enforcing "time, place, and manner" restrictions and applying the City’s obstruction ordinance to eliminate protected speech in traditional public fora whenever they believe individuals opposing the speech will act hostile toward it.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington denied Meinecke's motion for preliminary injunctive relief, reasoning that the officers' actions were content neutral and did not aim to silence Meinecke. The court also expressed concern about the vague request for injunctive relief.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Meinecke has standing to pursue prospective injunctive relief, given that the City has twice enforced its obstruction ordinance against him, he has stated that he will continue his evangelizing efforts at future public events, and the City has communicated that it may file charges against him for doing so. The court found that Meinecke established a likelihood of success on the merits of his First Amendment claim. The restrictions on his speech were content-based heckler’s vetoes, where officers curbed his speech once the audience’s hostile reaction manifested. Applying strict scrutiny, the court held that there were several less speech-restrictive alternatives to achieve public safety, such as requiring protesters to take a step back, calling for more officers, or arresting the individuals who ultimately assaulted Meinecke. The court also held that Meineke established irreparable harm because a loss of First Amendment freedoms constitutes an irreparable injury, and the balance of equities and public interest favors Meinecke. The case was remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction consistent with this opinion in favor of Meinecke. View "Meinecke v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the death of Susan Teel, who was shot by Deputy Jonathan Lozada during a suicide attempt at her home. Dr. Dudley Teel, Susan's husband and the personal representative of her estate, sued Deputy Lozada and the Sheriff of Indian River County, alleging excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and a claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York.The district court initially granted summary judgment in favor of Deputy Lozada and the Sheriff, but the decision was partially reversed and vacated in an earlier appeal. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment on the Monell claim, and the excessive force claim proceeded to trial. The jury found that Deputy Lozada did not use excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the Estate appealed the grant of summary judgment on the Monell claim, two of the district court’s jury instructions, and one of the district court’s evidentiary rulings. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decisions on all issues. The Court held that the district court had wide discretion to modify the jury instructions to make them understandable for the jury. The Court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of Deputy Lozada's prior misconduct. Finally, the Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff on the Monell claim, as there was no underlying constitutional violation. View "Teel v. Lozada" on Justia Law

Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow, a police officer in the St. Louis Police Department, alleged that she was transferred from her position in the Intelligence Division to a uniformed job in another department because of her gender. Despite maintaining her rank and pay, Muldrow's responsibilities, perks, and schedule were significantly altered. She filed a Title VII suit against the City of St. Louis, claiming that the transfer constituted sex discrimination with respect to her employment terms and conditions.The District Court granted the City summary judgment, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that Muldrow had to show that the transfer caused her a "materially significant disadvantage." The courts ruled that since the transfer did not result in a reduction to her title, salary, or benefits and only caused minor changes in working conditions, Muldrow's lawsuit could not proceed.The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed with the lower courts' interpretation of Title VII. The Court held that an employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII must show that the transfer brought about some harm with respect to an identifiable term or condition of employment, but that harm need not be significant. The Court rejected the City's arguments based on statutory text, precedent, and policy, and vacated the judgment of the Eighth Circuit, remanding the case for further proceedings under the correct Title VII standard. The Court clarified that Muldrow only needed to show some injury respecting her employment terms or conditions, not that the harm was significant. View "Muldrow v. City of St. Louis" on Justia Law

The case involves Caitlin Corrigan, a graduate student at Boston University (BU), who sued the university under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for implementing a mandatory COVID-19 testing program. Corrigan claimed that due to a chronic medical condition, she could not comply with the program and that requiring her compliance would violate the ADA. BU rejected her proposed exemption, leading to her suspension for the fall semester. However, before the district court could reach the merits of Corrigan's claims, BU ended its mandatory testing program, leading the court to dismiss Corrigan's suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that it had become moot.BU moved to dismiss Corrigan's suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the district court granted the motion, applying mootness principles. The court determined that since BU had ended its mandatory testing program, an order requiring BU to provide Corrigan with a reasonable accommodation to the program would have no effect. The court also found that Corrigan's claim was not inherently transitory and that BU was unlikely to subject Corrigan to mandatory testing again. The court held that the monetary relief that Corrigan sought was legally insufficient to support a claim of jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that the district court appropriately applied mootness principles to dismiss Corrigan's suit and that Corrigan had not shown that her case comes within an applicable exception to those mootness principles. The court rejected Corrigan's arguments that the district court misread the mootness exceptions, misconstrued the facts, and ignored the import of the ADA's scheme for providing prospective relief. View "Corrigan v. Boston University" on Justia Law

