Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in California Courts of Appeal
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This case involves a dispute between Dr. R. Michael Williams, a board-certified oncologist, and several defendants, including Doctors Medical Center of Modesto (DMCM) and various associated individuals. After a deterioration in their professional relationship, Williams alleged that the defendants acted to limit his medical practice and restrict his hospital privileges, affecting his ability to treat patients. Williams filed multiple lawsuits against the defendants, the second of which is the subject of this appeal.The trial court granted two anti-SLAPP motions in favor of the defendants, finding that Williams' claims arose from their protected activity and that Williams failed to establish a probability of prevailing on his claims. The court also awarded the defendants their attorney fees. Williams appealed both the granting of the anti-SLAPP motions and the awards of attorney fees.The court of appeal reversed both the granting of the anti-SLAPP motions and the award of attorney fees, finding that the trial court erred in its application of the anti-SLAPP statute. The court distinguished between the factual allegations that form the basis of Williams' claims and the defendants' protected activities, concluding that not all of the claims in the complaint arose from protected activity. As such, not all of Williams' claims were subject to the anti-SLAPP statute and the defendants were not entitled to attorney fees. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its decision. View "Williams v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto" on Justia Law

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The appellant, Elinton Gramajo, was a pizza delivery driver for Joe's Pizza on Sunset, Inc. and other defendants, and sued them for Labor Code violations regarding unpaid minimum and overtime wages. After several years of litigation, a jury trial awarded Gramajo $7,659.93. Gramajo then requested attorney fees of $296,920 and costs of $26,932.84 under Labor Code section 1194(a), which allows prevailing employees to recover reasonable litigation costs, including attorney fees. The trial court, however, denied these requests, arguing that Gramajo’s counsel had excessively litigated the case, and that the requested fees and costs were disproportionately high compared to Gramajo’s limited trial success.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight disagreed with the trial court. The court held that employees who win actions for unpaid minimum and overtime wages are entitled to reasonable litigation costs under Labor Code section 1194(a), regardless of the amount recovered. The court stressed that Gramajo was entitled to his reasonable fees and costs, and remanded the case back to the trial court to determine a reasonable fee and cost award. The court did not express an opinion on the reasonableness of Gramajo’s requests for litigation costs. View "Gramajo v. Joe's Pizza on Sunset, Inc." on Justia Law

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In this case, the court dealt with the suspension and subsequent resignation of a licensed obstetrician and gynecologist, Plaintiff Dr. Vardui Asiryan, from the defendant Glendale Adventist Medical Center and its Medical Staff. The Medical Staff suspended Asiryan’s privileges at the hospital without holding a hearing or giving her prior notice. Asiryan sued both entities, alleging they failed to comply with statutory and common law procedural requirements in connection with suspending her privileges at the hospital. She further claimed that the Medical Staff lied to her regarding their obligations to report her suspension and resignation to the state licensing board.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, held that the trial court correctly concluded that the Business and Professions Code is the sole source of procedural protections in connection with hospital peer review, and that the common law doctrine of fair procedure does not supplement those protections with additional guarantees. Therefore, the court correctly granted the nonsuit on Asiryan’s common law peer review claims and correctly rejected her proposed jury instructions regarding peer review.As for the court's order awarding attorney fees, the Court of Appeal held that given the court’s rulings denying certain portions of defendants’ summary judgment and nonsuit motions, a hypothetical reasonable attorney could have deemed Asiryan’s peer review claims against the Medical Staff tenable and reasonably decided to take them to trial. This same logic does not apply to the fees awarded to GAMC, because the court disposed of the claims against GAMC on summary judgment. The Court of Appeal therefore reversed the court’s fee order to the extent it awards fees to the Medical Staff, but affirmed the order as it applies to GAMC. View "Asiryan v. Medical Staff of Glendale Adventist Medical Center" on Justia Law

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The appellant, Samantha Wood, sought to legally change her name to Candi Bimbo Doll, an identity she had pursued for over a decade. Despite no opposition to her request, the trial judge of the San Francisco County Superior Court denied Wood's petition based on the judge's interpretation of the term "bimbo" as inherently offensive. The judge derived this interpretation from various sources, including the Oxford English Dictionary, a law review article, and trends on the social media platform, TikTok.Upon appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Two reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the trial court erred by denying Wood's petition for a name change. The court established that the trial court had incorrectly applied the principle that a name change may be denied only upon a "substantial reason".The appellate court determined that the term "bimbo" was not universally offensive or vulgar. They found that the term was being reclaimed and used as a means of empowerment in certain contexts, including on TikTok. The court also highlighted that the term did not appear to cause any confusion, as evidenced by its use in various business names and personalized license plates.Consequently, the court concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion by not adhering to the applicable legal principles that favor granting a name change, and by failing to identify substantial and principled reasons for denying the name change. The case was remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant Wood's petition for a name change. View "Wood v. S.F. Superior Court" on Justia Law

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Samantha Wood, a California resident, petitioned the state's superior court to legally change her name to Candi Bimbo Doll, an identity she had embraced for over a decade. The trial court denied her petition, citing a California case and a law review article to argue that the proposed name could be considered offensive. The trial judge also referenced a 2020's TikTok trend of "Bimbofication," which encourages self-love and reclaims the term "bimbo." The judge, however, viewed the term as offensive and a setback for women's empowerment.Wood appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Two. The court found that the trial court had erred in its decision. It cited several precedents emphasizing that a name change should only be denied for "substantial and principled reasons," such as potential confusion or fraud. The court reasoned that "bimbo" is not a fighting word, is not necessarily offensive, and is not inherently confusing. Furthermore, the court underscored that the term is being reclaimed in a positive way as part of a women's empowerment trend. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and directed it to grant Wood's petition for a name change. View "Wood v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