Two campus police officers at Shepherd University, Jay Longerbeam and Donald Buracker, were terminated due to alleged "misconduct" and "unprofessionalism" during two incidents in 2018 and 2019. The officers claimed that their termination was a result of age and disability discrimination, retaliation under the West Virginia Human Rights Act (HRA), violation of the West Virginia Whistle-blower Law, and common law wrongful discharge. The Circuit Court of Jefferson County granted summary judgment against both officers on all claims.The officers appealed the decision, arguing that the lower court erred in finding no genuine issues of material fact and in its handling of the burden-shifting paradigm. They contended that their conduct during the incidents was legally proper and that the court failed to consider intervening acts of reprisal which were more temporally proximate to their protected activity than their discharge.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that the lower court erred in its handling of the "temporal proximity" issue and the burden-shifting paradigm. The court also found that the officers offered more than sufficient evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could find retaliatory motivation. Therefore, the court reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment as to the officers’ whistle-blower and Harless claims and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment as to Buracker’s HRA disability discrimination claim, finding his evidence insufficient to create an inference of disability discrimination. View "Jay Longerbeam v. Shepherd University" on Justia Law

The case involves Adree Edmo, a transgender woman incarcerated in Idaho, who sued the State of Idaho, private prison company Corizon, and individual prison officials for failing to provide her with adequate medical care, including gender-confirmation surgery. Edmo alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the Affordable Care Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and negligence under Idaho law. The district court granted an injunction on Edmo’s Eighth Amendment claim and ordered the defendants to provide her with adequate medical care, including gender-confirmation surgery. The court denied preliminary injunctive relief on Edmo’s Fourteenth Amendment and ACA claims because the record had not been sufficiently developed.The district court's decision was appealed, and the injunction was stayed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision except as it applied to five defendants in their individual capacities. After the Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari, the parties engaged in settlement negotiations that led to Edmo voluntarily dismissing the remainder of her claims. The district court awarded Edmo $2,586,048.80 for attorneys’ fees incurred up until the injunction became permanent and all appeals were resolved.The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, affirmed in part, and vacated in part the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to Edmo. The court held that Edmo was entitled to fees incurred litigating her successful Eighth Amendment claim. However, the court found that the district court erred in calculating the lodestar amount to include fees incurred litigating unsuccessful claims advanced in the complaint, even if those claims were premised on the same facts that supported Edmo’s Eighth Amendment claim. The court also held that the district court did not err by applying an enhancement to the lodestar amount given that Edmo’s counsel operated under extraordinary time pressure and that the customary fee for counsel’s services is well above the PLRA cap. The case was remanded for recalculation of the lodestar amount to include only fees incurred litigating Edmo’s successful claim against the defendants who remained in the case. View "Edmo v. Corizon, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, Amber Jackson filed a lawsuit against Atlanta police officers Cody Swanger and Jeremiah Brandt, alleging that they violated her constitutional rights by unlawfully seizing her without reasonable suspicion or probable cause and using excessive force. She also claimed that Brandt failed to intervene in Swanger's use of excessive force. The officers moved to dismiss the case, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity, but the district court denied their motion. The officers then appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that it had jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of the officers' motion to dismiss Jackson's unlawful seizure claim. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that Jackson had plausibly alleged that the officers violated her clearly established right to be free from an unreasonable seizure.However, the court found that it did not have jurisdiction to review the district court's decision not to incorporate certain video footage into the pleadings. The court also declined to assert pendant appellate jurisdiction over that issue.As for Jackson's claim that Brandt failed to intervene in Swanger's use of excessive force, the court found that it had jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of Brandt's motion to dismiss this claim. However, the court vacated and remanded this part of the case, instructing the district court to dismiss the claim. The court reasoned that Brandt did not have a reasonable opportunity to intervene physically or verbally and stop Swanger's use of alleged excessive force against Jackson. Therefore, Brandt did not violate Jackson's Fourth Amendment rights. View "Jackson v. Swanger" on Justia Law