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The case centers around Laurie Smith, a former sheriff of Santa Clara County, who was investigated for bribery and other crimes related to the processing of concealed firearms licenses. Although she was not criminally charged, a civil grand jury presented an accusation charging her with misconduct in office. A month-long trial ensued, following which Smith retired and moved to dismiss the removal proceedings on the grounds of mootness. However, the trial court denied her motion, and Smith was found guilty on six counts, leading to a judgment of removal.Smith appealed, arguing that the removal proceedings were moot as she had already retired. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, disagreed. Despite her retirement, the judgment of removal had consequential implications: it barred Smith from jury service under section 203, subdivision (a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which excludes individuals convicted of malfeasance in office. In her removal trial, the jury found Smith guilty of perjury, a form of malfeasance in office.Smith contended that the literal language of these statutes should be disregarded because removal proceedings are not criminal cases. However, the court concluded that Smith's retirement did not render the removal proceedings moot because her conviction in those proceedings barred her from serving on a jury. The judgment of removal was thus affirmed. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

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Samantha Wood, a resident of California, filed a petition to legally change her name to Candi Bimbo Doll, a name she had been using for over a decade. There was no opposition to her petition and no hearing was held. However, the trial judge denied her petition, citing a California case, a law review article, and a TikTok trend. The court asserted that no person has a statutory right to officially change their name to a term that is universally recognized as offensive.Wood appealed the decision. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District examined previous case law and found that a change of name may only be denied when there is a 'substantial reason.' In this case, the court ruled that the term 'Bimbo,' while historically derogatory, is not universally recognized as offensive. The court also noted that the term is being reclaimed in a positive way through social media trends, such as on TikTok.The court found that the trial judge had not provided a substantial reason to deny the name change and had not properly exercised discretion according to the legal principles of the subject. Therefore, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case to the trial court to grant the name change. View "Wood v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

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In the case before the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, G.F. Galaxy Corporation (Galaxy) sought to enforce a default judgment against Phuoc Lee Johnson. After Johnson failed to pay the judgment, Galaxy filed a second action alleging Johnson was attempting to avoid the lien by transferring assets. While the second action was ongoing, Galaxy filed a cost memorandum seeking attorney fees and costs from the first two years of enforcement efforts. Johnson countered with a motion to tax costs, arguing Galaxy couldn't claim these costs until it prevailed in the second action.The trial court agreed with Johnson, granting his motion to tax costs with prejudice. The court concluded that a judgment creditor could not claim attorney fees and costs incurred in a separate action before prevailing in that action. Galaxy appealed, disagreeing with the interpretation that a "prevailing party" requirement existed in the relevant statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 685.040.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision. It held that section 685.040, which entitles a judgment creditor to reasonable and necessary costs of enforcing a judgment, does not contain a "prevailing party" requirement. The Court of Appeal found the trial court's interpretation erroneous and an abuse of discretion. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings, including determining whether the claimed attorney fees and costs were reasonable and necessary for enforcing the judgment. The Court also denied Johnson's motion to dismiss the appeal, motion to augment, and motion for judicial notice. View "G.F. Galaxy Corp. v. Johnson" on Justia Law

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The case involves Matthew Boermeester, a former University of Southern California (USC) football player, who was expelled from USC for engaging in intimate partner violence. Post-expulsion, Boermeester filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the superior court, which was denied, leading to an appeal. Initially, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that Boermeester had a right to cross-examine adverse witnesses at the live hearing. However, the California Supreme Court granted USC’s petition for review, reversed the opinion, and held that Boermeester did not have such a right.In the remanded case, the Court of Appeal held that substantial evidence supports USC’s decision and found no denial of fair process in USC’s use of an investigator-adjudicator or in its appeals process. Boermeester claimed USC’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence and that USC’s use of a combined investigator-adjudicator procedure denied him fair process. The court found that the combined investigator-adjudicator process, without more, does not deny fair process and that Boermeester received considerable, adequate appellate process. Hence, the denial of the writ was affirmed. View "Boermeester v. Carry" on Justia Law

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The case involves Applied Medical Distribution Corporation (Applied) suing its former employee, Stephen Jarrells, for misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of a contract governing Applied’s proprietary information, and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court granted Applied’s posttrial motion for a permanent injunction and awarded Applied partial attorney fees, costs, and expenses.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that Applied was the prevailing party on the misappropriation cause of action and was entitled to a permanent injunction to recover its trade secrets and prevent further misappropriation. The court also found that Applied was entitled to an award of the reasonable attorney fees, costs, and expenses it incurred to obtain injunctive relief.However, the court disagreed with the trial court's decision to mechanically award only 25 percent of the incurred attorney fees and costs because Applied prevailed on only one of four claims it asserted. The court found that the trial court erred in how it determined the amount awarded by failing to address the extent to which the facts underlying the other claims were inextricably intertwined with or dependent upon the allegations that formed the basis of the one claim on which Applied prevailed. The court also found that the trial court erred in excluding certain expert witness fees from the damages calculation presented to the jury.Finally, the court concluded that the trial court erred by granting a nonsuit on whether Jarrells’s misappropriation was willful and malicious, and remanded for a jury trial on this issue. If the jury finds the misappropriation was willful and malicious, the court shall decide whether attorney fees and costs should be awarded to Applied and, if so, in what amount. View "Applied Medical Distribution Corp. v. Jarrells" on Justia Law