In this case, a taxi driver, Lufti Said Saalim, sued Walmart and several individuals, including deputy sheriffs, alleging violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and state law claims following an incident at a Walmart in Toledo, Ohio. Saalim claimed that while waiting for his passengers at a loading zone, he was approached by a Walmart employee and subsequently by Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey Bretzloff, who was working as a private security guard for Walmart. Saalim alleged that Bretzloff used excessive force during the encounter, including pulling him out of his cab and using a taser on him.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision that granted Bretzloff qualified immunity on Saalim's Fourth Amendment claim. The court held that Saalim plausibly alleged that Bretzloff's use of force was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment. The court also found that this right was clearly established at the time of the incident.However, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Saalim's Fourteenth Amendment claim, agreeing that it was identical to his Fourth Amendment claim. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Saalim's state law claims of assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false arrest, and false imprisonment, as they were barred by the statute of limitations.The court remanded the case for further proceedings on Saalim's Fourth Amendment claim against Bretzloff; his § 1983 municipal liability claim against Sheriff Navarre; and his state law claims of negligent hiring, supervision, training, and retention and vicarious liability against the Walmart Defendants and McNett. View "Saalim v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

A dispute arose over Pennsylvania's rule requiring mail-in and absentee voters to date the return envelope carrying their ballot. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had ruled this requirement mandatory and declared that undated or incorrectly dated ballots were invalid under state law. The case centered on whether federal law, specifically Section 10101(a)(2)(B) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, mandated that these non-compliant ballots be counted. This provision prohibits the denial of the right to vote due to an immaterial error or omission on paperwork related to voting.The District Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, declaring that rejecting timely received mail ballots due to missing or incorrect dates violated the federal provision. They reasoned that the date requirement was immaterial, as it played no role in determining a vote's timeliness.However, the appellate court reversed this decision. The court held that the federal provision only applies when the state is determining who may vote, not how a qualified voter must cast their ballot. They found that the provision does not apply to rules, like the date requirement, that govern how a qualified voter must cast their ballot for it to be counted. The court concluded that a contrary approach could not be reconciled with the text and historic backdrop of the statute. Therefore, the court ruled that the federal provision does not override Pennsylvania's date requirement for casting a mail-in ballot. The case was remanded for further consideration of the plaintiffs' pending equal protection claim. View "Pennsylvania State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Northampton County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

This case involved the interpretation of an offer of judgment in a lawsuit where a prisoner, Samuel Lee Dartez, II, sued state officers for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The state officers offered a judgment of $60,000 “plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs allowed by law, if any.” The district court interpreted this offer as allowing attorneys’ fees exceeding the statutory cap and waiving the plaintiff's obligation to contribute to these fees.On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's interpretation. The court determined that the offer of judgment was ambiguous in its language pertaining to the statutory cap on attorney fees and the requirement for the plaintiff to contribute to those fees. The ambiguity was resolved against the defendants, who had drafted the offer, and found that the defendants had waived the statutory cap and the plaintiff's contribution requirement.In Dartez's cross-appeal, he argued that the district court wrongly applied a statutory cap on hourly rates. The Tenth Circuit agreed, reversing the district court's application of the cap and remanding for recalculation of the fee award without this cap. The court did not address Dartez's arguments that the statutory limitations on fees did not apply due to his obtaining non-monetary relief and because he received an agreed settlement amount rather than a monetary judgment. View "Dartez v. Peters" on Justia Law